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ABSTRACT 
This thesis is a study of private diaries written during the Occupation of France, 
1940-1944. The authors are not necessarily of French origin and did not always 
directly experience the Occupation. What they all provide is an insight into the period 
at the individual level. The aim of this thesis is to see how these individual 
testimonies contribute to a more comprehensive portrait of how the French lived 
during this period, and suggest new approaches for the historiography of the 
Occupation period. 
Although the analytical focus of this study is predominantly textual, there is, 
nevertheless, a determination to place this textual analysis in an historical, rather than 
a literary, context. This study privileges the diaries of Leon Werth, Charles Rist, Jean 
Guehenno and Andrzej Bobkowski because these selected diarists provide the 
greatest historical insight into the Occupation period. In order to appreciate why these 
diarists are more historically relevant than the other selected diarists, it is necessary in 
the introductory chapter to first examine the process of writing the private diaries. 
The first chapter demonstrates that the Occupation was from the outset a 
heterogeneous experience for all the diarists. The overall aim of this thesis is to 
demonstrate what divides the selected diarists as well as what unites them. The 
second chapter illustrates how History from above endeavours to categorise these 
individual experiences in order to impose a sense of order on them. The perspective 
of history from below reveals that for all the developments throughout the 
Occupation that had a universal impact on shaping attitudes and behaviour, there 
were just as many forces acting against these general trends to prevent a uniform 
experience. The third chapter demonstrates that the examination of life at the 
everyday level is just as important, if not more so, in gaining a comprehensive 
understanding of life during the Occupation period. These areas of inquiry combine 
to yield a portrait of a highly complex testimonial genre, where the ambivalence and 
the ambiguity of the period are reflected in the contrasting and often conflicting 
views of the authors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Le journal intime 
«Au fond de I 'histoire, it y a des sentiments.» 1 
History and the individual testimony: the example of Leon Werth. 
On June 11, 1940, Leon Werth, aged sixty-two, left Paris for the village of 
Saint-Amour. The circumstances surrounding his departure may well have been 
exceptional but he had made the journey every year with his wife. Werth, a writer of 
Jewish origins, was adamant that Paris would not fall to the advancing Germans, even 
though he acknowledged that his conviction was not based on any sound reason.2 His 
departure, in his mind, was more precautionary than one motivated by fear for his 
personal safety. This particular annual pilgrimage to the Jura, however, would be like 
no other. Werth could have had no idea that he had embarked on not only an arduous 
journey of thirty-three days but also ajoumey into one of the most painful chapters in 
French history. He would become inextricably caught up in the mass movement of 
French escaping from the German advance, which would come to be known as 
l' exode. Moreover, he would have to endure almost all of the Occupation years in 
Saint-Amour, cut off from his normal Parisian surroundings as well as family and 
friends. In this climate of uncertainty and solitude, he chose to capture his experience 
of the Exodus and the Occupation in written form. His personal account of the 
Occupation years will form the cornerstone of the private diaries examined in this 
thesis. His individual account, however, would be but a single voice testifying to a 
period, which would affect an entire nation of forty million people. 
This raises the question how can a solitary figure represent or make sense of an 
event, which occurred on such an unprecedented scale? What value or relevance can 
an individual testimony add to the History of the Occupation period? Werth was 
neither a dissident general nor an omnipotent octogenarian, so what can an 
I Werth, Leon, Deposition. JournalI940-I944, (Paris: Editions Viviane Hamy, 1992), pp.18-19. 
2 Ibid., 33 jours, (Paris: Editions Viviane Hamy, 1992), pp.11-12. 
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anonymous voice bring to the historiography of the Occupation period? Georges 
Gilsdorf argues that in Europe "Ie moment historique de I'individualite" had become 
outdated. 3 European society had been transfonned into a mass civilisation where 
unprecedented numbers of individuals were being collectively caught up in its 
movements. The experience of an individual prisoner of war, according to Gilsdorf, 
mattered little in the global scheme of things. The Occupation affected an entire 
nation, which requires a wide encompassing view. The problem with such an 
argument, however, is threefold. Firstly, such an argument repudiates the idea that 
individuals could record details, which fell outside their own direct experiences.4 
Secondly, it implies that each individual experience is homogeneous. To talk only of 
French behaviour during the Occupation, for example, is to ignore the ;multifarious 
individual variations of that collective behaviour. Thirdly, it reduces the French to 
anonymous beings, and denies the fact that they ultimately experienced the 
Occupation at the individual level rather than at the national level. 
The very title of Werth's diary, Deposition, clearly indicates an historical intent 
to his writing. He was detennined to provide evidence of the Occupation years for 
future generations of France. This carne not only from his empirical observations in 
Saint-Amour but also from secondary sources: the radio, newspaper, or 
conversational accounts. Werth admowledged that the sheer scale of the war tended 
to overshadow the individual experience: 
La faim, la mort, I 'heroi'sme ont perdu tout caractere individuel. On meurt 
dans les faubourgs, dans les camps de concentration, sur les champs de 
bataille. Qui? Personne. Des contingents, des unites, des formations, des 
armees. Dans com bien d 'annees ou de siecles retrouverons-nous un homme 
individuel avec nom et prenom?5 
Yet that did not alter his perception of how he lived the Occupation period, nor did it 
falter his detennination to document and chronicle his observations of his external 
world. Despite the global problems that afflicted France, Werth was still very much 
conscious of his own individual struggle. If he denied his own personal experience of 
the Occupation, he would, in effect, be denying the voices of all the others affected 
3 Giisdorf, Georges, Auto-bio-graphie, (Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 1991), p.287. 
4 Admittedly, the balance between reporting the outside world and the self varies considerably from 
one diarist to another. The diary of Jean-Paul Sartre, for example, is dominated by je whereas the diary 
of Jean Galtier-Boissiere has little authorial conmlent. Werth's diary enlightens the reader as much 
about Saint-Amour as it does about himself. Yet the examination of these diaries on a collective basis 
enables these inconsistencies to be evened out. 
5 Werth, Deposition, p.434. (22.2.43) 
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by the Occupation. Werth refused to allow the overall enormity of the Occupation to 
overwhelm his own unique viewpoint: 
Je ne veux plus cesser d'etre un homme pour devenir un animal historique, 
je ne veux plus m 'aneantir dans une pitie trop vaste, qui cesse d 'etre de la 
pitie, qui devient elle-meme historique. L 'epoque me touche, me traverse, 
m 'envahit, s 'attaque a ma chair. Mais eUe opere sur de tels chiffres et de 
teUes dimensions que je n 'ai pas assez de points de ma chair pour en 
recevoir les excitations. 6 
His private diary is an affirmation of his existence during the Occupation period, and 
a reminder that he had to confront and overcome his own particular problems. 
Gilsdorf claims that the individual is confined to too narrow a horizon to make 
any valuable judgements: 
L 'intelligibilite de I 'histoire ne s' etablit pas a I' echeUe de l'individu; c' est 
un phenomene de compensation, la resultante d'une immense quantite 
d'effets et de causes dont la perception correcte implique un recul suffisant. 
BaUote par les circonstances qui disposent de lui sans qu'it s 'en rende 
compte, confine dans un horizon etroit, l'individu ne peut pas prendre la 
mesure de I' even em en t; son espace et son temps sont trop etriques, its ne 
depassent pas Ie creux de la vague prochaine,' ses interpretations, s'it se 
permet d'en avoir, sans rapport avec la rea lite, n 'ont aucun interet. 7 
The consideration of this claim is the fundamental argument for this thesis. 
Gilsdorf would have us believe that the correct appreciation of history requires a 
detached view of the multiple, complex events well after those events have occurred. 
What Gilsdorf fails to take into account is the living of history and the representation 
of that living of history. History has a tendency to devalue the individual experience, 
preferring to place it into artificial groupings or predetermined concepts. This thesis 
is concerned with the way in which the diarists, recording their own individual 
experiences, represent the reality of life during the Occupation. Their cloak of 
anonymity will be lifted. 
The private diaries examined in this thesis are testimony to the fact that those 
who lived during the Occupation each had a uniquely personal view of that period, 
and that these testimonies can, therefore, bring a greater understanding to the period. 
How did it feel to live in France during the Occupation? What preoccupied the minds 
6 Ibid., pp.110-11 1. (28.11.40) Werth specifically had in mind the two million prisoners-of-war and the 
fifty thousand L07Tains chased out of the recently annexed territory. Unlike Gilsdorf, Werth refused to 
allow such collective experiences to detract from his own individual experience. 
7 Giisdorf, Auto-bio-graphie, p.287. See also Laborie, Pierre, L 'opinion jranr;aise sous Vichy, (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1990), p.2S. There is never one single cause in history. After taking into account the 
notions of contingency and necessity, there are many other complex factors to take into consideration, 
which are rarely coherent. There are always ambiguities and contradictions, which prevent one from 
drawing simple conclusions. 
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of the diarists that shaped their decisions from day to day? How did they keep going 
under such trying circumstances? Such questions cannot be answered by all-
embracing concepts. What the diarists elected to accord the greatest significance may 
well not correspond to the traditional themes favoured by historians but it may well 
also differ from one particular diarist to another. That is not to say that one cannot 
draw general conclusions from their individual experiences but, rather, it is the 
heterogeneity, just as much as the similitude of their experiences, which is of 
particular importance to this study. This is the role of history from below as opposed 
to History from above. 8 This requires not a detached, impartial overview of what 
occurred but, rather, a subjective, personal account of what took place. This is where 
Werth's journal intime comes to the fore in that it provides the reader direct access 
into Werth's consciousness and the world around him at the time he was writing his 
. 9 
expenences. 
The private diary adds another dimension, which History cannot provide. A 
general history has a beginning and an end. The diary has no end in mind and its 
present is filled with hopes and anxieties. The individual is in a state of conflict 
whereas in a general history these problems have already been sunnounted. The 
diarists were oblivious to the end-point of the Liberation. The Occupation started for 
them in June 1940, but they lived thereafter from day to day without lmowing 
precisely when the end would come. This state of anxiety is best represented by the 
private diaries. Werth, for example, was caught up in an exchange of artillery fire. He 
wrote: 
"Je conte ce que j 'ai VU, ce que j 'ai senti. Je ne tente pas une reconstitution 
historique, ni un recit apres coup, coherent et critique, d'operations 
militaires. Je ne sais rien, en ces minutes, de I 'ensemble OU cet episode a sa 
I ,,10 pace. 
This experience can be seen as a microcosm of his Occupation experience. Werth's 
private testimony is concerned with capturing a personal insight into the world he 
8 A review of the contemporary historical works on the Occupation, from both perspectives, will be 
made in Chapter Two. For the moment, it is necessary to acknowledge that the work of historians such 
as Pierre Laborie, who targeted their research at the popular level, resemble more the approach 
undertaken in this thesis. That is not to say, however, that the two approaches are entirely analogous. 
The important difference is that such historical studies collectively place the individuals into larger 
groupings, albeit far more selectively than those of History from above. The individual, therefore, 
remains anonymous. 
9 Gusdorf, Auto-bio-graphie, p.12. Gusdorfuses Michel Beaujour's term, miroir d'encre, to convey 
this sense ofliving the period through the eyes of the author. 
10 Werth, 33 jours, p.44. 
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experienced rather than establishing a critical and ordered reView of what he 
experienced. The writing of his next work may well have had historical intent but 
Werth could not escape the subjective modus operandi of his writing. Yet as the 
epigraph for this chapter suggests, feelings are just as important in explaining history 
as facts and figures. The fonnulation belonged to Werth's historian friend, Lucien 
Febvre, whose approach lies in effect between Histoire and histoire. He wanted to 
take into account the global vision of a period from its view of the world. To deny the 
voice of the individual, therefore, is to deny the personal feelings felt by each 
individual, which ultimately governed behaviour. 
Furthennore, it is essential to consider that History is always receding. 11 
Recounting the past can never serve up reality as it truly once was. Indeed, there is no 
infallible method of communicating reality through the written fonn. Each method 
has its own strengths and limitations. Herein lies the strength of the private diary: it is 
written at the crossroads of the actual witnessing of history and the awareness of the 
historical reality to come. Werth realised near the end of his journey to Saint-Amour 
that what he was witnessing was history in the making but at the same time he was 
insufficiently aware of the historical significance of what he was writing about and 
would come to write about: 
Le plus maigre cadeau de ce qu 'on appeUe la civilisation, c 'est que Ie detail 
des evenements, sinon leur sens n' echappe point tout it fait aux hOlnmes. 
Mais ce hameau du Gdtinais est loin des evenements comme Ie Sahara. Et 
jamais les destins individuels ne furent, comme en cette guerre, plus 
etroitement lies it ce que nous appelons I 'histoire. Notre vie est faUe 
d'attente, d'angoisse et de longueur de temps. 12 
Werth's journey to Saint-Amour was effectively a journey into the unknown but, at 
the same time, he was cognisant that his individual experience, along with all the 
other individual experiences, were bound to history. The recording of his individual 
experience, therefore, would be in part a representation of that history. What his 
individual testimony offers to History is a sense of immediacy. What can never be 
taken away from Werth's writing is the presence of himself as the author and the 
world around him - at the very time that he was experiencing those events. Films, 
photographs or newspapers can all transport their audience back in time to the 
11 The historians Eric Conan and ReillY Rousso described the Vichy years as an ever-present past 
(Vichy: un passe qui ne passe pas, (Paris: Fayard, 1994)) but they were targeting the impact of the 
Vichy years on the French nation after the Liberation rather than the representation of the Vichy years 
in an historical sense. 
12 Werth, 33 jours, p.129. 
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Occupation but no other medium can fully relate to its audience the private thoughts 
and feelings of those living during the Occupation. 
Werth is, therefore, more than just an eyewitness to the period. As he chose to 
make a written record of the period whilst he was experiencing it, the part of him that 
made that written record becomes frozen in history. The sense of immediacy, 
moreover, does not diminish with the passage of time. 13 Historians arrange their 
research material according to their own priorities, which may not reflect the 
preoccupations of the period but, rather, those of the present-day.14 They can do so 
because they are prophets of the past, as they know in advance what will happen 
next. 15 Thus, historians studying the Occupation period cannot help but be influenced 
by the shadow of the Liberation on that period. The diarists, in situ, recorded their 
experiences of the defeat and of the Occupation in a chronological manner. They 
knew what had come before but did not know what was going to happen. The 
significance of time, therefore, is a crucial concept to bear in mind when evaluating 
the behaviour and attitudes of the diarists during the Occupation. With the benefit of 
hindsight, it is easy to be mistaken that things became progressively clearer with the 
passage of time. History is concerned with smoothing over any rough edges in order 
to create a coherent overview: "Selon Ie denouement general, l 'histoire unifie, 
ordonne, traduit en clair ces signes epars, obscurs ou les laisse tomber. ,,16 Yet in its 
attempt to give a sense of order to the chaos, history moves away from its 
fundamental complex nature. The private diaries offer a unique perspective to the 
turmoil of the times: 
Que nous ayons si mal connu les eWJnements, que les nouvelles nous soient 
arrivees ainsi, sans ordre, sans lien, Ie plus souvent absurdes, cela etonnera 
sans doute les temoins serieux qui «synchronisent» apnl!s coup, qui donnent 
it leurs souvenirs un solide contour historique: «Nous autres, hommes du 
Moyen Age.» Ceux qui content leurs souvenirs les corrigent, les charpentent, 
ne nous donnent Ie plus souvent qu 'une reconstitution, une abstraction de 
souvenir. 17 
13 Werth would come to meet up in Saint-Amour with his friend Saint-Exupery, who would take the 
manuscript for 33 jours to the United States with the aim of finding a publisher. Saint-Exupery 
believed that he had succeeded in this aim but the publishing house, Brentano's, would inexplicably 
never publish the work. The general public would have to wait more than fifty years for the work to be 
published, and yet it still retains its sense of immediacy today. 
14 The issue of Jewish persecution in wartime France, for example, will be explorcd in Chapter Two. 
15 Gusdorf, Auto-biographie, pp.255-256. 
16 Werth, Deposition, p.452. (30.3.43) 
17 Ibid., p.488. (17.6.43) See also p.327. (27.7.42) 
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History from below may well afford us a more chaotic and less rounded 
representation of the lives of those individuals enduring the Occupation yet, in this 
sense, it is a true reflection of how they lived. 
The diarists may have experienced, in broad terms, the same events of the 
Occupation - the signing of the armistice, the entire occupation of France, the 
Liberation - but they were all exposed to these events in different situations. Werth's 
experience in rural Saint-Amour would have been quite different to the experiences 
of those diarists living in occupied Paris. His geographical situation was not the sole 
cause of his feelings of isolation and solitude. Werth returned to Paris just before the 
Liberation but had to remain in hiding. Werth's experience, in tum, was shaped by 
those feelings, so it is only natural to consider that his own experience would have 
differed from other diarists' experiences. Giisdorf is right to argue that "l'erreur est 
ici de considerer I 'histoire individuelle comme un fragment de I 'histoire universelle, 
chaque histoire formant un ensemble de significations qui s 'oppose it I 'autre. ,,18 Just 
as no two individuals are alike so too are no two individual histories alike. The 
diarists were all limited in what they could write about by both their environmental 
and personal limitations. That does not seem evident in the journal intime, as the self 
becomes the centre and there are no outward bounds restricting the author's view. 
What I contest is Giisdorfs assertion that "l'histoire reelle n 'existe que dans la 
mesure ou elle est reactivee dans la memoire d 'un historien, ou de plusieurs; dont 
chacun s'approprie une partie du patrimoine epistemologique disponible.,,19 This 
would mean that history can only be revived by the historian and cannot be witnessed 
on an individual level at the time it was taking place. 
What Giisdorf fails to appreciate is that it matters little that the diarists were 
unaware of the overall significance of what they were witnessing or whether their 
individual testimonies might differ from one another. The diarists' inherent lack of 
omniscience and objectivity are compensated by their uniquely personal perspectives, 
which are forever frozen in time. Giisdorf himself admitted: "L 'univers historique ne 
nous est accessible qu'it travers ses reflets dans des existences individuelles.,,2o The 
macro cosmic nature of history denotes the sum of all individual experiences. If the 
personal nature of the diaries can contribute to a further understanding of the 
18 Gusdorf, Auto-bio-graphie, p.417. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., p.452. 
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Occupation period, why should the study of such testimonies, in their own right, not 
be considered of historical significance? Febvre argued that Werth's diary is "un 
admirable document historique" but his critical attitude of the history profession led 
him to ask: "Les historiens. Mais liront-ils ces livres? [ ... ] Quelle etrange «France 
occupee» nous dessineront-ils dans leurs manuels?,,21 He believed that la vraie 
image of France during the Occupation could be found within the pages of Werth's 
Deposition. This study is by no means an attempt to challenge the historiography of 
the Occupation period but, rather, an attempt to illustrate how such an approach from 
a different perspective can bring about a greater historical understanding of the 
Occupation period. 
The private diaries as historical tools. 
Jean-Pierre Azema wrote, in his presentation of Werth's Deposition, that 
historians have not utilised the journal personnel enough in their research.22 
Historians in recent times have begun to appreciate the historical value of the private 
diary. Julian Jackson, Robert Gildea and Philippe Burrin, for example, employ a wide 
range of diarists to supplement their research in the archives. This is a significant 
change from the pioneering research of Robert Paxton, who worked exclusively in 
the German archives, as the French archives were still not available to the general 
public. Yet there still lacks a general study of the Occupation period where the . 
private diaries are privileged as the primary source.23 The research literature on 
private diaries focuses almost exclusively on their literary dimensions as opposed to 
their historical value.24 The purpose of this thesis is to thoroughly examine the 
21 Texte de Lucien Febvre, Les Annales, (1948), Werth, Deposition, pp.23/30. 
22 Werth, Deposition, p.9. 
23 There is the unsatisfactory work of David Boal, Journaux intimes SOltS {'occupation, (Paris: A. 
Collin, 1993). See pp.l0 and 155-162. Ernst JUnger's Parisian diaries are the cornerstone works for 
Boal but he is very vague as to his criteria for this selection. He tends to favour diaries written in Paris 
as they are, in his mind, more representative of France than diaries written in the provinces, even 
though France was still a predominantly agricultural country. He makes the flippant remark that 
Werth's diary is an excellent work to discover life during the Occupation ... in the Jura. Boal dismisses 
Werth's diary as being motivated out of frustration at his isolation and solitude. There is no thought 
that his writing was a serious attempt to document the Occupation years, and illustrates the tension 
between his desire for the Occupation to end and the waiting for that desire to be carried out. He makes 
the point that Guehenno's diary was written sous cloche but at least it was written in Palis. There is 110 
suggestion that both diaries represent the important psychological battles that afflicted the diarists 
throughout the Occupation and the effects that struggle had on their opinion and behaviour. 
24 Alain Girard's Journal intime, for example, is more concerned with the mechanics of self-writing 
rather than an illustration of how the writing of the private diary can be useful in a historical sense. 
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historical contribution that the private diaries offer to History and where their 
differences in perspective might contribute to a more thorough understanding of the 
period. The purpose of this section, therefore, is to introduce the diarists who assume 
a prominent status in this thesis and, by examining the content of their writing as well 
as their approach to their writing, explain the reasons why some diarists are more 
relevant in an historical sense than others. 
This thesis has privileged private diaries over memoirs in that they are more 
authentic in their reflections of the past. Memory, over time, becomes a flawed 
version of the past. Time is not altered or distorted in the private diary, and the diarist 
remains oblivious to the future. 25 The memoirs of de Gaulle, for example, were 
written in the third person, as he maintained that General de Gaulle belonged to the 
history of France whereas de Gaulle the private man only belonged to himself.26 The 
private individual was pushed to the background by the importance of the public 
office he held. The reader is denied access to de Gaulle's private thoughts and inner 
conflicts. Moreover, there is the danger of thinking that the personal identity of an 
individual is fixed in an abstract and absolute place, whereas it is constantly changing 
and shaped by life experiences. People writing their memoirs are looking back on 
their past experiences but they are not the same individuals they were when they 
experienced those events.27 The private diaries, on the other hand, are a true 
representation of the lives of the diarists, and the world around them, at that particular 
given time. 
It is useful to ask the question what if the private diaries were the only resource 
that we were able to use to study the Occupation period? How would their unique 
vision of the Occupation compare with the views of historians? Undoubtedly, we 
would have a personalised view of the Occupation, where feelings assumed an 
overriding importance over facts and figures. The private diaries recount their own 
history, which does not necessarily relate to that of History from above or that of the 
25 Girard, Alain, Le journal intime, (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1986. 2e ed.) p.18. The 
diarist still relies, to some extent, on memory to record recent events that remain strong in the mind. It 
would be impossible to record everything whilst it was happening. 
26 Gilsdorf, Auto-bio-graphie, p.466 
27 Ibid., pp.10-11. Gilsdorf breaks down the process of self-writing into three categories: Autos 
represents the identity, the me, conscious of itself and its autonomous nature; Bios represents the 
continuity of that identity as well as its past; Graphie represents the exclusive technical properties of 
self-writing. The writing, therefore, is not simply a mirror image of the reality being lived. The Autos 
is being shaped by the Bios, which in turn changes the nature of the Graphie. This is why individual 
histories are not fragments of universal history, since each individual's Autos and Bios are different. 
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forty million French citizens who endured the Occupation. It was not the diarists' 
intention to compete with the historians of the future but, rather, to provide a personal 
insight into the Occupation. Their vision would differ from one diarist to another 
because their writing was motivated by different factors. Some diarists wrote out of a 
desire to seek comfort and refuge from an inhospitable world, others wrote out of 
anger, others searched for answers to questions which plagued them. It could be said 
that Werth was motivated by all these factors. He was perhaps the least subjective, as 
he was conscious of wanting to record as much as possible in order to provide a 
comprehensive 'deposition' of the Occupation years. His field of vision may have 
been wider than other diarists in terms of what he was willing to portray, as opposed 
to what he actually observed. Yet his vision of the Occupation did not differ from the 
other diarists in that he could not escape the subj ectivity of his writing. He was not a 
detached, distant observer of the Occupation but, rather, someone who was intimately 
involved in the events unfolding around him.28 His particular circumstances - his 
education, his beliefs, or his social and geographical situation - determined the 
overall flavour of his writing. In order to appreciate, therefore, the historical value of 
the private diaries, it is important to know through what eyes each diarist viewed the 
Occupation. 
The use of Werth alone as a diarist, to this point in the introduction, has been 
deliberate. It illustrates the depth of an individual testimony and the advantages an 
individual voice can offer a general history of the period. Yet at the same time it 
should never be taken that the private diaries are impartial historical documents that 
are equal in their utility. Werth was the most diligent of the diarists studied in this 
thesis in terms of his commitment to the writing of his diary. He was not interested in 
the literary dimensions of the private diary, as opposed to other diarists like Andre 
Gide, but in the historical value of what he was writing. Although he was a Jew 
taking refuge in Saint-Amour, he never let that dominate his writing.29 The routine of 
28 Even the diary of Jean Galtier-Boissiere, (Journal 1940-1950, Paris: Edirna, 1992) which often has 
no overt authorial comment, reflects his own individual character. 
29 Jean Malaquais' Journal de guerre and Journal du mheque (Paris: Editions Phebus, 1997) are more 
obviously an account of a Jew in France. Originally from Varsovia, he was sent to the frontline in 1939 
without ever being formally naturalised as a French citizen. He was captured when the fighting fmally 
began but would eventually escape. His first diary, Journal de guerre would be published in New York 
in 1943 but his second diary, Journal du mefeque, which provides an account of his lUn from the 
Gestapo and the French police through to his escape from Marseilles in late 1942 to Venezuela, 
remained for a long time unpublished. His evident contempt for France, despite being tempered by his 
love for France, may well provide the reason for its neglect. 
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writing at the same time and in the same environment provides the perfect conditions 
for writing. 30 Taken out of his familiar surroundings and plunged into isolation and 
solitude, Werth had nothing but time on his hands to write. Werth had no work or 
family distractions to keep him from his writing, which goes some way to explaining 
why Werth's diary is easily the fullest and richest text. His aim was to provide a 
testimony which would represent life during the Occupation as closely as possible: 
"Man recit est jidele. Un phonagraphe n 'eat pas fait mieux.,,31 To achieve that aim, 
Werth was detennined to provide as full a text as possible: "Qu 'on ne me reproche 
pas d'aller chercher des documents dans la poubelle. Je repete que tout est signe et 
symptome.,,32 He read the Lyons newspapers as well as clandestine texts like the 
Cahiers du Temoignage chretien. He listened to Radio Nationale as well as the BBC 
and Swiss radio in order to be infonned about all the influences that might affect the 
French as a whole. 
Three other diarists deserve to be recognised in a similar fashion to Werth: 
Charles Rist, Jean GuehelIDO and Andrzej Bobkowsld. None of these diarists had 
nearly the same amount of time at their disposal to write, and yet they all share a 
common detennination to write on a regular and detailed basis. The writing of a diary 
requires a certain degree of stubbomness and defiance; a refusal to relent with the 
examination of the self and the world outside. But very few diarists maintained their 
writing vigil on a consistent basis. The fact that these diarists were so committed to 
their writing indicates that they were equally committed to what they were writing 
about. Not all the diaries were focused equally on the outside world and the inner 
self, which means that not all diaries can provide a full insight into either the 
character of the period or the perceptions and thinking of the period. The diaries of 
Werth, Rist, Guehenno and Bobkowsld were not only descriptifbut also interrogatif. 
The diaries which are of particular historical importance to this study are those that 
go beyond the simple level of recording observations about their personal experiences 
of the Occupation. That is not to say that the diaries that merely make such 
observations hold little historical value but, rather, those diarists who endeavoured to 
write on a more complex level merit closer attention. These diarists often used their 
writing to search for answers to questions which were plaguing them. The writing of 
30 Gilsdorf, Auto-bio-graphie, p.31. 
Jl Werth, Deposition, p.294 (24.5.42) See also p.ll. Azema describes Werth as a spectateul' engage. 
32 Ibid., pp.368-9. (24.10.42) 
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a diary can be a means of getting off one's chest the preoccupations of the mind. The 
diarist writes about a preoccupation in order to reach the end of the thought in the 
desire of getting rid of it. This is significant because it not only allows the reader to 
Imow what was preoccupying the writer at the time but it also reveals, if these 
preoccupations keep recurring, that the writer was unable to find answers to these 
preoccupations.33 The preoccupation with survival, for example, during the 
Occupation is an important consideration. To see how much time diarists were 
devoted to writing about the difficulties of obtaining provisions or materials is of 
historical significance. Yet it is also significant to see how much time they devoted 
themselves to more complex and abstract notions, which have traditionally been the 
domain of historians. Rist, for example, frequently traced throughout French history 
the reactionary, defeatist inclinations of a certain section of the bourgeoisie. 34 
The diaries of Werth and Rist, despite the different writing environments in 
which they were written, bear a remarkable resemblance to one another. Both reveal 
an avid appreciation of French history, which saw them view the events of the 
Occupation as a part of that history's evolution. The demarcation zone did not 
prevent them from adopting a scathing attitude towards Vichy, nor from placing their 
faith in an Allied victory. Rist came from a bourgeois, Protestant background and was 
of a similar age to Werth. He was sixty-five when France officially declared war on 
Germany, which goes some way to explaining their similar outlooks. Another reason 
was that the Occupation exacted a heavy toll on both men. Rist's son, Leonard, would 
become a prisoner of war after the signing of the armistice, and another of his five 
sons, Jean, would be killed fighting in the Resistance in August 1944. Yet there were 
important differences between the two men. Originally a university professor, Rist 
became involved after the Great Depression in the world of economics and banking. 
His elite position gave him access to people of high positions beyond the reach of 
most other diarists.35 Indeed, he was asked to be the Vichy ambassador in the United 
States, and even had a private meeting with P6tain. His busy work schedule sees none 
of the boredom and solitude associated with the writing of Werth. The psychological 
33 Gusdorf, Auto-bio-graphie, p.lOl. For example, Werth keeps returning to the question: Oil est-i!, Ie 
peupTe de Michelet? 
34 See Rist, Charles, Une saison gatee, (Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1983), pp.121-122 
(28.12.40), pp.257-258 (25.6.42), p.271 (5.9.42), p.282 (18.10.42), p.388 (6.2.44), p.404 (24.5.44). 
35 The diaries of Edouard Daladier, Journal de captivite 1940-1945, (Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1991) and 
Marc Bregner, Carnets du Pasteur Bagnellr 1940-1945 , (Paris: Fayard, 1992) offer a similar 
perpsective. Bregner often met with Petain and although Daladier was imprisoned during the 
Occupation, his previous office afforded him a privileged view of events. 
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struggle oflasting until the end is, therefore, more apparent in Werth's writing. Yet 
the fact that Rist continued working throughout the Occupation is more representative 
. of the French people. Despite these important differences, the fact that they still 
shared a great deal of similar views on the state of France illustrates how much the 
diarist's background, rather than the environment, could shape the diarist's writing. 
It is significant, however, to note that the differences between the two diarists 
can often be attributed to the different environments in which they wrote. Rist's work 
often kept him within the circles of the haute bourgeoisie, and so his interaction with 
the masses was restricted to his observation of Ie peupZe in public places. 
Furthermore, the poorer sections of Parisian society would have lived in different 
arrondissements to that of Rist, which would have further restricted his observations 
of Ie peuple. Werth, on the other hand, had no choice but to interact with the people 
of rural Saint-Amour. He was exposed to the thinking of the peasantry on an 
infinitely more intimate scale. He shared Rist's view of the decadent nature of France 
but he could not help but feel at times that the corruption of the bourgeoisie had very 
much infiltrated the ranks of Ie peuple.36 His vision of life in a tiny, rural village may 
well have been less dense compared with Rist's view of the most populous French 
city but it can also be seen as more representative of the social strata of Saint-Amour 
than Rist's narrower vision of Parisian society. Rist's relative isolation from the 
masses would cause him to adopt a much more optimistic view of Ie peupZe.37 He 
preferred to target his contempt at a certain section of the bourgeoisie. Although the 
title, Une saison gtitee, was chosen by the first editor of Rist' s diary, he could have 
just as easily entitled it Une bourgeoisie gatee. Rist's notion of France's decadence 
was confined to the elite of French society. 
It would be wrong, however, to suggest that Rist's writing was motivated 
exclusively by his desire to attack the section of the French bourgeoisie, who had 
welcomed the defeat and the German occupation as a means of protecting their 
interests and getting rid of the Republic. Certainly, it is a recurrent theme in his 
writing but the scope of his writing, in general tenns, is not appreciably different to 
that of Werth. His range of topics varied from the difficulties of procuring provisions 
to his concern for his family, from his observations of Vichy to the events of the war. 
36 Werth, Deposition, p.66. (21.10.40) 
37 Rist, Une saison giitee, p.30S. (28.12.42) 
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Rist would often question the utility of recording his own thoughts, but he would 
never lose sight of the overall advantages of writing his diary: 
Par/ois je me dis que Ie journal est bien inutile, et sera peut-etre pour moi 
dans l'avenir Ie temoin de mes propres erreurs de jugement. Meme s'it doit 
etre cela je ne regretterai pas de I 'avoir redige et d 'avoir garde la mbnoire 
de nos impressions au jour Ie jour pendant une epoque aussi affreuse, et 
qu 'on sera presse d' oublier quand la paix sera venue. Ce sera peut-etre la 
mesure de nos illusions, peut-etre aussi la mesure de ce que nous aurons pu 
garder de bon sens dans la tourmente. 38 
History is mostly concerned with facts as opposed to impressions. That is why 
historians can look back on a period without fear of colouring the facts with their own 
judgements. When it comes to impressions, however, the historian is susceptible to 
influences that might well not have been present during that period. 
Jean Guehenno, born in 1890, was from a working-class family. Although he 
was forced to leave school at the age of fourteen to work in a factory, he did complete 
his baccalaureat and studied at university after the First World War. He would divide 
his working career between teaching and writing. The Occupation, however, would 
see him choose, in his mind, the only honourable option: silence.39 This effectively 
brought an end to his writing career, at least on an official level. He would playa part 
in the literary resistance, and part of his private diary would be published in Les 
Editions de Minuit under the title Dans la prison. Guehenno was particularly critical 
of those writers who continued to publish their work during the Occupation, as, in his 
mind, this detracted from their status as prisoners. He would eventually publish his 
diary in 1946 but during the Occupation years his diary was a means of breaking the 
silence. It was a means of speaking out in an environment where speaking the truth 
could have serious repercussions. However, he freely admitted: "Ce journal, tel 
qu 'on Ie lira, est sombre, trop sombre. ,,40 The private diary held for Guehenno a 
psychotherapeutic function. It was invariably going to accentuate the low times rather 
than the highs, which places an unfair emphasis on the negative aspects.41 The editor 
of Kafka's diary noted: 
Tout journal produit necessairement une deviation de perspective dont il 
convient de tenir compte. Quiconque ecrit un journal ne note generalement 
38 Ibid., p.170. (17.6.41) See Werth, Deposition, p.573. (22.2.44) 
39 This decision was certainly made easier by the fact that he could fall back on his teaching job. 
Diarists, such as Cocteau, would often justify their position by arguing that they had to keep working 
in order to survive. 
40 Gu6henno, Jean, Journal des a1111eeS noires, (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1947), p.ll. 
41 Girard, Lejournal intime, pp.527-529. 
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que ce qui lui pese ou l'irrite. C'est la une maniere de se liberer 
d'impressions douloureuses et negatives. Les impressions positives ne 
demandent pas a se decharger dans I'ecriture; on ne les note (...) que dans 
des cas exceptionnels, ou lorsqu 'on l 'a decide (dans Ie cas de notes de 
voyage par exemple). Mais la plupart du temps, un journal evoque une 
courbe barometrique ou seules les basses press ions sont enregistrees. 42 
This was certainly the case with Guehenno's diary, Journal des annees noires, in that 
he was more intent on venting his rage than searching out the positive aspects of the 
Occupation. Guehenno was not being deliberately critical but he evidently felt angry 
that the Nazis were impacting negatively on France and its culture, and that certain 
sections of French society were willingly aiding the Germans in that cause. 
There is another element that needs to be examined, which explains the 
imbalance of negative material in Guehenno's diary. The fear of disclosing 
information about his work in the Resistance and the activities of his colleagues, such 
as Franyois Mauriac and Claude Morgan, prevented him from recording many 
positive and noble acts during the Occupation. He felt at times able to disclose the 
imprisonment or the execution of his colleagues but he never felt able to reveal his 
attachment to those people who were actively fighting for the honour of France. Ifhis 
documents had been found by the French or German police, such an incident would 
have inevitably led to his detainment and probable death, not to mention all those 
whose names were implicated by association. His diary is an excellent source for 
examining daily life during the Occupation and those aspects which caused division 
and resentment. Yet it does not tell the whole story of the Occupation. Guehenno 
warns in his preface: 
Cette prudence fausse Ie ton de ce journal. On n y trouve pas assez ce qui, a 
travers la honte et la misere, nous fit vivre. La France n' eta it pas sf triste. 
Elle n 'etait pas acoquinee a son malheur. On endurait mats on dura it. Je 
voudrais que Ie lecteur, en me lisant, pensdt toujours qu 'a travers ces pages 
ne cessait de courtr l'esperance, comme elle courait les rues de Paris: en se 
cachant. 43 
42 Gusdorf, Les ecritures du moi, (Paris: Editions Odile Jacob, 1991), p.333. The diaries of 
Andre Gide (Journal 1939-1949. Souvenirs, (Paris: Gallimard, 1954)) Lise Deharme (Les amu/Jes 
perdues, Paris, Librairie PIon, 1961) and especially of Jean Cocteau (Journal 1942-1945, (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1989) contradict such an argument. These diarists were more intent on celebrating their 
own particular pleasures than emphasising the negative aspects of life. 
43 Guehenno, Journal des amuies noires, p.12. None of the diarists selected for this thesis give an 
insight into life in the Resistance. Franyois Mauriac also came from the ranks of the literary resistance 
but his writing was more concemed with creating a moral code for the French to follow. Marc Bloch, 
who actively fought in the Resistance, concentrated on examining the reasons for France's catastrophic 
defeat. 
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His diary is in stark contrast with the diaries of Lise Deharme and Jean Cocteau, who 
preferred to accentuate the positive aspects of the Occupation. Where he differs from 
such diarists, however, is his determination to represent as fully as possible life 
during the Occupation. The aforementioned diarists were more concerned with 
relating exclusively their own personal experiences with no regard for abstract 
notions such as politics or ethics. Furthermore, the authentic nature of Gu6henno's 
diary - although by no means peculiar to his private testimony - contrasts with the 
testimonies of Sacha Guitry and Simone de Beauvoir, who wrote their accounts after 
the Occupation years. Their writing was motivated by a desire to portray themselves 
in a more favourable light. Gu6henno refused to make any amendments to what he 
had written during those years other than to edit out passages which were overly 
critical of certain people. 
Andrzej Bobkowski had no such restrictions in his writing, since he had no 
ties with the Resistance, and his Polish nationality afforded him a sense of 
detachment from his personal observations of occupied France. Born in 1913, 
Bobkowski was on his way from his native Poland to Latin America when war broke 
out in Europe in 1939. The Occupation years would effectively block his passage 
from France to Guatemala, and he would spend the majority of those years in Paris. 
Yet he did not share Gu6henno' s view of occupied France being a prison. Bobkowski 
comes across as an independent, free spirit, who seems largely unaffected by the 
Occupation. His attitude seems to contradict the historical view that life during the 
Occupation was harsh: 
Bien que ce soit la guerre en France, on continue a voir des vestiges de 
richesse. En depit du pillage allemand, en depit des requisitions repcitees, on 
ne peut pas parler de la famine. Il y a toujours du ch 0 ix, il y a toujours une 
certaine variete et il est possible d' organiser sa «petite vie». On retrouve 
dans ['atmosphere ce rien qui a si vite fait de vous rendre heureux. 44 
His diary serves as a reminder that each individual experience is relative. He believed 
that France was still a free country despite the presence of the German military and 
its secret police: 
Nous avons toujours notre liberti, deja restreinte, certes, mais encore 
vivable. II faut desormais declarer les changements de domicile ou de lieu de 
residence,' il y a des quantites de reglements nouveaux a respecter, mais 
dans I 'ensemble, on est libre. Encore, maintenant on en tend presque tous les 
jours dans les cafes des gens trainer Petain dans la boue et ne parler de 
44 Bobkowski, Anclrzej, En guerre et en paix. Journal 1940-1944, (Montricher: (Switzerland) Les 
Editions Noir sur Blanc, 1991), p.453. (13.4.43) 
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Laval qu 'en appelant «ce sale Auvergnat», ou encore menacer des 
Allemands. A voix haute. lei on possede encore le droit de parler et non 
seulement de penser. 45 
Certainly the Gennan attitude was much more lenient towards France than the one 
adopted in his native Poland. Yet Bobkowski does not mention the persecution of the 
Jews, those people who were captured and tortured by the Gestapo, or the abundance 
of denunciations sent to the Gennan authorities by French citizens.46 
Yet one could even go further to suggest that Bobkowski inadvertently 
introduces the concept that his diary can be seen as a negation of His to ire. To talk, in 
global tenns, ofihe French living under Gennan vassalage or the inadequate diets of 
the French during the Occupation belies the fact that some individuals, relative to 
their situation, were able to overcome these difficulties with no discernible 
discomfort. Bobkowski's diary is replete with his astonishment over the ease of life in 
occupied France and the ability to continue one's life as before. Does his experience 
not suggest that other individuals shared the same view, which would go against the 
historical notion that life during the Occupation was infinitely harsher than before the 
defeat of June 19407 Similarly, Werth would raise the question: "Ou est-il, le peuple 
de Michelet?,,47 The absence of revolutionary spirit amongst the peasantry of Saint-
Amour, along with their selfishness, caused Werth to entertain whether this historical 
notion of Ie peuple was merely an invention of Michelet. Was such a notion as 
artificial as that of the 'miracle' of Joan of Arc748 Werth argued that centuries had 
passed by without any mention of Joan of Arc by historians. It was as if Michelet had 
plucked both these concepts from thin air. 
Bobkowsld was certainly not afraid to speak his mind and challenge his pre-
existing views of France. He admitted that he had finnly believed in the myth of 
France but the defeat had made him aware that France only held on to vestiges of its 
fonner grandeur. This Polish intellectual, who spoke French fluently, was certainly 
not out of place in France. He represented Polish workers in Paris and endeavoured to 
help them when they found themselves on the wrong side of the law. Although he 
45 Ibid., pp.339-340. (28.6.42) 
46 The diaries of Maurice Toesca, Cinq ans de patience. (Paris, Editions Emilie-Paul, 1975) and 
Edmond Dumeril, Journal d'un honnete homme pendant l'occupation, (Thonon-les-Bains (Haute-
Savoie): Editions de l' Albaron, 1990) provide an invaluable insight into the effects of the Gemlan 
occupation on France. They were in a privileged position to observe the enforced cohabitation of the 
French and Germans at an official or administrative level. 
47 Werth, Deposition, p.308. (13.6.42) 
48 Ibid., p.82. (7.11.40) The section, La patrie, in Chapter Three will explore whether this notion is 
similarly an historical invention. 
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still retained a healthy respect for the country of Balzac, he was not afraid to draw 
unfavourable comparisons between France and Poland: 
La pauvre Pologne sans ressources et la riche et grande France se seront 
defendues aussi longtemps I 'une que l 'autre. Nous estimions scandaleuse la 
fat;on dont nous nous etions defendus, mais compare a elle, la fat;on dont se 
sont defendus les Frant;ais est w~ritablement criminelle. 
Nous voulions nous defendre mais nous n 'avions pas de quoi, alors qu 'eux 
avaient de quoi se defendre mais ne Ie voulaient pas. Je me demande si fa 
France s 'en relevera. Cette idee me hante depuis hier.49 
He still believed that France was a powerful country but feared that it had irrevocably 
lost its pre-eminent position. title of his diary, En guerre et en paix, can also be 
seen as a reflection of his attitude towards France. At times Bobkowski is em-aged 
that the French, who still lived in a prosperous country compared to Poland, should 
complain about their situation. Yet other times he admired how the French were able 
to rise above the war and remain indifferent to the Gennan Occupation. 
Whilst these four diarists undoubtedly provide the most comprehensive 
representation of life during the Occupation, this does not mean that the other diarists 
examined in this thesis cannot contribute to a rr1''''Q1"~'," understanding of a particular 
event or aspect of the Occupation. To write and maintain a diary over a period of 
more than four years requires great dedication, which means that none of what any of 
the diarists elected to write about should be dismissed as being insignificant. 
The diarists' idiosyncratic vision of their experiences whether it be through 
the particular position they held, their personal beliefs, their motivations for writing 
or the individual struggles that they faced contribute to a greater collective 
understanding of the period. That is not to ignore the limitations of each individual 
testimony, and why the other diarists examined in tllis thesis merit a subsidiary role to 
the aforementioned diarists. This can be attributed, for example, to their particular 
motivations for writing their respective diaries or the style in which they wrote their 
respective diaries. 
49 Bobkowski, EI1 guerre et en paix, p.26. (18.6.40) 
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Les journaux il1times: strengths and limitations. 
It is important to acknowledge that the four diarists privileged in this thesis 
afford us the most detailed, overall representation of life in Occupied France. Each of 
their individual testimonies on their own merits could contribute to a greater 
historical understanding of the Occupation period. The same cannot be said for the 
other diarists examined in this thesis. They are more limited in their contribution to 
the historiography of the Occupation. This raises the question why does the 
testimonial corpus of this thesis include diarists who offer a less historically 
comprehensive portrait of life in Occupied France? The answer to this question lies 
less in the individual merits of their testimonies but more in what they collectively 
represent as a whole. The corpus of private diaries may well comprise a narrow 
sample of individual testimonies but this is attenuated by the fact that, as a group, the 
corpus provides a wide-ranging coverage of reactions to historical events as well as 
the everyday hardships endured by those living in Occupied France, and the moral 
challenges which they confronted throughout the Occupation. This section will 
outline what historical events will be examined in this thesis as well as the everyday 
challenges the diarists faced but it is first necessary to identify the strengths and 
weaknesses of the other individual testimonies, and discuss all of the tendencies that 
they represent. It is not only what unites the diarists that is of historical significance 
but also what divides them. The diaries of secondary importance may not be as rich 
as the four diaries of Werth, Rist, Guehenno and Bobkowski but that does not mean 
that they are unable to provide a valuable contribution and offer an alternative voice 
on certain issues. 
The notions of freedom and refuge, for example, were often instrumental in the 
writing of the private diaries during the Occupation. Werth took refuge in his writing 
from his solitude in Saint-Amour.5o The diary represented for Guehenno somewhere 
that was unaffected by the German occupation. Maurice Toesca shared Guehenno's 
view that the Germans had effectively stripped the French of their freedom: "La 
50 See also Simone de Beauvoir, La force de l'age, (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), p.390: Et puis un matin, 
la chose an'iva. Alors, dans la solitude et dans I 'angoisse, j'ai commence a tenir un journal. II me 
semble plus vivant, plus exact que Ie recit que j' en pourrais tireI'. 
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France est au secret. Nous sommes bien des prisonniers.,,51 Toesca held a high 
position in the Paris Police Headquarters and worked in conjunction with the German 
military authorities. The title of his diary, Cinq ans de patience, suggests an attentiste 
attitude on his behalf, where he waited until France was released from its German 
captors. He sought refuge in his writing, as it afforded him the freedom he was 
otherwise denied by the German jailers: 
Ce journal m 'est un refuge. II me permet de garder la tete froide, L 'analyse 
fait du bien. L 'ecriture reduit les errements de l'imagination. Je ne veux rien 
consigner sur ces feuillets qui ne soU temoignage sincere, sans passion. La 
liberte, en cet instant ou je sais qu 'elle va m 'etre ravie, tne para it etre un 
privilege delicieux. Un instinct profand me dit de la sacrifier it I 'obligation 
socia Ie. 52 
The question that needs to be asked for all the private diaries is what sort of 
temoignage is each particular diary providing? Toesca's diary provides an insight into 
the lives of those French people who worked alongside the Germans. The notion of 
collaboration assumed a negative connotation during the Occupation but 
collaboration was not always carried out in a political or economic sense. 
It would be wrong to think that diarists who worked in similar fields also held 
similar beliefs. Edmond Dumeril is another example of a diarist who worked on a 
daily basis with the German military authorities. 53 Although he was devastated by the 
defeat, he took the opposite view to that of Toesca in that he sincerely believed that 
the best course of action for the French was to cooperate fully with the Germans. 
Their contrasting views represent the complexities of the period in that both men 
believed that their course of action was honourable. The moral universe of the 
Occupation contained infinitely more shades of grey than black and white. The minor 
diaries, therefore, add more shades of grey to the palette. Toesca and Dumeril, for 
example, provide a valuable addition to the austere view taken by Guehenno. 
The minor diarists as a whole also help to reveal what important historical 
documents the major diarists have written. Their limitations show up the strengths of 
51 Toesca, Cinq ans de patience, p.63. (June 1940) See also Guehenno, Journal des amu?es noires, 
p.18: Je me refitgierai dans mon vrai pays. Mon pays, ma France est une France qu 'on n 'envahit pas. 
(25.6.40) 
52 Ibid., p.55. (16.6.40) 
53 Like Toesca, his diary is dominated by his work, which gives the overall impression that his vision 
of the Occupation is seen almost exclusively through the eyes of a civil servant. There tends to be less 
emphasis placed on his observations of the Occupation through the eyes of an ordinary individuaL But 
his position as COl1seiller attache au cabinet du Prefet de Loire-Jnferieure pour les relations franco-
allemandes serves as another reminder that the German presence in France was not always distinct 
from the French world. The jailers often interacted with the prisoners. 
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the major diarists. Their limitations can, for the greater part, be attributed to their 
motivation for writing their respective diaries. Unlike most of the other diarists, 
Dumeril had kept a diary all his life. He believed that it was essential to record the 
events of the time in order to make more elaborate judgements on those events in the 
future: 
Le temps est un grand maitre! II met progressivement chaque homme et 
chaque ewinement it sa vraie place: telle catastrophe ne fut en rea lite qu 'un 
leger accident et tel fait qui nous parut minime a eu des consequences 
incalculables. C'est pourquoi, autant if est indispensable d'inscrire chaque 
soir les evenements de la journee, autant if est necessaire de n 'utiliser ces 
notes pour une ceuvre d 'histoire qu' apres plusieurs annees, quand Ie recul 
du temps permet de juger, de jiltrer en quelque sorte documents et 
. 54 
souvemrs. 
After the war Dumeril would use these notes to publish in 1947 a philosophical-
historical account of the war entitled Visions d'histoire. Jean Bourgeon comments, in 
his introduction to Dumeril's diary, on the difference in style between the two pieces 
of writing: 
Le journal, ecrit it chaud, redige it la hiite, livre les impressions du moment, 
sans recul. Le recueif « Visions d 'histoire», redige apres la guerre, juge les 
faits et les hommes dans Ie contexte historique de la Liberation et des 
. , II I' 55 passlOns qu e e sou eve. 
The danger of such an approach to writing history is illustrated by the 
individual testimonies of Simone de Beauvoir and Sacha Guitry. Although de 
Beauvoir's La force de l'age incorporates her Journal de guerre, written from 
September 1939 to January 1941, her other diary written far more intermittently 
throughout her life, and her correspondence to friends, it is ultimately written after 
the Occupation period. The work is, therefore, rendered susceptible to the changing 
climate of the post-Liberation period. Even she herself admitted that such a work 
could not wholly capture the attitudes and behaviour of the time and give valuable 
insights into the period, however subjective they might be, as other private diaries 
written at the time succeed in capturing: 
J'ai bien souvent senti, une fois la paix revenue, combien if etait difficile 
d'en parler it quelqu 'un qui ne l'avait pas vicue; maintenant, it pres de vingt 
ans de distance, j'ichoue it en ressusciter, meme pour moi, la verite. A peine 
puis-je en exhumer quelques traits, quelques episodes. 56 
54 Dumeril, Journal d 'un honnete homme pendant I 'occupation, p.13. 
55 Ibid., p.14. 
56 De Beauvoir, La force de I' age, p.513. 
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Despite these mIsglvmgs, her reactions towards the declaration of war and the 
subsequent defeat, which were taken mostly from her Journal de guerre, appear to 
reflect more her thoughts at the time.57 And although she appears at times to be 
justifying, rather than describing, her work- she attracted criticism for her work in 
Radio Paris her testimony gives an insight into the ethical dilemmas artists faced 
during the German occupation. 
Similarly, Sacha Guitry provides an insight into how people could pay the price 
for their decisions during the Occupation. Sacha Guitry, an actor, playwright and 
screen-writer, had already achieved by the Occupation wide-known success and 
fame, to the extent that he was sought out by several Germans, including Ernst 
Jiinger. Such success, notoriety and seemingly such familiarity with the Germans, 
however, would see him arrested after the Liberation and put on trial for alleged 
crimes of collaboration. Guitry was clearly embittered by this experience and felt that 
he was being made a scapegoat for the collective shame of the French people during 
les annees noires. It is obvious that the motivation for writing Quatre ans 
d'occupations was clearly to prove his innocence. It is not a private diary but, rather, 
an auto-justification of his behaviour and attitudes throughout the Occupation written 
after the period. Yet that does not change the fact that the arguments he puts up in his 
defence reflect an alternative perspective to the austere position adopted by Guehenno 
and Mauriac. 
Jean Cocteau is another diarist who attracted a similar amOlmt of criticism 
during and after the Occupation. He was a distinguished artist in many fields: a poet, 
a playwright, a film-maker, a writer, a painter and a sketch artist Cocteau took the 
individualistic but also nationalistic approach that it mattered little what other people 
thought of his decision to keep working, as he was convinced that he was best serving 
France. Cocteau's diary is obsessed with recording his artistic world, and, like 
Guitry's and de Beauvoir's testimonies, raises the question whether continuing one's 
work was patriotic or dishonourable. He would be particularly singled out for his 
public eulogy of the German sculptor, Amo Breker. His friendship of Gennan artists, 
in his mind, transgressed national borders. Cocteau had no concept of politics and 
rarely concerned himself with the war. This indifference is represented by the fact 
57 It should be noted that although the diaries of Werth, Guehenno, Rist and Bobkowski all remained 
predominantly untouched, there is less certainty with other diarists. One cannot be always certain that 
there have been some minor alterations made to cast the author in a more favourable light. 
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that his diary inexplicably commences in 1942. Yet what his diary offers is evidence 
of the fact that there was more often than not a blurring of lines between the occupier 
and the occupied. Guehenno' s position was an exception to the rule. Furthermore, 
like Bobkowski's diary, Cocteau's can be seen as a counterbalance to the historical 
notion that the Occupation was a massive intrusion on the lives of the French. One 
could continue to work during the Occupation as if the defeat had not happened. 58 
Pierre Drieu La Rochelle was similarly unconcerned with other people's 
opinion of his work. His position as editor of the Nouvelle Revue Fram;aise, however, 
would be impossible to justify as an attempt to promote French culture above German 
culture. The NRF was unequivocally under the control of the Germans, and published 
notorious works such as Chardonne's L 'ete it la Maurie, which unashamedly 
promoted the partnership of France and Germany. But herein lies the interest of 
Drieu's diary: he unrepentantly outlines his reasons for his attraction towards 
fascism: 
Ce journal, etant un vrai journal sans grand soin litteraire, n 'aura d'interet 
que beaucoup plus tard - si quelque erudit s 'interesse it mon temoignage 
politique pendant cette periode... On y verra nettement la suite de mes idees 
et comment J'ai toujours combine ['amour morose de la France avec une foi 
.. . I l'E 59 nazve et VlO ente pour urope. 
The writing of his diary held little appeal for Drieu. There is no sense of seeking 
refuge in his writing and, unlike the diary of Andre Gide, he paid no attention to the 
literary value of his diary. Instead, Drieu offers the unique historical perspective of a 
collaborator in the sense of what the French people would eventually come to 
recognise the term as: a traitor. He offers an insight into why some people felt 
compelled to completely abandon France to embrace the enemy, but he also 
illustrates the fact that his case represents only a tiny minority of the French people. 
One further consideration deserves particular attention, which has to do with 
the social class and gender of the private diarists. Giisdorf makes the point that 
writers have never been, as a general rule, well-off or exceptionally privileged. More 
often than not they have known financial worries or have endured hardship.60 Yet, 
equally, which is not made all that clear by Gusdorf, writers are not drawn from the 
58 Andre Roussin (Rideau gris et habit vert, Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1983) and Lise Deharme's 
diaries (Les anm?es perdues) are also testament to the fact that the war and the Occupation did not 
always cast a black shadow over one's attitude. 
59 Drieu La Rochelle, Pierre, Journal 1939-1945, (Paris: Gallimard, 1992), p.327. (8.2.43) 
60 Gilsdorf, Auto-bio-graphie, p.229. 
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lower end of the social scale. The overwhelming majority of the diarists examined in 
this thesis came from the lower ranks of the bourgeoisie. The diary of Fred6rique 
Moret, a young working-class girl, provides a valuable contrast to the overwhelming 
bourgeois perspective of the other diarists. Forced to abandon her home in the 
Ardennes by the Gennan invasion, her diary provides an account of her struggle to 
survive thereafter. Despite her youth, she makes some interesting observations and, 
furthennore, from a female perspective. Much like the preponderance of bourgeois 
diarists so too was there a preponderance of male diarists. The implications for this 
heavy representation of male, bourgeois diaries are that the private diaries cannot be 
said to be truly representative of the French population. That is not to say that women 
or the very rich and the very poor are not represented in these diaries but, rather, that 
they are overwhelmingly seen through the eyes of the male petit bourgeois. One must 
be mindful of this fact when drawing wider conclusions. 
The aim of the first chapter of this thesis is to situate the reader within the 
minds of the diarists at the very beginning of the Occupation. No appreciation of their 
mindset in the summer of 1940 can be undertaken without an examination of their 
attitudes and feelings leading up to that period. The temptation is to think that June 
1940 heralded the beginning of the Occupation but it only did so in an histOlical 
sense. The diarists, blinded to the future, concentrated on the cessation of fighting 
rather than the consequences of the cease-fire. Historians have a tendency to interpret 
the overwhelming acceptance of the annistice as an overwhelming acceptance of the 
Vichy regime. Such an interpretation implies that the French were aware that the 
annistice would lead to the inception of Vichy. The diarists remind us, however, that 
their concerns at that particular time in history lay more with the immediate past than 
with the immediate future. Their reality of June 1940 is, therefore, not influenced by 
the shadow of events to come. 
Chapter Two will focus on the notion of change over time. It is by no means an 
exhaustive chronological review of the Occupation as a whole but, rather, an 
examination of specific salient points that illustrate that the reality of the Occupation 
did not appear to the diarists in a logical, lucid fashion. The persecution of the Jews 
and the Anglo-American landing in North Africa will provide examples of how the 
diarists' living testimonies can raise new questions to particular historical events. As 
much as new developments brought about an evolution in attitudes among the 
diarists, there were constant factors that brought about a regression in their behaviour. 
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History has a tendency to overemphasise the former and disregard the latter. The 
impenetrability of the future and the weight of time were crucial in shaping the reality 
of the diarists throughout the Occupation. Such concepts are often overlooked by 
historians, which creates the mistaken impression that a linear line of awareness can 
be traced from June 1940 right through to the Liberation. History also has a tendency 
to oversimplify and generalise. Its use of broad terms to denote general behaviour 
belies the significant individual variation that occurred within these broad 
frameworks. 
Chapter Three will focus on the aspects of the private diaries that greatly 
contribute to this authentic image of life during the Occupation. The simple everyday 
problems that afflicted the diarists are just as important in explaining their behaviour 
as the 'big' issues or events, which have been traditionally favoured by historians. All 
the diarists shared the common aim of lasting through to the end of the Occupation. 
The problem was that none of them knew when that end would come. It would be 
more often the mundane rather than the extraordinary that would test each diarist. The 
problems of obtaining food or the moral dilemma of working whilst France was 
effectively under German control are both examples of the difficulties each diarist 
faced on a daily basis. And yet these difficulties were experienced very much 
unevenly from one diarist to another. What the historiography of the Occupation 
period often overlooks is to what extent such personal considerations shaped general 
attitudes and behaviour. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Desirs et realites 
La Revolution ne sera que tenebres pour ceux qui ne voudront regarder qu 'etle; c 'est 
dans fes temps qui la precedent qu 'it faut chercher fa seule lumiere qui puisse 
I " I' 1 ec azrer. 
Introduction: the starting-point of the jOllrnallx intimes. 
It is interesting to note the starting-point of the various private diaries written 
during World War Two. Although France only effectively started fighting in May 
1940, it is important to remember that France had officially been at war since 
September 1939. Some diarists, such as Rist, chose to commence their private 
thoughts and observations after the declaration of war in September 1939. Others, 
such as Bobkowski, began their writing after the German invasion of France in May 
1940. And then there were those, such as Guehenno, who undertook their writing 
after the signing of the armistice in June 1940. Their commitment to begin their 
writing, therefore, was triggered off by different events, which in itself is significant. 
The fact that France was again at war would be for some the crucial moment, whereas 
for others the defeat was the defining moment. It is a reminder that the diarists all 
experienced, directly or indirectly, the same events throughout the Occupation but 
they reacted to them in different ways. Rist, for example, started his diary after the 
declaration of war, but he was initially only preoccupied with how the war and 
France's foreign policy would impact on his work. His writing is almost telegraphic, 
recounting meetings with various bank officials and government ministers. It is only 
after May 1940 that his text becomes more developed and detailed, which signals his 
real interest in the period. Similarly, the other three principal diarists considered in 
the introductory chapter, whose writing began just before or after the defeat of June 
1940, will be largely absent from the first part of this chapter, which will examine the 
1 The Occupation period has clear parallels with Tocqueville's words on the Revolution of 1789. 
(L 'Ancien Regime et fa Revolution, (Paris, 1967), Laborie, p.70) 
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attitudes and feelings of the diarists leading up to the defeat. The focus of certain 
other diarists, which covers the period well before the defeat of June 1940, accords 
their testimonies a special significance in this chapter. 
There is, therefore, a temporal dimension to consider when evaluating the 
private diaries. History clearly defines the Occupation period within a finite 
framework, beginning with the armistice of June 1940 and culminating in the 
Liberation of Paris in August 1944.2 Historians examining the Occupation period may 
well broaden their focus beyond these parameters, in order to provide background to 
the period, but they are, nevertheless, largely confined within these two reference 
points.3 The diarists, however, were unaware of the overall historical significance of 
what they were witnessing. Just as none of the diarists knew beforehand when they 
would begin writing so too were they unaware of when they would stop writing. No 
diarist could have conceived in June 1940 that the war would last for another five 
years. Their decision to conclude their writing, therefore, was equally arbitrary as 
their decision to commence their writing. Werth, for example, would stop writing 
after the arrival of de Gaulle in Paris in August 1944, whereas Galtier-Boissiere 
would continue his writing well after the Liberation. In this sense, the timeframe in 
which the diarists worked was limitless. The writing remained open to the seemingly 
infinite possibilities of the future as well as what had already happened in the past. 
There were some diarists examined in this thesis, however, whose writing 
started at a more clearly defined point and who equally had a more definite end-point 
in mind. These were the diarists who were mobilised as frontline soldiers: Georges 
Friedmann, Georges Sadoul and Jean-Paul Sartre. They began their writing after their 
mobilisation and presumably anticipated writing until the fighting stopped. These 
diarists figure prominently in the first part of this chapter - particularly Friedmmm 
and Sadoul- because their testimonies go beyond the mere descriptive and attempt to 
search for the reasons behind their predicament. Why was France at war? How did 
they feel about being at war? Were they confident of victory? Their position as 
frontline soldiers made the answers to such questions that much more relevant and 
pressing than for those civilian diarists situated well behind the frontlines. 
2 It should be noted that some parts of France were not fully liberated until 1945. 
3 The works of Jean-Louis Cremieux-Brilhac, Les Frmu;ais de I 'an 40. Tome I La guerre oui ou 71011? 
and Tome II Ouvriers et soldats, (Paris: Gallimard, 1990) focus exclusively on the events leading up 
to the Occupation to place the reader in the context of June 1940. There are a number of other works 
which focus on the debticle period but they too can be seen in a global sense with respect to examining 
only the drole de guerre period. 
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Consequently, they provide a more comprehensive image of their own mindset during 
the period leading up to the defeat of 1940. 
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to represent the reality of the diarists 
at a specific moment in time: the summer of 1940. This can only be achieved by first 
examining what had shaped their attitudes leading up to that period. Indeed, the 
attitudes that they formed before the defeat, coupled with the circumstances of the 
defeat, go a long way to explaining their behaviour for the entire Occupation period. 
Part One of this first chapter will examine the impact of the First World War on the 
French national psyche and its impact on the diarists' attitudes towards the Second 
World War. The diaries reflect a strong pacifist sentiment amongst the civilian 
population, which had been fostered not only by the senseless destruction of the First 
World War but also its lasting detrimental effects on France well after the fighting 
had stopped. The price of victory was felt to be too high, which saw a great 
reluctance on the part of the French to enter into another war. Yet at the same time 
the diaries also reveal an overwhelming confidence in France's ability to repel any 
German invasion. When war was officially declared in September 1939, the illusion 
of French military supremacy blunted the distress that France was once again at war. 
The climate of uncertainty and inaction surrounding the dr6le de guerre played on 
this overconfidence and clouded each individual's perception of reality. Moreover, 
the absence of fighting and the stalling of events did nothing to prepare the French for 
when blitzkrieg or lightning war finally came. 
Part Two will explore the impact of these feelings on the diarists after the 
catastrophic defeat. The military debacle would precipitate into a civilian debacle. It 
quickly became evident that the government propaganda of military supremacy had 
been believed as much by the government as it had been by the civilian population. 
The diarists observed a clear absence of organisation from above, which had the 
effect of laying the blame for the defeat on the hands of the French government rather 
than the French military. Furthermore, the sense that the French had been betrayed 
and abandoned by their government encouraged the idea that they were on their own. 
All that they had been told had proven to be false so they were forced to construct 
their own realities. Not only had their confidence in France's ability to win the war 
been completely shattered but their image of France had also been greatly distorted. 
What had not been broken, however, was the overwhelming aversion to war. The fact 
that France had been taken out of the fighting appears to have surpassed the shame of 
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defeat. The diarists were, on the whole, more concerned with the immediate past 
rather than the immediate future. Yet at the same time the defeat brutally made the 
diarists aware of France's general ineptness and this awareness would be harder to 
overcome than the defeat itself. The process of national disintegration intensified 
after the defeat, with the individual withdrawing further away from the national 
community. This was an uneven process, however, as the Occupation was not a 
homogeneous experience for the diarists. Different regional and individual 
experiences could affect each diarist's overall perception ofthe Occupation. 
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Part One 
The coming of war 
Ce Jut une des periodes les plus vaseuses de ma vie. Je ne voulais pas admettre que la 
guerre Jut imminente, ni seulement possible. Mais j 'avais beau Jaire I' autruche, les 
menaces qui grandissaient autour de moi m 'ecrasaient. 4 
To fight or not to fight? 
No understanding of the diarists leading up to June 1940 is possible without an 
examination of the effects of the First World War on the French national psyche 
during the inter-war period. Although France had been on the winning side in 1918, 
victory had come at a terrible cost. Not only had France borne most of the fighting on 
its soil but it had also sustained the most casualties. One out of every ten Frenchmen 
was ldlled with the total number of fatalities estimated at one and a half million. On 
top of that 4 266 000 were wounded, which included approximately 1 200 000 
permanently maimed. 5 Plus jamais 9a was the understandable catchphrase of the 
1920s. The French had greeted the First World War in 1914 with great national 
fervour but no French citizen after 1918 was under any illusions as to what any future 
war would cost France. Simone de Beauvoir illustrates how the brutal legacy of the 
Great War could impact on an individual's thinldng towards the prospect of another 
war: "les images de l'autre guerre me revenaient au ca!ur: condamner a mort, par 
humanitarisme, un million de Fran9ais, queUe contradiction.,,6 
The arrival of the politically and economically troubled 1930s, however, saw 
the first major challenge to this strong pacifist sentiment. The 1920s had been 
relatively peaceful and prosperous years for France but the 1930s saw a sharp 
economic downturn. Furthermore, conflicts from Spain to Finland posed a serious 
threat to peace in Europe and undermined the efforts France had made in the 1920s to 
4 De Beauvoir, Laforce de ['age, p.327. 
5 Bemard, Phillipe & Dubief, Hemi, The Decline of the Third Republic, 1914-1938, (Cambridge; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp.78-86. 
6 De Beauvoir, Laforce de I 'age, p.367. 
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safeguard the country from any potential attack. Stripped of its young men, coupled 
with a low demographic rate, victory had presented France with the impossible task 
of maintaining an influence beyond its means. Yet the growing audacity of Hitler was 
obviously compromising France's honour. Even the liberal thinkers Sartre and de 
Beauvoir recognised that Hitler had won too many concessions: "«On ne peut pas 
ceder indefiniment a Hitler», me disait Sartre. Mais si sa raison I'indinait a accepter 
la guerre, il se revoltait tout de meme a l'idee de la voir edater.,,7 Daladier's 
government found itself in an impossible situation: to wage war would be to provoke 
those who wanted to avoid war at all costs and to avoid war was to provoke those 
who wanted France to stand up to Nazi Germany.8 De Beauvoir illustrates that even 
the same individual could simultaneously adopt these contradictory positions. 
It appears that France was split down the middle in its desire to maintain peace 
and to maintain honour. Leon Blum, writing in the newspaper Le Populaire after the 
Soviet-German Pact, argued that those who wished to rid Europe of Hitler's 
malignant presence were just as numerous as those who opposed war: 
Le pouls de la nation ne bat pas un eoup de plus el la seconde. Ce qui 
exp/ique cet etat de consensus etonnant et admirable, c' est que dans son 
immense majorite, ['opinion ne croit pas el la guerre, ou, pour parler plus 
exaetement, elle ne considere pas la guerre comme une possibilite 
raisonnable. ( .. J Autant l'opinion est determinee a tenir ferme contre cette 
entre prise de crime et de demence, autant elle a peine a y croire et eUe n y 
croit pas parce qu 'elle ne comprend pas. Elle croit ella Palx, et la Paix ne 
signifie pas autre chose pour elle que I 'arret des dtetatures dans la voie 
fatale. 9 
Diarists such as de Beauvoir, as the epigraph suggests, still held to the belief that 
peace could be maintained. One can detect in her writing a subconscious refusal to 
contemplate the possibility of war. In some instances, such pacifist feelings could 
even lead to a defeatist attitude where the negatives far outweighed the positives of 
war: 
7 Ibid., p.345. 
8 Cremieux-Brilhac, yoU La guerre oui ou 11011, p.28. This is reflected in one of Daladier's speeches, 
which was made in response to one of Hitler's speeches. The speech, made in 1939, was the most 
bellicose speech made by a French leader since the First World War: La France espel'e que la paix 
sera sauw:?e. car elle a ta Twine de fa guerre. Mais si la guerre lui etait imposee ou si elle lui ctait 
offerte comme la seule alternative entre la decheallce et Ie deshol1neur, eUe se dress era it d'ulI seul 
elan pour la defense de fa liberte. 
9 Leon Blum, Le Popu/aire, (17 August 1939), Cremieux-Brilhac, yol 1. La guerl'e oui Ott 110n, p.66, 
The Jewish Premier would be accused after the defeat of leading France into a war it did not want to 
fight. 
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Les «defaUistes», quand Us se reunissent, s'interrogent d 'abord 
prudemment, se donnant l'un a l'autre des gages, puis, rassures, epanchent 
leur cmur. Le nom dont on les affuble est injuste: aucun Fran<;ais ne desire 
la defaite de la France. Beaucoup croient a la victoire, mais puisqu 'elle doit 
etre lente et sanglante, its ne la souhaitent pas ... C 'est Ie patriotisme qui les 
inspire: Us pensent simplement que la guerre longue abaissera la France 
plus que la victoire ne pourra la relever. 10 
Georges Friedmann, in spite of his strong communist sympathies, represents 
very much the moderate view. was clearly frustrated that France had placed itself 
in the impossible situation of defending its honour without waging war over 
Germany: 
J'ecris ces rejlexions parce queje viens d'entendre les plaintes, d'observer 
la misere de ces familles, deja blessees, et qui se preparent a ['etre encore. 
Ce ne sont pas des nijlexions politiques, mats humaines. Sf ['on se place du 
point de vue de la nation, que d'erreurs, que de crimes commis de tous les 
cotes pour conduire celie-Gi, en vingt ans, d'une g1-terre a une autre, 
aujourd'hui, inevitable, necessaire: car Hitler, maitre de ['Europe, c'est la 
fin de la nation fran<;aise, la curee sur son territoire metropolitain et son 
empire. Hitler vainqueur, c'est la ruine de tout espoir de redressement de la 
France, selon son genie, de tout renouveau librement jailli de ses forces 
profondes. 11 
Friedmann echoed the pacifist sentiment of de Beauvoir but where he di ffered was in 
his firm belief that war with Hitler was inevitable. What is clear is that the blame for 
this situation was directed squarely at the French governments during the inter-war 
period. 
Diarists such as Georges Sadoul represent the other half of French opinion. 
Like Friedmann, he was a communist supporter who was convinced of the need to 
stop Hitler's aggression. He tended to concern himself, however, with the realisation 
of that goal rather than wondering how France had allowed itself to be placed in such 
a position. Writing his diary as a soldier on the frontline, he was certainly under no 
illusions as to the dangers of war. Yet he felt that this was obscuring the importance 
of why the French were at war: "Songer que la guerre qui commence ne pourra etre 
tres dijJrirente de la derniere, voila de quoi ecmurer les delicats. ,,12 Sadoul felt that 
the overwhelming pacifist sentiment had made an adverse affect on military 
10 Fabre-Luce, Alfred, Journal de fa France 1939-1944, p.93, Cremieux-Brilhac, yoU. La guerre oui 
ou non, p.148, 
11 Friedmann, Georges, Journal de guelTe 1939-1940, (Paris: Gallimard, 1987), pp.169-170. (14.2.40) 
12 Sadoul, Georges, Journal de guerre 2 septembre 1939 ~ 20 juillet 1940, (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1994. 
2" ed.) p.30. (11.9.39) 
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propaganda, which implied that the costs of the imminent war would outweigh the 
reasons for it being waged: 
On repete Nous n 'avons pas voulu la guerre et nous la faisons malgre nous. 
Ce slogan est Ie contraire d'une bonne propagande puisqu 'on peut en 
deduire que nous nous battons a contre-cceur et qu' on a tort d' agir contre 
son cceur... Certes, it est bon de dire que nous n 'avons pas voulu la guerre, 
(ce que dit traditionnellement chaque belligerant), mais it paraitrait normal 
d'ajouter que nous sommes resolus a la faire jusqu 'au bout, jusqu 'a 
I' aneantissement de I 'Hitlerisme. 13 
Sadoul preferred to look at the war from the other side of the coin to Friedmann: the 
will not to lose face by backing down to Hitler ultimately outweighed the cost in 
human terms of fighting another war. 
Others went even further in their condemnation of France. Bemanos believed 
that the refusal to fight was not only a slur against all those who had lost their lives 
fighting for the honour of France in the First World War but also a slur against France 
in general. France's submission at Munich in 1938, in his mind, 
n 'etait qu 'humiliante, accablante. L 'ennemi 11 'eta it nulle part et se trouvait 
partout. La trahison n 'avait encore ni nom, ni visage. Elle avait afJaibli 
I' opinion frant;aise dans tous les secteurs, elle avait ruine sournoisement les 
centres nerveux de peuple fran r;a is. Sans doute la Presse - d'ailleurs 
presque tout entiere a ses gages - faisait toujours beaucoup de bruit, mais 
c 'etait pour mieux couvrir I' efJrayant silence de la nation qui ne croyait deja 
plus en elle-meme, se detachait lentement d'elle-meme. 14 
Bemanos was so affected by this humiliating compromise that he left France for 
Brazil. France had preserved its freedom but the cost of that freedom was too much 
for him to bear. He believed that the cause of this humiliation was not so much a 
question of pacifism but one of social and political decadence. In this respect, he had 
an unlikely ally in Drieu La Rochelle: 
Certes, cette guerre est mal emmanchee. Mais la France ne peut plus que 
mourir en combattant. Sa victoire serait si miserable. Ni elle ni I 'Angle terre 
n 'ont des idees vivantes pour refaire I 'Europe. Leurs elites sont trop 
afJaiblies pour donner forme a Geneve, y mettre des idees saines et fortes. 15 
Although the two may well have differed on how this decadence had come about, 
they nevertheless agreed on the fact that France was in a state of rapid decline. Yet 
whereas Bemanos believed that pacifism was simply a symptom of France's 
13 Ibid., pAl. (23.9.39) The Jewish writer, Jean Malaquais (p.23) recorded a similar opinion from 
another soldier: <<Si nous ne leur avions pas declare la guerre, j 'aurais vomi sur la France!» (31.8.39) 
14 Bemanos, Georges, Lettres aux Anglais, (Paris: Gallimard, 1946), p.2S. 
15 Drieu, Journal, p.86. (30.9.39) 
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decadence, Drieu was more aware of the role pacifism had played in France's 
decline: 
Si Mussolini marche avec Hitler, c 'est que Staline n 'est pas sur. La reaction 
a tout cela des gens a qui I 'on parle est lamentable: la categorie de I 'action 
a totalement disparu de I' esprit fram;ais. lIs ne peuvent meme pas se 
representer ce qui leur tombe sur la tete. Quant a imaginer des actions 
venant d'eux-memes ... ! L 'idee d'entrer en Hollande ne s 'impose pas a eux. 16 
This refusal to make the first offensive move implies that only the defence of 
national soil would be tolerated. The pacifist undercurrent prevented any question of 
France initiating any military offensive. All faith was placed in France's ability to 
repel any German invasion of French soil. The strong pacifist sentiment would 
continue into the dr61e de guerre, and the absence of fighting would only serve to 
strengthen that feeling. The young French girl, Frederique Moret, illustrates how the 
refusal to accept the possibility of war had the potential to render oneself indifferent 
to war when it finally came: 
Je m 'ennuie de mon pays sous la guerre. Je m 'ennuie des nouvelles de la 
guerre. Je m 'ennuie de la guerre, telle est la verite. II n 'arrive rien, 
d'ailleurs. Ou c 'est qu 'il arrive des evenements trop importants. 17 
It took eight months for any fighting to take place and when that fighting finally 
eventuated it was over in six weeks. Neither aspect prepared the French for the fact 
that they were at war. All it encouraged was the desire for peace. The writer, Andre 
Therive, would argue after the defeat that France had never been able to shake off its 
pacifism: 
L 'armistice victorieux de 1918, je l'ai vu dans un hameau de I'Aisne, sans 
vin, sans eau non plus, et enveloppe d'un morne silence: on ne croyait 
presque pas a la paix, au bout de quatre ans. Cette fois on n 'a jamais crn a 
la guerre. De la une atmosphere de liesse m ilita ire, comme a la veille du 
depart de la classe. 18 
The purpose of this section is not to illustrate how the pacifist attitude may have 
contributed to France's defeat but, rather, to situate the reader in the minds of the 
diarists in June 1940. Every diarist had at least expressed the need to stand up to 
Hitler. The fact that France's catastrophic defeat had left Hitler's advance in Europe 
16 Ibid., p.169. (9.4.40) 
17 Moret, Franyoise, Journal d'une mauvaise Fram;aise, (Paris: Editions de la Table Ronde, 1973), 
p.38. (26.5.40). 
18 Therive, Andre, L 'envers du decor 1940-1944, (Paris: Editions de la Cle d'Or, 1948), p.8: (22.6.40) 
See also Bobkowski, p.32: Aujourd'hui,j'ai compris que les particularites des Franr;ais, charmantes 
en temps de paix, et qu 'on apprecie enormement, sont maintenantfatales. En temps de paix, its avaient 
oublie la guerre; en temps de guerre, it leur a ete impossible d'oublier la paix. (24.6.40) 
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unchecked would have added to the diarists' humiliation. The annistice, however, 
had brought an end to the fighting, which would have inevitably been welcomed by a 
significant proportion of the diarists. The French government had failed to avert war 
but at least the lightning victory by the Gennans had not prolonged the war. 
The illusiou of victory. 
The relief over the end to the fighting felt by many diarists in June 1940 must 
also be tempered by the fact that the diarists had been almost unanimously confident 
in the superior might of the French military and its ability to prevail over Gennany. It 
was as if they were bargaining on the fact that the Gennans would not seriously 
contemplate entering another protracted, bloody war. Rist recorded the opinion of a 
German official, which seemed to confinn the Gennan reluctance to wage war: 
Ie vice-consul de Dusseldorf [. . .} a franchi la frontiere dimanche. II raconte 
les choses les plus etonnantes sur ['etat d'esprit en Allemagne. 85% des 
geruiraux sont contre la guerre, les industriels rluinans desirent la defaite. 
Les ouvriers lui remettent en cachette les plans des aerodromes, 
fort~fications, etc. 19 
After the defeat, Petain would refer to les rnensonges qui nous ont fait tant de mal but 
in reality they were for the greater part based on the truth. Some commentators in 
Berlin, for example, reported that morale in the last months of 1939 was much lower 
than what it was in France, and that Hitler would not remain long in power, as the 
only support for the Nazi regime and its expansionist policies came from the younger 
generation. Indeed, many of the Gennan military chiefs were concerned about 
Gennany's capacity to maintain a war machine with its lack of primary resources and 
the Allied naval blockade.2o 
Such was the conviction ohserved by the diarists in France's military 
supremacy that some even entertained the hope that Gennany would never go 
through with its bellicose intentions. Sadoul, for example, noted a conversation with a 
worker who had been mobilised: 
19 Rist, Une saison gatee, p.36. (6-7.9.39) 
20 Cremieux-Brilhac, voLl. La guerre oui au non, p.338. See also Cremieux-Brilhac, vo1.2. Ouvriers et 
soldats, pA2S. From the French perspective, Daladier and Gamelin were sent reports on the morale of 
French soldiers ascertained from analysis of correspondence: Le moral de l'Anllee, dans l'ensemble, 
appara'it magnifique, avec une conjiance quasi unanime dans les chefs, dans fa ligne Atfaginot, dans 
notre materiel, fa foi en fa victoire finale et la resolution d'allerjusqu 'au bout pour (me pas remettre 
r;a>) iT. breve echeance. 
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Mais je suis sur qu'it n y aura pas la guerre. Tout cela, c 'est de la frime. 
Par exemple, dans mon quartier, on a mis les gardes devant les centraux 
telephoniques. Cela on Ie fait en cas de revolution, pas de guerre. Et puis je 
suis dessinateur dans la plus grosse fabrique de trains d'aterrissage. 
Jusqu'if it y a trois mois aucun de nous ne devait partir. On etait tous 
affectes speciaux [. . .} Eh bien, it y a deux mois, on nous a change tous nos 
fascicules de mobilisation, et aujourd'hui plus de la moitie de l'usine est 
partie[ .. .} Faudrait que Ie gouvernement soU fou pour faire des choses 
pareilles si l'on devait avoir la guerre. Non, je vous le dis, tout 9a c 'est de la 
fi . , I 21 rzme, on n aura pas a guerre .... 
War may have been declared but it was as if France had finally called Germany's 
bluff. The possibility that the war could resolve itself without any fighting taking 
place would persist right up until May 1940. There was certainly no concept in 
September 1939 of a humiliating defeat for France yet such sentiments would 
evidently contribute to the idea after the defeat that France had been betrayed by its 
leaders. 
Pacifist sentiment and overconfidence appear to be intricately bound up with 
each other but ultimately the failure to take the threat of war seriously came from an 
inherent confidence in France's ability to withstand any invasion. While France had 
failed to come to the aid of Czechoslovakia, Finland, Norway and ultimately Poland, 
there was still widespread confidence that French soil was under no great threat. 
Friedmann confidently predicted in September 1939: "Je suis convaincu qu 'Hitler ne 
peut, en definitive, vaincre.,,22 In his mind, the Germans would inevitably secure 
victories in battles but ultimately France would prevail over Germany. Sadoul, 
listening to conversations in the mess tent, observed a similar opinion: 
Au mess des sous-offs, on a meilleur esprit. On pense que la France sera 
sans peine envahie, par la Suisse, jusqu'if Lyon. Mais nous aurons la 
victoire et nous annexerons toute la rive gauche du Rhin, Hollande 
comprise, nous retablirons la Tchecoslovaquie, etc. 23 
Even the fascist sympathiser Drieu La Rochelle admitted that his memories of the 
way France's defences held during the First World War prevented him from 
imagining a rapid defeat: "A pres la Marne, je ne pus jamais de nouveau croire if la 
defaite. Aujourd 'hui, je ne crois guere non plus if la defaite m itita ire, au brusque 
21 Sadoul, Journal de guerre, pp.16.17. (2.9.39) 
22 Friedmann, Journal de guerre, p.49. (18.9.39) 
23 Sadoul, Journal de guerre, p.146. (5.3.40) The Maginot Line embodied the defensive attitude of 
France. It is significant to note the opinion that these defences were perceived as impregnable, which 
ultimately represented France's overall military capabilities. 
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effondrement - mais je sens plus que jamais la fin de la France.,,24 The imminence of 
war, when French troops moved into Belgium, did nothing to shake confidence in 
ultimate victory: 
Les Belges nous disaient: «Maintenant que vous etes la, it nous semble que 
la guerre est terminee.» Nous acceptions les compliments avec un air 
modeste, mais satisfait. Je n 'etais pas Ie dernier a etre fier d'etre Ie Soldat 
ji-anc;ais, celui qui rouspete toujours mais qui est invincible. Ma figure 
comme ceUe des copains, semblait dire: «Vous allez voir r;a!» Qui pouvait 
resisterPS 
ill this respect, the individual's past experiences were shaping the construction of that 
individual's reality. 
In the early hours of May 10 1940, the German forces began their offensive. 
Within a few days, they had made rapid advances into France. The diarists still 
continued to observe an undying confidence in the might of the French military. 
Sadoul, back from the front, observed in Paris: 
A Paris, qui est presque vide, tout Ie monde est tres calme, tres confiant. On 
demande a ce qu 'on aille au plus vite bombarder les civils allemands, au 
besoin les femmes et les enfants; «faut leur rendre ce qu 'Us nous font», dU-
on souvent, disent aussi mes camarades. En general on ne craint nullement 
une invasion; «Paris, est simplement admirable», me disait ce matin man 
beau-pere au telephone mais certains faits inquietent Eli. 26 
The defensive mindset of both the military and the civilian population would have 
allowed for a certain instance of acceptance of initial German successes. Friedmann, 
who had also returned briefly to Paris, observed even near the end of May that 
confidence in ultimate victory had not dissipated: 
Le soil', parfois, entretiens avec Ie beau-fi'ere du marquis, Ie comte de M, 
ancien ambassadeur a B., vieillard distingue et fin, plein de ponderation et 
de tact dans ses jugements. Malgre les evenements recents, il ne doute pas 
de la victoire. Et, son souci, en ce moment meme, va deja au probleme de la 
reconstruction de I 'Europe. «Comment preocederont-ils? QueUe tache 
eiJrayante!» Nul de nous, a vrai dire, ne semble ejJleure par ia crainte d'une 
foudroyante victoire de I 'AUemagne sur la France. 27 
24 Drieu, Journal, pp.l23-124. (6.12.39) Yet see p.501. He would later argue: Je ne suis pas patti 
comme tant d'autres de ['idee de la dejaite de la France; pour moi, ce nefitt qu'unjait significatif 
d'une situation beaucoup plus ge1U!rale. La position dominante de fa France en Europe etait perdue 
depuis l'extension de I'Empire anglais, ['unite allemande, Ie deveioppement de la Russie et des Etats-
Unis. La nouvelle echelle des puissances nous releguait au second rang. Whilst such ideas were 
certainly espoused by individuals before 1940, the defeat served as a catalyst for the outpouring of 
resentment and disillusionment with France. 
25 Crozet, Louis, Ni obeir, ni commander, ni combattre. Souvenirs militaires d'un mobilise de 1939, 
Cremieux-Brilhac, vol.2. Ouvriers et soldats, p.545. 
26 Sadoul, (25.5.40) 
27 Friedmann, pp.236-237. (29.5.40) 
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The civilians were prepared for protracted battles and a war of attrition but certainly 
not for a lightning defeat. Moret, who had been evacuated from her homeland in 
Sedan, was under the impression that the Germans were simply being led out from 
the forests into the open plains: "L 'autorite militaire commence it s 'en in quieter. Les 
refugies genent les troupes montant au front. La population doit faire preuve de 
patriotisme et de discipline. Elle n 'a rien it craindre. Si besoin hait, on la 
previendrait du danger. ,,28 The last sentence, however, is revealing in that it suggests 
that when the defeat finally dawned upon the French people, they would not be 
forgiving of the government, which, in their eyes, had done nothing to warn or help 
them. 
Reynaud's claim that nous vaincrons parce que nous sommes les plus forts 
appears to have cemented French confidence in the might and supremacy of the 
French military. This statement was much derided after the defeat, yet it did contain a 
certain truth in that the material and human resources of the Allies ultimately proved 
too much for the Axis powers.29 What is important to realise, however, is that this 
was little comfort to the diarists in June 1940. They had not even been prepared for 
the possibility of failure, which would have no doubt compounded their despair and 
shame: 
«Nous vaincrons parce que nous sommes les plus forts». Les Franr;ais y 
croyaient. Les Allemands, eux, lisaient ce slogan comme «Dubo-Dubon-
Dubonnet», et quand Hitler a dit, I 'automne dernier et au printemps, qu'ils 
«se desagregeraient tout seuls», la France a rio Quand il a dit en avril que Ie 
15 juin il serait it Paris, les rires ont repris de plus belle. Allez savoir si 
l'Etat-Major allemand n 'a pas ralenti expres sa marche sur Paris pour que 
les paroles du Fuhrer se verifient. 30 
The media had not given a heroic image of war as they had done in 1914, recognising 
the strong pacifist sentiment of the French people. They chose instead to emphasise 
the possibility of a miracle victory, where Germany would collapse rapidly and the 
war would be won without the need for fighting. This propaganda may well have had 
a calming effect on the diarists when war was declared in 1939 but it certainly had an 
28 Moret, Journal d'une mauvaise Franr;aise, p.35. (20.5.40) 
29 Cremieux-Brilhac, vo1.2. Ouvriers et soldats, p.2l. The eight months from September 1939 to May 
1940 were not sufficient to organise and put to best use the complete resources of the Allies. 
30 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.lOl. (5.6.40) One might argue that the significance of Hitler's 
predictions after the defeat was to further undermine the image of France and reinforce the dominance 
of Germany. See also p.l5. (5.6.40) Bobkowski freely admitted that he had been convinced of France's 
might. It appears that only Bobkowski's wife, Basia, had predicted that Germany would crush France. 
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adverse impact on them in June 1940, after essentially the complete opposite had 
occurred. 
History from above confirms this assumption that the threat of war was not 
taken seriously enough by the French government. This inability to fully appreciate 
the war is represented by France's rearmament programme. While Germany had 
begun rearming earnestly in 1934, France had only tentatively started in 1936 and 
only really got under way in 1937. Though Germany essentially restarted from 
scratch, France still had most of its impressive World War One artillery stocks intact, 
which may well have served to encourage the illusion of supremacy. As well as the 
time factor, France suffered a mental handicap, which aggravated the former. The 
French were deeply attached to peace and, moreover, assumed other countries shared 
their desire for peace. Few had understood the revolutionary and aggressive aspects 
of Nazism and even then it was thought that Hitler's aggression would be confined to 
Central Europe, as Hitler was always quick to point out that he had nothing against 
France. Moreover, the Maginot Line gave the illusion of security31 and together with 
the might of the French military the French could feel secure about any attack. What 
was more significant about the rearmament programme was not so much how late it 
was implemented but, rather, how it was executed. Up until the spring of 1938, and 
even as far as May 1940, the general conviction was that the rearmament programme 
was more of a precaution than a necessity. 32 
What is important to remember is that the realisation that France was 
underprepared for war invariably came after the defeat. Marc Bloch, who served as a 
captain during the fighting in May and June 1940, experienced first-hand France's 
military failings. His private testimony of France's defeat, which he entitled 
L 'etrange dejaite, mirrors Histoire in that it was written after the event had occurred. 
He was convinced that France had been let down by its leaders, and that the French 
military had lost before the fighting had even started: 
Beaucoup d'erreurs diverses, doni les effets s 'accumulerent, ont mene nos 
armees au desastre. Une grande carence, cependant, les domine toutes. Nos 
31 See Sadoul, Journal de guerre, p.146. The belief was that Germany would attack through 
Switzerland in order to bypass the Maginot Line. The Franco-German border was considered to be 
impenetrable but there was no thought of Germany attacking through the Ardennes. 
32 Cremieux-Brilhac, vol.2. Ouvriers et soldats, pp.10-11. It should be noted that the research of 
Robert Frankenstein (Le prix du rearmementji'anr;ais 1935-1939, notably p.222) shows that military 
spending from August 1936 to August 1939 accounted for 48 per cent of budgetary spending, which 
created massive budget deficits and compromised the improvement of social conditions. The problem 
was that France was preparing itself for war in order to avoid war. 
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chefs ou ceux qui agissaient en leur nom n' ont pas su penser cette guerre. 
En d 'autres termes, Ie triomphe des Allemands jut, essentiellement, une 
victoire intellectuelle et c' est peut-etre la ce qu'if y a eu en lui de plus 
grave. 33 
Yet the diarists who had started writing before any fighting had taken place reveal 
that there was no concept of France being underprepared for war. They may well 
have expressed disappointment over the government's failure to avert war but they 
had every confidence in the might and supremacy of the French military. Andre 
Roussin, for example, who was mobilised after the declaration of war, held no doubts 
over France's ability to secure ultimate victory: "Une phrase de mon journal m 'a 
d'abord etonne puis jait sourire: «Tout cela ne peut finir que par une catastrophe 
pour I'Allemagne.» Puis, souligne: «J'en suis absolument convaincu.»,,34 The illusion 
of victory leading up to the German offensive in May 1940, therefore, would make 
the diarists that much more vulnerable to the reality of defeat and that much more 
resentful to the previous government. It would be the previous government, rather 
than the military command, that would be blamed for France's lack of preparedness 
for war. 
QueUe drole de guerre/ 
The rude awakening in the spnng of 1940 to France's ill-founded 
overconfidence in total victory was exacerbated by the period of inaction from 
September 1939 to May 1940, which was known as the Phoney War or la drole de 
guerre. The diarists reveal that there was a subtle shift during this period from an 
aversion to war to an indifference to war. Consequently, they were simply not in the 
frame of mind for war when the Germans began their offensive in May 1940, least of 
all the lightning war that would see the total capitulation of the French army in little 
over a month. Maurice Toesca, a civilian living in Paris, observed that the months of 
inaction had the effect of anaesthetising the French with respect to war: "L 'esprit des 
soldats n 'est pas a la bataille. Les alertes n 'alertent plus personne. Personne ne veut 
croire a la guerre. On espere que «c;a va s 'arranger». ,,35 From a civilian perspective, 
it might be argued that initially there would have been relief that outright war had not 
33 Bloch, Marc, L 'et/"ange de/aile, (Paris: Gallimard, 1990) p.66. 
34 Roussin, Rideau gris et habit vert, pp.90-91. 
35 Toesca, Cinq ans de patience, p.34. (12.3.40) 
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come with the declaration of war. Yet as la drole de guerre progressed, the idea of 
war became increasingly confused: 
On vit un drole de moment. Personne ne peut accepter fa paix d 'Hitler; mais 
queUe guerre va+on faire? Que signifie au juste fe mot guerre? II y a un 
mots, quand il a ete imprime en grosses lettres dans les journaux, c 'etair une 
horreur informe, quelque chose de confus, mais de plein. Maintenant, ce 
n 'est plus nuUe part, ni rien. Je me sens detendue et vague, j 'attends, je ne 
sais pas quai. On dirait que tout le monde attend. D 'ailleurs, c' est 9a qui 
frappe d'abord, a travers les livres de Pierrefeu, dans f'histoire de fa guerre 
de 14: c 'est une attente de quatre ans, coupee de massacres completement 
inutiles; on dirait que c 'est fe temps qui travaille, et lui seu!. 36 
De Beauvoir inadvertently hints at the problems that the French civilian population 
would face during the Occupation. Though France would be spared four years of 
pointless massacres, the fundamental concept of attente would remain. This sense of 
waiting for history to take its course had already been experienced by the diarists 
during the Phoney War. It had the effect of disconnecting them from the events of the 
war and created the impression that the war operated in another dimension beyond 
their control. 
The waiting for events to unfold also had the detrimental effect of creating 
doubt as to why war had been waged in the first place. Government reports from 
Vaucluse, Haute-Savoie, Allier and Rhone revealed three common reactions after the 
declaration of war: 
- On ne peut plus etre mobilise taus fes trois mots! II faut y ailer, puisque 
Dafadier dit qu 'on ne peut pas faire autrement Enfin, personne au presque 
dans Ie peuple ne doute de fa victoire, meme sf 1'on effraie du prix qu 'elle 
coutera. 37 
There was a initially a clear determination to preserve France's honour by standing 
up to Hitler once and for all, and this was helped by a confidence in France's ability 
to get the job done. Yet it is interesting to note that the public needed to be told by 
Daladier that war was necessary, which indicates that there would be further 
reperCUSSIOns for Daladier's government, given that it was perceived to be 
responsible for France getting involved in the war. The longer la drole de guerre 
36 De Beauvoir, La force de I'age, pAlS. See also Roussin, Rideau gris et habit vert, p.87. For the 
military perspective, and Sadoul, lournal de guerre, p.89, (12.12.39) and p.87: A quai sert de 
s 'exercel' afail'e la guel'l'e, puisqu 'elle est declalY!e, mais qu'on lie la fa it pas. (12.12.39) 
37 Cremieux-Brilhac, vol. 1. La guerre oui au non, p.59. The American Henry Miller was struck by the 
mixture of resolution and the absence of bellicose rhetoric: 1Is par/aient de fa guerre comme d'une 
tache a accomplir, une cOlwie dont ils s'acquittaient salis discussion parce qu'ils etaient citoyens 
fral1l;ais. En verite, ce qui comptatt a leurs yeux, c 'etail le retour au foyer. (Henry Miller, Souvenirs, 
souvenirs, Paris: Gallimard, 1953) The pacifist sentiment prevented any overt enthusiasm towards the 
war but the confidence in the French military encouraged a determination to get the job done. 
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went on, however, the more difficult it became for the diarists who had mobilised to 
accept or even entertain the possibility of war: 
Plus que jamais en ce moment, sentiment de stagnation, d'attente. CelL'C-la 
memes qui s y refusaient Ie plus energiquement commencent a admettre que 
ce sera une longue affaire. En ce cercle de nuidecins, dont plusieurs sonl 
pie ins de bon sens, les opinions, previsions, interpretations possibles 
s'intelferent, se croisent, s 'echangent. Un theme affleure sans cesse dans les 
reflexions des anciens combattants de I' autre guerre: «En 1914, c' eta it plus 
clair. »38 
Friedmann observed that the initial resolve to stand up to Hitler had rapidly 
diminished over the harsh winter. The absence of fighting inevitably raised the 
question why had the French mobilised for war when the so-called enemy had not 
attacked? The more the Phoney War dragged on, the more their reason for being 
mobilised was undermined. 
The perceived betrayal of the Russians, after the signing of the Russo-German 
pact of non-intervention, further contributed to this uncertainty. The communist 
sympathiser, Sadoul, remarked how just one month into the Phoney War, the media 
were determined to replace Germany with Russia as the real enemy: 
Non, it n y a pas, dans chaque journal, la defense de ce mot d 'ordre tres 
simple et qui devrait dominer toute la propagande: Hitler ennemi public 
no.1. Et, paree que, depuis trois semaines, ee mot d'ordre n 'a ete nulle part 
ni defendu ni developpe, on entend Ie plus souvent, dans les conversations, 
dans la rue, dans Ie tram, au cantonnement, chacun s'inquieter de I 'attitude 
russe ou s 'en indigner. Tanclis qu 'au debut de septembre chacun 
maudissait ce «cochon» d'Hitler et parlait de la necessite d'enfinir avec lui, 
une fots pour toutes. Non seulement eet etat d 'esprit n 'a pas developpe, mats 
it a ete pratiquement ctetruit. La premiere chose pourtant, sf I 'on veut faire 
une guerre, me semble etre d'expliquer aux soldats et au peuple qu'ils ont 
. , b 39 un enneml a com attre. 
This had the effect, in Sadoul's mind, of confusing des irs et realites. In this 
case, many French believed that communism was the real threat so they constructed a 
reality where Hitler was not the main threat. One of the rare detailed observations of 
Rist during the Phoney War centred on this very issue: 
Ce que I 'avenir ignorera probablement, et ce qu 'iZ faut retenir, c 'est Ie role 
formidable que Ie conservatisme social, la crainte du communisme et du 
bolchevisme ontjoue dans la politique etrangfwe de ces dernieres annees en 
38 Friedmann, Journal de guerre, p.180. (27.2.40) See also p.20!. (10.4.40) 
39 Sadoul, Journal de guerre, pp.41-42. (23.9.39) See p,46 The media ignored the possibility that 
Russia had taken the bigger share of Poland so had, in turn, denied the Germans precious territory. 
Moreover, if France was supposed to protect Poland why did France not attack Russia as well? 
However, all good propaganda should not only manipulate public opinion but also respond to public 
sentiment. 
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France et en Angleterre. Cette crainte obnubile des centaines de personnes, 
les rend incapables de saisir les evenements autrement qu 'a travers ce verre 
deformant. De la des sympathies cachees mais certaines a I 'egard 711eme de 
Hitler, de ses methodes, de ses violences. 40 
In this climate of uncertainty, each individual's beliefs clouded their perception of 
reality. Sadoul and Friedmann, for example, believed that Socialism would triumph, 
whereas others, as Rist observed, preferred to believe that National Socialism could 
ensure the protection of bourgeois interests. The danger was that these often 
conflicting beliefs caused many to lose sight of the reason why France was really at 
war. 
The more the Phoney War went on, the more it created a type of vacuum where 
the French were not only detached from the war but also made indifferent to it: 
On se leve vers 8h, on travaille un peu a des blockhaus et des arrangements 
de cabanes, on va chercher la soupe (Ie soir, en pleine nuit, c 'est une dr6le 
de corvee). (:a n 'est pas du tout tragique, c 'est moche, mais ce qu'if y a 
surtout, c 'est qu 'on n 'arrive ja711ais a s'indigner vraiment ( .. ) On ne sent 
vrai711ent rien ( .. ) Je ne suis jamais triste et jamais fatigue (..), je suis 
. I 'd b' 41 slmp ement Vl e et a rutl ... 
The feelings of lassitude and emptiness also hint at how the French would feel with 
the slow progression of the Occupation years.42 The feeling of being in another 
dimension to the events slowly occurring around them is crucial in understanding the 
lethargy and apathy of opinion throughout the Occupation. Furthermore, as Sadoul 
comments, the absence of action was no preparation for the lightning war that ensued, 
which would have only served to compound the debilitating effect of defeat: 
Huit mois de fausse guerre ont demoralise les troupes endormies dans Ie 
repos, Ie tirage-au-cul, I 'ennui, la saoulerie. Apres quatre jours a peine de 
vraie guerre, les joueurs de belote et les champions de football ont vu les 
chars foncer sur eux, les avions les mitrailler en rase-mottes. lis n 'ont pas 
tenu Ie coup. 43 
It would also have the effect of intensifying the desire for an end to be brought to the 
fighting. 
40 Rist, Une saison gatee, p.37. (8.9.39) Rist was targeting this fear of communism at the bourgeois 
elite, who feared revolution and the eradication of their interests. 
41 Sarh'e, Jean-Paul, Les carnets de la dr6le de guerre novembre 1939 -mars 1940, (Paris: Gallimard, 
1983), p.200 (22.12.39) 
42 Claude Barrois, David Marlowe, Louis Crocq, Walter Reed and Franklin Jones in Psychiatrie des 
guerres a faible intensite de combat, International Congress ofPsychiah'y, (VielUla, 1983), argued that 
tIus type of reaction nostalgique is symptomatic of wars with low levels of combat action. Crenlieux-
Brilhac, vol.2. Ouvriers et soldats, pp.432-433. The same could apply to the Occupation years where 
the French had been removed from the fighting. 
43 Sadoul, Journal de guerre, p.207. (18.5.40) 
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Part Two 
The inlpact of la debacle and the defeat 
Ce qu 'il y a d 'affreux dans la situation actuelle, c' est I 'invraisernblable soudainete 
avec laquelle elle s' est produite. Du jour au lendemain, nous avons du passer de la 
plus grande con fiance dans une resistance invincible au fond de I 'abEme Ie plus 
profond de fa defaite. Nous avons encore de fa peine a croire a la realite. 44 
Effolldremellt: miltaire et civil. 
The diarists' reaction to the emphatic, rapid nature of France's military defeat 
must be understood within the context of their previous mode of thinking. They had 
overwhelmingly believed in the supremacy of the French military but, as the epigraph 
illustrates, they had no time to alter their thinking. The fighting was over too soon to 
appreciate that the French military had simply been outperformed by the Gennan 
military. Rist noted that the defeat had left the French paralysed by the events of the 
war. Their state of shell-shock would temporarily blind them from the reality of 
defeat. The majority of the diarists were not directly exposed to the fighting but it is 
interesting to note that even the diarists who were fighting on the frontlines reveal 
very little of the actual fighting in their diaries. Instead, they emphasised the chaos 
caused by the lack of governmental organisation, as opposed to the panic inspired by 
the rapidly advancing Wehrmacht. The annistice would encourage the perception that 
the military debacle had at least been brought to an end whereas the legacy of the 
civilian debacle would endure well beyond the cessation of hostilities. The emphasis 
on the civilian debacle, therefore, would have the effect of accentuating the sense of 
being betrayed by the government and downplaying the role of the milit31Y command 
in the defeat. 
It was not so much the fighting that haunted the civilian population but, rather, 
the fear of being caught up in the fighting. Werth, on leaving Paris for Saint-Amour, 
had been initially surprised at how orderly and calm the people were: "i! n y a point 
44 Rist, Une saison galee, p.79. (4.7.40) 
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encore de mauvaise humeur nt meme d 'irnpatience. ,,45 Yet with the slow progress and 
the imminent fall of Paris, there would be a rapid deterioration: "Ces gentillesses, ces 
complaisances, elles auront demain disparu. ,,46 The French civilian population may 
have been forgiving of early failures to withstand the German invasion but by June it 
became increasingly apparent that the cause was lost, and that there seemed little 
point in holding out as long as possible. Moret, for example, who had maintained the 
hope of victory in May, had adopted a defeatist attitude by June: 
La radio annonce ce matin que les allies ont demande I'intervention des 
Etats-Unis, sinon its capitulent. Chantage ou sincerite desesperee? Ce peut 
etre encore la guerre ou la paix. Mon Dieu, que ce soit la paix! ,,47 
There was no Gaullist suggestion that the battle was lost but not the war. The desire 
for peace, shared by many citizens, removed any consideration of what the cost of 
that peace might be. The fall of Paris would spark the growing sentiment that it was 
pointless to continue the battle: 
Qu 'est-ce qui se passerait sf les Allemands se mettaient a bombarder les 
refugies? Quel massacre! Pourquoi continuer maintenant que Paris est pris. 
C'est plus la peine de se battre. Qu 'est-ce qu'its attendent pour fa ire la paix, 
tout de suite!48 
As the French soldiers retreated further into France, the civilians became increasingly 
apprehensive that they would be brought into the fighting. It is no coincidence that 
the word tranquille figures widely among the diaries. In essence, this was the 
motivation for the Exodus: the search for tranquillite. This desire to be sheltered 
away from the effects of war had little or no concern for the needs of the nation: 
"Tout ce que je souhaite, c 'est de retrouver au plus vite ma femrne et rnes gosses, et 
de recommencer avec eux rna bonne petite vie tranquille, est la phrase qui revient Ie 
plus souvent dans les conversations. ,,49 
It could be argued that the exode swelled to such an extent that it exerted a 
greater influence on the diarists than the fighting itself. Historians agree on a figure 
between eight and ten million people, along with hundreds of thousands from 
45 Werth, 33 jours, p.14. 
46 Ibid., p.16. 
47 Moret, Journal d'ul1e mauvaise Franr;aise, p.48. (14.6.40) 
48 Sadoul, Journal de guerre, p.325. (14.6.40) 
49 Ibid., p.387. (28.6.40) See also p.299 (9.6.40), p.384 (25.6.40) and pp.36-37 (18.9.39) This search 
for tranquillite did not end with the signing of the armistice. It would continue throughout the 
Occupation. See Werth p.322, Deposition, (17.7.42): Paysans Oil mal'chands, Us souhaitellt Ie depart 
des Allemands et la realisation d'un ideal petit-bourgeois, une vie tranquille. See Bemanos, Lettre aux 
Anglais, p.45. Certain bourgeoisie, en 1914, camme en 1940, les h07l1mes dont je parle eussent 
va/antlers sacrifie la grandeur it la s(;kurite, invente une France agricole, pacifique et reacti0l111aire, 
Ott ils pussent esperer vivre enfin tranquilles, it l'abri des troubles saciaux. 
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Belgium and Luxembourg, who were caught up in the Exodus of May and June 1940. 
That is almost a quarter of the population, which is even more significant when one 
realises that most of the refugees came predominantly from the north-east of France. 
In fact, nearly half of the inhabitants from those regions fled from the German forces, 
and in many places close to the Belgian border, both rural and urban, the inhabitants 
were entirely evacuated. 50 One is struck with the sense of terror and panic amongst 
those fleeing and the absence of any consideration other than their own safety. They 
had no destination in mind other than to head south away from the fighting: 
Les Parisiens, maintenant, partaient a pied. Un vieillard poussait avec 
difficulte une charrette a bras contenant des oreillers, une petite flUe et un 
vieux chien qui hurlait desesperement. Boulevard Raspail, un interminable 
courant de refugies s 'ecoulait ... L 'epicier du coin de la rue du Con ten tin 
abandonne sa boutique sans meme fermer les portes ... Ce n 'etait plus le 
depart, c 'hait la fuite ... Des dizaines de milliers de personnes se massaient 
encore autour de la gare de Lyon, bien qu 'on y racont{it que les trains ne 
partaient plus... La radio transmettait des messages et des appels 
contradictoires: tantot ['evacuation de la population hait assuree, tantot les 
Parisiens devaient rester chez eux et garder leur calme. 51 
These feelings are significant as they imply a desperation to see an end to the 
fighting, which explains the French people's favourable response to Petain's call for 
an armistice. That the hero of Verdun should call to lay down arms was not worthy of 
consideration. All that mattered was that he was proposing a way out to the French 
people, which they had been blindly hoping for. It was not simply a matter of putting 
an end to the fighting but also to the civilian chaos caused by the fighting. The lack of 
preparation and direction from above created the impression that one no longer 
belonged to a national or local community. Furthermore, the Exodus created a sense 
of dislocation. Werth remarked on his journey to Saint-Amour: "Je pleure sur la 
France, dans un paysage que je connais pas, qui n 'est pas de ceux que j 'ai appris a 
aimer, un pays age plat avec exces de del. ,,52 Those fleeing their homes were exposed 
to different parts of France, which may well have been unfamiliar to them. Moreover, 
their welcome may well have been an unwelcome one due to the growing supply 
problems. It is understandable that they should feel a stranger and that their thoughts 
were of home and of their family. Werth, for example, had left his wife Suzanne in 
50 Rajsfus, Maurice, Les Frmu;ais de la debacle: juin-septembre 1940, un si bel ete, (Paris: Cherche 
midi, 1997) p.37. 
51 Ehrenbourg, Ilya, La nuit tambe, p.342 and Audiat, Pierre, Paris pendant la guerre, pp.11-12, 
Rajsfus, Les Frmu;ais de la debacle, pp.43-44. 
52 Werth, 33 jaurs, p.67. 
51 
Paris, and he had received no news of his son Claude. In addition, he had to come to 
terms with the fact that the Gemmns had occupied his country. He often observed 
German soldiers playing games, singing, or sunbathing and kept repeating to himself: 
"Je ne suis plus en France. ,,53 
The increase in refugee numbers, particularly in June, provided significant 
logistical problems for those regions receiving the swelling refugee numbers. 
Although nearly a quarter of the population was directly involved in the Exodus, 
there were few parts of France that were not indirectly affected by the arrival of so 
many refugees. The feeling that the national and local governments had abandoned 
the French in their hour of greatest need only served to accentuate the feeling of 
desperation, and created the impression that the French were unable to restore order 
by themselves. The question on everyone's minds was when would this chaos end?: 
Les gens du Limousin au du Poitou, qui ant deja vu passer les Lorrains, en 
septembre, les Belges, en mat, et les premiers flats des Parisiens, y ant use 
leur pitie. ns opposent maintenant aux arrivants des visages fermes. Les 
affames qui demandent toujours la meme chose, toujours ce qui manque -
du pain, de l'essence - finissent par les exasperer ... La querelle monte vile. 
Les refugies appellent sur Ie village, la famine, les bombes, to utes les 
calamites dont Us semblent proprietaires. 54 
The lack of sympathy for the distress of refugees and the feelings of resentment 
towards them hardly did anything to encourage a strong feeling of fraternity amongst 
the French.55 It encouraged, instead, a culture of selfishness where the individual's 
needs were placed highest, and everyone else was perceived as competition for scarce 
resources. 56 
Moreover, not only was there a culture of selfishness but there was also one of 
mistrust. The notion of a 'fifth column' had encouraged the idea of an enemy within 
before the war: 
La panique gagnait Ie peuple en marche. Trap de voitures criblees de balles, 
trap de cerveaux encore hallucines par la vision de colonnes de refugies 
mitrailles par d'enormes avions glissant au ras des arbres ... Ce n 'etatt plus 
Ie sentiment d'une migration mais celui d'une impitoyable catastrophe ... La 
moindre lueur de phare provoquait des cof(:res hysteriques. Ces salauds 
53 Ibid., pp.68-69. 
54 Alfred, Journal de la France, mars 1939 - juillet 1940, (JEP, 1941), pp.336-337. See 
also Toesca, Cinq ems de patience, p.50. (7.6.40) 
55 See Friedmann, Journal de guerre, p.244. (30.5.40) 
56 Sadoul, Journal de guerre, p.323. (13.6.40) Diarists, such as Sadoul, did seem genuinely concerned 
for those caught up in the exodus but the problem appeared so great as to be almost unbelievable. 
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vont nous faire reperer, ne sont-its pas de la Cinquieme colonne? C'est la 
troisieme fois qu'its rallument, its font des signaux ... 57 
Inevitably such a swift and emphatic defeat would cause the French nation to 
internalise the defeat. The enemy within, as opposed to Germany, was the real culprit. 
The Vichy regime was quick to point out that there was both a good and bad France 
and that its aim was to root out and eliminate the latter. Werth observed a nation, 
shamed by defeat, but eager nonetheless to find a culprit: 
«Nous sommes vendus, nous sommes trahis ... » Cette accusation populaire, 
que j 'ai depuis si souvent entendue sur la route, il semblait qu 'elle se suffit a 
elle-meme. Je n 'ai jamais obtenu de niponse a la question: «Par qui? ... » 
Mais it y a un sens populaire de divination qui depasse les tiitonnements de 
la critique. 58 
Such a statement allows a certain freedom to lay the blame on whoever or whatever 
the people wanted. This may well have differed from one individual to another but 
the important thing to consider is that this blame was never attributed to petain. 
Vichy, therefore, was absolved from any responsibility for the situation in which 
France found itself. The thought that France had been betrayed from within was 
perhaps more of a comforting thought than entertaining the idea that France, as a 
whole, was to blame for the defeat. 59 
It is clear in many diaries that the blame for the defeat was principally 
apportioned to the previous government. Sadoul observed during the Exodus a 
complete lack of organisation from above as well as a complete lack of authority and 
direction: 
Une femme m'interpelle. Je lui reponds. Elles sont bien tOt trente refugiees a 
m'interpeller, a me demander conseil, parce que je suis un homme, que j 'ai 
un un iforme, et que depuis des heures elles n' ont trouve personne a qui 
s 'a dresser, ni un garde-mobile, ni un garde-champetre, ni un agent, ni meme 
un conseiller municipal. OU allaient donc les gardes-mobiles en pullman? Et 
les flics a roulettes de la police parisienne, dont les velos nous ont de passes, 
un peu avant Sully? Les pompiers sont partis avec leurs pompes, les agents 
avec leur autorite et leurs matraques, mais nulle part sur les chemins de la 
retraite, quelqu 'un pour eteindre les incendies ou organiser la circulation 
aux carrefours. 6o 
57 Serge, Victor, Les Derniers Temps, p.137, Rajsfus, Les FraJ1(;ais de la debfzcle, p.36. See also 
Sadoul, Journal de guerre, p.42. (23.9.39) 
58 Werth, 33 jours, pp.28-29. See Sadoul, Journal de guerre, p.367 Trahis, nous sommes trahis. 
(17.6.40) Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, pp.101-102. (12.9.40) 
59 See Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.123. (17.9.40) 
60 Sadoul, Journal de guerre, p.351. (16.6.40) 
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Although preparations had been made for the evacuation of civilian populations in the 
north-east of France, the confidence in France's ability to repel any German invasion 
appears to have caused a complete lack of preparation for the possibility of a wider 
successful German invasion. Sadoul entered a town where women asked him for 
advice, as his soldier's uniform represented to them some sort of authority, but were 
too demoralised to heed his warnings: 
Je suis pris de panique ... Que fa ire pour ces malheureux? Je tourne la tete. 
Mon convoi est en train de filer. Je cours pour Ie rattraper sur la route ou if 
s 'engage. C'est moins un depart qu 'une fuite. Honte de cette totale 
desorganisation. Une once d'autorite suffirait a aiguiller sur les forets 
proches, ou elles ne risqueraient rien, ces femmes folies de terreur ... 61 
Such conspicuous disorganisation would have only served to encourage the idea that 
France had been betrayed. Vichy was only too willing to exploit such a climate of 
suspicion and mistrust, and would place the blame entirely on the previous 
Republican regime. 
The individual testimony of Bloch, written after June 1940, represents this 
desire after the defeat to go beyond the failings of the French military. Although 
Bloch had been directly involved in the fighting, he was more concerned with why 
France had been defeated rather than how it had been defeated. He was certainly 
under no illusions that the blame for the defeat lay squarely on the shoulders of the 
military command: "en un mot, parce que nos chefs, au milieu de beaucoup de 
contradictions, ont pretendu, avant tout, renouveler, en 1940, la guerre de 1915-
1918. Les Allemands faisaient celie de 1940. ,,62 Yet it must be said that the civilian 
population had also envisaged fighting in terms of the First W orId War. Bloch 
believed that the foundations of the defeat had been laid well before May 1940. His 
perception that the French forces had been outnumbered illustrates his belief that 
France had not just been shown up on the battlefield: 
Cette guerre acceleree, il lui fa lla it, naturellement, son materiel. Les 
Allemands se I' etaient donne. La France non, ou, du moins, pas en 
suffisance. On l'a dit et redit: nous n 'avons pas eu assez de chars, pas assez 
d'avions, pas assez de cam ions, de motos ou de tracteurs et, par la, nous 
avons ete empeches, des Ie principe, de mener les operations comme if eat 
convenu de Ie faire. Cela est vrai, incontestablement et if n 'est pas moins 
61 Ibid., pp.352-353. (16.6.40) 
62 Bloch, L 'etrange dejaite, p.84. 
54 
certain que de cette lamentable et fatale penurie, les causes ne furent pas 
toutes d 'ordre specijiquement militaire. 63 
Such a view would have been encouraged by the military command's overestimation 
of the German forces. History reveals that this overestimation was politically 
motivated rather than militarily motivated, as it is no coincidence that the defeatist 
supporters of 1939 were the most vocal supporters of the National Revolution and 
even collaboration. The military leaders wanted to be seen as the ones responsible for 
revealing the sins ofthe nation rather than being targeted as the problem itself. 64 
The sense of betrayal and chaos would be so great that not only the 
appointment of Petain as the leader of a new regime would be welcomed. Some even 
went so far as to welcome the German military presence in France. Werth remarked 
how some French were fooled into thinking that the Germans were also providing 
protection and maintaining order. He visited a farm where he encountered a Parisian 
who was also caught up in the Exodus: 
Je ne repeterai ses propos parce qu'its expriment Ie renoncement total, qui, 
chez une partie des Fram;ais, suivit la panique, parce qu 'on y decouvre cette 
brutale oscillation de l'emotion de peur a l'illusion de la securite. lIs 
craignaient que les Allemands ne tuent tout, en pass ant. lIs ont la vie sauve. 
lIs ont fait «Ouf» et ils ne savent meme plus s'its sont desesperes ou 
satisfaits. Cet homme ne conte point avec simplicite son exode, son aventure 
personnelle. II y a dans ses paroles de l'etonnement et de la colere: «A 
Ozouer, on a trouve les Allemands ... lIs nous ont donne une chambre». (II 
n 'ajoute pas que Ie village etair a peu pres vide et que les Allemands y 
etaient peu nombreux). «lIs nous ont donne une chambre et its nous ont 
donne a manger, Ie midi et Ie soir ... Les Franr;ais n 'en ont pas fait autant.» 65 
What the French craved after the trauma of defeat was a sense of order and security. 
The young girl Frederique Moret, who had witnessed the unruly behaviour of the 
French soldiers during the Phoney War, had no faith in their abilities to restore order 
and guarantee people's protection: 
Sedan est pris! Les Allemands sont chez nous, dans mon pays, dans ma 
maison. Eh bien, je m 'en fous. lIs ne seront toujours pas pires que la drole 
63 Ibid., pp.81-82. Later, he would acknowledge in a footnote: Je me rends compte mieux aujourd'hui 
que ce materiel, certainement ins uffisan t, ne manquait cependant point autant qu 'on 1 'a dit. Il 
manquait sur le fi·ont. Mais nous avions, aI' arriere, des chars immobilises dans les magasins et des 
avions qui ne volerent jamais. Les uns comme les autres, pmfois, en pieces detachees. 
64 Cremieux-Brilhac, voU. La guerre oui ou non, p.121. See also vo1.2. Ouvriers et soldats, pp.167-
168, for additional statistics concerning French and German forces. History reveals that the lack of 
French armour was illusory, born from the overestimation of German armour. What was different was 
how the Germans used their armour. 
65 Werth, 33 jours, p.96. See also p.B5: je comme1U;ais seulement d'apercevoir, chez quelques 
Franr;ais l'evanouissement de toute pudeur nationale ou l'agenouillement devant unefigure supposee 
de l'ordre, de "ordre dans l'absolu, de l'ordre qui ne tient compte d'aucune resistance humaine. 
55 
d'armee de la dr61e de ~uerre. lis ne pourront pas etre plus sales. lis ne 
pilleront pas davantage. 6 
Such an attitude had the danger of encouraging acceptance of the Gennan military 
presence in France. The Germans could be seen to be providing a service, which 
masked the true nature of their military presence in France. 
Shame or relief? 
Many diarists observed that the relief over the slgmng of the armistice 
superseded any feelings of shame over the defeat. Indeed, there was an acceptance of 
defeat even before the signing of the armistice or, at least, an awareness that the 
French had reached their breaking point. Sadoul kept on hearing remarks from people 
fleeing Paris: 
« Va falloir apprendre it marcher au pas de l'ote» ou «Est-ce que ma 
chemise kaki va pouvoir servir de chemise brune?» Que dira-t-on quand on 
saura la prise de Paris? 11 ne stiffit pas que Ie gouvernement veuille 
continuer la lutte, il faut aussi que ses troupes, que Ie pays tout entier Ie 
veuille. Etje crots bien que personne n 'en veut plus ou n 'en peut plus. 67 
Friedmann argued that after the armistice there was an unwillingness to own up to 
what had happened to France. He believed that too many were taking the soft option 
of believing that peace had granted France the blessing of no longer needing to think 
about the war: 
Aujourd 'hut, chez beaucoup de Fram;ais, je ne trouve pas I' expression de la 
douleur devant Ie malheur de la France: mats, it travers ces villages, ces 
villes, ces cantonnements du Limousin, du Perigord et de la Guyenne, chez 
trop de civils et de militaires de l'exode, je n 'at dtscerne, dans ces journees 
d 'un ete pmfaitement pur, qu 'une sorte de detente satisfaile (et parfois 
presque epanouie) dans l'animale conscience de savolr que «pour nous, 
, fi' I ' . . d I 68 C est znl» ... et mconsclence e tout e reste. 
It is significant to note that these regions were situated outside the Occupied Zone, 
which would have encouraged the idea that the armistice had gained a certain kind of 
victory for these regions. There appeared to be no consideration of those regions 
which did remain under German control. Yet even within the Occupied Zone, the 
Germans were keen to stress the fact that the war was over for the French. A German 
66 Moret, Journal d'une mauvaise Fram;aise, p.3l. (15.5.40) 
67 Sadoul, Journal de guerre, p.325. (13.6.40) See also p.354: Je III 'ell moque, dU I 'Ull d'eux tres fort, 
d'une voix qui chante,je m 'en moque que nous soyons Fra11(;ais ou Boches, pounlu qu 'onfasse fa paix 
aujourd'/zui... (16.6.40) 
68 Friedmann, Journal de guerre, p.307. (28.6.40) 
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soldier remarked to Jean Malaquais: "Nous sommes tous des freres; et vous, les 
Fram;ais, vous avez de la chance: pour vous la guerre est finie ... ,,69 
This illusion that life could continue as normal after the signing of the armistice 
would be first promulgated by the French soldiers. This illusion was created by their 
inability to see past the defeat. Jiinger invited some captured French officers to dine 
with him and his soldiers, and noted their overwhelming acceptance of defeat: 
Ces hommes jatigwis etaient visiblement dans l'etat de dormeurs qui voient 
un affreux cauchemar prendre tout a coup une tournure favorable. [. .. ] La 
plupart de ces hommes etaient deja completement emousses. Ils ne posaient 
que deux questions: Leur donnerail-on a manger? La paix etait-eUe signee? 
Je jis repondre que Petain avait propose un armistice. L 'armistice etait-it 
signe? L 'inestimable valeur de la paix apparaissait ici a l'evidence. 7o 
Inherent in this overwhelming desire for peace is the belief that peace would see their 
lives return to normal. They had no concept that the war would continue and that 
Germany would require their labour to maintain its war machine. They were simply 
focused on escaping the fighting and allowed that to blind them to any contemplation 
of the future: 
Entendant des gars perorer haut et clair que la liberation de taus et de 
chacun ne jait pas un pli, que c 'est affaire de jormalites, de convois, qu 'ai-je 
besoin d y mettre mon grain de sel? «Mais, les potes, ai-je dil a peu pres, 
vouz prenez vas desirs pour des rea lites. La guerre n 'est pas jinie, loin s 'en 
faut. La defaile de la France n'est qu'un episode dans la partie de 
brigandage en cours. Plus Ie Reich etendra ses conquetes et plus il aura 
besoin d' esclaves pour faire toumer sa machine de mort. Alors, la, nous 
autres, ses prisonniers, en fait de liberation, it nous fera pisser Ie sang, et 
pas chez toi, dans ton bled, mats outre-Rhin, et pendant des annees 
71 
encore ... 
It appears that many did not comprehend that the military debacle would have 
serious, enduring repercussions for France. 
The situation was not helped by the fact that no one could tell what was going 
to happen next. Paris had been occupied before by foreign military forces: the 
Prussian occupation, after their victory in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, being the 
most recent example. The First World War had also seen the German occupation of 
69 Malaquais, lournal de guerre, p.181. (27.6.40) See also Friedmann, p.203. 
70 Jiinger, la/'dins et routes, (Paris: Christian Bourgois Editeur, 1979) pp.204-20S. (18.6.40) See 
Rajsfus, Les Franr;ais de la debacle, p.64. It would be wrong to think that the French soldiers facing 
the Gemlan soldiers chose to flee rather than fight. In less than six weeks, there were more than 92 000 
killed, or 2 000 killed on average each day, which was higher than the average of 900 during the First 
World War. Although some soldiers exploited the exodus and joined the civilian masses, a much more 
significant number were taken prisoner 
71 Malaquais, lournal de guerre, p.188. (2.7.40) 
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territories in the north-east of France. Yet the occupation of almost two-thirds of 
France was unprecedented. Consequently, the armistice72 provided no clear 
assurances as to what the future would hold for France: "Armistice - armistice ... 
J'essayais d'apprehender le sens de ce mot, la signification, la portee, htitivement, 
febrilement, comme pour dejouer un piege mortal. - Il faut, il faut, me repetais-je, il 
faut ... Je ne savais pas ce qu 'il fallait.,,73 Before the signing of the armistice, there 
was the perception that France was like a sinking, rudderless ship. The notion of 
P6tain acting as a shield against the Germans dispelled this notion. Yet even more 
importantly, Vichy's inception was marked by perhaps its most telling achievement: 
the restoration of peace. Its motives were simply not questioned. Sadoul observed a 
crowd of civilians and soldiers listening to de Gaulle's speech: 
Il est tres dur pour le gouvernement Petain,dit que l 'armistice qu'il va 
signer est une faute contre l 'honneur et les interets supremes du pays, qu 'il 
placera la France sous la dependance de l 'Allemagne. Il appelle les 
ojjiciers, les soldats, les specialistes a passer en Angleterre pour continuer 
la guerre. Ce discours est mal accueilli. - Vas-y te battre, eh, salaud! T'as le 
cul dans ton fauteuil et tu veux que les autres se fassent encore tuer. Tu peux 
toujours courir! Ce sont les soldats qui parlent, mais les habitants et les 
refugies les approuvent. La troupe et les civils en ont assez. Ils veulent la 
. , . 74 pmx a tout pnx. 
The consequences of the armistice were irrelevant to a nation stunned by defeat. The 
only thing that mattered was restoring peace. There was certainly no desire to prolong 
the suffering of those perceived to have been betrayed by the previous government. 
The acceptance of the armistice by the French people, however, must be 
qualified. Did it also mean that the French were prepared for a political regime under 
German supervision? This question seems much more difficult to answer. From an 
historian's perspective, it appears that the regime starting to emerge in Bordeaux and 
then Vichy was less important, for the majority of the French population, than the 
certainty of the need for the return to peace and the hope of a speedy return of the 
prisoners of war. How many were actually interested in the actual clauses of the 
72 Goutard, Colonel A., La Revue de Paris, (October, 1960), pp.79-95. It must be noted that the 
armistice of Compiegne was not in effect an armistice. An armistice implies a cease-fIl'e, a tempol'ary 
halt in fighting but not the surrendering of weapons to the enemy. The term capitulation is more 
appropriate, as articles four and fIve saw the handing ovel' to the Germans of vil'tually all of France's 
war material, including that of the Unoccupied Zone. 
73 Malaquais, Journal de guerre, p.168. (19.6.40) 
74 Sadoul, Journal de guerre, p.378. (23.6.40) See also Roussin, rideau gris et habit vert, p.101: 
Encore un gbuiral, d'ailleurs! On venait de voir de quai ils haient capables, Ie gbuiralissi711e en tete! 
Celui de Londres n 'hait-if pas aussi un mediocre qui se croyait Ie plus fort? Son ton meme, de 
mauvais acteur de l'Odeon, Ie rendait suspect. Et qui etait-if pour se permettre d'insulter Ie sacro-
saint vaillqueur de Verdun qui venait de faire a la France Ie don de sa personne? 
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armistice rather than the general fact that the fighting had stopped? How many 
realised that aside from the capitulation of the army and the handing over of all of 
France's war material to the Gennans, the armistice also called for French 
'collaboration' with the German military authorities?75 All that was certain to the 
French was that they had been taken out of the fighting. The diarists reveal that the 
individual had withdrawn from the national community and was no longer concerned 
with public interests. Peace had been obtained and the consequences of that peace 
mattered little: "Le journal est arrive a I 'heure habituelle, it annonce officiellement 
l'armistice, et en detaille fes conditions. Mme F. a rompu fa bande et, apres un coup 
d'ceil discret, replie les papiers: "Je lirai ce soir, sij'ai fe temps. ,,,,76 The illusion of 
normality had returned to France: in Paris the metro started running again, the 
newspapers reappeared, the cinemas, theatres and music-halls reopened and the race 
courses as well as other sporting events were hugely popular again. 
It is important to remember that the conditions of the armistice created different 
experiences for the French. There was no homogeneous experience of the Occupation 
in France. Even within a particular zone, different regions or different occupations 
exposed individuals to different experiences. Jean Gu6heuno, for example, living in 
occupied Paris, refused to give in to German propaganda and believe that the war was 
over or that life had returned to normal. Swastikas were draped over public buildings 
and the French tricolour was taken down, German street signs were set up alongside 
French signs, and German defensive positions were set up at different strategic points 
in the city. The notion that the French had become prisoners under the Germans was 
that much more palpable: 
Je pense a toute la jeunesse. Ii etait cruel de la voir partir it la guerre. Mais 
est-il moins cruel de la contraindre a vivre dans un pays deshonore? Je ne 
croirai jamals que les hommes soient faits pour la guerre. Mats je sais qu'ils 
ne sont pas non plus faits pour la servitude. 77 
The cessation of hostilities was no consolation for Guehenno. The war had merely 
assmned another form. 
Edmond Dumeril, on the other hand, was prepared to aclmowledge the German 
presence in France. Dumeril, who spoke fluent German, believed that something 
positive could be taken out of this enforced partnership with Germany. His daily 
75 Rajsfus, Les Fram;ais de fa debacle, p.95. 
76 Therive, L 'envers du decor, p.8. 
77 Gu6henno, Journal des al1nties noires, p.15. 
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contact with the Germans inevitably coloured his view in terms of his reaction to the 
defeat: 
Enfin, Dieu soit loue! Ie massacre des troupes en deroute et des civifs en 
fuite est arrete! Le royaume de I 'Esprit et de la charite demeure! La force 
brutale aujourd'hui triomphante, s 'effondrera, et l'heure de la Vraie Paix 
viendra un jour. Heureux qui n 'a pas vecu ces heures tragiques! Que de 
ruines if faudra relever!78 
Yet Dumeril was conscious of the fact that the armistice was only a temporary 
measure and peace had yet to be restored to France. Although he was a self-confessed 
Germanophile, he certainly did not embrace the German military presence in France. 
Werth, on the other hand, encountered another Germanophile, Madame Soutreux, 
whilst on his way to Saint-Amour. He was incredulous that this woman freely offered 
her German hosts a glass of champagne, and justified their occupation of France. 79 
One could never say that Dumeril shared such a defeatist attitude but, rather, believed 
that something positive could be taken out of France's shameful defeat. It seems only 
natural that those who could speak German should feel some sympathy towards 
Germany. The problem was knowing how far to go. It was clear that, in the eyes of 
Werth, Madame Soutreux had gone too far: 
Nous acceptons comme des prisonniers acceptent leur pitance. Car chez la 
Soutreux, if est evident que nous ne sommes pas en France. Nous ne sommes 
pas non plus tout it fait en Allemagne. Nous sommes dans un pays, que nous 
ne savions pas exister: une France qui accepte la victoire allemande ou s 'en 
rejouit, une France qui ne se sent liee it aucune coutume ou qualiti 
franc;aise. Nous regardions cette femme avec stupefaction. Nous ne savions 
pas. Et nous nous demandions si elle appartenait it la «cinquieme 
colonne».80 
It could be argued that those living in ,the Unoccupied Zone would have had 
more cause to be grateful for the armistice in that they would have been more 
inclined to think that they were no longer involved in the war. Andre Roussin, for 
example, who had been demobilised, was too caught up in the realisation that 
Marseilles would be untouched by the German advance: 
Marseille avec son effervescence naturelle et l'invasion brusque de 
Parisiens de toutes sortes refoules par l'exode - mais sa ins et saufs - connut 
dans les jours qui suivirent l'armistice une animation particuliere. Apres les 
gran des peurs Ie rire devient nerveux. II y eut it Marseille cette exageration 
78 Dumeril, Journal d 'un honnete h07nme pendant I 'occupation, p.26. 
79 Werth, 33 jours, pp.58-60. One is reminded of Chardonne's notorious novella, L 'efe it la Maurie, 
where the German officer, von Ebrennac, is offered a glass of cognac in good faith by a French 
vineyard owner. 
80 Ibid., p.71. The notion of an enemy within was particularly prevalent in the summer of 1940. 
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dans la joie d 'une vie retrouwie. Ville libre, zone libre ... Tout ce qui restait 
tragique dans le reste de la France semblait presque oublie ou du moins ne 
plus concerner ceux que le sort gratifiait de ce ciel bleu et de cette 
apparente liberte. La vie reprit furieusement. 81 
The illusion of normality blinded him to the fate of others less fortunate in the 
Occupied Zone. There was no consideration of the German military presence in 
France, given that his own comer of France was unaffected by the German 
occupation. His relief, therefore, shielded him from the shameful defeat: 
Je negligeai donc le general de Londres et ne me souciai guere du marechal 
de Vichy. Je retrouvais la vie, c'etait pour y faire du theatre. Je l'ecris 
loyalement: je ne voyais pas en quoi la guerre me concernait encore. 
L 'euphorie de Marseille a cette epoque dut fortement peser sur mon etat 
d'esprit. Je laissais d'autres en toute bonne foi jouer les David face au 
Goliath hitterien, s 'its etaient assez utopiques pour croire a leurs chances. 82 
The Unoccupied Zone was sheltered initially from the consequences of the 
defeat. Even Werth, who would vociferously come to challenge the acceptance of 
defeat expressed by many living in the Unoccupied Zone, aclmowledged how one 
could view the defeat purely in military terms: 
Je me rends compte que je n 'avais pas encore cru a la totalite de la defaite. 
J'y croyais comme a une maladie dont on a peur et dont au fond de soi on 
ecarte la possibitite. Chacun de ces Allemands, c' est le signe d 'une maladie 
donI on a lu la description, mais que soudain on decouvre en sa peau. 83 
The fact that the Germans stayed out of the Unoccupied Zone meant that its 
inhabitants were not reminded of France's affliction. Similarly, Bobkowski observed 
on his cycle tour of the south of France that the war had made little or no impact on 
the locals: "Il y a eu la guerre, elle continue, mais pour eux, c 'est comme si elle etait 
deja jinie; elle n 'est d'ailleurs jamais arrivee jusqu'ici. Ils n 'ont pas change.,,84 
Perhaps because Werth's thoughts were often of his family and friends in Paris meant 
that he was unable to ignore the wider ramifications of defeat. He despaired at how 
often he encountered the acceptance of defeat among the French and their 
overwhelming passivity. Certainly, he acknowledged that it took time to fully 
appreciate the totalite of the defeat. Events had transpired so quickly after months of 
inaction. Yet he was astounded to observe the reaction of a family in Saint-Amour, 
more than a month after the signing of the armistice, who had not only accepted the 
defeat but also consigned it to the annals of French history: 
81 Roussin, Rideau gris et habit vert, p.99. 
82 Ibid., pp.lOl-l02. 
83 Werth, 33 jours, pp.68-69. 
84 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.39. (28.7.40) 
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Pavais toute raison de supposer qu 'en ce milieu conservateur et patriote, on 
serait accable par Ie malheur de la France, que du moins on ne 
l'accueillerait pas paresseusement comme un effet de telle politique ou de la 
fa ta lite. Tous, vieux et jeunes, s 'apitoyerent sur nos maigres repas, nos 
fatigues et nos risques pendant l'exode. Mais notre etonnement devant la 
debacle leur parut un sentiment prehistorique. Notre tristesse leur Jut 
etrangere. lis avaient accepte l' even em en t, comme s'it appartenait a la plus 
vieille collection de faits historiques. lis manifestaient seulement leur 
satisfaction de ce que la petite ville, pres de laquelle ils habitent, n' ayant 
point resiste aux Allemands, n' avait pas ete bombardee. 85 
The national disintegration of France. 
The palpable relief in June 1940 that the fighting was over could not hide the 
nagging question over the ensuing months: how had France fallen so far so quickly? 
Bloch, in his concluding lines of Examen de conscience d 'un Franr;ais, claimed: 
"Quel que puisse etre le succes final, /'ombre du grand desastre de 1940 n 'est pas 
pres de s' effacer. ,,86 The relief over the cessation of hostilities would only last a 
certain amount of time, given that an armistice implied that terms of peace would 
soon be dictated to the French. was no concept that the armistice would lay the 
foundations for the entire Occupation period. Nor did every diarist comprehend 
straight away that whilst the French had been taken out of the fighting, the defeat had 
not taken them out of the war. When Galtier-Boissiere was asked when he would 
restart the newspaper, Crapouillot, which he had edited before the war, he replied that 
he would do so after the war. He noted the confident reply that the war would be soon 
over, and the style of Galtier-Boissiere's diary would suggest that this opinion, 
although not his own, represented a significant proportion of French opinion: 
Mais la guerre est fin ie, I 'Europe va se faire! Vous avez un role a jouer; la 
reconciliation franco-allemande ouvre des perspectives magnifiques. Ce 
sont nos reves enfin realises, a nous autres pacifistes! La guerre n 'est pas 
finie. Phh! les Allemands seront a Londres dans quinze jours. Weygand Ie 
disait deja if y a deux mois ... 87 
It would take time for all the diarists to awake to the reality of defeat. The 
defeat, as Bobkowski emphasised, was not the cause of France's decadence but, 
rather, a symbol of how decadent France had become: 
85 Werth, Deposition, ppo40-41. (Finjuillet 1940) See also 33 jours, p.133. 
86 Bloch, L 'etrange dejaite, p.207. 
87 Galtier-Boissiere, Journal, p.13. (26.8040) 
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Pourquoi donne-t-on toujours (Ie plus souvent), comme exemple de la 
culture d'un peuple, la culture qui a vu son declin? II est faux que les 
cultures declinent sous l'effet des coups exterieurs. Elles declinent d'abord 
d'elles-memes. Les coups exterieurs ne sont que des coups de sica barbare. 
La culture et la civilisation de notre epoque me font penser a un fou qui 
aurait decoupe des vieux journaux en morceaux sur lesquels it aurait ecrit 
«un million de dollars» et qu'it aurait ensuite ranges dans son portefeuille, 
. d'~ . h 88 convamcu etre nee. 
Bobkowski admitted that he had been convinced of France's grandeur before the war 
yet the defeat opened his eyes to the true decadent nature of France. What he found 
disturbing was not so much the defeat but, rather, the fact that the French themselves 
had not recognised this deterioration in their own country. They too had been caught 
up in the myth of France and the defeat served to expose that myth. Bobkwoski, in his 
conversation with a baker, disagreed with her harsh view of the character of French 
men but conceded: 
Mais la boulangere a raison quand elle dit qu 'avant la guerre on ne 
racontait aux Franr;ais que des balivernes. On leur clamait sur tous les tons 
que «la nation franr;aise [etait} une forteresse de culture», «Ie berceau de la 
grande phitosophie», «I 'esprit franr;ais invincible», etc., en citant a I 'appui 
Descartes, Voltaire, La Revolution, Napoleon et Louis XIV, pour finir par 
Foch et Lyautey ... Tous les Franr;ais etaient convaincus de leur grandeur. lIs 
avaient l'impression que Moliere et Racine etaient morts la vieille, que tout 
etait formidable, et its dormaient sur les deux oreilles en jurant leurs grands 
dieux que c 'etait vrai. lIs nourrissaient Ie monde de leur grandeur 
rechauffee. Mais manger sans arret des plats rechauffes a de fdcheuses 
, . I ,89 
repercusslOns sur a sante. 
The process of national disintegration had begun well before the defeat of 1940. 
It was just that the diarists had mostly been concentrating on the upcoming war rather 
than the domestic problems afflicting France. Drieu was an exception to the rule, in 
that he had detected France's decadence before the defeat: 
Cet abandon de tout Ie peuple a la superstition russe est Ie signe Ie plus 
certain de notre abdtardissement a tous. Quand un peuple n 'a plus de 
maitres, it en demande a l'etranger. Cependant que d'autres Franr;ais 
s 'abandonnent a I 'attente clandestine de I 'Allemand. Quant a la masse, elle 
est vouee aux Anglais. lin' est plus de Franr;ais pour ainsi dire qui pense et 
qui veuille franr;ais. La veitleite franr;aise est entierement partagee entre Ie 
parti du centre ou anglais, Ie parti d 'allemand d 'extreme droite et Ie parti 
russe d' extreme gauche. Il y a aussi tous ceux qui veulent qu 'on leur foute la 
paix, c'est-a-dire qu'on les recouvre comme d'une dejection. 90 
88 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.61. (27.8.40) See also Werth, p.67. (21.10.40) 
89 Ibid., p.lOl. (12.9.40) See also p.83. (8.9.40) 
90 Drieu, Journal, pp.123-124. (6.12.39) See also pp.129-130. (15.12.39) Bemanos was also aware of 
France's decline before the defeat. See p.36, Lettre aux Anglais, (Paris, 1946). 
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Drieu was also unconsciously foretelling how the French would react after the defeat. 
It was not so much the divisions themselves that were the real problem but the fact 
that they all signified an abandoning of France for foreign ideas. The problem was 
that the defeat ensured that the hitherto gradual awareness of French decadence was 
brutally exposed to every French citizen. The diarists may well have gone into the 
war with little enthusiasm but they were certainly confident in their chances of 
victory. When the French army was shown to be woefully unprepared to combat a 
modem fighting force it was inevitable that the diarists would focus on why rather 
than how their army, with its proud history, should have been so emphatically routed. 
The defeat, in military terms, could have been explained by the inferior 
numbers at the French military's disposal - even though History reveals that this 
disparity was for the greater part illusory - but there was no excuse for France's lack 
of preparedness or its incapacity for modem warfare. Gide did not have the privileged 
position of Bloch on the battlefield yet it is significant to note that he too was under 
the impression that France had fought a hopeless battle against insurmountable odds. 
Consequently, he was less concerned with how France had been defeated than why it 
had been defeated, which was also, coincidentally, the position of Vichy: 
Sans doute n y a-t-il aucune honte a etre vaincu lorsque les forces de 
l'ennemi sont a ce point superieures, et je n 'en puis eprouver aucune; mais 
c 'est avec une tristesse sans nom que j' en tends ces phrases ou viennent 
s 'epanouir encore tous les defauts qui nous ont perdus: idealisme vague et 
stupide, meconnaissance de la rea lite, imprevoyance, insouciance, . et 
croyance absurde en la valeur de propos fiduciaires qui n' ont plus credit 
que dans l'imagination des niais. [. . .} A la lueur tragique des evenements 
est apparu soudain Ie delabrement profond de la France, que Hitler ne 
connaissait que trop bien. Partout incoherence, indiscipline, revendication 
de chimeriques droits, meconnaissance de tous devoirs. 91 
The implications for France, as a nation, were not at all favourable. It would have the 
effect of lessening the impact of the German presence in occupied France in that 
France was seen as the real cause of its own demise and, significantly, the France of 
pre-1940. It was not the leaders of Vichy, therefore, who were sought out as culprits 
but, rather, the leaders of the Popular Front governments of the 1930s. 
The defeat had been humiliating for France but equally humiliating, if not more 
so, was the fact that France had deteriorated to such an extent that it found itself in a 
position to be defeated so emphatically: 
91 Gide, Journal, p.28. (14.6.40) 
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«La France ... , la France seule», disent-ils. Helas! Je doute qu 'il y ait en elle 
de quoi remonter la sinistre pente. En sa jeunesse, peut-itre; mais elle est 
par trop divisee. L 'hat de delabrement ou nous sommes, et que notre de/aite 
a si tristement revele, m 'affecte bien plus encore que la de/aite meme. 92 
Inevitably, the crushing defeat crushed with it any feelings of confidence or self-
worth among the French. Rist had been aware of the harmful effect of the bourgeois 
fear of communism before the defeat but after the defeat he feared that there was 
another more prevalent issue: 
Humiliation enfin pour ceux qui savent la vraie cause de cette affreuse 
de/aite: la paresse, la routine, la suffisance de ceux qui avaient la mission 
d'organiser sa defense, leur ignorance criminelle de ce qui se preparait a 
cote d'eux; meme paresse, meme routine dans tous les domaines, civil ou 
militaire, industriel ou agricole. Meconnaissance totale des conditions 
nouvelles de la vie moderne. Est-ce Ie signe d'une irremediable decadence? 
Faut-il vraiment desesperer?93 
The diarists Mauriac and Gu6henno, who both wrote clandestinely for underground 
publications, were well aware of the temptation to give in to feelings of despair and 
resignation, which would prevent any rebuilding of France as a nation. They were 
intent on spreading the message that to give in to such feelings was to betray France: 
La pire des de/aites pour les Fram;ais serait d'avoir honte de la France. 
Peguy, a qui on ne pense pas sans douleur aujourd 'hui, disait 
magnifiquement qu 'il y avait quelque chose de pire que «I 'invasion militaire, 
barbare, et de servitude», c 'est, ce serait «la plus dangereuse des invasions, 
I 'invasion qui entre en dedans, I 'invasion de la vie interieure infiniment plus 
dangereuse pour un peuple qu 'une invasion, qu 'une occupation 
territoriale».94 
To accept defeat and to accept the German military presence in France was to 
abandon all hope in the rebuilding of France. 
The German invaders were not perceived as the real problem; the real enemy 
was within. This is significant as the defeat was internalised and saw the French tum 
on themselves. Every diarist agreed that France had a serious problem and that the 
problem was France's problem alone. Gu6henno preferred to ignore the German 
military presence and focused instead on the weakness of France: 
Le vrai drame de la France, ce n 'etait pas tout ce qui, de l'exterieur, la 
menat;ait. Son peril, ce n' hait ni Ie chancelier Hitler, ni M Mussolini. Le 
mal etait en elle-meme; c' eta it cette crise de con fiance qu' elle traversait, 
cette peur d'etre soi. Les jeunes gart;ons /ran t;a is, ales considerer 
92 Ibid., p.76. (6.5.41) Gide had considered the fall of France well before this date. See, for example, 
p.56. (24.9.40) 
93 Rist, Une saison gatee, p.88. (4.8.40) 
94 Gu6henno, Journal des annees noires, p.2l. (5.7.40) 
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individuellement, etaient aussi actifs, aussi intelligents que jamais. Mats it 
leur manquait cette sorte d'unanimite dans l'espoir et Ie songe qui est Ie 
signe de sante des peuples. Que les fetes pour Ie cent cinquantieme 
anniversaire de la Revolution ne fussent que des commbnorations fimebres 
revelait cette fatblesse et cette atonie. 95 
The problem was that different people had different ideas as to what that mal entailed 
and which groups were responsible for that mal. Stanley Hoffmann argued that Vichy 
was not a simple revenge of the reactionary right but a 'pluralist dictatorship' where 
different ideologies tried to stamp their mark on Vichy policy.96 Everyone was cel1ain 
that there was a problem within France but there was great uncertainty and confusion 
as to what that problem actually was. Such confusion was exploited by Vichy, which 
was quite clear in its targeting of who was to blame. Vichy was quick to identify the 
undesirable elements in France, which had no place in its desire for a France of 
rootedness and regions. The pillar communities of family, workplace and region held 
up the national community and the Jews, Freemasons, Communists and foreigners 
undermined these foundations. Exclusionary laws were among the first measures 
undertaken by the Vichy regime, many of which had precedents dating back to the 
1930s.97 
The question facing the diarists was whether France had the ability to 
regenerate itself on its own or whether it needed external help. Drieu was one of those 
diarists who had openly criticised the decadent state of France in the 1930s. He held a 
notion of France in the wider European scheme of things rather than as an 
independent nation. He believed that France alone had nothing to offer and though he 
did not believe that France would be defeated, least of all in such an emphatic 
manner, the defeat would have only served to confirm his conviction that Gernlany 
needed to inject some life into France. During the debilcle he observed: 
Cette torpeur qui regne a Paris, qui s 'est manifeste a ['occasion du 
bombardement no.l. J'avais raison de dire if y a quelques annees que les 
Fram;ais etaient devenus un peuple triste, qui n 'aimait plus la vie. lis aiment 
la peche a la ligne, l'auto en famille, la cuisine, ce n 'est pas la vie. lis ne 
sont pas lilches, mats pires; Us sont ternes, mornes, indifJerents. lls 
souhaitent obscurement d 'en fintr, mais ne feront rien pour que 9a aille plus 
95 Ibid., p,48. (20.9,40) 
96 Hoffmann, Stanley, La Droite it Vichy, in Essais sur la France. Declin ou renouveau, (Paris: 
Editions du Seuil, 1974) pp.17-41. 
97 Jackson, Julian, France the dark years 1940-1944, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001) 
pp.150-151. At the end of 1940 the internment camp stood at about 55 000 to 60 000. These were 
French camps that had nothing to do with the Germans, many of which dated from the late 1930s. 
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vite. Cette ge armee qui s 'en va les mains dans les poches, sans fusils, sans 
,{'f;' 98 0jjlClers. 
Drieu was very clear on why this indifference was so prevalent. The decadence of 
France had prevented the French from thinking of more noble concepts: 
La France meurt d'avarice dans tous les ordres de sentiments et de pensees. 
Pays de petite iron ie, de petit den igrem en t, de petite critique, de petit 
ricanement, pays de petitesse. Tout y a ete abaisse: les institutions et meme 
leurs pauvres contraires. Si on a abattu la monarchie on n 'a pas ileve Ie 
peuple, si on a avili l'aristocratie on n 'a pas decante la bourgeoisie, si on a 
ravale Ie clerge on n 'a pas defendu les professeurs contre l'insipide vanite et 
on les a loues dans leur inenarrable vacuite. La fraternite n 'a pas remplace 
la charite, I' ega lite n 'a profite qu 'a I' argent, quant a la liberte ce ne fut que 
la basse licence de dire tout de fac;on que rien ne tirat plus a consequence. 99 
There was no sense of grandeur but, instead, the feeling that a once proud 
nation had been reduced to petitesse. Drieu did not hide his belief that the values and 
institutions of the Republic were responsible for this petitesse. He was not the only 
observer to express regret over the weakening of structures that had been so strong 
under the monarchy. Drieu never went so far as to take joy in France's humiliation 
and the fall of the Republic like Charles Maurras, who called the defeat a 'divine 
surprise'. Despite his fascist leanings, Drieu was a Germanophobe and so, in this 
respect, he was in tune with the opinion of Raymond Aron: "II m' est arrive par 
instants de penser, peut-etre de dire tout haut: s 'il faut un regime autoritaire pour 
sauver la France, soit, aceptons-le, tout en Ie detestant. ,,]00 There were many 
bourgeois, however, who shared the mentality 'the Republic is dead: we have won'. 
The implication of such a feeling is illustrated by Galtier-Boissiere. He recorded an 
old man's opinion on the organisation of Europe: 
Cet effondrement a revile chez nous une decomposition effroyable, et telle 
qu 'on ne peut vraiment entrevoir Ie moyen de nous relever. L' annexion de 
notre pays par I 'Allemagne serait peut-etre la solution la moins facheuse 
pour nous, d'autant que I 'A llemagne seule serait capable de mettre un peu 
d' ordre dans ce chaos. Une fois disparus de la carte d 'Europe, personne ne 
pourra se gausser de notre decadence. 101 
Not only was there a desire for Germany to instil some order and strength in 
France but there was an acceptance that the price for this would be the loss of 
France's independence, indeed, France itself. Whilst this is an extreme view, and one 
shared by Drieu, it is significant to note that it was being considered at all. The 
98 Drieu, Journal, p.235. (5.6.40) 
99 Ibid., p.238. (8.6.40) 
100 Laborie, L 'opnionji'anc;aise sous Vichy, p.61. 
101 Galtier-Boissiere, Journal, p.14. (End of September 1940) 
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enforced cohabitation of France and Gennany would put forward this question of 
nationality to the French and not just those of fascist tendencies would have to show 
where their loyalties lied. Drieu leaned towards the extreme right but his view of 
France was very similar to many other diarists whose views were less extreme. 
Where he differed from the other diarists was his solution for France. 
The refusal to accept the defeat required common values, a feeling of national 
fraternity and faith in an eventual victory for Britain. The divisions that had so 
affected France during the 1930s prevented this from happening. The common 
feeling in 1940 was that France and the French had nothing to offer. Guy de Pourtales 
remarked in Switzerland: 
Nous avons a peu pres les memes reactions: etonnement attriste du 
retournement subit apres I 'armistice, fin du liberalisme traditionnel, guerre 
aux Juifs; Petain a tout mise sur la carte allemande, se croyant certain de fa 
voir gagner. Et voici qu 'on se demande: gagnera-t-elle? Ramuz 111 'a dit cette 
. I" T • If' diD: ,,102 trzste paro e: Je ne reconnms p us e visage ear ranee. 
These divisions were not a new phenomenon born out of the defeat. The defeat 
merely brought them out into the open. The despair in France's decadence and the 
special circumstances of the debacle encouraged a wholesale abandoning of France 
for foreign ideas and protection. Just after the declaration of war in 1939, Raymond 
Queneau's Un rude hiver was published, which seemed to anticipate the events of 
1940. A lieutenant reveals to a Gennan spy: 
EI1 bien, monsieur Frederic, vous savez ce qu'it faudrait pour sauverla 
France de la decrepitude et du desordre? Vous ne le savez pas? Non? Eh 
bien mot je vais vous Ie dire. Il faudrait un protectorat allemand sur fa 
France, voila ce qu 'it faudrait. 103 
This bears a remarkable resemblance to a woman's opinion Werth encountered in 
June 1940: EIle nous rassure d'ailleurs sur le sort de la France: "«Ce sera un 
protectorat, comme le Maroc... On ne sera pas plus malheureux, on travaillera 
comme avant...»,,104 The acceptance of France's fate and the indifference to its 
demise is what Werth in particular could not comprehend. The events of the debacle 
certainly consolidated this acceptance of the Gennans they were seen as the only 
ones capable of restoring a sense of order - but they also forced the French to think 
back as to how these events were allowed to happen. 
102 Pourta1es, p.441. (19.10.40) Bun-in, La France a l'/zeure allemande, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1995) 
pp.38-40. See also Vallotton, Annie, & Vallotton, Gritou, C'etait aujour lejour Cm'nets (1939-1944) 
(Editions Payot & Rivages, 1995), pp.96-99. 
103 Un rude hiver, (Paris, 1939), pp.132-133. Burrill, La France a ['heure allemande, p.53. 
104 Werth, 33 JOUI'S, p.86. 
68 
It would be wrong, however, to think that these pre-existing divisions were a 
sign that 1940 was merely a continuation of the 1930s. There were exceptional 
circumstances that also need to be considered to fully understand why so many were 
inclined to reject the notion of an independent France. For a start, the France after 
June 1940 bore no resemblance to the France before the armistice. There was no 
unified France but at least six segregated Frances and these divisions respected no 
previous administrative boundaries. Firstly, there was the Unoccupied Zone, which 
covered 45 per cent of metropolitan French territory and comprised about a third of 
the popUlation. Secondly, the tiny Italian Zone, which would be extended after 1942. 
Thirdly, Alsace and Lorraine would be effectively annexed by Germany. Fourthly, 
the two dcpartements of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais were attached to the German 
military command in Brussels. Fifthly, the forbidden zone, which ran from the mouth 
of the Somme in the north down to the Swiss frontier in the Jura, was separated from 
the Occupied Zone and refugees were not allowed to return there. Lastly, there was 
the Occupied Zone, which would incorporate the Unoccupied Zone in November 
1942. One must also take into account the 1.5 million prisoners of war, which added 
to the feeling of dislocation. There were, therefore, not only political and social 
divisions but also physical divisions. Bobkowski reveals the destructive nature of 
these different divisions: 
L 'important, c' est qu 'on puisse dire et, plus important encore, qu' on puisse 
ccrire que Ie gouvernement Petain s 'attaque it la reconstruction du pays. Les 
gens y crotent, comme its croient que la zone fibre est effectivement la 
France libre, alors qu'if est difJicile d'imaginer d'effet plus destructeur que 
cette partition du pays en deux. Ce jaisant, les Allemands ont partagc non 
seulement la France, mais chaque Fram;ais. 105 
The fighting may have stopped but the Occupation was, nevertheless, a brutal 
intrusion into French territory. Not only were new laws and regulations enforced 
upon the French people but also a change in thinking and behaving. Postal 
correspondence throughout France was only by special postcards until June 1941, 
which could only indicate a very restricted amount of information.106 Free 
correspondence only came about in March 1943. The population ofthe Nord and Pas-
de-Calais felt entirely cut off from the rest of France and workers there were drafted 
105 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.112. (15.9.40) 
106 See Werth, Deposition, pp.90-91: Si aucun Fra1U;ais n 'avait consenti it utilise1' ces cartes, je ne dis 
pas que les troupes allemandes auraient passe Ie Rhin. Mats nous eussions remporte la seule victoire 
qui nous flit possible. Nous eussions decollcerte "ennemi autrement qu 'en fltyant sur les routes. 
(13.11.40) 
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right from the outset to work in Germany. Alsace and Lorraine became completely 
German, and it was illegal to speak French or express one's French culture. Those 
who tried to escape the compulsory Wehrmacht service had reprisals exacted on their 
families. 107 It is important to remember, however, that these changes were not evenly 
experienced by the diarists. Conditions in the two main zones were very different. 
The Occupied Zone, for example, was on German time and one hour ahead of the 
Unoccupied Zone until all zones were on German time after May 1941. In the North, 
the swastika flew from buildings but it was the French flag in the South. The impact 
of seeing the swastika fly from buildings in the Occupied Zone is aptly illustrated by 
Toesca, writing from Paris: 
Le c(£ur serre, nous assistons au decrochage de I'emb!eme qui etait notre 
garant, qui representaient pour nous la liberte non seulement de vivre, mais 
de penser. Pour moi, ce sera desormais comme si je porta is autour du cou Ie 
d I d ' d A' A , 108 n(£u cou ant une cor e prete a etre serree. 
The feeling of captivity was inescapable in the Occupied Zone. In the South, 
however, all outward signs would point to the fact that France's sovereignty remained 
intact. A curfew was imposed in the North from 10pm to Sam but not in the South. 
Newsreel propaganda was also markedly different. In the Occupied Zone, cinemas 
had to show German newsreels. Much time was devoted to anti-British propaganda 
and news about the war, whereas in the Unoccupied Zone the outside world was 
largely absent. Spain and Switzerland seemed to be the only other countries ever 
mentioned. One would have difficulty in knowing a European war was taking place 
as the Vichy newsreels depicted a peaceful, rural France, with much time devoted to 
P6tain and the Empire. 109 
These regional differences are well documented in the private diaries during the 
crucial first months of the Occupation. Bobkowski, on his travels by bicycle around 
the south of France after the armistice, noted that the illusion that the war had 
changed nothing for France lingered on much longer in the Unoccupied Zone. He 
noted in the middle of September 1940: 
La patronne nous a gates: dejeuners et diners de cinq plats, 14 francs, vin 
compris. A chaque repas j 'avais I'impression non seulement de dejeuner, 
107 Jackson, The dark years, pp.246-248. 
108 Toesca, Cinq ans de patience, p.63. (18.6.40) 
109 Jackson, The dark years, pp.255-256. Radio Paris was innovative and more popular than the stuffy, 
unimaginative Radio Vichy. 
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mais aussi de manger ies restes ... de ia France. Au cafe, je n 'arretais pas de 
me dire que c 'est trap beau pour que fa dure. 110 
There is~ however~ a hint at the problems which would eventually affect all of France. 
This plentiful bounty in the South would certainly not last the entire Occupation. 
Bobkowski was right to be concerned about the future. Roussin, on the other hand, 
allowed his reHefto cloud his vision ofthe future. llI This would inevitably colour his 
view of France and, moreover, his attitude to the Germans and to Vichy, which had 
kept the Germans out of the South. Dumeril on the other hand, working alongside the 
Germans in Nantes in the Occupied Zone, was made very aware through his job of 
the consequences of the German presence. The cafes closed at six o'clock, the post 
offices closed well before and the telephone connections were closed in the 
afternoon. Marks had to be accepted at an inflated value and there were German signs 
everywhere. 1 12 
It would be impossible~ therefore, to talk about French opinion on a national 
level and think that there was a national consensus. Certainly History from above is 
aware of regional variations but it is more concerned with detecting general trends 
rather than accentuating differences. These differences are what the private diaries 
provide yet they too are aware of general trends~ albeit in a personalised sense. With 
regard to the first months of the Occupation, it is important to bear in mind these 
differences. For example, the north-eastern departements were the only parts of 
France which had been occupied during the First World War and, therefore, they 
were the only ones where there was any concept of what occupation entailed. They 
were traditionally anti-German and Anglophile. They also had an engrained suspicion 
of southerners and the temptation for thcm was to see the armistice as a means of 
avoiding occupation in the South. That is not to say that they forged a unified 
regional identity, as the Popular Front governments had exacerbated class tensions in 
this highly industrialised region with its ultra-conservative bourgeoisie. Il3 Yet 
compared with other regions, particularly in the South, their history made them more 
predisposed to react unfavourably to the German occupation. Mauriac wrote in Le 
110 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.120. (17.9.40) See Rist, Une saison p.94. Food 
restrictions were introduced on September 19th 1940 by the Germans: occupied countries had to have 
30 per cent less rations than the Germans. 
III Roussin, Rideau gris et habit vert, p.99. But see p.112. Roussin went to Switzerland to put on his 
play and noticed the contrast between genuine freedom and the so-called zone fibre of France. 
112 Dumeril, Journal d'un honnete homme pendant I 'occupation, pp.27-28. (19.6.40) 
113 Jackson, The dark years, pp.248-249. 
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Figaro just after the armistice: "Les Fran9ais du Nord, dont les maisons furent 
detruites en 1914 et en 1940, je croyais les plaindre. Aujourd 'hui seulement, je 
comprends: leur douleur nous restait etrangere.,,114 It is understandable that those 
who had been unaffected by the German invasion were oblivious to the pain of those 
who had been directly affected. 
Werth observed too often a meek acceptance of France's situation. He argued 
that for the French citizen: 
L 'univers entier se bat pour lui ou contre lui. Mais il ne participe pas a cette 
bataille. L 'histoire se fait pour lui comme pour les autres, mais elte se fait 
sans lui. L 'evenement vient au Fran9ais, mais il ne va pas a l'evenement. Il 
lui reste un pouvoir, un droit: celui de faire des VIEUX. II peut pratiquer 
toutes les vertus de I 'homme interieur, dans la mesure OU I 'homme interieur 
est immobile et muet. 115 
He met a wife of a prisoner of war, who asked him what would become of France: 
"Qu 'est-ce qu 'on va devenir? Les A ngla is, les Boches ... ,,116 Such a question is 
significant, as it was a sign that the French were not thinking of themselves in terms 
of a nation but, rather, as in the first example, as individuals. The upheaval of the 
civilian debiicle and the consequences of the armistice appear to have engendered an 
inability on behalf of the French to have any concept of France as a patrie. Werth, on 
the other hand, refused to renounce his French nationality: "Je tiens a une 
civilisation, a la France. Je n 'ai pas d'autre fa90n de m 'habiller. Je ne peux pas 
sortir tout nu. ,,117 Yet he was only too aware that the uncertainty of the period and the 
uncertainty over what direction Vichy was taking would undermine national 
solidarity. He cited a passage from de Vigny's Servitude et grandeur, which, one 
infers, had clear parallels for Werth with the France of 1940: 
Helas/ dis-je, milord, il y a des temps ou I 'on ne peut pas aisement savoir ce 
que veut la Patrie ... aces signes funestes, quelques etrangers nous ont crus 
tombes dans un etat semblable a celui du Bas-Empire, et des hommes graves 
se sont demande si Ie caractere national n 'altait pas se perdre pour 
. 118 touJours.» 
The overwhelming passivity of the French is, in part, explained by this inability 
to think in terms of France. It was as if France no longer existed, or had temporarily 
vanished and the only available options were to side either with Germany or Britain 
114 Mauriac, Franc:;ois,Journal du temps de ['Occupation, in CEuvres Completes: Tome XI, (Paris: 
Fayard, 1952), p.308, (23.6.40) 
115 Werth, Deposition, p.51. (3.10.40) 
116 Ibid., p.65. (17.10.40) 
117 Ibid. (21.10.40) 
118 Ibid., pp.41-42. (6.9.40) 
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or indeed to side only with oneself. It was as if France had not only been taken out of 
the fighting but also taken out of existence. Talking to a doctor, Werth entertained the 
idea of whether France still existed: 
«La France est decomposee ... » me dit-il. Et vous entendez bien qu'il ne 
donne pas a ces mots Ie sens que lui peuvent donner les moralistes de Vichy. 
Dans une societe aux mG!urs effrangees, sans morale dominante et donc sans 
heresie, il ne voit plus que des hommes denoues, sans lien avec la societe, 
sans lien avec eux-memes. 119 
His friend Lucien Febvre, an historian who had also escaped to Saint-Amour from 
Paris, expressed a similar opinion: "La France est foutue. [ ... J Jugements bien 
differents en leurs attendus, mais identiques. Si la France est foutue, je ne my 
resigne pas. J'etais habitue a elle.,,120 This was the crux of the problem: the 
perception that France was finished encouraged resignation amongst the French to its 
fate. Germany had not only emphatically defeated France but it had also revealed 
how decadent it had become. What was the point of uniting with other French 
citizens if many of them were responsible for France's weakened and decadent state? 
Rist felt that the only option left to the French was to wait: 
Les gestes du gouvernement de Vichy ont quelque chose d'irreel. La verite 
est ailleurs. Ces fantoches n 'ont aucune prise sur I' opinion et les sentiments. 
On regarde I' avenir - c' est la qu' est la rea lite. L 'impression que nous 
vivons dans une parenthese (horrible sans doute, mais simple parenthese). 
On vous dit: oui, les Anglais, c 'est tres bien, mais pourront-ils reellement 
vaincre? C'est la seule inquietude. Tout Ie monde aussi se sent humilie que 
ifi d d 121 nous soyons purement paSSl sans ce rame. 
There was a general lack of fraternity amongst the French but direct experience 
could also alter one's overall perception. This could be true not only on a regional 
level but also on an individual level. In Le Chagrin et la Pitie, a man's wife was 
brutally assaulted and tortured by the Germans, whereas another man had no direct 
problems with the Germans at all. Evidently, the former perception of the Germans 
would be infinitely more negative than the latter perception, shaped as it was by his 
negative experience. Werth noticed the difference between children from Alsace and 
Besanyon, and those of the town: "Les eleves refugies de Besanr;on ou les Alsaciens 
resistent durement a toute idee de collaboration. Parmi les eleves dont les familles 
habitent Bourg, la plupart sont inertes. Pour eux, I 'Allemand est loin et il y a encore 
119 Ibid.,pp.54-55. (4.10.40) 
120 Ibid. 
121 Rist, Une saison gatee, p.1 07. (23.11.40) 
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du beurre dans les fermes. ,,122 The refugee children had seen their homeland 
repatriated to Germany whereas the children of the bourg had yet to be directly 
affected by the Germans. Werth was well aware that the personal experiences of the 
refugee children had affected the way that they perceived the Germans and Vichy's 
desire for collaboration. 
Examining the mindset of the diarists in the summer of 1940 throws up many 
differences in opinion, revealing the confusion and uncertainty of the period. It also 
reflects the fact that the Occupation initially impacted on the French to differing 
degrees, caused by regional variations or different personal experiences. Yet leading 
up to this period, one can also detect shared beliefs that would have shaped their 
overall view of the Occupation. Firstly, there was an aversion to war, which would 
remain constant up to, and indeed beyond, the defeat. The humiliating defeat would 
only reinforce the idea that to carryon the fight was pointless. The Gaullist notion of 
continued resistance was soundly rejected by a civilian popUlation haunted by the 
effects of battle. The civilian deMicle would endure well beyond the military debacle 
in the minds of the diarists, and would serve to encourage the idea that war was to be 
avoided at all costs. The widely-held conviction that France would ultimately prevail 
in the war with Germany was revealed to be illusory, which would raise further 
questions about France in general. This would leave them vulnerable to the 
manipulation of both Vichy and the German military authorities. The First World 
War had seen France pull together as a nation in a union sacree but while the 
mobilisation for the Second World War went relatively smoothly, there had certainly 
been no national enthusiasm for the war. The debacle and the eventual defeat 
certainly put an end to any possibility of a union sa cree and exposed the divisions 
that had been lying just below the surface. The process of national disintegration, 
which had been well under way during the 1930s, accelerated with the events of the 
Exodus and the physical divisions imposed by the armistice. The shame of defeat had 
been, to a certain extent, alleviated by the armistice but the consequences of that 
armistice were not fully appreciated at the time by a French population in utter chaos 
and turmoil. 
122 Werth, Deposition, p.212. (30.5.41) 
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CHAPTER TWO 
Remembrance of a past France 
L 'Histoire avec un grand H a pris au piege les histoires individuelles. 1 
Introduction: the historical evolution of the Occupation. 
The historical representation of the 'dark years' has undergone several 
transformations. New interpretations have superseded pre-existing ones or, at least, have 
led to new paths of enquiry. The history of the Occupation, in that sense, is a living, 
breathing entity? Far from being a past that has truly passed, the Occupation is a period 
whose historiography continues to be rewritten. The events and experiences of that 
period remain unchanged but our interpretation of those events and experiences is 
constantly evolving with the passage of time. The private diaries symbolise the 
immortality of history as well as its pliancy. What the diarists chose to record for 
posterity is the living of history but their individual perspectives offer up different 
interpretations to that history. Moreover, it is not just the historiography of the 
Occupation period that has evolved with the passage of time. The private diaries reveal 
that opinion was constantly changing and evolving over the entire duration of the 
Occupation period. Opinion was never stagnant or lifeless. When reading history, it is 
easy to be mistaken in thinking that the past has relinquished all its mysteries to time. 
Just as historians have reacted to the opening of archives or the publication of influential 
works, so too did the diarists react to new developments or influential experiences. 
Contemporary historians generally agree upon some aspects of the Occupation but any 
1 Veillon, Dominique, Vivre et survivre en France 1939-1947, (Paris: Editions Payot & Rivages, 1995), 
p.8. 
2 Golsan, Richard, History and counterhistory in postwar France. Vichy's afterlife, (Nebraska: University 
of Nebraska Press, 2000), pp.l-2. Henry Rousso argued that a post-mortem examination of Vichy France is 
still impossible today, as the Vichy years maintain a presence in modem French society. The trials of Rene 
Bousquet, Paul Touvier and Mam1ce Papon are examples of Vichy's ever-present legacy. In that sense, the 
cadaver is still too warm for the historical pathologist to perform a complete autopsy. 
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overall interpretation is still very much open-ended. Similarly, one can detect global 
trends amongst the diarists as the Occupation progressed but the complexity of their 
individual experiences prohibits any definitive evaluation of their overall collective 
expenence. 
This chapter is concerned with examining the notion of change over time and 
exploring concepts, which have rarely been the primary focus of the historiography of the 
Occupation period. The French may have overwhelmingly remained outside the poles of 
collaboration and resistance throughout the Occupation but this does not mean that their 
behaviour and attitudes remained static for the entire duration. Yet what forces were 
acting to prevent any dramatic shifts in attitude or behaviour? Part One is concerned with 
the crucial formative years of the Occupation. The opinions formed during the years 
1940-1941 go a long way to explaining the behaviour of the French for the entire 
Occupation period. Historians have talked about the notion of a France fully behind 
Petain in the initial period of the Occupation3, but the diarists reveal that support for 
Petain was far from unanimous. Similarly, the absence of vocal disapproval of Vichy 
should not necessarily be interpreted as support for the new regime. Indifference better 
represents the diarists' attitude towards Vichy than acquiescence. The conect behaviour 
of the Germans following the defeat should not undermine the fact that their military 
presence in France was overwhelmingly rejected. Yet the relatively benign first year of 
the Occupation and the absence of overt hostility towards the Germans should be seen as 
having a major influence on the indifferent attitude of the diarists towards Vichy. Vichy 
would always be judged by its ability to protect the French against the Germans and 
alleviate their suffering. The Germans, therefore, effectively governed public opinion in 
both the Unoccupied and Occupied Zones. 
Part Two is concerned with examining the development of French attitudes and 
behaviour after the first year of the Occupation. One issue that still provokes controversy 
today is the persecution of the Jews in France. The historiography has focused on 
Vichy'S role in the 'Final Solution' without an appreciation of how the average French 
citizen viewed the persecution of the Jews in France. In the index of Paxton and Man'us' 
3 Amouroux, Henri, Quarante millions de Petatnistes jutn 1940 - juin 1941, (Paris: Librairie Attheme 
Fayard, 1977). 
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collaborative work4, for example, there is a noticeable absence of personal testimonies. 
The diarists who did comment on the persecution of the Jews observed that public 
opinion towards the Jews did change from indifference to sympathy but there was never 
any significant vocal support for their plight. What were the reasons behind this silence? 
Secondly, did Gern1any's increased repression after 1941 affect the French more than 
Vichy's growing complicity? The shooting of French hostages did nothing to generate 
support for the Germans but there was little patience for Vichy's constant attempts to 
curry favour with the Germans. Lastly, the final outcome of the war remained uncertain 
for the first half of the Occupation but after the Allied landing in North Africa, at the end 
of 1942, the balance seemed to shift irrevocably in favour of the Allies. Did the 
expectation of an Allied victory make the Occupation more difficult for the diarists to 
endure? These questions all require a more personal evaluation of the period. 
It is worth tracing, therefore, a broad outline of the historiography since the 
Liberation in order to see where new directions might be taken from the perspective of 
history from below. The Occupation period is the most intensively researched period in 
French history. This is all the more remarkable given that the French were initially more 
intent about forgetting the 'dark years' after the Liberation than examining them in great 
detaiL De Gaulle would be the foremost instigator of this attempt to restrict the 
Occupation years to a temporary breach in French history. His provisional government 
issued an ordinance immediately after the Liberation, which maintained that all Vichy's 
legislation would be declared null and void. Furthermore, de Gaulle would refuse to 
announce the restoration of the French Republic, claiming that it had never ceased to 
exist. 5 He refused to acknowledge the truth that L 'Etat fram;ais had been legitimate, 
which had the effect of marginalising the role of Vichy in occupied France. The diarists 
reveal that no one doubted the legality of Vichy but their views certainly differed on its 
utility. De Gaulle preferred to propagate the myth that the horrors inflicted on France 
during the Occupation had been the work of the Germans and that only a handful of 
traitors had betrayed France. Such a theory enabled de Gaulle to silence the widespread 
call for vengeance that prevented the French from moving on from the shameful and 
4 Robeli Paxton & Michael Manus, Vichy France alld the Jews, (New York: Basic Books, 1981). 
5 Jackson, The dark years, p.L 
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divisive events of the Occupation. The notion of f011y million resisters who had awaited 
the reconciliation of state and nation satisfied people right across the political spectrum. 
The bubble, however, would eventually burst. The heroic myth could only conceal 
the sinister underbelly of the Occupation for so long. The 1970s saw a new interpretation 
of the Occupation years, which challenged de Gaulle's version of a Resistant France.6 
Marcel Ophiils' documentary film, Le chagrin et la pitie, which was released in 1971, 
portrayed the French population in an unprecedentedly unfavourable light. Far from 
being unified in obdurate resistance to the Germans, the French were depicted as selfish 
and passively attentistes.7 Werth would often adopt a scathing attitude towards the 
selfish, apathetic peasants of Saint-Amour but he would equally often admire them for 
their refusal to succumb to Vichy propaganda. In order to disprove a theory, there is the 
tendency to go to the other extreme. Ophills created the impression that the French had 
been a nation of collaborators. The diarists reveal that opinion was very rarely so clear-
cut. Robert Paxton's La France de Vichy, which appeared in 1972, took a more scholarly 
approach. It was more concerned with exposing the true nature of Vichy than providing 
an insight into the behaviour and attitudes of the French population at large. His work 
was instrumental in revealing that collaboration was a French design ultimately rejected 
by Hitler. 8 Vichy consistently offered more than what it was asked to do, patiicularly in 
its anti-Semitic and labour policies. The Petainist myth of a double jeu and the Gaullist 
myth of a Resistant France were totally undermined by this notion of an independent 
entity acting of its own volition. The private diaries reveal very little on the everyday 
workings of the Vichy regime but they provide a very useful insight into how the French 
reacted to the Vichy regime and its policies. Moreover, they reveal that I)etain often 
6 See Jackson, The dark years, p.9. It also challenged the first history of Vichy, (Histoire de Vichy 1940-
1944, published in 1954) which had come not from an academic histOlian but from the writer Robert Aron. 
He argued that Vichy had been used as a shield to protect France from the German demands for 
collaboration. He also distinguished between Petain and Laval, blaming the latter for Vichy's failings. 
Aron's interpretation was certainly not Gaullist but at the same time it did not necessarily subvert the 
Gaullist myth of a Resistant France nor increase the number of traitors. It simply tried to incorporate Vichy 
into this Resistant France. 
7 Ibid., p.2. 
S Paxton, Robert, Vichy France. Old Guard and New Order 1940-1944, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1982), p.5l. Paxton expanded on Hoffmann's notion that there was not just one Vichy but several 
Vichys and several kinds of collaboration, as opposed to Aron's notion of a good and bad Vichy. He did 
acknowledge that there was a degree of coercion from Germany but ultimately Vichy'S policy of 
collaboration was of its own volition. 
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assumed a distinct role from that of Vichy but opinion would constantly oscillate with 
regard to these two separate entities. By the end of the Occupation, P6tain and Vichy 
could no longer be separated but this process should not be seen as strictly linear. 
It must be remembered that Paxton was concentrating on Franco-German relations 
with respect to the Vichy regime. He was limited in his scope by the fact that the French 
archives had not yet been opened for public investigation, which would have prevented 
him from widening his approach to an evaluation of how the French viewed the Vichy 
regime. The opening up of the French archives at the end of the 1970s caused a change in 
the focus of the historiography, which made a step in this direction. The studies of Pierre 
Laborie, John Sweets and Phillipe Burrin are examples of the shift in emphasis away 
from the Vichy regime to the French people and their social and political attitudes. They 
broke down 'French opinion' into smaller subsets: regions of France or various social 
and political groups. Such studies challenged the traditional notions of collaboration and 
resistance. 9 These studies, written from the perspective of history from below, sparked 
off other studies, which were concerned with individual reactions to the Occupation on 
an everyday level. 10 They all took account of the fact that opinion was multifarious and 
ever changing. It is impossible to talk of French opinion or behaviour according to black 
and white notions of collaboration and resistance, since only a tiny minority comprised 
either group. Instead, it is necessary to accommodate the overwhelmingly different 
shades of grey of French opinion and behaviour. Burrin's term of accommodation is now 
recognised as the most appropriate term to represent this attitude of moral ambiguity. 11 
Certain sacrifices or compromises had to be made. Yet at the same time such a term 
tends to take away the individual experience from the Occupation years. The private 
diaries reveal that within this broad framework of accommodation there was a great 
variation in behaviour throughout the period. What continues to remain most lacking is 
an investigation into why the French overwhelmingly chose to adopt this strategy of 
9 Jackson, The dark years, pp.12-14. 
10 Dominique Veillon, Vivre et survivre en France (1995); J.-P. Rioux, (ed.) La vie culturelle SOliS Vichy 
(1990); Henri Amouroux, La vie des Franr,:ais sous ['Occupation, (Paris, 1990). Such studies, however, 
still treat individuals on a collective basis, albeit on a significantly narrower level than historical works 
undertaken from the perspective of History from above. 
11 Burrin, Phillipe, La France if l'heure allemande 1940-1944, (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1995). 
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accommodation. These histories from below are more concerned with illustrating the 
complexity of opinion rather than exploring the reasons behind this complexity. 
What this suggests is that opinion is still very much divided on an overall 
interpretation of the Occupation years. 12 The historiography may well be clear on the role 
of the Vichy regime but there are still prevailing doubts over the behaviour and attitudes 
of the French population at large. Henry Rousso discovered that Vichy continues to exert 
an influence on opinion in contemporary French society and still excites controversy. 13 
One area in particular the historiography has tended to focus on since the 1970s is Vichy 
and the Jews. Where historians once distinguished between the formative years of Vichy 
and the totalitarianism of its final stages, historians such as Paxton and Manus began to 
stress the continuity of Vichy repression. 14 What these studies fail to consider, however, 
is the relation of French opinion to the persecution of the Jews. Moreover, there appears 
to be an imbalance over how much the historiography devotes to this issue and the 
impact this issue had on the French population who endured the Occupation. The private 
diaries reveal very little on the subject, which raises the question whether there is an 
historical Judaeo-centric view of the Occupation period. That is in no way to downplay 
the role of Vichy in the persecution of the Jews but, rather, to suggest that the Jewish 
issue has assumed a more prominent position in contemporary French society than it did 
during the Occupation period. 
12 Some recent studies attempt to offer a definitive study of the Occupation, encapsulating both French 
opinion and an examination of the Vichy regime: Julian Jackson, The Dark Years 1940-1944, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2001); Robert Gildea, Marianne in chains. III search of the German occupation 
1940-1945, (London: Macmillan, 2002). 
13 Rousso, Henry, Le syndrome de Vichy, (Palis, Editions du Seuil, 1990). There is also his collaborative 
work with Eric Conan, Vichy: un passe qui ne passe pas, (Paris: Gallimard, 1996) which appeared at the 
time when controversy sunounded President Mittenand's own Vichy past. In 1997, the tlial of MaUlice 
Papon for crimes against humanity became the longest trial in French history. The verdict, however, 
satisfied very few, as the tlial raised more questions than it answered. 
14 Peschanski, Denis, Vichy 1940-1944: Contr6le et exclusion, (Brussels: Editions Complexe, 1997). 
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Part One 
The formative years 1940 - 1941 
La debiicle totale n 'eta it pas prevue; les plus pessimistes ne prevoyaient que la 
dejaite. Au debut de 1940, qui eat predit une dictature ala solde de l'etranger et une 
terreur blanche en miniature qui ne demande a grandir?15 
Quarante millions de Petainistes and Vichy. 
P6tain announced on June 17, 1940 that he would offer France Ie don de sa 
personne pour attenuer son malheur. 16 The spontaneous movement of confidence 
towards P6tain can be seen as a result of the uncertainties thrown up by the Exodus. Gide 
reveals in June 1940 how the defeat had come too quickly to enable one to take one's 
bearings properly: 
Quant a la situation presente ... , Ie temps n 'est pas encore venu ou if jaudra «se 
prononcer». Les vraies questions ne sont pas encore posees. Pour I 'instant je ne 
sens en moi que de I' attente; et de I' espoir ... mais je ne sais encore de quoi. 17 
With a population riddled with divisions and experiencing a sense of betrayal, it is easy 
to understand why P6tain's offer to be the protector of the French people should have 
been so readily accepted. It is crucial to consider that his offer was to protect France from 
Germany rather than collaborate with Germany. The policy of collaboration would, 
therefore, come to be embodied by Vichy. As the epigraph suggests, Vichy would only 
be seen, in the summer of 1940, as a provisional episode; a regime of circumstance. As 
the Occupation progressed, the realisation that the Vichy regime was not going to be as 
provisional as first thought corresponded, more or less, with growing opposition to its 
policies. 18 Yet P6tain would always keep that father-figure role. 
15 Werth, Deposition, p.87. (11.11.40) 
16 Burrin, La France a "heure allemande, p.15. 
17 Gide, Journal, pp.31-32. (26.6.40) 
18 LabOlie, L 'opinionfranr;aise sous Vichy, pp.234-236. 
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Petain would be seen as the savIOur and protector of France not from the 
Occupation but, rather, from the debiicle. It was he who had put an end to the fighting 
with the call for an armistice. From the very outset of the Occupation, he established a 
separate identity to that of Vichy. Vichy was a provisional regime to keep France running 
and to help maintain independence but Petain was the father-figure of France trying to 
restore order and stability. His relationship with the rest of France was much more 
intimate. For a long time, and certainly beyond the first year, Werth would observe that 
people would distinguish between Petain and his regime: 
N espere et souhaite la victoire de I 'Angleterre et, en meme temps, il crait en 
Petain. J'ai deja constate que quelques paysans separaient Petain d'avec les 
hommes de Vichy. Mais pour eux Petain est une maniere de bon vieux. Au lieu 
que N. .. lui prete de fermes desseins. II a sauve, de la France, ce qui, apres la 
debacle, en pouvait etre sauve. En attendant que I 'Angleterre ait gagne, Petain 
fait I 'interim de de Gaulle. 19 
In the countryside, it was commonly said 'Ah if only the Marshal knew'. Even when his 
actions were met with disapproval, such as his meeting with Hitler in October 1940, he 
was able to recover support, such as when he sacked Laval in December 1940. Petain 
would become an incarnation of France. The song Marechal, nous voila became a semi-
official anthem with its closing line of 'For Petain is France, France is Petain' .20 There 
was at times certainly beyond the summer of 1940 a blurring of lines between Petain and 
Vichy but their respective roles were quite distinct initially. 
Petainism, as opposed to support for the regime, was a genuinely popular political 
culture born out of the Exodus, where many individuals had experienced the 
disintegration of the French state first-hand. In many cases, the authorities were the first 
to flee and this sense of betrayal by the politicians encouraged the French to withdraw 
into themselves and retreat into self-reliance. Petain's apolitical talk of les mensonges qui 
nous ont fait tant de mal and his compassion for the suffering of the refugees struck a 
chord with a population, who felt abandoned and directionless. For the first time since 
the declaration of the war, where the gap between official propaganda and reality had 
increasingly widened, here was someone who was genuinely addressing the French 
19 Werth, Deposition, p.140. (22.12.40) See also p.l53, (14.1.41) and p.188, (20.3.41) and Bobkowski, En 
guerre et en paix, p.146. (24.9.40) 
20 Jackson, The dark years, p.278. 
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people in words that actually reflected their own experiences.21 Bobkowski would 
emphatically reject Petain's claim: "«Trop peu d'enfants, trap peu d'armes, trop peu 
d'allies, voila la cause de notre defaite.»" Yet he would be far more receptive to his 
claim that the defeat had exposed France's rotten core: "«Depuis la victoire, l'esprit de 
jouissance l' a emporte sur l' esprit de sacrifice. On a revendique plus qu 'on n 'a servi. On 
a voulu l'epargner l'effort; on rencontre atljourd'hui le malheur.» Enfin quelques mots 
de verite.,,22 Petain was a means of alleviating the turmoil that had arisen during the 
Exodus but the people were far more sceptical of Vichy's programme to mend France's 
divisions: 
Les gens de Vichy veulent regenerer la France. Retour a la terre, famille, 
morale. Regenerer la France avec des poncifs de bachot. Car its ne connaissent 
meme plus Ie beau langage, les belles periodes, Ie style en toge de la 
bourgeoisie de 1840.23 
Petain was the object of an extraordinary personality cult with images produced of 
him on an industrial scale. It was sustained by his provincial tours of the Unoccupied 
Zone, which started at Toulouse on 5 November, 1940. Although the cult was at times 
excessive in its praise of Petain, it would be wrong to think that it was an entirely 
artificial construction orchestrated by Vichy. Yet as Werth remarked on a trip to Lyons, 
the popularity of Petain may well have been genuine, but there was pressure from above 
to exploit it: 
A la campagne, Ie marechal n 'etait pas obsedant. Nous n 'avions vu son image 
que sur Ie journal. Les vendeurs de cartes postales ne sont pas venus jusque 
dans les fermes isolees. A Lyon, le marechal est partout. Ses portraits, ses 
messages, ses allocutions radio-diffusees sont collees aux glaces des magasins. 
Signe d'un incontestable enthousiasme? J'apprends qu'avant son passage a 
Lyon la prefecture avait distribue ces placards et que nul commen;ant ne se fut 
risque a ne les point apposer. La pubUcite du marechal fut organisee comme 
celle d 'un grand cirque. Sur les arbres des quais, la prefecture a fait coller des 
bandes imprimees, qui portent l'inscription: «Vive Petain! »24 
The people may well have bought portraits or postcards of Petain but the fact that they 
did so mainly in concentrated urban areas rather than isolated rural areas is an indication 
21 Ibid., p.279-281. 
22 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.34. (25.6.40) See also Gide, Journal, p.29: (14.6.40 - 24.6.40) He 
also agrees with Petain's words but one day after the armistice cannot comprehend how France has agreed 
to offer up itself to the Germans. 
23 Werth, Deposition, p.47. (26.9.40) 
24 Ibid., p.139. (22.12.40) 
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that his appeal was nevertheless reliant on visible promotion. In other words, the genuine 
goodwill of the French people towards P6tain was ruthlessly exploited and this 
exploitation was best exercised in populated areas. The implication is that there was 
ostensibly great support for Petain but if one looks beyond the portraits and provincial 
tours, the substance of this popularity is less clearly defined. From his observations in 
Saint-Amour, Werth saw that the peasants were angry over the policies of Vichl5 yet 
they chose to ignore the negative aspects of Vichy to shelter under P6tain in a safe, 
peaceful, rural France: "Le marechal est par-dessus Vichy une carte postale en couleurs, 
une image de piete, une icone dans sa niche. ,,26 Moreover, it is important to remember 
that this promotion of Petain only occurred in the Unoccupied Zone. Vichy may well 
have officially spoken for all of France but German military rule in the Occupied Zone 
effectively silenced Petain's voice. Rist, for example, looked upon P6tain's words with 
distant disdain: 
Petain a donne une interview a des journalistes america ins, ou it declare que la 
France doit redevenir «agricole et chretienne». La stupidite de ces propos est 
vraiment desarmante. En France christianisme = catholicisme. Croit-if faire 
plaisir aux Allemands? Et croil-il Jaire plaisir au clerge fra1U;ais qui deteste Ie 
national-socialisme ?27 
The diarists reveal that support for Petain was far from universal but at times 
criticism of him was not always readily apparent. Fran<;ois Mauriac, for example, would 
clearly diaspprove ofP6tain's refusal to face up to the humiliating defeat: 
Le 17 juin, apres que Ie marechal Petain eut donne a son pays cette supreme 
preuve d'amour, les Franr;ais entendirent a la radio une voix qui leur assurait 
que jamais la France 11 'avait ete aussi glorieuse. He bien, non! 11 ne nous reste 
d'autre chance de salut que de ne plus jamais 110US mentir a nous-memes. 
Reconnaissons que nous sommes aufand d'un abime d'humiliatian. 28 
Mauriac, a devout Catholic, was much more receptive to P6tain's notion that life would 
be hard under the Occupation, and that the French would have to atone for their sins. 
Indeed, at times his words bear a remarkable resemblance to those of Petain: 
25 Ibid., p.158 Ceux du bourg s 'en fichent. lis ne lisent plus les mandements et messages. Mais ils son! de 
mauvaise humeur et tres pres de la colt?.re a cause des dernieres taxations. (8.11.40) 
26 Ibid., p.140. (22.12.40) See also p.153. (14.1.41) and p.l91. (26.3.41) 
27 Rist, Une saisol1 gatee, p.90. (26.8.40) This uncertainty over the direction Vichy was taking can be 
explained by the lack of infonnation flowing beyond the demarcation zone. 
28 Mam1ac, Figaro, (19.6.40) See also Dumeril, Journal d'Ull honnete homme pendant l'occupation, p.95. 
(21.12.40) 
85 
Nous possedons dans le monde bouleverse d'aujourd'hui la seule richesse qui 
compte, et qui est de pouvoir tirer de notre sol notre subsistance. [. . .} Cette 
terre fou!ee aux pieds par les vainqueurs reste une terre benie et d'autant plus 
benie que de notre malheur un bonheur du moins va sortir: la pays ann erie 
franr;:aise a demi detruite se reconstUuera, et nos enfants affames retrouveront 
leur vieille nourrice et se disputeront ses mamelles, dont parlait Sully: 
labourage et paturage ... 29 
This view bears a striking resemblance to Vichy's policy of retour a la terre, which 
praised the simple, rural virtues of the peasants. Stanley Hoffmann's description of 
Vichy as a 'pluralist dictatorship' is apposite.3o Vichy did not merely represent one set of 
values but a whole range of values, which, in turn, could appeal to a whole range of 
people. This does not mean, however, that because certain Vichy policies coincided with 
the views of Mauriac that he supported Petain or Vichy. It is significant to note that 
Mauriac even initially advocated collaboration with Germany: 
Et pourtant, nous ne pouvons rien faire aujourd'hui qu 'une politique de 
collaboration, dans la mesure du possible. Mais je doute que la condition 
essentielle qui serait d'avoir un gouvernement respecte par les Allemands, soU 
remplie par nos chefs actuels '" Helas/31 
Vichy's ineffectual leadership may have convinced Mauriac to join the literary 
resistance. 
There were others who arrived unequivocally at their certainties about Petain very 
early on. Rist, living in Paris in the Occupied Zone was initially hesitant as to the 
intentions of Vichy but he would be very critical of Petain: "Discours pitoyable de 
Petain dans lequel il incrimine la faible natalite et le desir de loisir. ,,32 Rist became a lot 
clearer in his idea of Vichy towards the end of 1940 but was still doubtful as to its exact 
function: 
Il se passe quelque chose a Vichy. Mais quoi? Quelles demandes allemandes? 
Quelles dispositions chez ces ministres divises entre eux, preoccupes de 
politique interieure, de pre parer l'av(mement chacun de son pretendant, - et qui 
ont deja tant cede a 1 'ennemi, qu 'il n y a pas de raison de ne pas continuer. 33 
29 Ibid., Figaro, (15.7.40) See Bloch, L' etrange de/aite, pp.l80-182. Similarly, Bloch believed that there 
were advantages in the people identifying with the land, but on the other hand, he recognised Gelmany's 
desire to have vassal states produce agJicultural foodstuffs, which would turn France into a musee 
d' antiquailles. 
30 Hoffmann, Essais sur la France, p.l8. 
31 BurJin, La France it l'heure allemande, pp.31-32. 
32 Rist, Une saison gatee, pp.73-74. (19-22.6.40) See also pp.78-79. (2.7.40) 
33 Ibid., p.120. (21.12.40) 
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Rist was clearly not fooled that Vichy, despite its preoccupation with internal refonn, 
could act independently of Gennany. It is interesting to note that Rist should feel that the 
Vichy government, working from the so-called zone libre, was different from the 
Gennan administration of the Occupied Zone only by degree. Werth was far better 
placed in Saint-Amour to monitor P6tain and his Vichy regime. From the outset, he was 
opposed to Vichy and P6tain: 
On attendait de n 'importe quel gouvemement qu 'il se declariit avant tout 
proviso ire, qu'if subsistiit jusqu 'a fa paix dans la reserve et la pudeur. Mais 
celui-ci impose ses passions partisanes et les habille des laisses-pour-compte du 
fascisme. La France est comparable a une usine incendiee. Tout a crouIe. Seule, 
la loge du concierge est intacte. concierge I 'habite et garde les decombres. 
Mats il devient fou, ne se contente pas de chasser ies pillards, les ramasseurs de 
metal. II s'imagine qu'il est Ie maitre de I 'usine. Et if plaque a sa vitre des 
mandements aux ouvriers, des notes de service et surveille attentivement un 
appareil de po in tage, qui 7l 'enregistre plus ni entrees ni sorties. Tel est ie 
marechal. 34 
Werth was by no means the only one who believed that there was no hope of rebuilding 
France with this concierge fou presiding over the ruins of France. Bloch was equally 
convinced that France could rebuild itself but believed that Vichy was merely a caretaker 
government until that day anived: 
Notre redressement national en sera, a coup sur, ionguement retarde. Retarde 
seulement, j'en ai la conviction. Les ressorts profonds de notre peupie sont 
intacts et prets a rebondir. [ .. .] La France de ia defaite aura eu un 
gouvemement de vieillards. CeZa est tout naturel. La France d 'un nouveau 
printemps devra etre ia chose des jeunes. 35 
The government of vieillards is a clear reference to Petain but it is also refening to the 
values of the past to which Vichy wanted to return. In this respect, Bloch's vision of 
P6tain and Vichy resembles very much that of Bernanos: 
la France s 'est donnee publiquement au vieillard, a la vieillesse, a Z'esprit de 
vieillesse, Ia plus jeune, ia plus rieuse nation du monde s 'est jetee dans la 
vieillesse par c/esespoir, comme si elle ne se jugeait plus digne d 'un autre genre 
de mort. Le Vieillard se crait son maitre, et I 'h isto ire dtra qu'il en a he dupe, 
qu'it est prisonnier de sa jeune prote. Elle lui a fait incarner la honte qu 'a 
l'heure de ta plus grande detresse elle n 'a pas ose assumeI'. Elle a mis dans ce 
vieillard toute sa honte, comme on verse de I 'huile dans une outre de cuir, et Ie 
34 Werth, Deposition, pp.42-43. (6.9.40) He saw Vichy as a melange de nazisme et d'idyllisme champetre. 
35 Bloch, L 'etrange dejaite, pp.206-207. Although Bloch did not write a dialY, his testimony was written 
immediately after the defeat, which situates him in that period. 
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jour venu, au premier tournant favorable de sa destinee, elle jettera dans 
I' oubli, it la fois, Ie Vieillard et la Honte. 36 
It is surprising how prophetic the words of these individuals are, given that they 
arrived at them so quickly and with such certainty. It illustrates that the notion of 
quarante millions de Petainistes is a false one. These individuals were by no means a 
majority but the fact that they were so clearly against Petain would suggest that the 
support for Petain was not as unanimous as has been thought. To these individuals must 
be added the fascist supporters, such as Drieu, who were far from supportive of Petain 
and his reactionary government: "Ce vieux con de marechal, ce salaud de Laval 
reagissent comme ils sont aux .evenements. J'ai toujours meprise ce general passif, ce 
defenseur de Verdun purement negatij.,,37 Then there were those like Roussin in 
Marseilles who were completely indifferent to Petain and Vichy: 
Je negligeai donc Ie general de Londres et ne me souciai guere du marechal de 
Vichy. Je retrouvais la vie, c' eta it pour y faire du theatre. Je I' ecris loyalement: 
je ne voyais pas en quoi la guerre me concernait encore. L 'euphorie de 
Marseille it cette epoque dut fortement peser sur mon etat d' esprit. Je laissais 
d'autres en toute bonne foi jouer les David face au Goliath hitlerien, s'ils 
etaient assez utopiques pour croire it leurs chances. 38 
When one considers those individuals who espoused similar ideas to Petain but 
who did not openly support him, such as Mauriac, the anti-Petain sentiment becomes 
even more significant. Indeed, De Beauvoir would go so far as to ask the question 
whether the French had more difficulty in accepting Petain's stance than they did 
accepting the German military presence: 
La haine, je m 'aperr;us que je ne I 'avais pas encore connue, mais seulement des 
rages assez abstraites; maintenant, j' en savais Ie gout; elle visait avec une 
particuliere violence ceux de nos ennemis qui m 'etaient Ie plus familiers. Les 
discours de Petain m 'atteignaient plus vivement que ceux d'Hitler [ .... /9 
If support for Petain was far from unanimous, why did this not translate into more 
conspicuous opposition to Petain and the Vichy regime? It is important to remember that 
the defeat required someone or something to blame, which inevitably entrenched existing 
36 Bemanos, Lettre aux Anglais, p.39. Similarly Bemanos was writing his open letters in that period 
immediately following the defeat. 
37 Drieu, Journal, p.303. (8.11.42) See also p.275. (1.10.41) 
38 Roussin, Rideau gris et habit vert, pp.1 01-1 02. 
39 De Beauvoir, La force de l'age, pp.515-516. See also p.479: Hitler, le nazisme, c'etait un lInivers 
etranger que je haissais it distance, avec line espixe de t/'anquillite. Petain, la Revolution nationale, je les 
detestais d 'une maniere intime et dans une colere qui flambait it netif chaque jour. 
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divisions and, moreover, forced them out into the open. The expectation of victory would 
have delayed the consideration of these divisions until after the defeat. There were 
diarists such as Drieu, however, who had noted before the German invasion the climate 
into which Vichy would enter: "A pres les votes sur Daladier et Reynaud on sent la 
France aussi divisee qu 'au temps de Munich. II y a plusieurs factions et personne ne sait 
comment defendre la cause qu'il defend. ,,40 There was no one voice calling for change 
but, rather, several voices all calling for change. The defeat presented the French with the 
perfect opportunity for change but their lack of consensus over what direction to take 
would remain constant. Vichy entered this climate of open divisions with the impossible 
task of bringing these different factions together. The irony was, however, that the 
divided nature of France suited admirably Vichy's pluralist approach, as it gave the 
illusion that France's diverse interests were all being catered to: 
Le pire est que les vieilles dissensions se prolongent. Tout Ie monde se croit 
trahi, les uns par les communistes, les autres par les gens de droite. II est 
certain que bien des gens se consolent aujourd 'hui en pens ant que leurs idees 
sont au pouvoir! Mais quelles idees avait Ie parti au pouvoir? Et comment les 
defendait-il?41 
This uncertainty over what specific direction Vichy was taking would not last for 
long but it would last long enough to create the impression that there was an initial broad 
acceptance of Vichy. The defeat would naturally encourage a unanimous call for change, 
as the old system had been brutally exposed in its failings. Yet this universal desire for 
change should not be confused with universal support for Vichy'S proposed solutions. 
How could a nation so divided and so broken accept a new regime with open arms? It is 
over-simplistic to think of France in terms of polar divisions of Left and Right or 
Catholic and Protestant. France was not simply split down the middle but, rather, as 
Welih described, cut en tron90ns: 
La France est en tron90ns: France occupee, France du marechal, France des 
paysans, France des ouvriers, France des bourgeois, France de droite et France 
de gauche, l'une pretendant etoujJer l'autre et tout resoudre par lefascisme, qui 
demain peut-etre se decomposera en Itatie meme. France travailleuse, savante 
et pensante, France des cartes postales du marechal, tous ces tro71(;ons de 
France se rassembleront-ils? Sous la botte allemande, par la brutatite du 
fascisme, d'un parti de l'ordre a tout prix? Ou bien la France se reinventera-t-
40 Dtieu, Journal, p.l65. (24.3.40) 
41 Rist, Vile saison gatee, 84. (21.7.40) 
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elle? Le peuple la reinventera-t-il? La bourgeoisie n 'est plus capable de penser 
la France. L'idee de France est devenue une idee difficile. Le peup/e 
l'eclaircira-t-elle? Mais Ie peuple existe-t-il encore?42 
These different sections of France were looking for different solutions. It was what 
they perceived Vichy could offer rather than what Vichy actually delivered that accounts 
for this ostensible initial support for Vichy. This support, enthusiastic or resigned, came 
from the disintegration of the French nation. Vichy was an attempt to rebuild the national 
framework and, to use the expression of Franyois B6darida, created the false hope of 
"I 'impossible symbiose du national et du social.,,43 The Vichy regime was fortunate in 
that it gave the French people what they wanted. The fighting was put to an end and the 
Republican regime faded away with massive approval because it was confused with a 
past that had seen great political and social divisions, which appeared to have paved the 
way for national disaster.44 
This did not stop the overwhelming majority of the French population from 
consciously electing to remain on the sidelines rather than actively participate in Vichy's 
programmes. Such a widespread absence of active palticipation would only encourage 
further doubts over Vichy's value. ThCrive, writing from occupied Paris, concluded from 
a conversation with someone who advocated the comte de Paris acting as king: "En 
revanche, personne ne croit aux institutions de Vichy. ,,45 Werth believed that greed was 
, 
the only explanation for the actions of those honourable citizens who had taken up roles 
in Vichy: "je commence it croire qu'it y a une passion de la haute politique, 
independante de son contenu, comme il y a un gmit de I 'amour qui se satisfait de 
n'importe quelle femme. ,,46 Rist was more inclined to think that the bourgeois fear of 
communism, rather than the lust for power, was the motivating factor: 
Dans la catastrophe actuelle, Ie pire est que les bene.ftciaires politiques du 
desastre ant interet it ce qu'it continue. Par la force des chases, les gens au 
pouvoir (et ceux qui se rejouissent de les y voir) doivent souhaiter la defaite de 
I 'Angleterre et bientat celle des Etats- Un is ! Car la victoire anglaise sera leur 
chute. Par une consequence qu'ils ne veulent pas avouer mats qui se produit en 
depit d' eux-mihnes, Us souhaitent la continuation du triomphe allemand et la 
42 Werth, Deposition, p.l50. (3.1.41) 
43 Laborie, L 'opinionfi'anr;aise SOliS Vichy, pp.200-201. 
44 Burrin, La France a !'heure allemande, pp.24-26. 
45 Therive, L 'envers du decor, p.26. (October 1940) Roussin (Rideau gris et habit vert, pp.lOl-102) freely 
admitted that he paid little attention to petain. 
46 Werth, Deposition, p.l42. (22.12.40) 
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France subjugUlie. Ainsi it y en France un parti de 1 'humiliation et de la de/aite, 
prejerant cette honte a une France libre mats 012 ils ont peur d'une partie de 
leurs concitoyens ceux qu'ils nomment les communistes. C'est cette peur qui 
est a la base de toute la perversion de ces dernieres annees. 47 
What is significant is that all these views shared a very negative opinion of Vichy 
at a relatively early stage. The influence of Petain had very little effect on shaping their 
opinion of Vichy in general, which suggests that Petain had forged an identity separate 
from Vichy in June 1940, and that would have lasting effects. Werth, for example, 
probed a railway worker for his view on how his peers perceived Vichy: 
«On ne s 'occupe, me dU-il, que des restrictions et, pour Ie reste, on attend. On 
espere que I'Angleterre gagnera. C'est tout. On ne parle pas de po!itique ... » 
«Et Laval ... » «Tres impopulaire ... » «Et Petain? ... » «Beaucoup pensent que, 
sans lui, les Allemands /eraient pire ... » 48 
When talking of Vichy during the first year of the Occupation, it is important to 
distinguish between the National Revolution and the policy of Collaboration. The former 
was seen to be can-ied out almost immediately but the latter would take longer to take 
shape in the French psyche. Petain's full powers were the platform for a fundamental 
transformation of politics and society, which would come to be called the National 
Revolution. The Armistice would provide a durable platform for the redefining of 
Franco-German relations, which would come to be called Collaboration. The vote of full 
powers and the Armistice were the necessary prelude to these policies but it must be 
stressed that they were not a logical outcome of these events. They were a deliberate 
choice. Moreover, they were two distinct policies.49 The important thing to remember is 
that the National Revolution, although largely ignored, was perceived as Petain's idea, 
whereas Collaboration was perceived as Laval's brainchild. What was equally significant 
was that the latter would come to be perceived as far more sinister than the former. 
The National Revolution was not a revolution from below but, rather, a revolution 
from above. It was an attempt to redress the imbalance created by the concessions 
47 Rist, Une saison gatee, pp.90-91. (31.8.40) See also p.82. (12.7.40) and pp.121-122. (28.12.40) 
48 Werth, Deposition, p.113. (29.11.40) 
49 Jackson, The dark years, pp.139-140. Weygand, for example, was opposed to collaboration but 
supported the National Revolution as a means of allowing France one day to avenge its defeat, as Prussia 
had done after Jena. Laval, on the other hand, was cynical about the National Revolution but committed to 
collaboration. He felt that the National Revolution was the instrument of collaboration, whereas Petain felt 
that collaboration was the instrument of the National Revolution. Laval believed the National Revolution 
was only useful for maintaining order to ensure Gemlan conciliation, whereas Petain believed 
collaboration could alleviate conditions in France to facilitate his refonns. 
91 
granted to the workers and the loss of bourgeois privileges during the 1930s. Rist 
believed that the National Revolution was an attempt to deceive the French that France's 
sovereignty remained intact. Moreover, the elite were exploiting the uncertainty of the 
future to carry out refonns, which were designed to halt the erosion of their interests: 
Ainsi nous sommes conduits dans fa nuU, pendant que les imbeciles continuent a 
parler de «renovation nationale». Sans doute par Ie mensonge, la stupidite et 
['impuissance. Beaux atouts pour «refaire l'ame d'un peuple» comme disent les 
journalistes payes, embrigades et ligotes par la censure. Ce qu 'if faut souhaiter 
c 'est que ce peuple si plein de bon sens et de patriotisme - ne laisse pas 
«refaire» son ame (dans tous les sens du mot «refaire»), mais garde l'ame que 
lui ont faite cent cinquante ans de lutte et de liberte et que voudrait bien 
confisquer a leur profit les eternels emigres de l'interieur, qui n 'ont pas change 
depuis Valmy et dont les rangs se sont gross is du stock des bourgeois craignant 
pour leur cofJre-fort. 50 
Werth was well aware of this reign of white terror but his observations from rural Saint-
Amour enabled him to appreciate that not only the elite were concerned about the 
concessions gained by the workers: 
Ce gouvernement est tout «vetu de pro bite candide et de lin blanc». II 
s 'enveloppe d'une nuee blanche. 11 est voue au blanc, comme une petite fiUe est 
vouee au bleu. Ceux du bourg s 'en fichent. lIs ne lisent plus les mandements et 
messages. Mais iis sont de mauvaise humeur et tres pres de la colere a cause 
des dernieres taxations. 51 
Werth was only too aware that the National Revolution was an attempt to halt the 
workers' encroachment on the rights of the bourgeoisie. Yet it is interesting to note that 
this aroused little or no concern among the peasants of Saint-Amour. They too resented 
the concessions granted to the workers and so any attempt to check their progress would 
have been welcomed. What concerned the peasants was the fact that Vichy was 
interfering with their own interests with regard to requisitions and taxation: 
Les paysans d'ici, s'i! ne s'agit de restrictions ou requisitions, sont absolument 
indifferents a tout ce que eli! et fait Ie gouvernement. fls ne lisent meme pas «la 
journee a Vichy». lis s'interessent au duel entre 1 'Angleterre et 1 'Allemagne et, 
en ce moment, surtout a la guerre italo-grecque... Si bien que tous les actes, 
mesures, reformes ou projets de Vichy passent inapen;us. Comme si un coup de 
baguette magique avail rendu invisibles et impalpables les gens de Vichy. Les 
paysans et les gens du bourg ni ne se rejouissent nl ne s' ef]i'ayent de cet hitlero-
50 Rist, Une saison galee, p.132. (12.1.41) See also pp.l65-166. (28.5.41) 
51 Werth, Deposition, p.84. (8.11.40) and p.87. (11.11.40) See Bernanos, Georges, Le Chemin de la Cl'Oix-
des-Ames, (Paris: Gallirnard, 1948) pp.93-94. 
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fascisme. Soit qu 'Us ne I 'identijient pas, soit qu 'its tiennent que Vichy n 'est pas 
dans Ie coup, que la partie se joue ailleurs. 52 
The peasants were largely indifferent to Vichy unless it directly affected their interests. 
Yet the taxes and requisitions were not tied up with the National Revolution but, rather, 
with the policy of Collaboration. The armistice included the conditions that the German 
occupying force would be maintained by the French government and that the Germans 
would be able to requisition anything and do so legally. Vichy needed an enormous 
amount of extra revenue and supplies to fund and feed the German occupying force, and 
the peasants felt the brunt of that squeeze. The National Revolution, however, ostensibly 
courted the peasants. The policy of retour a la terre, for example, which encouraged a 
return to the traditional rural way of life as opposed to the modem, decadent urban life, 
was a reversal of fortune for the peasants who had been overshadowed by the rise of the 
workers in the 1930s. On the one hand, Petain's efforts, despite being largely ignored, 
were nonetheless seen by the peasants as a genuinely honest attempt to rebuild France 
but, on the other hand, the policy of Collaboration, associated with Laval and which 
directly affected the peasants, caused resentment. Even at an early stage there was a 
distinction already being made between not only Laval and Petain but also their 
respective roles within the Vichy regime. Petain appeared to be working for the interests 
of France whereas Laval appeared to be working for the interests of Germany. 
The fact that Germany had occupied almost two-thirds of France meant that 
relations with the Germans would be inevitable. Dumeril felt that he could best 
contribute by gaining the best conditions for France through these contacts. Yet, in his 
mind, Vichy was taking this too far. It is significant, moreover, to note that Dumeril did 
not include Petain in the more sinister aspects of Vichy's collaboration with Germany: 
La radio de Vichy a annonce aussi que les Lorrains de langue jiAam;:aise 
auraient dil quitter dans les 24 heures la Lorraine pour etre transportes en 
Po logne. L 'achevement des pourparlers Laval-Hitler est peut-etre la cause de 
cette severite nouvelle. Jamais on n 'a vu s 'exercer une telle pression sur les 
peuples vaincus ! On comprend que les populations et surtout les jeunes 
s'impatientent, mais la seule politique est d 'accepter la situation et de s 'y 
adapter diplomatiquement Ie mieux possible. 53 
52 Ibid., p.123. (5.l2.40) 
53 Dumeril, Journal d'un honnete homme pendant l'occupation, pp.82-83. (14-15.l1.40) See p.120. His 
preferred strategy was: Attendre, c 'est la seule chose a faire, et faire son travail au jour Ie jour. 
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The term collaboration needs fwiher clarification as there were different levels of 
collaboration. Jackson takes the example of Jean Moulin, who was the prefect of the 
Eure-et-Loir. He refused to sign a declaration that French Senegalese troops had 
massacred civilians, which he knew had been caused by German bombing. He was 
arrested by the Germans but after the potentially embarrassing attempt on his life, he was 
set free and worked with the Germans thereafter, and instructed the mayors and French 
population at large on how to best deal with the Germans. He would be dismissed by 
Vichy and would come to playa key role in the Resistance. Moulin was an example of 
collaboration, as his official position of prefect required him to collaborate with the 
Germans. This was collaboration as specified by article 3 of the armistice, which 
required French civil servants in the Occupied Zone 'to conform to the regulations of the 
German authorities and collaborate with them in a correct manner '. Collaboration, in 
this spirit, was totally distinct from the policy of Collaboration, which Vichy would come 
to pursue. 54 Dumeril was another who genuinely believed that France could work with 
Germany and, unlike Moulin, he would 'collaborate' with the Germans for the entire 
Occupation. Yet he, like Drieu55 and Rist56, was invited to work for Vichy but would turn 
down the offer: "Pas Ie temps de m 'en occuper, et neutralite absolue de ma part. ,,57 It is 
significant that despite the fact that he worked daily alongside the Germans, he would 
think that Collaboration, in the sense of Vichy's policy, was out of the question. 
It took a while for Vichy's policy of Collaboration to become established and 
recognised. The notion of a double game, aided by the image of Petain, cast doubt over 
whether Collaboration was merely a ruse. Collaboration was fOffilalised with the meeting 
of Hitler at Montoire in October 1940 and the veil of uncertainty over Vichy's intentions 
was lifted. What is noticeable from the reading of the private diaries is that Vichy was 
often seen as a greater evil than the German presence. The defeat was hard to tolerate but 
the emergence of Vichy's designs was even more of a bitter pill to swallow: 
54 Jackson, The dark years, pp.l66-168. There was also political collaboration, as espoused by the Paris 
collaborationists, and economic collaboration. 
55 Drieu, Journal, p.272. (21.9.41) 
56 Rist, Une saison gatee, p.186. (13.9.41) 
57 Dumeril, Journal d 'un honnete homme pendant I 'occupation, p.129. (9.3 AI) 
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Meme je vais jusqu 'iz croire preferable pour un temps, la sujetion allemande; 
avec ses penibles humiliations, moins prejudiciable pour nous, moins 
degradante que la discipline que nous propose aujourd'hui Vichy. 58 
France had been defeated and so the German military presence was inescapable. Yet 
Vichy had made the conscious choice of collaborating with Germany. Rist, on reading 
about the Montoire meetings between Laval and Hitler and P6tain and Hitler on October 
22 and October 24 1940 respectively, remarked: 
Tout Ie monde est silencieux et comme constermi! Humiliation nouvelle? 
Descente plus bas dans l'abime? La radio anglaise, les echos des Etats-Unis, 
nous montrent ces pays de plus en plus irrites contre Ie gouvernement de 
Vichy. 59 
The existence of Vichy and the Unoccupied Zone may have given the illusion of 
independence, albeit to a limited degree, but the longer the policy of Collaboration was 
practised with no rewards for France, the more difficult this illusion was to maintain. 
Gu6henno, in the preface to his diary, argued that Vichy's very existence was a 
temptation to collaborate with Germany on a higher level: 
J'avais trop raison en juin 1940 de craindre que la servitude ne fut pour les 
jeLtneS gens une plus grande epreuve encore que la gtlerre. Le crime de ['ex-
marechal Petain a be de fa ire pour tout un peuple du deshonneur une tentation. 
II n 'est pas pire crime contre l'homme que de Ie tenter dans sa bassesse et sa 
lfichete. Mais surtout if n 'est pas pire crime contre de jeunes hommes. Je les ai 
vus se debattre dans cette honte qui leur etait proposee. 60 
The FTench population, however, did nothing to change the situation. The danger was, as 
Werth pointed out, that this muted indifference could be interpreted as acceptance: 
La France - ce que d'lci je puis voir et presumer de la France se laisse 
museler par Vichy, comme un chien docile. Eile ne peut echapper, il faut qu 'elle 
consente iz la museliere. Mats du moins pourrait-elle grogner?61 
The key question remains: why did this dissatisfaction with Vichy's direction not 
lead to an overthrow of the Vichy regime? Werth would often wonder whether the 
FTench would attempt to channel theiT anger into open dissidence: 
Existe+if, contre Vichy, un sens populaire de la nation? Et trouvera-t-il son 
occasion? Dans une levee en masse, emportant tout? Dans line guerre civile? 
Car Ie marechal, fabriquant son entite de revolution nationale sur une miette du 
58 Gide, Journal, p.76. (6.5.41) 
59 Rist, Une saison gatee, p.l 00. (26.1 0.40) and Guehenno, Journal des annees noires, p.58. (24.1 0.40) 
60 Guehenno, Journal des anllees noires, pJ 3. 
61 Weith, Deposition, p.209. (21.5.41) 
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territoire, a prepare d'assez bonnes conditions de guerre civile, pour le cas ou 
1 'Allemagne vaincue ou renon9ante ne pourrait enteriner ses messages. 62 
If Vichy aroused more anger than solace why did the French refuse to at least grogner? 
The circumstances that led to its existence go some way to explaining this appearance of 
acceptance. Yet the situation in which the French found themselves after the defeat 
cannot be discounted. The Occupied Zone contained the overwhelming majority of 
workers in France and although they suffered the most out of all the social groups, the 
fear of unemployment was a great motivator in preventing them from voicing their 
concerns. Moreover, the Occupied Zone was controlled by the German military and to 
rise up against the Germans was not the same as overthrowing a government. The fact 
that the so-called zone libre was free from the German military might well have made 
those living there more hesitant about changing the status quo. Although Vichy spoke for 
all of France, its influence was felt much less in the Occupied Zone, which contained the 
majority of the French population.63 
Yet the other question that needs to be asked is what would have replaced the 
Vichy regime? There seemed to be no other alternative, and any attempt to do so would 
have incurred the wrath of the Germans: 
La politique de Vichy, c' est l'integration de la France a 1 'Allemagne. Le pays la 
repousse mollement, la reprouve. Mais c 'est un mouvement in time, une 
reprobation interieure. Il ne resiste pas et sans doute il ne peut resister. Et c 'est 
face a mon papier que depuis six mois je resiste. 64 
Werth realised that it was impossible to actively resist either Vichy or the Germans and 
that one had to adopt a more subtle form of resistance. The trouble was that such a form 
of resistance was not easy to detect and left those who practised it open to reproach. 
Werth, for example, talked about resisting through his writing but he did not publish 
clandestinely his material like Guehenno or Mauriac did. Inwardly he may have been 
defiant but outwardly he differed little from those he was criticising for being too 
acquiescent. This ostensible acquiescence enabled Paxton to portray the French 
population at large as 'functional collaborators'. Unless one was exposed to the true 
private feelings of the individual, it was impossible to differentiate from those who were 
62 Ibid., p.182. (4.3.41) 
63 Burrin, La France it l'heure allemande, p.89. 
64 Werth, Deposition, p.128. (9.12.40) 
96 
resigned to the defeat and those who were struggling against it each day. As Gu6henno 
pointed out in February 1941, it was difficult to sort the French people into categories, 
although he believed that, in general, the French people saw past the motives of Vichy: 
Quel genie devront avoir historiens de I' avenir pour reconnaitre les vraies 
causes et les vrais mobiles des evenements dans ces textes, ces communiques, 
dont pas un mot n' est loyal, ni exact. Et que veut-on qu' myourd 'hut meme Ie 
peuple, dans son ensemble, y comprenne. Mais son instinct Ie sauve. De tant de 
tergiversations il conclut seulement avec une totale surete que Laval est 
l'homme de Hitler et que fa collaboration n 'est qu 'un beau mot pour fa 
servitude. 65 
It would take time for the French to realise that Vichy's collaboration with 
Gennany was not gaining any concessions for France. When Rist still had no news at the 
end of October 1940 of his son, who had been taken prisoner of war after the annistice, it 
is clear his patience had nm out for a regime that was supposedly trying to protect the 
French: 
Qui jamais pardonnera au gouvernement de Vichy son in curie et son impudence 
dans Ie mensonge? Je Ie tiens pour personnellement respol1sable du sort de mon 
fils qui n Jaw'ait jamals dil etre prisonnier, ayant he pris apres I 'armistice. Je 
tiens Laval et Baudouin pour personnellement responsables de ce qu'il souJfre 
et soufJrira. Je les tiens pour personnellement responsables des soufJrances de 
froid et de faim qu'ils font subir ames enfants et petits-enfants. Pour 
personnellement responsables d'ajouter aces souffi'ances les mensonges 
cyniques qu Jils font paraitre dans leurs journaux. Pour personnellement 
responsables de la prolongation de ces souffi'ances par 1 'aide qu 'Us font donner 
a I 'Allemagne par notre industrie. Pour personnellement responsables de la 
degradation intellectuelle qu'iZs irnposent a nos journaux et qui nous 
maintiendrait dans une ignorance totale de ce qui se passe sans la radio 
americaine et anglaise. It est impossible de penser que Ie jour de fa vengeance 
ne viendra pas et que ces cyniques provocateurs et profiteurs de fa defaite de la 
F . 66 rance ne seront pas pums. 
The point to remember is that there had already been much oscillation in opinion by 
1941. The Mers-el-K6bir incident, which had seen the British Navy open fire and sink 
part of the French Fleet, had caused much Anglophobia but the meeting of Hitler at 
Montoire, where it appeared Laval and P6tain were courting Hitler under the guise of 
65 Gw§henno, Journal des al11uies noires, pp.100-101. (10.2.41) See BUlTin, La France if l'heure allemande, 
p.9. It is interesting to note the evolution of the word collaboration. Until 1940, it simply meant a common 
work or participation in a common work. Yet in a very short time it came to mean betrayal for the profit of 
the invader or at the very least submitting to an occupying power, which clearly illustrates that 
collaboration was roundly rejected by the French. 
66 Rist, Vile saison gatee, p.ll1. (12.12.40) 
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collaboration, had caused much despair amongst the French. Out of this came the 
directive to ban any British radio broadcast. Petain's speech on October 30, 1940 would 
help to calm things down, in which he mentioned that he had refused to bow to immense 
German pressure. But the expulsion of those from Lorraine and the violent reprisals 
against students protesting in Paris on Armistice Day would undermine this.67 However, 
underneath this oscillation in opinion was the belief that Collaboration was more of a 
reflection on Vichy than the German occupying force. It was Vichy that suggested 
collaboration as the best path forward for France; it would seem that the French 
population was not convinced. Yet opinion towards Vichy cannot be fully understood 
without an examination of the diarists' reactions towards the Germans. 
The Germans: invasion des rats. 
Just as it took Vichy time to establish itself, and just as its influence affected 
different regions and individuals to differing degrees, so too did the German invasion and 
subsequent occupation affect France to varying degrees. The French living in the north-
east had already experienced German occupation during the First World War. In that 
sense, they were more prepared for what lay ahead of them. Those living in the 
Unoccupied Zone, however, had no first-hand experience of life under German 
occupation and this would remain so until November 1942, when the Germans would 
occupy all of France. The "invasion des rats,,68, as Guehenno put it, would take time to 
reach all of France. It would, consequently, take time to fully appreciate the ramifications 
of the Occupation. Mauriac would write in Le Figaro in June 1940: "Les Frant;ais du 
Nord, dont les maisons jilrent detruites en 1914 et 1940, je croyais les plaindre. 
Aujourd'hui seuiement,je comprends: leur douleur nous restaft etrangere.,,69 This would 
explain the attitude of the diarist Roussin, living in Marseilles, who was oblivious to the 
suffering of those in the Occupied Zone: "Tout ce qui restait tragique dans Ie reste de fa 
France semblait presque oublie ou du moins ne plus concerner ceux que Ie sort gratifiait 
67 Laborie, L 'opinionfram;aise SOliS Vichy, pp.239-243. 
68 Guehenno, Journal des amuJes noires, p.17. (22.6.40) 
69 Mauriac, (Euvres completes, p.308. (23.6.40) 
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de ce del bleu et de cette apparente liberte.,,7o Moreover, the attitude of the Gennans 
was different towards the French than the people of many other occupied territories. 
There was no intention of erasing France from the European map. Hitler's intention was 
to exploit France ruthlessly but at the same time keep up the pretence that nonnal 
everyday life could continue. Roussin illustrates how those living in the Unoccupied 
Zone would have been especially inclined to believe that the Gennan occupation would 
not affect their lives. 
The initial reactions of the diarists to their first encounter with the Gennans are 
useful to analyse. Toesca made the very astute remark: "Ce qui est important c 'est 
l'impression premiere. Les hommes n 'aiment pas changer d'avis.,,71 The opinions 
fonned in the initial period of the Occupation would be crucial in shaping the opinions of 
the French throughout the Occupation. Some actively sought to build good relations with 
the Gennans. Galtier-Boissiere noted that the prospect of advancing oneself through 
Gennan contacts was certainly enticing for some: "la reconciliation franco-allemande 
ouvre des perspectives magnijiques."n Those who chose to work alongside the Gelmans, 
however, were by no means always acting out of self-interest. In the early months of the 
Occupation, there were posters put up in the Occupied Zone to warn the French not to 
attack the Gennans, as such action would provoke harsh reprisals: "Que chacun reste a 
son poste et continue son travail. Ce sera pour lui la meilleure far;:on de servir sa partie, 
son peuple et lui-meme. ,,73 This raises the question whether those who blocked out the 
Gennan presence were being defiant or submissive? Were those who worked with the 
Gennans out of a desire to best serve France's interests really working in Gennany's 
favour? The language schools, for example, were hit with a sudden surge of interest in 
learning the Gennan language.74 Was this a sign of simple practicality or was it a case of 
the French going too far? Dumeril, who spoke fluent Gennan and worked with the 
Gennans on a daily basis, was convinced that establishing good relations with the 
Gennan occupiers would be the best option for France. He finnly believed from his first 
70 Roussin, Rideau gris et habit vert, p.99. 
71 Toesca, Cinq ails de patience, p.83. (5.9.40) 
72 Galtier-Boissiere, Jou7'I1al, p.13. (26.8.40) 
73 Dumeril, Jou7'I1al d'un hon71ete homme pendant l'occllpation, p.37. (June 1940) 
74 Burrin, La France a l'heure allemande, ppJ06-308. In 1939, the Berlitz school had 939 Gelman 
students and 2470 English students. In the autumn of 1941, these figures had changed to 7 920 and 625 
respectively. 
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encounter with Commander Hotz that not all Germans were Nazis and that it was 
possible to conduct civilised relations with them. It made no sense to fight them; the best 
course was to gain the maximum benefit from them until peace in Europe arrived: 
II n 'y avait aucune arrogance ni joie de la victoire chez cet homme modeste et 
cultive qui semblait reJouZer en lui-meme une douleur poignante. Quand je pris 
conge de lui, Ie Commandant serra ma droite dans ses deux mains, d 'un geste 
qui devait etre lui Jamilier. «Nous nous trouvons tous les deux, dil-il les larmes 
aux yeux, dans une situation que nous n 'avons pas voulue. Nous essaierons de 
nous en tirer au mieux des interets de nos deux peuples.» J'espere que cette 
conversation sera utile a tous mes concitoyens en me permettant d'intervenir 
sans repit en leur Javeur. 75 
He believed that the majority of the Nantais popUlation reacted to the first signs of active 
resistance with overwhelming disapproval. 76 
Toesca was also of the opinion that it was vital that the French had a say in their 
own affairs: 
Administrer, c'est Jaire repartir par des Fraru;ais pour des Franfais, entre 
Franfais; c 'est assurer la distribution de d 'electricite, d 'eau potable, c 'est 
retablir les ecoles, Ie reseau medical, etc ... Autant de questions qui echappent 
au domaine des politiciens, que nous voulons systematiquement ignorer. Par Ie 
travail indispensable de chacun a I' entretten de la communaute Jranfaise, nous 
aurons du meme coup maintenu la cohesion de tous dans Ie meme ideal: 
I' espoir de la paix par la liberation. Quand? On Jremit rien qu 'en se posant la 
t . 77 ques lOn. 
The abandoning of one's post may have been perceived favourably after the Liberation 
but it was certainly not deemed patriotic in the context of 1940. Yet it would take a long 
time for Dumeril to be fully aware of Germany's divisive goal. His cordial relations with 
Hotz evidently made a lasting impression. He expressed surprise over a statement made 
by a German attache: "«Le resultat en Syrie importe peu. Le resultat est atteint de laire 
battre Anglais et Franfais». Cette idee est a retenir. II doil y avail' beau coup de vrai. 
attendant, Ie desarroi est grand certainement en France; la tristesse aussi. ,,78 Toesca, 
75 Dumeril, Journal d'un honm2te homme pendant ['occupation, p.31. (24-25,6.40) See p.lOS He was 
aware that Nazism was just as oppressive as Communism and needed an extensive police force to repress 
and keep in check the local population. Yet he also believed that there were sufficient numbers of honest 
German officials, which would allow fruitful collaboration, 
76 Ibid" p.62, 
77 Toesca, Cinq ans de patience, p.75, (14.7.40) 
78 Dumeril, Journal d'ull honnete homme pendant ['occupation, p.l40. (16.6.41) See also p.109 The 
Germans got the French to denounce one another. Commander Hotz acknowledged: «Sans les Fram;ais, 
nous 11 'arriverions pas a en decouvrir un seu/», 
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who was in an equally privileged position with respect to his working relationship with 
the Germans, became aware of Germany's real intentions much earlier: 
Pour la premiere fois, je comprends ce qu 'est la «querelle d'Aliemand». Je 
fremis a la pensee de 1 'hegemonie qui nous menace. Desormais, tout acte, tout 
desir allemand 111 'apparaitra comme un coup donne a notre liberte. Liberte, 
peau de chagrin. 79 
Toesca's view of his work with the German military authorities was different to that of 
Dumeril from the outset. He did not share Dumeri!' s desire to extract the maximum 
benefit from Germany: "La politique actuuelle consiste a amadouer les Allemands Ie 
plus possible, ales detourner des exactions qu'ils sont prets a commettre. ,,80 Their 
ultimate aim may have well been the same - to serve France's interests in the best 
possible way - but their approach was quite different. Dumeril believed that the sinister 
side of Nazi Germany could be offset by the honest and noble intentions of many 
German officials, whereas Toesca believed that it was necessary to fool every German. 
The German occupation would see many French people working for or alongside 
the German occupiers. Yet much like the attitude towards Vichy, the ovelwhelming 
majority would refuse to actively work towards the goal of forging a partnership between 
France and Germany. That is not to suggest, however, that the French completely 
shunned the German occupiers. It is important to consider that the all-important initial 
reactions were formed by the French whilst they were at their lowest ebb. Werth, in 
1942, would recall how so many had been mesmerised by the first sight of the Germans: 
Et je me souviens de cette belle jeune fllle, qui, a Chalon, Ie 13 juillet 1940, la 
fleur a fa bouche, se promenait avec des soldats allemands. Et j'ai vu des 
bourgeois de petite ville s 'ouvrir de tous leurs pores it ['Allemand. Pal vu la 
France traumatisee, h)pnotisee par Ie vainqueur, ensorcelie par la botte. 81 
The psychoanalyst Marie Bonaparte argued: "la haine aggressive avait alors souvent fait 
place chez les vaincus a une admiration soumise et fascinee pour leurs vainqueurs. ,,82 
Werth, on his escape to Saint-Amour, observed that the Germans' emphatic victory had 
softened considerably their notorious reputation of the First World War: 
79 Toesca, Cillq ails de patience, p. 79. (30.7.40) 
80 Ibid., p.82. (25.8.40) 
81 Werth, Deposition, p.323. (18.7.42) 
82 Burrin, La France it l'lle/we allemande, p.20l. See also p.29. The Gem1ans, in their first reports, noted 
that the French population was jortement impressionnee par la discipline and that de llombreux Franc;ais 
expriment leur appreciation au sujet des rapports de camaraderie qui existent entre officiers et so/dats. 
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Cette guerre ne s 'est point developpee comme les autres. On n 'y a point cree de 
la haine par images d 'Epinal. Il est assez remarquable que I' on n' entende 
presque plus Ie mot «Boches» et que les Allemands soient devenus les 
Allemands. Mais ce qui me para it non moins etonnant, c 'est que les femmes ne 
disent pas les Allemands, mais les soldats. Comme s'il y avait une sorte 
d' equivalence entre toutes les armees du monde. 83 
The anticipation of terror, on the whole, did not materialise for the French. The 
result of this unexpected 'correct' conduct by the Germans, as de Beauvoir observed in 
Paris, was an acceptance of the German presence: 
Comme I 'auto s 'est arretee pres d'un pont, un soldat allemand nous lance d'un 
camion un paquet de chocolat. Il y en a au bord de la route qui causent 
gaiement avec de jolies fllles. Et Ie type me dit: «II y aura bien des petits 
Allemands de fabriques!» J'ai entendu dix fois cette phrase, et jamais elle 
n'impliquait de bliime: «C'est la nature, me dit Ie type, il n y a pas besoin de 
parler la meme langue pour fa.» Je n 'ai vu de haine chez personne; seulement 
des peurs paniques chez les villageois, et quand la peur s 'etait dissipee, ils en 
gardaient I' ceil rond et reconnaissant. 84 
Moret, a young girl at an impressionable age, had nevertheless a firm determination to do 
the honourable thing by France. Yet when she went to fetch some water and encountered 
two friendly Germans she began to feel something else: 
J'arrive a eprouver pour eux une espece de haine artificiellement excitee. 
Pourtant, ils sont tellement simples qu 'on ne sent pas en eux des vainqueurs. En 
outre, je n 'ai pas particulierement une ame de vaincue. 85 
Her first instinct was to shun the German invaders yet she discovered that the identities 
of the vanquished and conqueror were not readily recognisable. Familiarity with the 
Germans would only further blur these identities. The cafes, for example, were an area of 
socialising where the Germans assumed a familiar role. The historian Louis Chevalier 
observed in his village of Vendee that whilst the peasants drank at home, the sailors kept 
their habit of drinking at the port hotel: 
Dans les premiers temps, its avaient fait semblant de ne pas voir les Allemands, 
de faire comme s'ils n 'etaient pas lao [. . .] Et puis, a force de se rencontrer, 
d' echanger des paperasses et de boire a part les uns des autres, on avait flni par 
83 Werth, 33 jours, p.1l8. See Jackson, The dark years, p.273. It should be noted that those from the north-
east not only remembered atrocities committed during World War One but also those carried out in 1940. 
98 civilians, for example, were massacred at Aubigny-en-Artois on May 22, 1940. 
84 De Beauvoir, Laforce de ['age, pp.467-468. 
85 Ibid., p.59. (27.6.40) 
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trinquer et, quand on avail un peu bu, par se tutoyer et par s 'appeler par son 
petit nom. 86 
In the first weeks after the defeat, the diarists observed that the French often 
responded to the Germans with relief, surprise and curiosity: relief that the fighting was 
over; surprise at the 'conect' conduct of the Gelmans; curiosity to see these triumphant 
conquerors. Soup kitchens were set up by the Germans to provide relief to the refugees 
and locals. Posters stressed that the French had nothing to fear and were asked to place 
their trust in the German soldier. In Paris, the Germans carried cameras as often as guns, 
and one observer wondered if they were a beauty chorus reserved for triumphal entries. 87 
Women refugees caught up in the Exodus, who had smeared themselves with mustard to 
bum soldiers who might rape them, were pleasantly surprised to see the 'conecl' manner 
of the German soldiers in stark contrast with the haggard French soldiers. In his preface 
to 33 jours, Werth wrote: "c 'etait Ie temps ou ils etaient «corrects», qui precede Ie temps 
ou Us nous donnerent des «let;:ons de politesse»,,88 This period of correctness was only a 
moment in the overall scheme of the Occupation but it left a marked impression that 
outlasted this brief period. Th6rive's observation of the Germans in October 1940 is an 
example of someone still transfixed by the Germans, who represented freshness and 
order to France's staleness and disarray: 
11 fait beau. Les terrasses des cafes regorgent de consommateurs qui, d 'un air 
narquois, regardent passer les occupants. La plupart des soldats sont maigres, 
vetus de pauvre etoffe et leur teint grisatre contraste avec celui des vaineus. Les 
infirmieres sont d 'une rare inelegance, et on les a deja surnommees: les 
bonniches. En revanche, beaucoup de jeunes officiers de belle stature et de type 
archange, dont on admire les impernuiables gris et les capes. 89 
Hinger socialised with many French people and argued that many did so of their own free 
will. He never felt any overt hatred towards him during his time in Paris in the first year 
of the Occupation: 
Je dois dire d'ailleurs que Ie sejour a Paris m 'a eM profitable aussi par la 
quantite de rencontres qu'il 111 'a fait faire. Les etres cachent encore en eux 
86 Burrin, La France a l'heure allemande, p.207. 
87 P. Audiat, Paris pendant la guerre,juin 1940 - aout 1944, pol7, Jackson, The dark years, p.272. 
88 Werth, 33jow's, p.9. 
891Mrive, L'envers du decor, pp.32-33. (October 1940) See Bloch, L'hrange dejaite, p.124. Even Bloch 
admired the harmonious relationship between GenTIan officers and soldiers. 
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beaucoup de bons grains qui germeront a nouveau des que Ie temps s 'adoucira 
et reprendra des temperatures humaines. 9o 
The effects of this 'correct' behaviour, however, must be qualified. The conduct of 
the Germans was a surprise but this did not mean that the French welcomed the Germans 
with open arms. They were still the enemy but in the summer of 1940 most people were 
too traumatised to think beyond the problem of getting home or retracing relatives split 
by the zones or taken prisoner by the Germans. What mattered was that the fighting was 
over; the conduct of the Gennans was an unexpected bonus. People knew what the 
Armistice had ended but they had no conception of what it had begun. Peace would not 
come in time to soften opinion sufficiently towards the Germans for genuine 
collaboration. From the other perspective, many diarists realised the danger of 
Germany's lenient approach in the initial stage of the Occupation. To concentrate on 
their correct conduct or their restoration of order was to forget that they were the sworn 
enemy: 
C. a exprime aujourd'hui l'opinion des Franr;ais eclaires: «Les Allemands sont 
encore trop gentils avec nous. II faudrait qu'its nous serrent la vis pour qu' on 
comprenne. C' est Ie seul moyen que nous ayons pour nous relever de notre 
chute et de notre effondrement maral.»91 
Moreover, the 'correct' behaviour of the Germans was often ambiguous. As Werth 
remarked, first appearances were not always what they seemed: 
Naus sommes «entretenus». Les soldats distribuent des bo'ites de singe, de 
sardines, de «salmoll», du chocolat, des bonbons. Mats tout est de marque 
franr;aise. Tout vient de Rouen ou d'Orleans, tout a efe pille. 92 
That is not to say that one should discount the significance of the 'correct' German 
conduct but, rather, that one should place it within the overall scheme of things. Mauriac 
was willing to forgive the initial curiosity demonstrated by the French, particularly those 
living in the Unoccupied Zone: 
Ayez des yeux pour ne point voir.» C'est Ie mot d'ordre a donner £lUX Franr;ais 
devant ['occupation etrangere. II ne faut certes pas se scandaliser de ce que, 
dans nos villages, les gens n 'atent pas d'abord tous ferme leurs volets, ni de ce 
que Ie bruit des lourds camions allemands les ait, un instant, attires sur les 
seuils. Dans notre Sud-Ouest, surtout, Ie coup etait trop inattendu pour qu 'ils Ie 
90 Jilnger, Premierjournal parisien, (Paris: Ch11stian Bourgois Editeur, 1980) pAO. (14.6041) Hinger rarely 
wore his uniform, however, which might well have influenced the opinion of those he encountered. 
91 Bobkowsld, Ell guerre et en palx, pp.191-2. (31.1041) 
92 Werth, 33 jow's, p.l24. See also p.90. The Gelmans loot only abandoned French property. 
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sentent dej(J. lis n 'etaient pas prepares if cette espece de malheur. Les anciens 
ne leur ont pas transmis avec le sang, comme dans les provinces du Nord et de 
I 'Est, 1 'horreur de I 'invasion. Ils ne I' avalent jamais connue. Les defiles de 
troupes allemandes, ce n 'etait guere pour eux un effet de cinema. Ce la Jaisait 
partie d 'un pittoresque sinistre qui ne concernait personne entre fa Loire et les 
Pyrenees. 93 
Yet he was equally quick to point out that this initial curiosity could no longer be 
tolerated. These words came more from a desire to tell the French what to do rather than 
what the French were actually doing. Very few adopted the position of Guehenno: "Je ne 
veu.:'( rien ecrire iei de ces hommes gris que je commence if croiser dans [es rues. C' est 
['invasion des rats.,,94 Moret was much less forgiving than Mauriac, and believed that the 
curiosity displayed by the French signified a shameful resignation to the defeat: 
Je comprends maintenant les rires des Allemands quand, if leur arriwie, Us 
trouvaient la Joule massee Ie long des rues et c' est tout juste si elle ne 
souhaitait pas la bienvenue. If y avail autre chose dans ces rires qu 'une 
gentillesse naturelle. Mon Dieu, que nous avons ete laches! Si Ie drame avait pu 
etre moins rapide! Mals it y a longtemps que nos detachements, if la Jrontiere, 
ont ete sacrifies inutilement. 95 
What must be remembered is that such observations belie the overall sentiment of 
the French towards the Germans. A Wehrmacht report in September 1940 claimed: "La 
population est dans ['ensemble calme, if ['occasion accueillante, mals la plupart du 
temps reservee, souvent inamicale et en partie meme hostile. ,,96 After the initial shock of 
defeat and despite the anti-British propaganda surrounding the Mers-el-Kebir incident, 
opinion had by autumn become pro-British and anti-German. This is confirmed by every 
source which monitored public opinion, whether it be in the south or the north. 97 Yet 
equally it should not be said that after the initial shock of the first weeks there was a 
conscious and constant rejection of the Germans. Just as French opinion, shaped by 
events, oscillated with respect to Vichy, so too did events shape opinion towards the 
93 Mauriac, CEuvres completes, p.309. (29.6.40) 
94 Guehenno, Journal des amuies noires, p.l7. (22.6.40) See also Dehamle, Les amu?es perdues, pp.58-60. 
(9.7.40) The Gelmans took something far more valuable than French soil: her memories and impressions 
were shattered by the invasion. 
95 Moret, Journal d'une mauvaise Fram;aise, p.70. (22.9.40) 
96 Burrin, La France a I 'heure allemande, p.l88. 
97 Jackson, The dark years, pp.274-275. Anti-German feeling was initially most intense in the forbidden 
zone but the rest of the Occupied Zone soon followed suit. The expulsion of the Lorrainers in November 
would tum the tide of opinion in the Unoccupied Zone. Almost unanimously pro-British was how the pro-
Vichy prefect described his departement in February 1941. 
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Germans. Rist felt proud of the initial Parisian reaction to the Germans,98 yet with the 
passage of time - and the slow, uncertain and confused nature of that passage of time -
he noticed that the accumulation of German victories had a demoralising effect: 
Incertitude de l'avenir. Le gros public se laisse impressionner par les victoires 
allemandes. fl se decourage. Les journaux frant;ais nazis essayent d'en tirer 
parti en faveur de Laval. Car Darlan ne leur suffit plus. II leur re-faut Laval. 99 
Similarly, Guehenno may have been impressed with the initial reaction of the Parisians 
towards the Germans: "Je suis content des Parisiens. fls croisent les Allemands comme 
Us croisent les chi ens et les chats. fl semble qu'its ne les voient, ni ne les entendent. ,,/00 
Yet it did not take him long to recognise that food restrictions would make many resign 
themselves to the defeat: "ce peuple ne pense, ne sent, ne veut plus rien. QUinze jours 
suffirent pour faire de lui un troupeau."IOI In the queue for his ration card, Guehenno 
was appalled to hear that the people were without hope and resigned to the defeat "les 
gens ant la tete aussi vide que Ie ventre" to the extent that some were hoping that the 
English would be defeated too so that France's situation did not seem so shameful. 
Survival seemed to be the preoccupation and for many the sole preoccupation. 
The fact that the French appeared to be solely preoccupied with survival does not 
mean that they were any more favourably disposed to the Germans. Certainly their 
tendency to concentrate on obtaining food and supplies would have diverted their focus 
away from the growing sinister nature of Nazism yet it is important to consider that the 
first year of the Occupation would not see the shooting of hostages in great numbers or 
the mass internment of Jews. It was precisely through the food and coal shortages that 
the French would experience the impact of the German presence in France. Children 
were encouraged to alleviate the food crisis by foraging for acorns and chestnuts. They 
were also encouraged to root out the Colorado beetle, or d01yphore, which had recently 
arrived from America and caused crop destruction.102 It is significant that the term 
98 Rist, Une sarson gatee, p.l 07. (23.11040) 
99 Ibid., p.156. (2004.41) See also p.86: D 'jei a quelques mois, Ie bon sens reprendra Ie dessus, parce qu 'on 
prejerera tout it l'envahisseur. Mais en attendant! [ ... J Contradictions et confusions! C'est bien Ie resultat 
cherche pat!' ennemi. (28.7.40) See also Werth, Deposition, p.4l. (6.9.40) and p.85. (8.11.40) 
100 Gu6henno, Jou1'11al des alllleeS noires, pAl (7.9.40) See Rist, Une saison gatee, p.96: Dans la rue, les 
gens qui passent a cote des soldats jont semblant de ne pas les voir et de les cOllsiderer comme «non 
existants». (6.1 0.40) 
101 Ibid., pAS. (19.9.40) 
102 Jackson, The dark years, p.259. 
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doryphore came to be used as a slang term for the Germans. The French may not have 
fully realised the true sinister nature of Nazism but they certainly were aware that the 
German presence was causing the French undue suffering. The extent of that suffering, 
however, would only be revealed with the passage oftime. 
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Part Two 
The awakening 
L 'histoire n 'est pas du tout, comme nous en avons I 'illusion, une suite de tableaux 
d 'h is to ire, dont les modides ont bien pose. Elle est Jaite d'incoherents melanges et 
d 'anachronismes. 103 
Le juif absellt. 
The first year of the Occupation was a relatively benign period for the French. The 
Germans were eager to create a good impression and the French, for the most part, were 
unwilling to rock the boat. Some diarists would adopt a hostile attitude towards both 
Vichy and the Germans at a very early stage but it would take more time for other 
diarists to be awakened to the more sinister aspects of the Occupation as well as Vichy's 
complicit role. One particular sinister area historians have chosen to focus on is the 
persecution of Jews during the Occupation. Yet when examining the diaries written 
during the period, one is stmck by how little the Jewish issue is mentioned. The fate of a 
small but significant part of the French population appears to have provoked a telling 
absence of reflection. Even examining the diary of Werth, who was a Jew himself, 
reveals surprisingly little on the matter considering his Jewish origins were the very 
reason why he was forced into exile to Saint-Amour. The seemingly sparse reflection on 
the Jewish issue by a Jew is telling. That is in no way to suggest that the Jewish question 
is of little relevance but the question needs to be asked why the diaries contain so few 
references to the fate of the Jews. 
History from above appears to have focused entirely on the issue of whether Vichy 
was equally responsible for the fate of the Jews living in France as the Nazi regime. 
While the Germans embarked on their extermination of all the Jews in Europe after 
January 1942, anti-Semitic legislation had already been introduced by Vichy without any 
103 Werth, Deposition, p.288. (14.5.42) 
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persuasion by the German occupying force. The research of Paxton was instrumental in 
negating the myth that Jewish persecution was imposed on Vichy against its will but it 
seems to have ignored the wider issue of how the French population felt about their own 
country's participation in the persecution of the Jews. One must make not only the 
distinction between the Nazi aim for extermination and the discriminatory legislation 
introduced by Vichy but also Vichy's policies and the French reaction to them. 
Moreover, it is not always what the diarists chose to talk about that is significant but also 
what they chose not to talk about. 104 There seems to be an imbalance on how much the 
historians devote to the Jewish question and how much the diarists wrote on anything 
concerning the Jews. As the historian Denis Peschanski argued: "I 'image du Juij est plus 
importante que Ie Juij lui-meme et cette absence de I 'autre est decisive dans la 
construction des fantasmes. "J 05 Was this 'absence' due to the climate of fear in a time 
where denunciation was rife or incriminating evidence could have serious consequences? 
Was it due to the difficulties of ascertaining other people's opinion on the matter when 
people preferred to keep their own thoughts to themselves for fear of persecution 
themselves? Did it represent the cult of individuality born out of the Exodus and the 
debacle? Did it reflect an inability to appreciate the suffering of other people? Was it due 
to anti-Semitic propaganda bandied about by both Vichy and the Germans? Or was it 
simply a matter of indifference to the Jewish people, who had endured discrimination and 
persecution well before the Occupation? Was this simply a nouvelle affaire Dreyfus? The 
diaries may well not hold all the answers to these questions but it appears that such 
questions need to be raised more than History from above has been willing to examine. A 
shift in emphasis is required: the fate of the Jews is equally important to consider at the 
level of the average French citizen. This section, therefore, is expressly concerned with 
examining the diarists' reflections on the persecution of the Jews and notably those of 
Rist, Gu6henno and Werth. It may be valuable to first consider why the other diarists 
overwhelmingly chose not to write about the Jews but it is also instructive to consider 
why these three diarists were the only ones who consistently chose to write about the 
Jews. 
104 Gilsdorf, Auto-bio-graphie, pp.72-73. The dimists who can wlite about anything they choose, must first 
organise their thoughts and wlite about what they feel to be the most impOliant to them. 
105 Jackson, The dark years, pp.277-278. 
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Furthermore, the reason why this section is included in this chapter is that these 
diarists, and indeed others later on such as Bobkowski, observed that during this period 
an impOliant change in thinking took place. This change in thinking did not necessarily 
see a change in behaviour. Yet there was a marked change from the indifference shown 
by the French to the anti-Semitic legislation introduced by Vichy in 1940 and the 
discriminatory measures adopted by the Germans in the Occupied Zone to the 
consternation and fear expressed after the round-ups, or rafles, of Jews, which took place 
in 1941 and 1942. A major change in attitude took place: the Jews went from being 
scapegoats to being perceived as victims. The enemy within had become just another 
French victim of German oppression. The deportation of the Jews helped to make it clear 
that the real enemy was Germany, which started the first tentative us-against-them 
mentality not previously seen in the first year of the Occupation. The severe measures 
taken by the Germans during the second year of the Occupation encouraged the idea that 
every French citizen was a potential victim of German oppression. Moreover, Vichy's 
complicit role in the deportation of the Jews reinforced the fear that the French people 
would be abandoned by the Vichy regime. The French may have felt powerless to defy 
the Germans or Vichy but there was a definite marked increase in sympathy for the Jews 
living in France: 
On a egalement annonce aujourd 'hui qu' a partir du 8 juin, les juifs de toute la 
zone occupee devront porter une etoile jaune sur la poitrine, cote cceur. lis 
pourront se procurer ces etoiles dans leurs commissariats de police contre deux 
coupons de leur carte textile. Ces deux coupons m' ont mis dans tous mes etats. 
Les Franrais ont des sourires de pitie. II faut vraiment avoir un grain. Quand on 
a besoin des Franrais et qu 'on veut les inciter a collaborer, pour publier pareil 
deeret et parader ainsi devant la nation qui a tout de meme publie la 
Declaration des droits de I'Homme et qui en est encore aujourd'hui tout 
. , 'C' ., d" , 106 lmpregnee. est traglque, repugnant et esespere. 
Yet, at the same time, it appeared that the average French citizen was more afraid that he 
or she might meet the same fate as the French Jews than expressing a genuine sympathy 
for their plight. 
What is very much noticeable from the reading of the diaries is this 'absence' of 
the Jew. There were some diarists who gave the Jewish matter merely a fleeting attention 
and there were those who made no mention of the Jews at all. At the other extreme, there 
106 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, pp.332-333. (1.6.42) 
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were those, like Lucien Rebatet, whose diatribe, Les decombres, was filled with venom 
and hatred towards the Jews, and delight that after their alleged rise in the years of the 
Popular Front, Vichy was intent on stamping out their perceived perfidious intentions. 107 
The fact that this work was unashamedly published demonstrates that there was a 
significant anti-Semitic audience within France. It is worth considering, however, why 
diarists ofless extreme views chose to leave out any talk of the Jews. Ifwe take the diary 
of Dumeril, for example, it is replete with references to his work in trying to defend 
communist prisoners and the German attempts to expel the communist threat in France. 
Such is indeed the work of a honnete homme, as his title suggests, yet it seems difficult to 
imagine that a man who had inside access to information on prisoners was not equally 
informed about Jewish arrests or prisoners. There is a conspicuous absence of any 
reference to the Jews in his diary. The one brief allusion to the Jews he makes is when he 
announces the Jewish Statutes in October 1940 in a matter-of-fact style with no reaction 
of his own. 108 Even when one takes into account the fact that the Jews were not spread 
evenly around France but, rather, concentrated in specific and usually urban areas, this 
does not explain why there should be such a glaring absence of reflection on the 
persecution of the Jews by a man who worked so tirelessly for those whose actions and 
political sympathies he had little sympathy for. Was any reference to the Jews an 
acknowledgement by the diarist that one was aware of the problem and, therefore, 
somehow complicit in their persecution? Does the absence of reflection on the Jews 
mean that the diarists preferred to keep quiet about the problem so that they could say 
after the war that they were not involved in what Vichy was openly advocating? Or does 
it suggest that they approved of the direction taken by Vichy? Or were they so caught up 
in their own problems that they did not spend time to reflect on the persecution of others? 
Is their silence, therefore, damning or merely a reflection of their ignorance? 
In order to answer these questions, one needs to take into consideration the diarists' 
motivation for writing their diaries. Rist argued: 
Parfois je me dis que ce journal est bien inutile, et sera peut-etre pour moi dans 
I 'avenir Ie temoin de mes propres erreurs de jugement. Meme s'il doit etre cela 
je ne regretterai pas de l'avoir redige et d'avoir garde la memoire de nos 
107 Rebatet, Lucien, Les memoires d'un jasciste, (Paris: Pauvert, 1976) This work is a reprinting of his 
diatribe, Les decombres, together with some of the author's unpublished memoirs. 
108 Dumeril, Journal d'un honnete homme pendant I 'occupation, pp.66-67. (2-5.10.40) 
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impressions au jour Ie jour pendant une epoque aussi ajJreuse, et qu 'on sera 
presse d'oublier quand la paix sera venue. Ce sera peut-etre la mesure de nos 
illusions, peut-etre aussi la mesure de ce que nous aurons pu garder de bon sens 
dans fa tourmente. 109 
There would be a good deal of impatience to forget about Vichy's role in the persecution 
of the Jews after the Liberation, which might well explain the historians' emphasis on 
this particular issue. Yet the last sentence is equally significant: many diarists chose to 
write about what got them through the Occupation rather than what brought them down. 
The title of Guitry's diary Quatre ans d'occupations would suggest that he was too busy 
to concern himself about the plight of the Jews because his work was the means of 
getting through the Occupation. In his case, he was motivated by a desire to clear his 
name, which had been muddied after his arrest in 1944. He found it strange that the Jews 
after the Liberation were concerned primarily with finding those directly responsible for 
the persecution of the Jews and not also with those who were too afraid to defend or help 
them. He claims that he was one of only two actors who openly pleaded their case. 110 Yet 
the following remark questions how sensitive he really was to what happened to the 
Jews: "Drancy pendant ou apres I' Occupation? Si j 'avais su, j'y serais aile, ma joi, du 
temps des Allemands. Cela doit etre moins hideux d'etre interne par I'ennemi que d'etre 
ecroue par les siens. ,,]]] Guitry was referring to the Drancy camp, which was used to 
intern prisoners arrested by the French authorities after the Liberation, but during the 
Occupation the Germans had used it to intern Jews before they ",:ere sent to concentration 
camps. To suggest that his fate was worse than that of the Jews is very much in poor 
taste. Yet at least he was sufficiently aware of the Jewish issue to comment upon it. It is 
worth asking the question why this was the case. The reason why Guitry raised the issue, 
and someone very similar like Cocteau did not, may have been that Guitry wrote his 
auto-justification after the Liberation. The Jewish issue was perhaps of more relevance at 
this time of recrimination and finger-pointing than during the Occupation, where there 
appeared to be more pressing concerns. 
Equally, it is interesting to note the diarists who did give the Jewish concern some 
attention. By concentrating on the diarists who seemed more concerned by the plight of 
109 Rist, Une saison gatee, p.170. (17.6.41) 
110 Guitry, Sacha, Quatre ans d'occupations, (Palis: L'Elan, 1947) p.66. 
111 Ibid., p.265. 
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the Jews, it may shed light on why the majority of the diarists preferred to remain silent 
on the issue. Gu6henno, Werth and Rist fall into the former category and it is no surprise 
that all three diarists were committed to their writing and wrote rich and full texts. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note the title of their respective diaries: Les amu?es 
noires, Deposition and Une saison gatee. It would follow that these diaries, which had as 
their goal the systematic exposure of all the bad aspects of the Occupation, should 
include the persecution of the Jews. That does not mean to say that those who chose to 
write on the persecution of the Jews were heroes and those who chose to keep silent on 
the matter were villains. People were motivated to write by different things and indeed 
one could become a hero with one's actions more often than with one's words. 
Furthermore, there is still an imbalance between how much these diarists devoted their 
writing to the Jews and how much the historians devote their research to the matter but 
that in itself is significant. 
It suggests that there is still a good deal ofbittemess amongst the Jewish survivors 
today and a lack of reconciliation with the wider French national community, who also 
had unanswered grievances. Marcel OphiHs' film, Le chagrin et la pitie, delighted in 
exposing French attempts to rewrite their past. The film was released in cinemas in 1971 
but its intended screening on television was prevented for ten years.1l2 It was an 
indication of how the French state was unwilling to face up to Vichy's involvement in 
the deportation of the Jews. Indeed, the French never faced up to their wartime past in 
any sustained or systematic way. The purges after the Liberation were by no means 
comprehensive or systematic. In the interests of national unity, de Gaulle preferred to 
move on from les annees noires rather than confront the shameful past. There was no 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as there would be in South Africa, for the French 
to openly express their anger and remorse. 113 Werth himself, in 1943, acknowledged the 
problem of how to deal with all those who had been involved, directly or indirectly, in 
the persecution of the Jews: 
La radio anglaise donne d'atroces details sur la vie des Franr;ais et des 
Franr;aises parques pres de Kattowitz, en Silesie. La guerre gagnee. Comment 
punira-t-on ceux qui ont ordonnee, ceux qui ont execute? Et ceux qui, 
112 Jackson, The dark years, p.2 
113 Gildea, Marianne in chains, pp.2-5. 
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Allemands ou Fram;ais, oni, par leur silence, consenti? Ceux qui ont me 
I' atroce, parce qu'it hail dangereux ou intolerable de Ie connaitre, de Ie 
regarder en face? Punira-t-on la torture par la torture? Par la mort? 
Dechafnera-t-on la cruaute en la punissant? Inventera-t-on une forme nouvelle 
de represailles, qui n 'avilisse nt ceux qui les ordonnent, ni ceux qui les 
executent? Ou tout sera-t-il oublie, tout se perdra-t-il dans Ie souci des 
constructions economiques, dans la fureur de vivre et de manger, dans fa 
jrenesie de danser, dans l'obeissance a des rythmes nouveaux, qui ne seront ni 
celui dufox, ni celui du tango?1l4 
There is no doubt that the research of Paxton and others was needed in order to set the 
record straight in terms of exposing the myth that France's involvement in the 
detainment and deportation of the Jews in France only came from immense German 
coercion. It is understandable that feelings of betrayal and bitterness endured well after 
the Occupation. The French Jew, Claude Levy, was a rare survivor of the Occupation and 
was understandably bitter towards Vichy. But when he accuses France of collaboration, 
he confuses the Vichy regime and its police with the rest of France. us 
Such a view excludes those who helped the Jews to hide or survIve. Stanley 
Hoffmann was another Jew who survived the Occupation. Although he was only a boy, 
his general impression was much more favourable than that of Levy. He makes the 
important point: 
Sur les balances de 1 'Histoire, lorsqu 'on pourra enfin peser plus equitablement 
les hommes, leurs actes et les effets de leurs actes, les grandes choses peseront 
plus lourd que les mediocres. [. .. } Dans ma memo ire a moi, Ie professeur, 
aujourd 'hut age de soixante-seize ans et toujours vibrant, qui m 'enseigna 
['histoire de France, me donna de ['espoir dans les pires jours, secha mes 
pleurs quand mon meilleur ami fut deporte avec sa mere, nous fabriqua de faux 
papiers, a ma mere et a moi, pour que nous puissions fuir une ville infestee par 
la Gestapo, ou la complicite des amis et des voisins n 'eta it plus une protection 
suffisante, - cet homme efface tous les mauvais moments, et les humiliations, et 
les terreurs. Sa douce epouse et lui n 'etaient pas des heros de la Resistance, 
mats s'if existe un Fram;:ais moyen, c' est cet homme-Ia qui representait son 
peuple; et pour cette raison, fa France et les Fram;:ais meriteront toujours notre 
h t . . . . d I . 116 ommage, e Je ne cesseraz Jamazs e es azmer. 
The complicity of Vichy must not be allowed to overshadow the actions of those 
French people who could not tolerate Vichy's involvement in the removal or persecution 
114 Werth, Deposition, pp.51 0-51 L (17-18.8.43) The answers to such questions still continue to remain 
unanswered in contemporary France, illustrated, for example, by the trial of Maurice Papon for crimes 
against humanity. 
1I5 Hoffmann, Essais sur fa France, p,83. 
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of their fellow citizens. The reverse is equally applicable but History from above tends to 
look beyond the individual level and privileges the big questions. We might have a 
thorough understanding of Vichy's role in both saving and removing Jews but the 
contribution of the French at a popular level remains unclear. The diaries may well 
provide little insight into the motivations of those French people who aided the Jews but 
they offer sufficient glimpses to raise the question as to how much credit should be given 
to the French people, as opposed to Vichy, for the highest rate of Jewish survivors in 
Western Europe?!!7 Rist, for example, made no mention in his diary that the Jew, 
Georges Schneider, was taking refuge in his home in the Haute-Savoie.!!8 Was this out 
of concern for his and Schneider's safety or did he simply feel that this was a normal act? 
Gu6henno admitted that the former applied to him. A friend came to tell him that the 
Germans had taken away another Jewish friend of his. He did not feel "libre de tout noter 
ici.,,119 Werth remarked how a hotel owner, who kindly allowed a destitute German Jew 
to stay for free in her hotel for three months, dismissed her actions: "Elle semble s 'en 
excuser, craindre que, pour cela, je ne la juge avec severite: «C' etait une petite chambre, 
une chambre tres modeste ... ,,120 This suggests that the anti-Semitic sentiment amongst 
the wider French public must have been sufficiently great to excite fear in this woman 
that she herself might be persecuted for her actions. It also suggests that those people 
who did aid the Jews were generally unwilling to talk about it, which prevents an 
understanding of the extent to which such actions occurred. 
The Jewish debate has been dominated by a long history of ignorance and fear, 
which, as Peschanski argued, has helped to create fantasmes. In 1942, the Institut 
d'etudes des questions juives put the number of Jews in France at 1 200 000 and 
estimated that in a hundred years this figure would be between 10 to 15 million Jews for 
only 20 to 25 million authentiques fram;ais. Yet the figure in 1939 was only really about 
300 000 and only a slight majority were foreigners. Moreover, their geographical spread 
117 See Jackson, The dark years, pp.379-381. There is no single cause but, rather, a complex set of 
determining factors. Yet historians and Paxton and Marrus tend to emphasise the role Germany played -
namely the less aggressive stance it took in France compared with other European countries - and overlook 
the role of the rescue networks in France. 
118 Rist, Une saison gatee, p.98. (19.10.40) Rist merely mentions that as a Jew his friend was obliged to 
leave his work. His refuge is mentioned, rather, in the notes by Jean-Noel Jeanneney. 
119 Gu6henno, Journal des annees noires, p.139. (16.5.41) 
120 Werth, Deposition, p.194. (3.4.41) 
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and their discreet behaviour made direct contact with the rest of the inhabitants as limited 
as possible. 121 Werth would make the observation that the persecution of the Jews during 
the Occupation was by no means a new phenomenon: 
Inauguration a Paris d'un Institut d'etudes des questions juives. Si l'on veut 
juger l' anti-semitisme, il est absurde, il est bas de le prendre ou il touche, il faut 
le prendre a son point de depart. Car les Juijs sont indefendables. Tout autant 
que les Auvergnats, ces empoisonneurs publics, tout autant que les Corses, ces 
gabelous, ces adjutants. D 'ailleurs, il est a remarquer que la foule, aux 
denominations ethnologiques, attribue presque toujours un caractere pejoratij 
Le Normand est process if, le Breton est brut, le Meridional est liiche et bavard. 
A tout groupe humain, l'homme-foule oppose d'abord unjugement de defense et 
de reprobation. Son narcissisme y trouve son compte. Mais s'il s 'agit des Juijs, 
le mot entraine tout. Il est charge de souillure par vingt siecles de 
, . 122 persecutlOn. 
The Dreyfus Affair, where a Jewish army captain was wrongly accused of espionage for 
Germany, had polarised the French nation at the tum of the twentieth century. It was 
built on existing divisions between Left and Right but certainly it brought out into the 
open once again the desirability of Jews living in France. The First World War would see 
this issue lose momentum, as the whole of France came together against a common 
enemy. The catastrophic defeat in 1940 would reopen debate on this question. It seemed 
easier to blame a certain section of French society rather than blame the French people 
collectively. The explanation that France had been led into a guerre juive and that the 
defeat was the fault of the forces du mal expanded on the anti-Semitism already felt 
during the Popular Front years, where the Jew was held responsible for the national 
identity crisis and where the foreigner was identified as the cause of divisions, and where 
both were seen as the cause and symptoms of France's decadence. The lines between 
anti-Semitism and xenophobia were reinforced by the defeat and would continue under 
Vichy. 123 
In this respect, it is more appropriate to see the Jewish statutes as a continuation of 
anti-Semitism rather than as a new development. As in the Dreyfus Affair, France was 
still very much divided over the Jewish question. Gu6henno recorded the published 
121 Laborie, L'opinionJram;aisesous Vichy, p.277. 
122 Werth, Deposition, pp.205-206 (16.5.41) 
123 Laborie, L 'opinionji'am;aise sous Vichy, p.274. 
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account of the Vichy Commissioner for Jewish Affairs, Xavier Vall at, which aptly shows 
these lines of division: 
M Xavier Vallat commente lui-mbne Ie nouveau deeret qu'iZ vient de prendre 
contre les Juifs et qui institue contre eux fes mesures les plus severes. C'est Ie 
triomphe du style jesuite. «A ceux, ecrit-il, apres avoir enumere les moyens de la 
terreur, qui trouvent ces mesures insuffisamment radicales, nous repondrons 
qu 'ilnous suffit qu 'elles soient efficaces et que les efJets de fa justice sont plus 
durables que ceux de la persecution. A ceux, au contraire, dont Ie liberalisme 
s 'efJarouche de ce qu 'il considere comme une manifestation de sectarisme, nous 
repondrons que I 'antise,nitisme n' a jamais eM suscite par autre chose que par 
I'insociabilite et I 'inassimilation fonciere du juif.» 124 
Vallat was aclmowledging that the statutes would draw both praise and criticism from the 
French, which clearly suggests that Vichy believed it would be supported by a significant 
part of the population in its discriminatory policies against the Jews. It is interesting to 
note that Vall at would defend himself at his trial for collaboration in 1947 by arguing 
that he had always been an anti-Semite. That he could even consider such a defence is a 
telling reflection that although the fate of the Jews was not entirely ignored at the 
Liberation, anti-Semitism in itself was considered secondary to the crime of 
collaboration. 125 It also suggests that the popular anti-Semitic sentiment continued not 
only from the inter-war period but also after the Occupation. 
In order to appreciate the change in attitude towards the Jews in the second year of 
the Occupation, it is necessary to first examine the attitude towards them dming the first 
year of the Occupation. The Jewish statutes of October 1940 constituted the first 
discriminatory measures taken by Vichy to repress the Jews. This was not something that 
was forced upon the Vichy government by the Germans but, rather, something it arrived 
at independently. Evidently, the three diarists focused on in this section fall into the other 
category of French people, who were appalled at the measures adopted by Vichy. It is 
interesting to note the Jewish perspective to the Jewish statues. Werth argued that French 
Jews did not think in terms of religion over nationality: 
Vichy prepare un statut des Juifs. Le Juif de Pologne, du moins if se SOl ta it juif. 
Les gens du qUalAtier Nalewki a Varsovie ne se concevaient pas comme 
Polonats. Mats Ie Juif de France ne se sentait plus juif. Le plus juif de cceur ne 
l' etait que par Ie souvenir de quelques traditions familiales. S'if hait naif, it ne 
comprenait pas l'anti-semitisme, parce qu'iZ ignorait la methode politique des 
124 Guehenno, Journal des anntfes noires, p.153. (16.6.41) 
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abces de fixation. Ainsi s' explique, sinon se justifie, sa liichete ou sa pudeur a 
s 'avouer juif126 
France demanded of its citizens assimilation into the French nation; an unreserved 
adoption of French culture. Vichy xenophobia, therefore, in a French assimilationist 
tradition, was more cultural and national than racial. 127 Yet Werth's reaction clearly 
suggests that the Jews felt humiliated that their allegiance to the French nation should be 
brought into question. Darlan confided in Pastor Boegner on 10 March, 1941 that he 
distinguished three categories of Jews: 
les etrangers, dont je veux que la France soit debarrassee; les naturalises de 
fraiche date: qu' on les renvoie, je ne demande pas mieux; enfin, les vieux Juifs 
fram;ais qui sont assimiles, qui ont rendu de grands services au pays. Nous ne 
voulons pas qu' on les maltraite. 128 
From Werth's testimony, it appears that these differing grades were not apparent to the 
French Jews. Rist's testimony gives the impression that the French gentiles were equally 
unaware. He believed that the laws were beyond the realms of comprehension. 129 The 
need to blame someone for the ills that had befallen France had seen outsiders targeted as 
scapegoats. Jews were perceived as outsiders, which may have encouraged the idea that 
all Jews were foreigners. Rist was particularly appalled by the overt glee shown by the 
newspapers in the Occupied Zone: "Depuis hier les decrets sur les Juifs sont publics! Un 
ignoble journal, Ie Pilori, met en grand titre rouge: La chasse est ouverte.» Depuis 
l'epoque de la Saint-Barthelemy, rien d'aussi affreux comme bassesse.,,]30 In this 
respect, Rist may have believed that the Jewish issue was a long-standing one but Vichy 
had chosen a means of dealing with it that was unprecedented in its ignominy. 
It is worth examining what these diarists felt were the motives behind Vichy'S anti-
Semitic policies. Were they an attempt to rewrite the alleged wrongs that had occurred 
during the Popular Front years? Were they a gesture of goodwill to the Germans? Or 
were they encouraged by the Germans? Other than the forces du mal argument Vichy 
propagated, there was no other explicit propaganda targeting the Jews in the Unoccupied 
126 Werth, Deposition, p.51. (3.10.40) 
127 Paxton, Old guard and new order, pp.174-175. Vichy, unlike the Germans, displayed no more 
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Zone. Vichy commissioned no anti-Semitic posters, there was no anti-Semitism in any of 
the official film documentaries produced by the regime, and no speech by Petain directly 
mentioned the Jews. This was in stark contrast with the Occupied Zone where the 
Germans and collaborationist press were vehemently anti-Semitic. l3l Yet it is clear that 
Vichy was influenced by the Germans in terms of enacting anti-Semitic laws. Pastor 
Boegner, who was one of the rare diarists to be offered an insight into the minds of 
Vichy authorities, met with Lucien Romier, who was economic adviser to Petain: 
Nous avons parte de la question juive. Le Marechal en est de plus en plus emu. 
Ce matin meme, au Conseil des ministres, Darlan a declare qu 'il faut changer 
completement de methode. Mais la pression allemande est tres forte. 132 
It is interesting to note that Rist firmly believed that Vichy's anti-Semitic laws were 
designed to curry favour with Germany. That Vichy should openly divide the country 
was an indication that it cared more about the opinion of Germany than it did about its 
own people: 
Decret sur les Juifs paru hier. Ignominie. Visiblement, Ie gouvernement 
s 'enferre dans une politique qu'il crait plaisante aux Allemands, et qui de plus 
do it, dans sa pensee, lui amener I'adhesion des Franr;ais les plus violents. 
L'illusion que I' ennemi lui en saura gre est si folle qu 'on ne peut la mesurer. Le 
voila prisonnier d'une politique dont l'effet Ie plus clair est de diviser les 
F ., I 'h ' I" 't I . d . 133 ranr;azs a eure ou unzon seraz e premzer evozr. 
In short, Rist saw an ulterior motive for Vichy's actions. Guehenno was slightly more 
circumspect but nevertheless believed that Vichy was consciously following the example 
of Germany: 
Le vainqueur nous inocule ses maladies. Le gouvernement de Vichy publie ce 
matin Ie statut des juifs en France. Nous voila antisemites, racistes. Mais de 
quelle race? Malin qui pourrait Ie dire. Je pense ames bons amis juifs, Moo., 
Loo., si genereux et si in telligents. Mais on se venge justement de leur 
intelligence. Je me sens plein de honte. 134 
Both suggest that there were at least some French who believed that Vichy was more 
interested in appeasing German opinion than it was in keeping the nation together. The 
fact that the overwhelming majority of the diarists, however, remained silent on the 
Jewish statutes would suggest that the French population was largely indifferent to the 
131 Jackson, The dark years, p.359. 
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discriminatory legislation enacted by Vichy. This does not necessarily mean that they 
agreed with it but it suggests that they had more pressing concerns. 
There appears to be a lack of empathy in the wider French public to the 
ramifications of this discriminatory legislation. The application of the Jewish statutes 
drew many people into complicity with anti-Semitism. It was the professional 
organisations of doctors, dentists and lawyers who administered the quotas in their 
professions and it was the universities that excluded Jewish teachers. The fact that the 
statutes relied upon the cooperation of people who were not necessarily virulent anti-
Semites makes their participation all the more significant. 135 In other words, self-interest 
may have well been a major reason for the tacit consent to the discriminatory measures 
imposed by Vichy and the Germans. The removal of Jews from many professions and 
businesses allowed many gentiles a free lift up the ladder. Freemasons, communists and 
Jews were liable to lose their jobs and, in the case of the Jews, their businesses. Yet 
influence counted for more than the rule of the law. Thus Freemasons, who should have 
lost their jobs, managed to stay on by virtue of their connections, whereas Jews, who 
might have retained their employment even under the laws that Vichy made for itself, 
were sacked. There is also evidence that gentiles were quick to dump Jewish partners in 
order to take over their businesses. 136 This raises the important consideration that the 
Jews were not the only group to be persecuted during the Occupation. Vichy also openly 
discriminated, for example, against the Freemasons and the Communists. Yet their 
persecution is also conspicuously absent from the diaries. It is true that the Freemasons 
belonged to a secret society and were not as visible in the French community as the Jews, 
particularly after the imposition of the yellow star in the Occupied Zone. The diarists did 
express horror at the shooting of hostages in 1941, whose numbers were almost 
exclusively taken from communist prisoners. Yet they were perceived as French victims 
rather than dissidents who were paying for their communist crimes. Even Dumeril, who 
was actively involved with defending Communists put on trial, tended to look upon 
them, above all, as French citizens. Communists were not part of the Final Solution but 
they could suffer a similar fate in German or even French camps. Yet, in its 
135 Jackson, The dark years, pp.370-37L 
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preoccupation with the fate of the Jews, the historiography takes little account of this 
fact. 
The answer to why the majority of the diarists ignored the persecution of all these 
groups may well lie in the fact that the wider French public was prevented from seeing 
the ramifications of these discriminatory laws. All Jews, for example, in the zone libre 
had to declare their Jewish status at the prefecture, which had been a requirement in the 
Occupied Zone since September 27, 1940. It was humiliation, rather than anger, that 
Werth felt most of all: 
Je vais iz Lons pour y declarer qu'aux termes de la loi du 2 juin 1941, je suis 
juif. Je me sens humilie, c 'est la premiere fois que la societe m 'humilie. Je me 
sens humilie non pas d'etre juff, mais d'etre presume, etant juff, d'une qualite 
inferieure. C' est absurde, c' est peut-etre un defaut d' orgueil, mais c' est ainsi. 137 
He felt obliged to create a patrie juive, to which he felt he did not belong but felt, 
nevertheless, compelled to create out of simple dignity. When he went to the prefecture 
to declare his Jewish status he bellowed it out, as if singing La Marseillaise: 
Ainsi ils pretendent m 'imposer une autre partie, un autre groupe. QueUe lachete 
sera it de deliberer sur Ie point de savoir si je me sens ou je ne me sens pas juif! 
Si vous insultez en moi Ie nom de juff, je suis juff, eperdument juff, juifjusqu 'iz 
I . d h . if' , . A' 138 a racme es c eveux, JUl Jusqu aux tnpes. pres on verra. 
How could the wider French public share in this humiliation when they were not directly 
involved? This discrimination occurred behind the scenes. The French may have been 
aware of this discrimination but they did not have to witness it. The second year of the 
Occupation, however, would see more diarists, particularly in the Occupied Zone, share 
in this humiliation felt by the Jews living in France. 
It is interesting to trace the evolution of thinking before this overt empathy 
occurred. The Germans had cared so little for French internal matters during the first year 
that France was used as a dumping ground for German Jews. On 23-24 October 1940, 
over intense French government objections, six thousand German Jews were sent into 
France from Western Germany. Just as France was not included in the 'Middle Eastern 
Great Economic Region' of German peace plans, so too was it not considered part of the 
area to be 'purified' of Jews. 139 There appeared to be a perception that the Jews being 
137 Werth, Deposition, p.225. (9.7.41) 
138 Ibid., pp.225-226. (9.7.41) 
139 Paxton, Old guard and new order, p.147. 
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targeted by the Germans and Vichy were foreign Jews. This may well explain why the 
removal of foreign Jews was largely accepted by the French, who were having great 
difficulty surviving themselves. The attitude of the Germans, however, would change in 
the second year, particularly after 1942. Yet until then, the fear of communism and the 
hysteria built up over les forces du mal had blinded the French to the direction events 
were taking: 
Avis annom;:ant, a la suite d'attentats, une amende d'un milliard sur lesjuifs; la 
deportation de nombreux juifs au travail force dans I 'Est; la fusillade de 100 
otages mais, disent certains journaux, n 'appartenant pas au peuple de France 
Ouifs, communistes, anarchistes). J'ai entendu une dame dire: « ... mais, voyons, 
ce ne sont que des communistes!» Paroles effroyables! Georges Suarez dans 
Aujourd'hui ecrit: «Si severe que soit la nouvelle, elle a ete accueillie avec 
soulagement par I' opinion parce qu 'elle fait la part de I 'innocence.» 140 
Inherent in such an attitude was that the Jews were second-class citizens, even 
though France was the birthplace of the Declaration of Human Rights. Whilst there may 
have been initially relief that the Germans were only targeting the Jews and Communists, 
the longer these arrests and executions continued, the more the French became concerned 
for their own safety: 
L 'air est de plus en plus lourd, irrespirable. Dans certains quartiers la police 
barre les rues. Tout un arrondissement est perquisitionne (Ie XJe). Des juifs sont 
arretes, des communistes fusilles. Tous les matins, de nouvelles affiches invitent 
a la delation, on nous menace de mort. L '«occupant» inquiet organise la 
terreur. 141 
The French were gradually being caught up in the deaths of their fellow French citizens. 
The limited comfort brought by the sense that only the Jews or communists were being 
targeted by Vichy and the Germans was undermined by the fact that anyone suspected of 
opposition, let alone resistance, was liable to arrest and deportation. It is interesting to 
note that Gu6henno believed that the Germans alone were responsible for creating this 
climate of terror: "Telle est la methode de repression des Allemands qu'il n 'est pas un 
Fran9ais qui bienti3t ne sentira sa dette envers les JUifs et les communistes, emprisonnes, 
fusilles pour nous, veri tables hosties du peuple. ,,142 Those who were living in the 
Unoccupied Zone had yet to experience or witness the repression of the Germans first-
140 Galtier-Boissiere, Journal, p.84. (15.12.41) 
141 Gu6henno, Journal des annees noires, p.178. (21.8.41) 
142 Ibid., p.197. (12.10.41) 
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hand. It was inevitable that those living in the Occupied Zone had a more sympathetic 
attitude towards the Jews, as they were confronted, for example, with the sight of 
children being separated from their parents. This was not something they read in the 
newspapers but, rather, something which they saw with their own eyes. They may well 
not have wanted to see it but they often had no choice in the matter. 
It appears, therefore, that the major reason for this difference in attitude between 
the two main zones was that the imposition of the yellow star was only compulsory in the 
Occupied Zone. Vichy refused to follow the German example of forcing all Jews in the 
Occupied Zone to wear a yellow star but this was more out of fear of public reaction than 
concern for the Jews. Somehow Werth managed to obtain a document written by Darlan, 
which is most revealing of Vichy's attitude towards the Jews. Darlan stated in this 
document that he was opposed to the law requiring Jews to wear a yellow star: 
J' estime que les diverses mesures de rigueur prises jusqu 'a ce jour a I' encontre 
des Israelites sont suffisantes pour atteindre Ie but recherche, c 'est-a-dire les 
ecarter des emplois publics et des postes de commande de I 'activite industrielle 
et commerciale du pays. II ne saurait etre question d' aller au-dela sans choquer 
profondement I' opinion publique fram;:aise qui ne verrait dans ces mesures que 
des vexations sans efficacite reelle tant pour l'avenir du pays que pour la 
securite des troupes d' occupation. L' exd~s meme de ces decisions irait 
certainement a I' encontre du but recherche et risquerait de provoquer un 
fi d 1 'l't 'd' , d 143 mouvement en aveur es srae 1 es, conSl eres comme es martyrs. 
This clearly suggests that Vichy wanted to repress the Jews but in a manner that would 
not offend the French people. That in turn suggests that Vichy was aware that whilst 
there was a sufficiently large anti-Semitic sentiment for some discriminatory measures to 
be enforced, there was equally a limit as to how far these measures could be pushed. 
Bobkowski had already observed sympathy for the Jews at the end of 1941 when the 
Germans decided to execute one hundred Jews and Communists and fine the Jews in the 
Occupied Zone a billion francs: 
Les Allemands essayent d'expliquer que cela ne concerne pas les Fram;:ais, pour 
attenuer Ie coup. N'empeche que les Fram;:ais sont indignes. Meme Radio-Vichy 
a laisse entendre qu' elle n' appro uva it pas ce genre de methodes parce que la 
mort de ces cent personnes vise malgre tout des Franr;:ais. Ce des accord discret 
de Vichy est d'un certain point de vue tres revelateur parce que c'est la 
premiere fois qu 'on entend ce genre de commentaires, d'autant qu'it s 'agit de 
juifs. Beaucoup parmi les personnes avec qui j 'ai parle aujourd'hui m 'ont dit: 
143 Werth, Deposition, p.305. (12.6.42) 
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«II a faUu qu'iZ s 'agisse de juifs pour que Vichy proteste. Ne trouvez-vous pas 
cela un tout petit peu ... etrange?» On pourrait se lancer dans maintes 
suppositions, et ce tres antisemites. On entend ce genre de discours dans la 
bouche de gens it qui cette idee ne serait jamais venue et, sur ce plan, la 
«protestation» de Vichy a fait plus de mal que de bien. 144 
There were still those at this stage, who saw the Jews as second-class citizens. The first 
grumbles had occurred but there was still new impetus needed. 
The yellow star provided that impetus, as it was one thing to discriminate against 
the Jews in restricting their movements and work but this had been discrimination that 
the wider French public did not have to visibly witness. The following observation of 
Gu6henno not only expresses sympathy for the Jews in the Occupied Zone for having to 
wear the yellow star but also sympathy for the fact that many Jews of poor means were 
unfairly hit the hardest, which undermined the stereotype of the rich Jew: 
Depuis huit jours les Juifs doivent porter I 'etoile jaune et appeler sur eux Ie 
mepris public. Jamais les gens n 'ont ete avec eux si aimables. C' est qu'if n 'est 
sans doute rien de plus ignoble que de contraindre un homme it avoir a tous les 
instants honte de lui-meme et Ie gentil peuple de Paris Ie saito Comme Ie savait 
Nietzsche. «Epargnez, disait-il, it tout homme la honte.» Rien qu 'en voyant Ies 
Juifs de ce quartier, on peut verifier it quel point Us sont «Ie capitalisme 
international»,' ta plupart sont dans une evidente misere et Ie petit peupZe tout 
entier s 'indigne qu 'on s 'applique it dishonorer ainsi la pauvreti. 145 
The Jewish journalist, Jacques Bi61inky, observed in Paris that when Jewish-owned 
shops were required to put up a special sign, many of them reported an increase in non-
Jewish clients as a sign of solidarity. Some even went so far as to wear stars in sympathy 
and were punished by being sent to Drancy.146 
The out-of-sight out-of-mind mentality was totally undermined by the wearing of 
the yellow star. The wider French public, which was by no means completely against the 
Jews, was forced to acknowledge the persecution of the Jews. This was visible and 
'official humiliation' in the words of Werth.147 Moreover, the French were forced to 
decide on how to react to the Jews: to ignore or support them. As Werth argued, such 
feelings of sympathy required reflection beyond the individual leveL An old Parisian 
144 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, pp.243-244. (15.12.41) 
145 Guehenno, Joumal des al1lufes noires, p.266. (16.6.42) 
146 Jackson, The dark years, p.375. See Therive, L 'envers du decor, p.129. (l.6,42) Women wore yellow 
handkerchiefs as a sign of unity with the Jews, who had to wear yellow stars. 
147 Werth, Deposition, pp.302-303. (10.6,42) 
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shopkeeper taking refuge in the Unoccupied Zone admitted to Werth that if she was a 
Jew she would hate Hitler too: 
Elle ne peut pas penserplus d'un individu a lafois. Ce qui ne lui permet aucune 
notion du juste ou de l'injuste ou de I 'ignoble. Cela explique sa reaction vague 
a l'anti-semitisme. Les chretiens qui, a Paris, porterent, quelques heures, par 
protestation et deft, l'insigne jaune, se sentaient humilies par cette obligation 
imposee aux Juifs, autant et plus que s'ils avaient ete juijs. lIs se sauvaient ainsf 
d'une humiliation personnelle. Mats la pauvre vieille n 'imagine pas si loin, ne 
possede pas ce pouvoir de transfert et de substitution, sans lequel if n y a point 
de sens de la justice, de sens de I 'humain. 148 
It was admittedly harder to feel sympathy for a faceless victim rather than for someone 
you were visibly confronted with in the street. Darlan's concems were justified as there 
would even be some public protests in the Zone, which led Laval to remark, in 
September 1942, that as France had decided to deliver to Germany all foreign Jews and 
Jews naturalised after 1933, there was no need for the Germans to make further demands. 
This was an indication that opinion had hardened. 149 What was behind this hardening of 
opinion in both main zones? 
The diarists observed that the round-ups, or rajles, did even more to stir up feelings 
amongst the wider French public than the imposition of the yellow star. This was 
'official humiliation' taken to a new and more frightening leveL Initially, mainly foreign 
Jews would be targeted in these round-ups. Nevertheless, as Gu6henno observed, this 
was the first time the French public visibly witnessed the ramifications of Jewish 
persecution on such a grand scale. This was a marked jump from the wearing of the 
yellow star: 
Hier, au nom de la lol fram;aise, cinq milles Juijs ont ete conduits dans des 
camps de concentration. Pauvres Juijs venus de Pologne, d'Autriche, de 
Tchecoslovaquie, gens miserables de petits metiers qui mettaient en grand peril 
I'Etat. Cela s 'appelle «epurer». Rue Compans plusieurs hommes ont he 
emmenes. Leurs femmes, leurs enfants suppliaient les policiers, criaient, 
pleuraient... petit peuple parisien qui assistait a ces scenes dechirantes etait 
plein de revolte et de honte. 150 
The fundamental point that must be taken out of the round-ups of the summer of 1942 is 
that French Jews were being targeted by the Germans and that the French police were 
148 Ibid., pp.321-322. (15.7.42) 
149 Bunin, La France it l'heure allemande, p.163. 
150 Guehenno, Journal des annees noires, p.l39. (9.5.41) See also Rist, Une saiso71 gl1tee, p.215. (20.12.41) 
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involved in rounding them up. There may well have been many who considered the Jews 
to be inferior but this did not take away the fact that Jews of French nationality were 
being deported as well. There were many round-ups in Occupied France but one in 
particular many diarists recorded was the one in Paris on July 16, 1942, where some 13 
000 Jews were herded into the Velodrome d'Hiver and then shipped off to Draney and 
eventually to the East. Werth was angered that it took so long for the news of this 
shameful incident to reach the Unoccupied Zone: 
Le Vel' d 'Hiv', les enfants parques, arraches aux parents. «Pour les parents, me 
dit Laurent, qui panse ses vaches, pour les parents, it y a de quoi mourir ... Moi, 
it me semble que je pourrais mourir ... moi ou un autre.» Suzanne s' etonne de 
mon impassibilite. C'est qu 'en eifet it y a de quoi mourir. Et je m 'eiforce de 
dissimuler mon sentiment de pitie, de fureur et de honte. Tout cela est mete et je 
me sens coupable, comme si j 'etais moi-meme un des bourreaux. Sans doute, it 
me reste l'orgueil d'evaluer a l'infini la profondeur de l'ablme entre un homme 
de la Gestapo et moi-meme. Mais cette profondeur ne peut etre plus grande que 
la plus grande difference entre deux hommes. Cela fait peur. J'ai honte aussi 
pour ces journalistes de la presse allemande de Paris, qui acceptent les cris, les 
pleurs de ces enfants parques. 151 
The delay suggests that Vichy was sensitive to the fact that such news could undermine 
the legislation already put in place in the Unoccupied Zone. 
The diarists detected a level of sympathy previously absent from the wider French 
population, at least in terms of those who were publicly expressing their feelings towards 
the Jews. Yet at the same time one can also distinguish a sense of fear that the French 
population as a whole was going to be caught under the net of German persecution: 
La fin de la semaine derniere a ete marque par des rajles de Juifs s' etendant a 
des milliers de personnes. Les femmes sont parquees au V ilodrome d 'hiver. Les 
enfants de six a quatorze ans sont enleves a leurs meres et groupes sous la 
surveillance de gendarmes. Les hommes doivent etre envoyes sur Ie front 
oriental. On dit que seuls les Juifs apatrides sont arretes. En fait, it semble que 
des Franr;ais aient ete pris aussi dans Ie filet. Tout Ie monde est sous Ie coup de 
I d l 'h " 152 a terreur et eorreur creees par ces mesures. 
Suddenly the thought occurred to many that if the Germans could make the jump from 
foreign Jews to French Jews, they could also make the jump from French Jews to other 
French nationals. There may have been sympathy for the manner in which the French 
151 Werth, Deposition, pp.338-339. (17.8.42) 
152 Rist, Une saison gatee, p.262. (24.7.42) 
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Jews were deported but it appears that the major concern was that every French citizen 
might be caught up in these deportations: 
Tres vive emotion parmi les Franr;ais. lis commentent en particulier avec fureur 
Ie fait que les enfants de plus de trois ans aient he separes de leur mere. Je ne 
peux que le noter. Je n 'at pas Ie courage de fa ire de commentatres. En mol tout 
hurle et tout se c/echire. Dans Ie meme temps, le bruit a couru, tres 
probablement repandu par Ies milieuxjuifs, que <;a allait etre notre tour, et tout 
Ie monde y a cru. Paris etait en pleine effervescence. Les plus peureux sont 
partis a la campagne, d'autres n 'ant pas couche chez eux plusieurs nuits de 
suite. Main tenan t, tout Ie monde est persuade que tot au tard, ils vont nous 
emmener, nous aussi. 153 
It appears that the French still thought of their own personal safety above all else. 
This is understandable in a time of great fear where the Germans were becoming 
noticeably more repressive. Yet it also explains why this increase in sympathy for the 
plight of Jews in France did not translate into more effective support and why anti-
Semitic sentiment was allowed to continue. Indeed, comment by the diarists on the Jews 
would reach its apogee with the rafles of the summer of 1942 and would noticeably 
decline thereafter. It is interesting, for example, to note the difference between the 
deportation of the Jews and the releve system to recruit workers. The Jews were 
relatively few, dispersed among the local populations and isolated from the rest of 
society as refugees or bearers of the yellow star. On the other hand, the workers were 
concentrated in large-scale workforces, firmly implanted in working class communities 
and were able to show defiance and solidarity. The Jews elicited nothing more than 
sympathy when they were rounded up. There were individuals who were prepared to 
show solidarity with the Jews but this did not change their fate. Furthermore, whereas the 
French authorities acted promptly and efficiently to execute German orders when it came 
to rounding up Jews, this was far less the case when it came to rounding up workers. 154 
This leads to the equally sinister consideration of Vichy's involvement in these 
round-Ups. They were carried out by the French police under the direct supervision of the 
SS but the Germans had never forcibly demanded the participation of the French police. 
This is significant, as without the participation of the French police, the SS would have 
been unable to make anywhere near as many arrests. Vichy had a simple choice: to let 
153 Bobkowsld, En guerre et en paix, p.344. (4.8.42) See also Rist, Une saison gatee, p.262. (24.7.42) and 
Daladier, Journal de captivite, pp.l56-157. (3.8.42) 
154 Gildea, Marianne in chains, p.287. 
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the Germans proceed in the Occupied Zone and compromise its sovereignty or do the 
dirty work for them. Often the latter was chosen. The round-ups showed that Vichy was 
not only in collusion with Germany but openly working for Germany. There was the 
realisation what the policy of collaboration actually meant, which sped up the process of 
a junction of hostility between not only the French and Germans but also the French and 
Vichy: 
Et quand Ie gouvernement de M. Petain souscrit aux lois raciales, livre a la 
Gestapo les etrangers qui avaient cru en la parole de la France, quand Ie 
bourreau nazi trouve dans la police de Vichy, parmi les hommes de Doriot, de 
Darnand, assez d'aides et de valets pour n 'avoir presque plus besoin de se salir 
les mains lui-meme, qui pourrait feindre de ne pas voir que c 'est d 'une trahison, 
ou plus precisement d 'une apostasie que ces miserables chargent la conscience 
de cette personne, de cette ame vivante: la nationfram;aise?155 
It would be premature to say that it was a brutal change in opinion and a definite 
move away from the Vichy regime. The daily struggle for survival encouraged a sauve-
qui-peut mentality. There were no great numbers at a popular level, let alone at an 
official level, who seemed willing to try to stop the deportation of Jews. This may well 
have been because it seemed impossible to bend German will or to openly defy them. Yet 
this did not change the fact that it appeared that Vichy had irrevocably chosen the path of 
Nazi Germany. The French police's involvement in the round-ups made a mockery of the 
concept of the double jeu. The French were forced to consider whether they could still 
remain passive when confronted with such persecution and open collusion with 
Germany: 
Mais alors, face aux tragedies d 'Outre-Rhin, pouvais-je encore opter pour la 
passivite? Les nazis avaient organise la terreur en Boheme, en Autriche. La 
presse nous reveta l'existence du camp de Dachau ou etaient internes des 
milliers de Juijs et d'antijascistes. [ .. .] Partout dans Ie Reich, l'attentat avait 
servi de pretexte a d 'horribles pogromes: les dernieres synagogues avaient ete 
brUlees, les magasins juifs saccages, des milliers d'Israelites internes. «Peut-on 
travailler, peut-on s 'amuser, peut-on vivre quand les choses pareilles se 
passent?» me disait Bianca en pleurant. Et j' avais honte de mon ego i'sm e, moi 
qui obstinais a miser sur Ie bonheur. 156 
De Beauvoir was speaking about the period before the war and the fact that one could not 
tum a blind eye to the horrors of the Nazi regime. But the same problem applied to the 
155 Mauriac, CEuvres completes, p.372. 
156 De Beauvoir, Laforce de I 'age, p.365. 
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second year of the Occupation. The French could not tum a blind eye to the German 
persecution of the Jews and Vichy's complicit role in it but at the same time one had to 
try to continue with one's life. Open defiance of the Germans or Vichy would only lead 
to more suffering. The Jewish issue, therefore, would remain unresolved. There was a 
definite change in attitude amongst the French towards the Jews but there was still an 
unwillingness to do anything about it. 
The weight of time versus la marche progressive. 
The diaries reveal that the first year of the Occupation was largely characterised by 
indifference. The diarists had to come to terms with the defeat but at the same time they 
had to try to get their lives back on course after the immense upheaval of the German 
invasion. This was admittedly an uneven process in that the Occupation affected certain 
regions more severely than others. This indifference, however, should not be construed 
as acquiescence, as some historians have interpreted the overwhelming silence of the 
French population. Petain and, in particular, Vichy enjoyed far from unanimous support. 
The diarists observed that the French tended to adapt to the Occupation on an individual 
basis rather than as a local community or nation: "Les Fram;ais se sont deja habitues, 
chacun s 'est accommode comme il peut de la situation et s 'est organise sa petite vie 
[ .... ]"157 Bobkowski was referring to the French response to the news that Petain and 
Laval would continue at Vichy as before, even after the Germans had occupied all of 
metropolitan France in November 1942. The temptation is to think that one can detect a 
continuity of opinion and behaviour throughout this period. This accommodation, 
however, did not mean making one decision and settling on that one path. Reaction to 
events and personal experience saw opinion constantly vacillate. Historians, such as 
Laborie158, maintain that 1941 saw a subtle but definite change in France's collective 
thinking but it is not only valuable to explore the reasons behind this developing general 
157 Bobkowski, En guel're et en paix, p.324. (14.4.42) 
158 Laborie, L 'opinion jram;aise sous Vichy, p.248. He argues that the importance of 1941 has been 
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trend in French opinion but also the reasons behind the continued individual variation 
and oscillation in opinion. 
The summer of 1940 showed no hint of the prospect of a long war yet there would 
be growing signs in the summer of 1941 that the war would be much longer than first 
anticipated. The invincibility of the Wehlmacht, which had swept through Western 
Europe essentially unchallenged, would finally be undernlined by etTective resistance in 
Russia. Whilst a long war seemed increasingly likely with the passing of time, the 
unce11ainty of the final outcome very much persisted. Guehenno remarked at the start of 
the winter of 1941-1942 that the French had to contend not only with the cold and hunger 
but also with the thought that they had no idea how long their suffering would continue: 
C'est l'une de nos miseres de vivre ainsi sans rien savoir, rien sur quai nous 
puissions prendre appui, construire Ie moindre raisonnement, la moindre 
esperance, dans une sorte de nuage mental fait de vagues bruits, de fausses 
nouvelles, de mensonges interesses, d'illusions imbeciles. 159 
The future remained impenetrable, and although Germany's veil of invincibility had been 
lifted, there was ce11ainly no great optimism that Germany would lose the war: "Tout Ie 
monde reconnait que les Allemands 11 'ant pas vaincu et ne peuvent plus vaincre. Mats les 
Anglais non plus. Et comment Ie pourraient-ils.,,160 In order to make an unequivocal 
choice, one has to be ce11ain that one is making the right choice. The uncertain climate 
surrounding occupied France discouraged such choices. There were, of course, 
exceptions to the rule. Drieu, for example, was convinced before the defeat of the 
restorative powers of fascism, which enabled him to firmly side with the Germans from 
the outset of the Occupation. Equally, Guehenno was resolute from the outset in his 
opposition to the German military presence in France. The overwhelming majority of the 
diarists, however, were much more circumspect in their decision-making. 
The prolongation of the war appeared to be the only certainty, which encouraged 
an attentiste mentality. In the summer of 1940, there had been little or no thought to the 
future. Vichy was seen as a regime of circumstance, and the diarists felt disconnected 
from the events of the war. Werth, for example, felt as if he was just killing time in Saint-
Amour. He lived alone in his country-house and often spent the day reading, writing his 
diary or taking walks in the countryside. He did observe rural life in Saint-Amour for his 
159 Gu6henno, Journal des amuies noires, p.2I6. (28.11.41) 
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Deposition but he always felt on the periphery. He was always conscious that he was not 
only disconnected from the events of the war but also from the everyday life of the Jura 
village. His prolonged stay in Saint-Amour was out of necessity rather than of his own 
choosing. The outcome of the war, therefore, held that much more significance for 
Werth. The more time he spent in Saint-Amour away from his family and familiar Paris 
surroundings, the more powerless and frustrated he felt: 
Le temps, depuis I 'armistice, ce n 'etait pas du vrai temps. C'etait du temps 
d'attente. Nous Ie classions dans la categorie du temps qu 'on passe dans une 
gare pour attendre un train, dans la categorie des nuits de chemin de fer. Temps 
qu 'on annule, temps hors la vie, temps in term edia ire. Mais ce temps a dure, 
dure encore. Si j'avais su, je ne serais pas reste ici. Je ne serais pas reste 
immobile, inutile. Je serais aIle n 'importe OU, ou I' on a prise, si infinitesimale 
soit-elle, sur l'evenement, ou du moins on garde Ie droit de Ie juger, de ne pas Ie 
subir, comme une hete. Je ne serais pas reste dans cette etable qu' est la 
campagne. Mais ou?... En Angleterre, en Amerique? OU et comment? 
Maintenant, il est trop tard. Je suis rive a l'hat contemplatif.161 
Werth had all the time in the world to contemplate the war and his place in it. 
Indeed, at times it seems that his situation afforded him too much time to contemplate 
about the war. Other diarists had more of a semblance of normality in their lives, which 
would distract them from the war. Some, such as Rist and Roussin, continued their 
previous occupations and others, such as Dumeril and Bobkowski, took up new 
occupations. Furthermore, these diarists would be influenced more, at least initially, by 
other distractions thrown up by the Occupation. The needs of the individual - working, 
finding food, returning home, finding separated family members - outweighed any 
thoughts on the war or the future of France as a nation. Although Cocteau is an extreme 
example, it is significant to note how one's work could distract one's mind: "Depuis que 
je travaille a Joinville, je n 'ai pas pu ecrire une ligne. C'est a se demander comment Ie 
milieu du cinema trouve une minute pour lire, pour vivre, pour aller chez !e coiffeur. ,,]62 
With the passing of time, however, the war's impact on France took on a more 
significant dimension. Indifference to the war was replaced by a sense of being inundated 
by the war: "I! faudrait trouver !es moyens de durer a travers cette hOrT'eUJ', de s'installer 
161 WeIth, Deposition, pp.245-246. (6.10.41) See also p.339: Apres la debficle,je me suts trompe dans 111011 
evaluation du temps. Pai cru Ii un temps mort, Ii un temps entre parentheses, Ii une contraction au Ii un 
sommeil du temps. (18.8.42) 
162 Cocteau, Journal, p.211. (November-December 1942) 
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en elle, d' attendre. Mais comment fa ire ? On a du sang jusqu 'au ventre et tout autour de 
soi? Comment ne pas Ie voir?,,]63 It took time for every diarist to realise that regardless 
of one's geographical situation in France, nobody could escape the war. This realisation 
was compounded by the fact that there seemed to be no end to the war. Guehenno 
believed that this overwhelming feeling of helplessness made the French vulnerable to 
the sinister designs of Vichy and Nazi Germany: 
L 'opinion, il y a un an, molle et lache, etait prete a tout. Vichy et Berlin ont si 
bien fait ensemble que Ie pays tout en tier a desormais le sentiment de sa 
servitude. II se sent asservi, non gouverne. Il deborde de haine et il ne sait pas 
encore ce qu'il veut, il sait du moins tres bien ce qu'il ne veut pas: c 'est 
justement tout ce qu'il subit. J'entends dire a de notables bourgeois que «la 
Republique n 'etait pas si mal». Pourquoi donc l'avoir trahie, livn!e? Mais nous 
n 'avons pas encore touche au fond de I 'horreur. La vengeance appellera 
longtemps la vengeance. Quel homme ou quel evenement pourrait rendre a ce 
pays le sens de sa dignite propre? Il vit dans de teZZes conditions qu'il ne pourra 
de longtemps agir qu 'en reaction a des evenements exterieurs; la defaite de 
l'Allemagne?164 
The maj ority of the diarists would have disagreed with Guehenno' s notion that the 
entire country felt enslaved by Vichy or Germany. Certainly diarists such as Cocteau and 
Roussin did not feel inhibited by the German military presence or the authoritarian Vichy 
regime. Guehenno's attitude right from the outset was that he was a prisoner, which 
would have inevitably coloured his view. 165 Bobkowski did argue that the French were 
ripe for subversion in the initial stages of the Occupation: 
C'est en 1940, alors que les trois quarts de la France etaient 
psychologiquement favorables aux Allemands, que les Allemands suscitaient 
beaucoup de sympathie et qu'ils leur en imposaient, qu 'il fallait rassasier les 
Fram;ais avec du pain, du beurre, des ceujs, de la viande et du vin. 166 
He felt that the Germans had failed to realise that the French would not tolerate any 
further deterioration of conditions. The armistice was supposed to alleviate the suffering 
of the French rather than increase it. Werth, to a certain extent, corroborates the first half 
of Guehenno' s argument. He certainly believed that France was divided into 
incompatible trom;ons and that all these factions were bitterly fighting for their particular 
interests at the expense of the nation. Yet at the same time, he believed that the 
163 Gu6henno, Journal des amu!es noires, p.225. (16.12.41) 
164 Ibid., p.222 (12.12.41) 
165 Ibid., p.9. 
166 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, pp.348-349. (5.9.42) 
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overwhelming majority of the French were against collaboration: "La politique de Vichy, 
c 'est l'integration de la France it I 'Allemagne. Le pays la repousse mollement, la 
reprouve. Mais c' est un mouvement intime, une reprobation interieure. ,,]67 Where he 
agreed with Guehenno was his belief that the French were too accepting of the 
repercussions of defeat: 
La France - ce que d'ici je puis voir et presumer de la France - se laisse 
museler par Vichy, comme un chien docile. Elle ne peut echapper, il faut qu 'elle 
consente it la museliere. Mais du moins pourrait-elle grogner?168 
The French endured the Germans and Vichy, as opposed to being enslaved to them. It 
was just that Werth often felt that the French endured too much. It is interesting to note 
that the diarists' views were influenced by the particular zone in which they were living. 
Werth was inclined to emphasise the influence of Vichy on the people of Saint-Amour. 
Rist, who lived in the Occupied Zone, was more inclined to emphasise the German 
presence: 
II est curieux de constater la physionomie de Paris. On passe it cote des 
Allemands sans les voir. Ceux-ci sont entoures de silence. L 'hostilite cachee de 
chaque Franr;ais se respire. Silence dans les trains, dans Ie metro, dans la rue. 
Chacun garde ses pensees. Et pOUl'tant on sent l'inimite. Tout Ie monde attend 
quelque chose. [. . .} Les gestes du gouvernement de Vichy ont quelque chose 
d'irreel. La verite est ailleurs. Ces fantoches n 'ont aucune prise sur I' opinion et 
les sentiments. On regarde I' avenir - c 'est lit qu 'est la realite. L'impression que 
nous vivons dans une parenthese (horrible sans doute, mais simple parenthese). 
On vous dit: oui, les Anglais, c' est tres bien, mais pOUl'ront-ils reellement 
vaincre? C'est la seule inquietude. Tout Ie monde aussi se sent humilie que nous 
soyons purement passifs dans ce drame. 169 
The diarists would all agree with Guehenno's contention that the French had lost 
all initiative in their actions and thoughts. The previous passage from Rist illustrates that 
Werth was not the only one to feel helpless. The thought that France had been taken out 
of the fighting led to the belief that every French citizen had been taken out of the war: 
L 'univers entier se bat pour lui ou contre lui. Mais il ne participe pas it cette 
bataille. L 'histoire se fait pour lui comme pour les autres, mais elle se fait sans 
lui. L 'evenement vient au Franr;ais, mais il ne va pas it l'evenement. II lui reste 
. d' I' d fi' d 170 un pouVOlr, un rOlt: ce Ul e azre es WEUX. 
167 Werth, Deposition, p.128. (9.12.40) 
168 Ibid., p.209. (21.5.41) 
169 Rist, Une saison gatee, p.1 07. (23.11.40) 
170 Werth, Deposition, p.51. (3.10.40) See also Gu6henno, Journal des annees noires, p.260. (27.5.42) and 
Moret, Journal d'une mauvaise Franr;aise, p.l16. (10.11.41) 
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It was as if Vichy and Germany had put a spell on them, and though there was the 
growing realisation that France was in a worse position than under the Republic, one 
could only wait and endure or subir. That is not to say that the diarists were happy with 
Vichy or the German military presence in France. The problem was that they could not 
shake themselves out of their passivity. This was aided by the fact that there seemed to 
be no viable alternative to Vichyl71 and the fact that a German defeat still seemed 
uncertain. The diarists had no concept of the suffering and perils that awaited them in 
1940 but with the passing of time came the slow but steady exposure to the horrors of 
war and France's inescapable role in it. This disenchantment with Vichy and the German 
occupation, which had already begun during the first year, was an ongoing process. What 
was clear was that there were growing numbers who were unhappy with France's 
situation but at the same time there was a general resignation that nothing could be done 
to alter that situation: 
Les nouvelles de Russie sont mauvaises. II semble aux ouvriers que leur reve 
s 'ecroule. Les visages se ferment. Approche Ie moment ou, personne ne tenant 
plus a rien, s 'allumera la flamme des revolutions. On se sent lentement glisser 
vers on ne sait quoi d'affreux. On etouffe. Aufond de mon cceur, je souhaite aux 
pauvres gens au milieu desquels je vis courage et patience. Nous ne pouvons 
. . I t 172 rzen et nous ne pourrons rzen ong emps encore. 
The weight of time is, therefore, crucial for explaining the ostensibly rigid, passive 
behaviour of the diarists. Their actions were governed not only by what had happened 
but also by what they thought was going to happen. The uncertainty over what the future 
had in store for them prevented them from making any irrevocable decisions. Historians 
talk of a perceptible change in thinking during the second year of the Occupation but this 
tends to shift the emphasis away from the fact that the French continued to remain 
overwhelmingly outside the axes of collaboration and resistance. The events of the war 
were watched more closely by the diarists but they became far more impatient for the 
war to end: 
Periode stationnaire, ou nous vivons tous dans I 'attente. Les Anglais ont repris 
leurs bombardements des usines de la region parisienne, - et nous avons eu des 
171 Rist, Une saison gatee, p.214. (14.12.41) 
172 Werth, Deposition, p.178. (21.8.41) 
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alertes ces trois dernieres nuits. La radio parle beaucoup de l'esprit d'ofJensive 
des Anglais et des Americains. Mais quand se traduira-t-il par des resultats?173 
The fact that the war seemed more and more likely to last a long time merely served to 
compound that impatience. It was the accumulation of events rather than the events 
themselves that would wear the French down. This was a process that was only allowed 
to occur with the passage of time. 
Herein lies the crux of the entire Occupation: Vichy was born out of the 
circumstances of the defeat but it was never meant to be a permanent situation. A change 
in thinking may have taken place during the second year but it did not change the fact 
that the French had no idea how the Occupation would be brought to an end. It is 
important to place oneself in the position of the people living in the Occupation at the 
time, and this sense of being transported to the day-to-day struggles of the French during 
the Occupation is exactly what the diaries achieve. As the war progressed, the 
accumulation of events gradually made an impact on the thinking of the French people. 
Yet one should never think that with the passing of time, one can trace a linear 
progression of awareness. The excitement of the summer of 1941 and the entry of the 
United States into the war, for example, were followed by sharp falls in enthusiasm. The 
start of 1942 would see British and American failures in the Far East and the Pacific and 
the advance of Rommel in North Africa. 174 Werth provides a fitting illustration of the 
relationship between History from above and history from below, between the 
retrospective and the personal: 
If y aura bien tot un an, un paysan me disait: «On est comme les hetes ... on se 
reveille le matin sans rien savoir ... » If disait fort bien ainsi qu 'it viva it dans une 
sorte de nuit historique. Dans cette nuit, je cherchais des signes, des reperes. 
Aujourd'hui, les reperes et les signes abondent ... Quand une solide convention 
historique aura fait un systeme des evenements presents (Syrie, Russie), quand 
tous ces evenements seront figes d 'un seul bloc, qui pourra prendre fa peine de 
s'interesser encore aux demarches de chacun pour s 'orienter au jour le jour? 
Les evenements apparaftront a ceux qui furent les plus hesistants, comme un 
aboutissement logique, qu'its croiront avoir prevu. 175 
Werth was recording his own personal history but would only have a real appreciation of 
History when those events that he had lived through were well and truly in the past. The 
173 Rist, Une saisoll gafee, p.24 1. (4.4.42) 
174 Bunin, La France it ['heure allemande, p.l93. 
175 Werth, Deposition, p.22S, (17.7.41) 
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problem is that the sense of order History provides does not illustrate the personal 
disorder experienced at the individual level. Werth may have had no idea of his fate but 
this explains his inability to alter his situation. The diarists were like a rudderless ship. 
They were powerless to change their course and could only await their fate in a detached 
manner. This is why the two notions of collaboration and resistance, favoured by 
historians, are inappropriate to explain the behaviour of the French people, as it implies 
that these were the only options available to them. The concept of a grey zone is an 
unsatisfactory one for History from above. Historians prefer to search further in order to 
place individuals collectively into more concrete groupings. The overwhelming majority 
of the diarists, however, had nothing concrete on which to base their decisions. 
That is not to say that one is unable to detect within this climate of obscurity an 
awakening to the designs of both Vichy and the German occupation force. The diarists 
may have ridden the highs and lows of the war on the international front but it would be 
events on the domestic front that would really have profound effects on opinion. For 
example, on 20 October 1941, Feldkommandant Hotz was shot in the streets of Nantes, 
one day after a German soldier had been killed in Bordeaux. The Germans retaliated by 
killing 48 hostages two days later in Chateaubriant, Nantes and Paris. 176 Germany's 
resources were tied up on the Eastern Front, which meant that there would be no 
tolerance of disorder. Although attacks on German soldiers were isolated and carried out 
only by a tiny minority, their growing number was sufficient to excite the Germans' 
growing fear of security, which saw the SS replace the Wehrmacht as protectors of the 
German forces in France. It is clear that the hostage killings had a profound impact on a 
hitherto resigned and even indifferent population: "Les Franr;ais se sont vraiment 
reveilles. Tout le programme de collaboration, tout le plan de collaboration medite et 
elabore depuis un an (non sans resultats) va echouer. ,,177 There may have been many 
who had a fear of communism but these executions caused a wave of national outrage. 
Vichy had always claimed that Collaboration would cause the least harm to the French. 
176 Jackson, The dark years, p.l82. Between September 1941 and May 1942, 471 hostages were executed 
by the Germans and these hostages were selected almost exclusively from the ranks of communist 
prisoners. 
177 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.227. (22.10.41) See also p.233. (13.11.41) 
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Even JUnger conceded that the reprisal attacks "depassent leur but. ,,]78 The increase in 
German repression was made all the more apparent by Vichy's failure to do anything 
about it: "On parle ce soir de l'execution de cent otages it Paris. Notre gouvernement 
pourra-t-il obtenir la fin de cette repression qui rend impossible la collaboration si 
souhaitable entre les deux pays. ,,179 It should be noted, however, that whilst people could 
understand the motivation behind these attacks on the Germans, there was just as much 
disapproval of the methods used as there was of the methods used by the Germans to 
combat them. The fact that Resistance numbers remained so low would suggest that such 
militant activity was frowned upon by the majority of the French population. They were 
certainly becoming increasingly hostile to the Vichy regime and the Germans but there 
was an unwillingness to needlessly provoke the Germans, as the price was too heavy to 
180 pay. 
It was the German Occupation force, therefore, that ultimately helped shape 
opinion on Vichy. When Stucki, who would represent American interests at Vichy, asked 
Rist of his opinion on Petain's prestige in the Occupied Zone, Rist replied frankly that 
Petain's reputation had suffered greatly. Yet he made the interesting point that "l' etat de 
l 'esprit de la zone occupee est determine par I 'occupant.,,181 The execution of hostages 
revealed that active resistance would only incur the wrath of the Germans, and the threat 
of being occupied loomed over the so-called Free Zone. Yet Vichy's desire for a rebuilt 
nation, a close collaboration with Germany and a favoured peace settlement became 
increasingly harder to sell to a French public increasingly exposed, whether directly or 
not, to German repression and persecution: 
Si la guerre n 'avait dure que peu de temps, et si l 'Angleterre avait ete vaincue 
en septembre 1940 - Ie coup d'Etat qui a porte au pouvoir Ie Marechal et ses 
acolytes aurait peut-etre pu reussir. Mais void un an que la bande des 
178 JUnger, Premier journal parisien, p.108. (23.2.42) See Dumeril, Journal d'lIn honnete h0171me pendant 
l'occupation, p.233. (19.7.42) 
179 Dumedl, Journal d'lIn honnete homme pendant ['occupation, p.210. (13-14.12.41) This was 
collaboration not in the ideological sense of supporting the Gelman mission, propagated in particular by 
the collaborationist press and political parties of the Occupied Zone, but in the original sense of 
maintaining good relations between the French and Germans. See also Boegner, Carnets du Pasteur 
Boegner, p.l46. (22.10.41) and Rist, Une saison gatee, p.215. (15.12.41) 
180 Gildea, Marianne in chains, pp.255-256. When de Gaulle gave the order for a 'gigantic standing to 
attention' between 4:00 pm and 4:05pm on 31 October 1941, as a sign of fraternity and a warning to the 
Gelmans of the threat surrounding them, the call was ignored with the exception of the workforce in the 
biggest Nantes factory. 
181 Rist, Une saison gatee, pp.254-255. (12.6.42) 
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«revolutionnaires» est au pouvoir et Ie pays a pu se rendre compte de fa valeur 
de leurs personnes et de leurs idees. Le resultat est un degout profond pour eux-
mentes et pour tout ce qui touche a eux. Vis-a-vis des Allemands, ils se sant 
conduits avec la derniere likhete. Le pays accupe ne Ie leur pardannera pas. 
Quant a la renovation nationale, elle se traduit par la vengeance et par la 
terreur. Le ravitaillement, seuf probteme qui interesse Ie pays, marche aussi mal 
que possible. 182 
The increased strain of living under such harsh conditions would see an irrevocable shift 
away from the concept of collaboration. Yet Gu6henno aclmowledged that only with the 
passage of time would the ineffectiveness of Vichy be fully revealed: "La logique de la 
trahison oblige Ie gouvernement a trahir toujours davantage. Mais la logique de la 
souffrance augmentera tous les jours la resistance de la nation a fa trahison. ,,183 The 
latter would bear a greater effect on opinion than the former but it would take time for it 
to be recognised by every region and individual of France. 
What shocked many diarists was that the two separate entities of Vichy and the 
German Occupation force were beginning to resemble one another. The buffer against 
Germany or the shield, in P6tain's words, was increasingly perceived as ineffectuaL 
Indeed, it appeared that P6tain's shield was being used against the French people to 
protect the German occupation force. It is interesting to note that Bobkowski totally 
misinterpreted P6tain's slogan "«Je tiens les prom esses, meme celle des autres.}},,184 He 
believed that those mitres referred to the Germans whereas, as Paxton points out, it was 
merely a reminder of the Republic's inability to keep their promises. 18S Admittedly 
Bobkowski would have been unaware of this, as he was not living in France at that time, 
but it is interesting to note that he should feel that P6tain was so openly confirming that 
Vichy was working for the Germans. Werth provides another example of how Vichy 
seemed to be openly working for Germany's interests. Vichy passed a law prohibiting 
the listening to anti-national radio propaganda, which only a year before had been 
ordered by the German occupation force. Vichy was effectively inciting the French to 
turn on themselves: 
182 Ibid., p.l86. (13.9.41) 
183 Guehenno, Joumal des annees noires, p.176. (13.8.41) 
184 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.194. (1.5.41) 
185 Paxton, Old guard and new order, p.137. It had taken twenty-four bill proposals, for example, on old-
age pensions between 1936 and 1939 only for them to fail in the Senate on March 14 1939. Two years later 
P6tain would issue an old-age pension law and his slogan, therefore, was meant to show how effective the 
new regime was compared with the ineffective Republic. 
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Au bourg, personne ne me parle du decret. On a peur. Vichy, it y a un an, 
n 'aurait point ose signer ce decret. Preuve nouvelle de ses tatonnements et de sa 
marche progressive. Preuve nouvelle que fa moindre resistance eut ete efficace, 
que Vichy avait peur de la resistance. lei se mesure la lachete des Franc;:ais de 
la zone libre. Mais it faut dire a leur defense qu'ils ne croyaient pas plus a 
l'occupation de leurs libertes par les Petain et Darlan qu'its ne croyaient 
auparavant a l'occupation de Paris et des deux tiers de la France par les 
Allemands. 186 
This marche progressive was a clear recognition on the part of Werth that Vichy was 
heading towards fascism and that eventually Vichy and Nazi Germany would become 
inseparable in identity. Werth implies that this had been deliberate on Vichy's behalf, 
which may be overly harsh, but he is right to say that no one in 1940 could have forseen 
these alleged intentions: 
II y a un an, jour pour jour, nous arrivons ici, apres trente-quatre jours d' exode. 
Ayant vecu sur les routes, nous savions seulement que la France etait vaincue. 
Mais, quelle que put etre la mutilation imposee par I 'Allemagne, nous 
n 'imaginions pas que la France, une partie de la France au moins, travaillerait 
elle-meme a se mutiter, prendrait contre elle-meme Ie parti du vainqueur. 187 
It would be wrong to overemphasise this shift in perception of Vichy. The two 
paths were merging but the march towards fascism was by no means complete; Vichy 
was still a long way off the totalitarian state of 1944. This can be attributed to the fact 
that although Petain continued to enjoy a separate identity from Vichy, he also continued 
to exert an influence on how Vichy was perceived. With Petain at the helm, it was still 
not possible for some to dismiss Vichy outright. Guehenno, for example, was still 
hesitant in his opinion of petain. He saw a shift in the Vichy government between the 
military power under Darlan and the civil power under Laval. He wondered whether 
Petain was playing one off the other in order to gain some measure of independence: 
Ce qui est sur, c 'est que fa France, les quarante millions de Franc;ais ne veulent 
ni de I 'un ni de ['autre. Le gouvernement Petain avait derriere lui quelques 
pleutres. Le gouvernement Laval-Darfan n 'a personne. Les pleutres eux-memes 
ont honte. 188 
186 Werth, Deposition, pp.252-253. (31.10.41) See also Dumeril, Journal d'ull /zOllllete homme pendant 
l'occupation, p.234, (30.9.42) Bobkowski, En guerre et ell paix p.21I, (13.8.41) Guehenno, Joul'I1al des 
anllees noires, p.176, (13.8.41) and Rist, Une saison gatee, pp.206-207. (11.11.41) 
187 Ibid., p.227. (13.7.41) This was no longer collaboration in the original intended use of the word, as 
Vichy was adopting a more complicit and subjugated role rather than a cooperative one. 
188 Guehenno, Journal des annees noires, p.251. (20.4.42) 
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Werth held no such doubts over the intentions of P6tain. He made no distinction between 
Petain and Vichy; both, in his eyes, were dishonouring France. Yet at the same time he 
was aware that many refused to give up the idea that P6tain was protecting France. His 
wife, Suzanne, received a letter from a bourgeois woman living in the provinces, who 
claimed: "Un vieillard magnifique est en train de nous sauver et beaucoup ne veulent pas 
Ie comprendre.,,189 Werth was stunned that people could be so blinded at this stage of the 
Occupation and were unable to detect the changes in Petain: 
Un marechal douloureux va signer fa paix. Elle naitra toute seule apres 
quelques semaines, trois mois ou six mois d'armistice. La legende nait d'un 
marcJchal, dont Ie prestige militaire intimidera Hitler. Puis vtent Ie temps du 
«No us, Philippe Petain, chef de l'Etat frmu;ais ... » Puis nait la legende du 
marechal dresse contre I 'Allemagne, ou plutot du marechal temporiseur. Puis la 
tegende du marechal reorJ;anisateur. On suit facilement aujourd 'hui les etapes 
de la momerie au nazisme.190 
The abandoning of Vichy by the French people did not occur, therefore, in a rapid 
or uniform manner. Perhaps Werth's more overt disappointment in P6tain's popularity is 
an indication that P6tain was more likely to be venerated in the Unoccupied Zone, as he 
was seen to have done more to protect those living there than those living in the 
Occupied Zone, who were already under direct German rule. There may have been a 
good deal of ignorance for those living in the Occupied Zone as they were not exposed 
directly, for example, to P6tain's goodwill tours or Vichy propaganda. Perhaps there was 
a greater reluctance to see behind the 'legends' of P6tain in the Unoccupied Zone 
because they had seemingly more to lose than those living in the Occupied Zone. 
Gu6henno was shocked to see, on his visit to the zone libre, children enrolled in the 
Jeunesses, the French equivalent of Hitler Youth Camps, and adults all wearing the 
Vichy francisque emblem. Behind all these trappings of not only Vichy but also Nazi 
Germany, he asked: "OU est 1a France?,,191 Yet as Bobkowksi revealed the notion of a 
double jeu was a powerful one for all the French: "Tout Ie monde se laisse attendrir. 
L 'opinion gimerale est que Ie vieux gagne du temps et masque son jeu. Cependant, trop 
de faits Ie contre-disent. En definitive, Vichy est un sphinx .. sans enigmes. ,,]92 Historians 
189 Werth, Deposition, p.259. (4.1.42) 
190 Ibid., p.244. (30.9.41) See also Galtier-Boissiere, Journal, p.60 (5.9.41) and Rist, Une saison gatee, 
p.173. (26.6.41) 
191 Guehenno, Journal des annees noires, p.272. (17.7.42) 
192 Bobkowksi, En guerre et en paix, p.274. (13.1.42) 
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have noted that the public opinion of this period was characterised by indifference and 
lassitude. 193 There is certainly evidence in the diaries to support this: "Situation peu 
changee, massacre toujours. Trois alertes lei. L 'egofsme dit «pourvu que fa finisse vUe, 
n'importe comment 1»,,194 Yet that does not reveal the whole picture. What had changed 
from the first year of the Occupation was that German repression and Vichy's reaction to 
it were slowly shaking the French out of that indifference and apathy. The indifference of 
the first year, therefore, should not be confused with the lassitude of the second year, 
since a definite evolution in thinking had taken place. The weight of time and the 
uncertainty over the future served as a deterrent that was perceptible during the second 
year. This is why the change in attitude would not be accompanied by a change in 
behaviour. 
Durer versus esperer. 
Right from the outset of the Occupation, the diarists never felt able to change their 
situation themselves. They were resigned to the fact that all they could do was wait for 
history to take its course. This section is concerned with examining how the Anglo-
American landing in North Africa on November 8, 1942 shook up this concept of durer 
amongst certain diarists. Until that event occurred, the diarists had only their individual 
hopes and desires to sustain them through the oppressive waiting. Their hope was a 
means of lasting until the end. The landing, however, would cause some diarists' hopes 
to rise too soon and too far, which provoked a greater impatience for the war to end. The 
fact that the war continued as before only served to compound that impatience. Their 
raised hopes, in this respect, were more of a hindrance than an ally to these diarists. This 
sentiment goes against the contention of historians such as Paxton who believe that 
193 For example, LabOlie, L 'opinionji-al1{:aise sous Vichy, p.257. The following words were used to 
describe the French population in the second year of the Occupation: amOJphe, inerte, timoree, apathique, 
sceptique, retiree dans sa coquille. 
194 Dumeril, Journal d 'Ull honnete homme pendant I 'occupation, p.l62. (1.10.41) See also Bobkowski, En 
guerre et en paix, pp.334-335 (11.6.42) and Werth, Deposition, pp.328-329. (30.7.42) 
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French opinion followed a linear progression.195 History from below reveals that this 
process was far more complex than what Paxton is willing to concede. 
Until as late as the end of 1942, hope had been the only option open to the diarists 
awaiting the outcome of the war. This process of durer could only be alleviated by hope 
but for well over two years these diatists had endured the Occupation with no real cause 
for optimism that their situation would change. The Russians had at least provided 
effective resistance but their situation, particularly in Stalingrad, still seemed precatious. 
De Beauvoir claimed that the French simply had no reason to believe in an Allied victory 
in 1941. Ametica had not yet entered the war, the Desert War, at least initially, was 
favouring the Axis powers, and having been thrown out of the Balkans, the Allies had no 
base in Europe from which to launch an attack. The anti~Semitic persecutions increased 
and German propaganda was relentless: "Nous voutions garder I 'espoir, mais [,horizon 
etait sombre.,,196 Such scepticism would last well beyond the initial unce1iainty over the 
war's outcome. The only option, therefore, was to wait and hope for the situation to 
improve: 
Je ne tiens sans doute plus beaucoup it la vie, mais j 'at cette idee fixe: durer. 
Faire durer encore quelque temps et moi~meme et mes dependances: tinge, 
vetements, chaussures, esperance, con fiance, sourire, bonne grace; fes faire 
durer jusqu 'au revoir. En vue de quoi je me fats econome, parcimonieux de tout, 
afin que rien du tout cela ne s' epuise avant I 'heure, par grande crainte que cette 
. 1 d d" t d . d' . I fi 197 guerre ne tlre en ongueur, par gran eSlr e gran espOlr en VOlr a m. . 
Although Gide was writing his diary in North Aftica at the time of the Anglo~American 
landing, the fact that his observations were essentially the same as those writing in 
metropolitan France proves the existence of a common theme among the diatists. They 
were all anticipating the end but until that time came the only certainties that they could 
hold on to were their individual desires and hopes. There may have been differences in 
what they hoped would happen in the end but they were an conscious of the fact of 
having to 'last' until the end. 
195 Paxton, Old guard and new order, pp.234-235. Paxton believed that a crude graph of public opinion' 
would see two lines, representing support for Petain and de Gaulle, declining and rising respectively and 
intersecting after the occupation of the zone fibre in November 1942. 
196 De Beauvoir, Laforce de i'age, pp.496-497. 
197 Gide,Journal, p.160. (31.12.42) 
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The diarists were, for the most part, hoping that Germany's fortunes would take a 
tum for the worse, and that the Allies would rescue them from their German captors. 
Gu6henno had asked the question at the end of 1941 : 
Quel homme ou quel ewinement pourrait rendre a ce pays Ie sens de sa dignite 
propre? [Le pays} vit dans de telles conditions qu'il ne pourra de longtemps 
agir qu 'en reaction a des evenements exterieurs; la de/aite de I 'Allemagne ?198 
What is significant to take out of this is that' Gu6henno could not foresee that France's 
dignity could be salvaged from within France. History would prove that this man would 
be de Gaulle and that this event would be the Allied landing in Normandy and the 
subsequent liberation of France. Yet this was of no comfort to the diarists, who had to 
endure the Occupation until that occurred. There was no definite light at the end of the 
tunnel for them to make out but only the hope that there would be an end to their plight. 
Rist commented, in October 1942, that the French were still waiting for the British to 
make an effective contribution to the war: 
L 'an dernier a pareille epoque nous disions: si les Russes tiennent jusqu 'au 15 
septembre, alors viendra l'attaque des Anglais et l'hiver, et la chance tournera. 
Rien n 'est venu sau/la de/aite des Anglais a Tobrouk. Cette annee nous disons 
de nouveau: «si les Russes tiennent jusqu 'au 15 octobre, les Anglo-Americains 
auront Ie temps d'intervenir ala vieille de I 'hiveI', et la chance tournera». Mais 
les Anglais ne font rien. Leurs raids sur I 'Allemagne sont trop espaces pour 
produire un serieux effet moral. On n' est meme pas tranquille sur leur sort en 
Libye. Ainsi au debut de la quatrieme annee ils sont incapables d'aucune action, 
~ I"'" 199 meme avec appUl amerzcal71. 
Furthermore, opinion on de Gaulle was very much divided.2oo He may have given 
hope to the French in their hour of need - although very few people ever heard his 
address to the French people in the summer of 1940 - but this did not mean he was 
necessarily perceived as the saviour of France. In June 1940, Rist recognised ''l'appel 
courageux et emouvant du general de Gaulle, qui nous redonne l'espoir et la 
conjiance",201 yet even as late as August 1944, he commented: 
Charles de Gaulle a debarque a Cherbourg avec Juin, d 'Argenlieu et Kcenig. Ce 
dernier vient d'etre nomme gouverneur de Paris. Dans Ie Midi, c 'est de Lattre 
198 Guehenno, Journal des a117uies noires, p.222. (12.12.41) See Drieu, Journal, pp.312-313. (25.11.42) 
This was the same attitude that Drieu adopted in that he looked upon Gelmany to rectify the internal 
problems that afflicted France. 
199 Rist, Une saiSOIl gafee, p.280. (1Ll 0.42) 
200 Opinion towards de Gaulle will be explored in Chapter Three: Pali Two. 
201 Rist, Une saiSOIl gatee, p.73. (19.6.40) 
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de Tassigny. Nous voila en plein gouvernement de militaires. Bien fou qui 
n 'aura it pas des inquietudes pour l'avenir. Car taus ces gens viennent plus au 
mains de I 'Action fram;aise et haissent la Republique.202 
The catastrophic defeat of 1940 had caused a deep mistrust of all those serving in the 
military and it is equally significant to remember that P6tain's prestige had been forged 
during the First World War. The French, therefore, were passively awaiting this man or 
event blindly in the fervent hope that there would be eventually someone or something of 
sufficient importance to change their fate. 
The Anglo-American landing in North Africa on November 8, 1942, gave the 
illusion of that major significant event. History would prove that this was not the decisive 
event that would bring about real change to the daily lives of the French, namely the end 
of German occupation in France. Indeed, it brought about occupation to parts of France 
that had yet to experience directly the German occupation force. It could be seen, 
however, as a foretaste of the Nonnandy landing in that suddenly the external forces the 
French had been waiting for appeared tangible. The end of the war still seemed a distant 
prospect, and the war continued to be fought in distant lands. Yet the concentration and 
closer proximity of the Allied forces in North Africa caused a change in thinking: an 
Allied victory now seemed likely whereas before there had only been hope. Bobkowski 
observed how happy the French had become with the news of the British victory at El-
Alamein,203 and when the Anglo-American forces landed in North Africa, he remarked in 
his diary: "Des miracles commencent a se produire. ,,204 It was one thing to hope for an 
A1lied victory but it was another thing to see how that could actually happen. The North 
African landing, therefore, had a profound psychological impact: 
Rien ne fut, depuis la debacle, aussi riche en espoir. «Tournant de I 'histoire», 
phase nouvelle. Deja it me semble qu 'entre la debacle et ce debarquement, Ie 
202 Ibid" p.428. (22.8.44) See Paxton, Old guard and new order, pp.35-41. P6tain fitted the national mood 
perfectly. Internally he was a substitute for politics and a barrier to revolution and externally he was a 
victorious general, who would make no war. No Resistance groups in France supported de Gaulle at first, 
and his failed attempt at Dakar, in September 1940, to win over pro-Vichy generals only served to confirm 
that decision. 
203 Bobkowski, Ell guerre et en paix, p.375. (6.11.42) This altered the perception that the only real fighting 
was taking place in Russia. 
204 Ibid" p.378. (8.11.42) 
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temps s' est nitreci. Ces deux annees et demie perdent de leur dimension et de 
leur po ids. Elles vont rejoindre la guerre de 1914 et la guerre de 1870.205 
Werth reveals not only the extent of how much he had eagerly awaited this event but also 
how the weight of time had affected him prior to this perceived toumant de I 'histoire. 
The landing finally provided something that could erase those prolonged years of 
silent suffering. When the Germans occupied the so-called zone libre, it gave Werth the 
impression that events were precipitating towards the end: 
Je suis incapable de mesurer ['evenement. C'est sans doute l'effet de l'isolement 
ou je vis depuis deux ans et demi: Ie choc de tout evenement imprevu me donne 
du ton, une energie, qui n 'est, helas! qu 'une energie it vide. L 'envahissement me 
redresse, com me m 'avail redresse Ie debarquement. Ce n 'est plus l'attente 
inerte. Je fouille l'avenir. Je voudrais me delivrer de mon immobilite, 
m 'engager dans une armee, m 'engager dans l'ew/mement. Pen cherche les 
moyens etje n 'en trouve que d'absurdes. 206 
Suddenly, Wel1h was excited about the future, as the outcome of the war appeared more 
certain. This was no longer attentisme inerte, as he felt that the clarification of what the 
future entailed enabled him to participate on a more conscious level. Werth's isolated 
situation should not be seen as the cause of this mindset. Gu6henno, for example, who 
was kept busy by his teaching work in Paris, also believed that the landing had changed 
the hitherto monotonous rhythm of the war: 
Cette jote que nous avons sen tie hier matin. Les Americains avaient debarque 
PaJ'tout en Afrique du Nord. [. .. ] Le fait est d'immense consequence, peut 
changer Ie lythme de la guerre, tout;micipiter. La situation redevient ce qu 'elle 
eat he sans fa trahison de juin 40. 20 
The implication, moreover, is that the landing gave the impression not only that the 
Occupation seemed much shorter but also that the end seemed much nearer. This change 
in thinking is aptly illustrated by Rist. He remarked before the landing in August 1942: 
Les affaires sont nulles ou liees exclusivement it la guerre. On sent que rien 
n'importe, que tout peut etre bouleverse par les evenements militaires d 'un 
instant it I 'autre, que Ie regime ban caire, les entreprises sont domines par 
l'issue de la guerre sur laquelle nous ne pouvons rien. Tout le reste ne compte 
pas. On essaye de maintenir ce qui existe en vue d 'un avenir inconnu. Lit-dessus 
les esprits se heurtent - envisageant eet avenir avec des espoirs, des craintes, 
205 Werth, Deposition, p.381. (8.11.42) See also, pp.382-383. (8.11.42) The of this event is 
represented by Werth's overwhelming desire to tell everyone this momentous news but at the same time 
his wariness of openly expressing his joy to strangers. 
206 Ibid., p.384. (11.11.42) 
207 Gu6henno, Journal des annees noires, p.298. (9.11.42) 
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des des irs qui different de ['un a I 'autre et qui ne s 'expriment qu'indirectement. 
La majorite cependant attend et espere la victoire alliee. Les aulres sont ceux 
qui se considerent comme superieurement informes ou intelligents. 208 
Rist, from his banking work, accorded a greater importance to the war than many other 
diarists did but he shared their belief that France's salvation lay in the hands of external 
forces. The only problem was that the events leading up to the landing did nothing to 
comfort the French that their individual hopes could be realised. The increased repression 
of the Germans and Vichy's growing sUbjugation may well have affected the French 
directly but it did nothing to change their belief that their fate remained beyond their 
control. The landing in North Africa, however, made the war's end less open to varied 
possibilities: "La question n' est plus de savoir si les Allemands seront battus, mais 
comment its Ie seront.,,209 There was still no idea how the Germans would be defeated 
but there was a growing belief that external events speIt the end for the Germans, which 
enabled the French to envisage a clearer future. Moreover, it confirmed that France's 
salvation lay in the hands of external forces, which, in tum, split the Vichy government 
further apart from the French people: 
En realite Vichy a cesse d'exister pour la majorite des Fra1U;ais. Depuis que 
I 'Algerie est sauVfie de I' em prise ennemie, et qu' on entrevoit la liberation de la 
Mediterranee, et un effondrement de l'Itatie deja bombardee a Genes et Turin, 
et qui va se trouver it la merci des aerodromes de I 'Afrique du Nord et de Malte, 
tout Ie monde sent que c'est la que fe sort de fa France est en train de se 
decider. Devant ce grand evenement, les intrigues de Vichy pour conserver son 
. . t t 210 prestlge au pouvOlr ne camp en pas. 
The fact that the end appeared less distant created an impatience for that end to 
an-ive. It is important to note, however, that this impatience for the Occupation to end 
was not felt equally by the diarists. The difference in opinion lay in the personal 
situations of each diarist. Gide, for example, who spent most of the Occupation in North 
Africa, did not experience the rigours of Occupied France. It was perhaps easier for him 
to endure the rigours of the war than others living in occupied France, whose access to 
basic needs was greatly restricted. His casual remark at the time of the landing was very 
similar to Cocteau' s attitude: 
208 Rist, Une saisoll gatee, p.267. (23.8.42) 
209 Ibid., p.289. (11.11.42) Rist saw Italy as the next natural progression for the Americans but after that he 
still had no idea how France would be liberated or Germany defeated. 
210 Jbid., p.293. (20.11.42) 
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Occupation de la France «libre» par l'Altemagne; de I 'Afrique du Nord par les 
US.A ... Les evenements m 'enlevent toute envie de rien dire. Toujours tente de 
penser que cela n 'a aucune importance, au fond, et ne m 'interesse pas, quand 
b · ., d . d At 211 zen} y evrazs per re ma te e. 
Cocteau, who was consumed by his own work, was largely indifferent to the war, 
whereas Werth was increasingly impatient for his rural exile to end. Rist was so excited 
at the news of the landing that he found himself unable to work: "Je n 'arrive pas it 
travailler ces jours-ci. Comment concentrer sa pensee sur I 'histoire des doctrines 
economiques quant tout notre sortfutur est suspendu aux actions militaires?,,212 
In that respect, there were some diarists who were more impatient to see the end of 
the war than others. It would follow, therefore, that those who were more impatient to see 
the end of the war would be more susceptible to the hope that the North Africa landing 
would spell the end of the war: 
«Qu'its viennent vite! ... » disait Andree Franr;ois. «Qu'its viennent vite!» disent 
la rue, la loge et la boutique. «Qu'its viennent vite!» disons-nous tous. II est 
temps. Nous vivons une vie qui n 'est plus que d'attente, d'oscillation de la peur 
it la rage. 213 
With that greater expectation, however, came the bitter reality that the war, with all its 
unfathomable destruction, would still last a long time: 
Les raisons d'esperer augmentent chaque jour. Et pourtant it me semble que, 
depuis Ie jour du debarquement, notre tonus a diminue, que notre altegresse est 
plus incertaine. Le debarquement, ce fut d'abord comme un conte des Mille et 
une Nuits. Nous crames que tout altait se terminer par enchantement, par un 
coup de baguette. A la buvette aussi Ie tonus a baisse. L' espoir est monte trop 
haut, trop vite. 214 
The Anglo-American landing, in effect, did nothing to outwardly change the French 
situation. The war continued, and the Germans still occupied France; indeed all of 
France. Cocteau gave the very fitting analogy: 
211 Gide, Journal des mznees noires, p.l44. (12.11.42) 
212 Rist, Une saison gatee, p.292. (15.11.42) 
213 Werth, Deposition, p.634. (6.5.44) This comment may have come close to the end ofthe Occupation but 
there were many similar comments recorded much earlier on. See also p.435: Que c 'est long de tuer 
1 'Allemagne et le nazisme ou le nazisme sell!. Qll 'on fasse plus vite, qu 'on en fin isse! Qu 'on nous laisse a 
d'autres sOUCis!2]3 (24.2.43) See also Rist, Une saison gatee, p.347: Approchons-nous vraiment de fa 
delivrance! On vit non plus dans l'anxiete mais dans l'impatience. (6.8.43) And also Gu6henno, Journal 
des annees noires, pJOO: Mais on se sent perdu dans quelque chose d'enorme qui passe l'entendement 
meme. Du moins sent-on que l' espoir va desormais grandir avec les jours ... (14.11.42) 
214 Werth, Deposition, p.392. (27.11.42) 
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Ce qui se passe dans le monde. La guerre est trop longue et ennuyeuse. Les gens 
se nhndividualisent. Il arrive ce qui arrive au theatre. Si la piece est 
interessante et courte, le public forme un seul bloc,· on dirait un enfant de douze 
ans qu 'it faut prendre par le rire ou par les larmes. Si la piece est longue et 
ennuyeuse, le public se reindividualise. Une dame tousse, une autre consulte le 
programme, un monsieur dort, un autre regarde autour de lui, etc. 215 
The landing had broken the monotony of the Occupation. Suddenly, something 
interesting or important had taken place that could capture everybody's attention. 
Unfortunately its effects would not be enough to retain everybody's attention. That 
interest would quickly dissipate with the realisation that the war would continue as 
before, which saw the French revert to their individual desires and hopes. 
The landing, therefore, provided false hope for some diarists. It gave the illusion of 
clarity in a hitherto world of confusion and uncertainty.216 The diarists were still 
restricted to playing a waiting game but the feeling was that the end was nigh. The 
landing had revealed the way out, which saw certain diarists focus exclusively on that 
exit point. They neglected to think about the rescue process itself: how long it might take 
and what it entailed. Rist gave the apt analogy the following year: "Nous sommes ici 
comme des mineurs enterres qui entendent les coups des sauveurs qui approchent, mais 
qui sont encore loin. Il n 'y a plus qu 'une chose qui occupe: combien de temps?,,217 The 
problem was that even at that late stage of the war in 1943 when Rist made the comment, 
the French would still have to wait a year for their sauveurs to arrive on French soil.. The 
Allies did make their way into Europe through Italy but they made very slow progress. 
This was particularly vexing for Werth, as the closer the end appeared to him, the longer 
it seemed for the end to come. He remarked at the start of 1944: 
Les Allemands, a qui chaque jour apporte une goutte de defaite, semblent plus 
redoutables qu 'au temps ou its detenaient la totalite de la victoire. «Ca ne va 
pas vite», dit Andree Fram;ois, qui a ecoute la radio. L' atmosphere est lourde, 
la duree est lourde. Dans vingt ans, tout sera rassemble en deux pages de 
manuel scolaire, reduit a des faits calligraphies, avec pleins et delies. 218 
The evolution of French opinion during the Occupation is a source of contention 
amongst historians. There was a significant shift in opinion after the Anglo-American 
215 Cocteau, Journal, p.226. (5.1.43) 
216 Werth, Deposition, pp.289-290. (11.11.42) See also p.292. (15.11.42) 
217 Rist, Une saison gatee, p.357. (12.9.43) 
218 Werth, Deposition, p.560. (28.1.44) 
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landing but at the same time this should not be confused with a significant shift in 
behaviour. Moreover, this shift in opinion did not remain constant. The overwhelming 
majority remained passive throughout the Occupation but within that broad passive 
framework there was still scope for variant thinking. Just as it seemed likely in the 
summer of 1940 that Germany would be victorious, so too did it appear after November 
1942 that Germany would be defeated. That is not to say, however, that in between this 
period, or indeed after it, there was a linear awareness that Germany would be defeated. 
Laborie disagrees with Paxton that the evolution of opinion, despite some irregularities, 
was linear and followed a geometrical 10gic.219 Laborie was concerned with French 
public opinion at a popular level and, therefore, his findings were much more ambivalent 
and ambiguous than those of Paxton, whose research was concerned on a higher level 
with the Vichy government. Paxton wrote of the French people: 
Si ['on trar;ait un graphique grossier de l' opinion publique entre 1940 et 1944, 
on verrait que la quasi-totalite de la population eta it pour Petain en juin 1940 et 
pour de Gaulle en aout 1944, le point d'intersection de ces deux courbes, 1 'une 
decroissante, ['autre ascendante, se situant apres ['occupation de la zone libre 
en novembre 1942. 220 
His argument bears a striking resemblance to the cynical observation of Bernanos, who 
wrote from Brazil: 
Si l'on pouvait, en effet, de 1940 a 1945, tracer exactement, mois par mois, la 
courbe des chances d'une victoire alliee, on verrait qu 'elle coi'nciderait 
paifaitement avec celle des effectifs grandissants d'un pretendu parti de la 
Victoire, qui Jut tour a tour celui de la victoire allemande puis de la victoire 
alliee, par une curieuse application d'un vieux principe de physique 
'1 ' . l' d . t 221 e ementazre, ce Ul es vases commu71lcan s. 
Is it coincidental that both Paxton and Bernanos shared the same view, even though they 
published their work for different reasons and at different times? They both wrote from a 
detached perspective: Bernanos wrote his thoughts in Brazil and Paxton gathered his 
arguments for his historical research from the Gern1an archives. They may have both had 
the advantage of being able to step back from the personal experiences of those living in 
Occupied France but at the same time they both had no personal concept of duree in 
Occupied France. 
219 Laborie, L 'opinionji'Qlu;aise sous Vichy, p.16. 
220 Paxton, Old guard and new order, p.22S. 
221 Bemanos, FralU;ais si vous saviez, (Paris: Gallimard, 1978) p.273. 
149 
Both these views fail to take into account the individual indecision and oscillation, 
which afflicted the diarists. Even those who had made irrevocable decisions were still 
affected by oscillations in opinion.222 The diaries, written en situation, reveal that opinion 
was much more ambiguous and complex. There was no overnight change in thinking but, 
rather, a series of constantly changing and confl1cting emotions over time. Werth had 
already observed before the landing an abandonment of Vichy and its policy of 
collaboration with Gennany, which had been fostered by the increased repression of the 
Gennan Occupation force after 1941.223 The landing, and the increased likelihood of a 
Gennan defeat, did serve to reinforce that decision but it by no means set it in concrete. 
History from above confinns Werth's prediction that the French would all become 
gaullistes but these gaullistes at no stage comprised a homogenous group. Just as one 
could be in 1940 pro-Petain but not necessarily pro-Vichy so too could one be gaulliste 
after 1942 but not necessarily anti-Petain: "II n 'est pas impossible que la protestation du 
glorieux vieillard attendrisse sentimentalement les foules, qui ont deja oublie I 'hommage 
qu 'il rendit a la generosite de Hitler. ,,224 Paxton appears on even shakier ground when he 
maintains that acceptance of the Vichy regime was ultimately collaboration in a 
functional sense: 
Public opinion, then, offered a broad basis of acquiescence within which active 
participation in the Vichy regime was made legitimate. Only in the spring of 
1943, after the whole of France had been occupied and after young men began 
to be drafted to work in German factories, do the intelligence reports consider 
opinion to have turned deciSively against the regime. 225 
This argument raises more questions than it answers. Paxton assumes that the French 
people accepted the Vichy regime up until 1943. Yet tacit approval of Vichy in 1940 
should not be confused with rapid disenchantment during the period 1941-1942 and yet 
both come under the same banner of acceptance in the eyes of Paxton. And what is the 
definition of decisively against given that there was never any attempt to overthrow the 
Vichy government? 
What the private testimonies offer History is a reminder that the divergent 
experiences of the diarists should deter one from drawing simplistic conclusions about 
222 See Drieu, Joumal, p.301, (7.11.42) pp.41 0-411, (29.7.44) pp.345-346, (16.6.43) and p.370. (1.3.44) 
223 Werth, Deposition, p.349. (23.9.42) 
224 Ibid., p.384. (11.11.42) See also p.642. (17.5.44) 
225 Paxton, Old guard and new order, pp.240-241. 
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French behaviour during the Occupation years. P6tain's call for an armistice was well 
received but he enjoyed far from unanimous support. Similarly, enthusiasm for Vichy's 
call for change should not be interpreted as enthusiasm for the regime's policies. It was 
the German military authorities who ultimately governed behaviour in both zones. The 
policy of Collaboration was overwhelmingly dismissed but the diarists observed that 
there was an equal amount of antipathy for the notion of Resistance. Vichy may have 
been independently involved in the persecution of the Jews but French opinion towards 
Vichy and Germany's anti-Semitic policies is infinitely more difficult to decipher. That 
is not to say that the testimonial divergence prohibits one from detecting general trends 
in the experiences of the French during the Occupation. It is just that one must be always 
mindful of the constant oscillation in opinion generated by events and different personal 
experiences. The diarists did observe during the years 1941-1942 a definite hardening in 
opinion towards the German occupation force and a greater disillusionment with the 
Vichy government. The spirit of partnership, which had been so encouraged in 1940 by 
both the Germans and Vichy, was undermined thereafter by the growing repression of the 
Germans and Vichy's subjugation as well as its submissiveness. The hope of getting 
through to the other side may have become more apparent after the Allied landing in 
North Africa with the realisation that the end was nigh. Yet this does not mean that that 
the diarists were incognisant of having to endure the Occupation until that end came. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
La vie quotidienne 
Bien qu 'on soit en guerre, ou en armistice, ou en paix, I 'etre humain, tant qu 'it est en 
vie a Ie soud de sa nourriture et de son habitat. 1 
Introduction: strategies de sllrvie. 
Henri Amouroux, in the preface to his study of everyday life for the average 
French citizen during the Occupation, argued that historians have traditionally tended 
to emphasise, or focus exclusively on the major figures or dramatic events of the 
Occupation: 
lis etudient Ie gouvernement de Vichy, les rapports franco-allemands, les 
querelles franco-anglaises, its racontent les combats pour la Liberation, les 
exploits des meilleurs resistants, ou se penchent longuement sur la 
psychologie du marechal Petain et de Pierre Laval. [. . .} Ce sont des livres 
d 'Histoire. Et I 'Histoire est peuplee, on Ie sa it, de plus de ministres, de 
genera ux, de financiers, d 'explorateurs que de boutiquiers, de bouchers, de 
cousettes, de cheminots, de menageres et d' enfants pates. 2 
Amouroux preferred to be "un historien de quarante millions d'anonymes", studying 
life at the mundane level. To focus on an elite clique excludes the experiences of the 
forty million French people, who endured the Occupation rather than being actively 
involved in its evolution. The fact that every diarist consciously chose to record their 
everyday concerns is an indication that they often eclipsed the global concerns of the 
Occupation. Werth recorded how his son Claude, who was eighteen years old, 
remarked to his mother: 
«Quandj 'etais un enfant, je revais de vivre dans une epoque extraordinaire, 
pleine de grands evenements historiques. Je croyais qu' en une telle epoque, 
Ie mesquin, Ie quotidien de la vie ne comptait plus. Je vis une telle epoque et 
1 Toesca, Cinq ans de patience, p.67. (5.7.40) 
2 Hemi Amouroux, La vie des Franr;ais sous l'Occupation, (Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1990) 
p.10. Richard Cobb, (French and Germans, Germans and French: A personal interpretation of France 
under two Occupations, (London: University Press of New England, 1983)) was another who preferred 
a more personal approach. See also Jacquet, AmIick, & Todorov, Tzvetan, Guerre et paix sous 
I 'occupation (Paris: Arlea, 1996). 
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je vois que Ie mediocre, Ie mesquin, Ie quotidien pesent sf lourd qu'ils ne 
pourraient peser davantage.»3 
The infinitesimal might well have wider repercussions for the behaviour of 
the French people than the grander concepts favoured by many historians. A global 
study of Vichy, for example, requires an understanding beyond the machinations 
within the private walls of the tiny spa town. The indirect consequences of Vichy are 
just as important to examine. This chapter is concerned with examining the diarists' 
reactions to the banal rather than the extraordinary. The exode and the debiicle, the 
rafles and shooting of hostages, and the Allied landings in North Africa and 
Normandy were all dramatic events for the diarists but they were relatively infrequent 
when one considers that they occurred over a period of more than four years. There 
were more constant and pressing concerns that affected the diarists, which raises the 
question what effect did the everyday life of the diarists have upon their attitudes and 
behaviour? The diaries are replete with references to the difficulties of finding 
provisions or clothing. The fact that they elected to write about these everyday issues 
on a regnlar basis indicates that the daily rhythms of their private lives were often 
more pressing than those of the public sphere. 
The personal nature of the journaux intimes is a reminder that the diarists 
responded to events differently, often depending on whether they were affected 
directly or not. Roussin felt relieved that Marseilles appeared to be unaffected by the 
war but Werth felt ashamed that the Jewish statutes questioned his French nationality. 
The weight of these individual concerns would encourage different reactions amongst 
the diarists. Some diarists, such as Deharme, would refuse to acknowledge the 
evenementiel: "Au loin, dans Ie monde, les grands evenements font leur tapage 
vain.,,4 Cocteau, for example, would disavow any notion of politics: "La radio 
anglaise m 'accuse de «collaborer». La presse fi"anco-allemande m 'accuse d'etre 
gaulliste. Voila ce qui arrive aux esprits fibres qui refusent de se l1u2ler de politique et 
n y comprennent rien."s Roussin would initially block out any notion of the war: "Je 
ne voyais pas en quoi la guerre me concernait encore.,,6 The weight of time would 
3 Werth, Deposition, pp.484-485. (6.6.43) 
4 Deharme, Les al1l1eespetdues, p.77. (25.4.41) 
5 Cocteau, Journal, p.372. (1.10.43) See also Dumeril, Jou17lal d'Ul1 honnete homme pendant 
l'occupation, p.129: Pas Ie temps de m 'en OCClIper, et neutralite absolue de ma part. (4.6.41) 
6 Roussin, Rideau gris et habit vert, pp.101-102. 
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see Werth entertain at times the temptation of retreat: "J'attends Suzanne. Je me fous 
de la guerre, je me fous de la civilisation. J'attends.,,7 
Each diarist had different strategies for coping with the Occupation. They all 
had differing views on their work and their general everyday behaviour. The Parisian-
based diarists are privileged in Part One of this chapter simply because they comprise 
by far the largest regional group amongst the selected diarists. Whilst they may well 
form a specific group and are confined to a specific area of France, the dilemmas they 
faced represent a microcosm of the problems faced by every individual living in 
France. The first section is concerned with their attitudes to work, particularly those 
who worked in the artistic field. The Germans wanted the French to feel that they 
could return to life as normal but to do so could have far-reaching implications for 
those individuals concerned. Many artists would be singled out after the Liberation 
for having supported the German cause. The second section is concerned with the 
wider issue of how the Parisians survived the war in terms of their psychological 
approach to the Occupation. The diarists were split between the notion that the 
French had the innate ability to adapt to calamitous events and the notion that they 
had gone too far in their resignation of defeat. 
Part Two is concerned with examining how the preoccupation with survival 
prevented the French from forming a united front against the German invaders. The 
first section deals with how the material decline impacted on the diarists. The effects 
of the Occupation took time to filter down to every region of France. The German 
need for French materials would only become more insatiable as their fortunes in 
North Africa and Europe deteriorated, which would come to affect the diarists on a 
more global scale. That is not to say that the material decline came to be felt 
uniformly by the diarists but, rather, that every diarist felt compelled to write about 
the difficulties of everyday life during the Occupation. Historians have tended to 
focus on political or social divisions rather than examining the differences between 
the rich and the poor. The diaries suggest that there were two Frances: the haves and 
the have-nots. These divisions did not necessarily run along social or political lines. 
Peasant farmers were often in a privileged position as they had ready access to the 
most important commodity: food. Those who lived in rural areas were often better off 
than those who lived in urban areas but those living in the cities who had connections 
7 Werth, Deposition, p.l43. (23-25.12.40) 
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with the countryside were invariably better off. The second section is concerned with 
examining how the notion of patrie was undermined by the constant preoccupation 
with survival. It also raises the question whether such notions have any relevance in 
such times of individual turmoil. Finally, there is an examination of the narrative 
conclusion of the private diaries. The Liberation did not necessarily see an end to the 
problems encountered during the Occupation, and it is interesting to note which 
diarists continued to write well after the Liberation. The focus of this chapter, 
however, is less concerned with the chronological dimension than with the thematic 
dimension, namely the feeling of powerlessness amongst the diarists to alter their 
situation and their attempts to deal with the situation as best they could. 
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Part One 
Jouer it fa balle 
On n 'ose plus prononcer Ie mot de bonheur dans ces temps tortures. Et pourtant, des 
millions d'etres, aujourd'hui, sont it sa recherche, et ces annees ne sont pour eux 
qu 'un sursis qui n 'en fin it plus, et au bout duquel Us esperent que leur bonheur it 
nouveau sera possible. QUi donc pourra les en blamer? Et qui pourrait dire qu'ils ont 
tort? Que serait lajustice sans la chance du bonheur, de quoi servirait la liberte it la 
misere?8 
Travailler so us l'Occupation: Art for art's sake or Le silence de la mer? 
One problem remained constant for the diarists throughout the Occupation: 
how to behave in a time when the country was occupied by a foreign military force. 
The suddenness of defeat and Germany's military dominance had initially lent itself 
to the idea that the war would not last long. The diarists had to adapt to this change in 
thinking as the Occupation progressed but at the same time they had to continue with 
their lives as best they could. One wanted to act in the best way that one could but 
one also had to think about one's own livelihood and the survival of one's own 
family. Mauriac recalled the following image, which provides the title for the first 
part of this chapter: 
Peguy admirait la reponse du jeune Louis de Gonzague it qui, durant une 
recreation, ses camarades demandaient ce qu'il ferait si on venait leur 
annoncer que la fin du monde eta it pour I 'instant meme: (de continuerais de 
jouer it la balle ... » Et c 'est vrai qu 'il est dur, tandis que Ie sol se derobe sous 
nos pieds, de continuer de jouer it la balle, surtout lorsque Ie jeu consiste 
pour nous it ecrire des livres, des articles. Un metier manuel occupe Ie 
corps, il tend it un resultat positif et dont I 'utilite s'impose. Mais I 'ecrivain, 
pris dans Ie remous d' evenements enormes, lutte contre Ie neant de ses 
imaginations et de ses idees. Qu' elles paraissent vaines, les speculations du 
clerc, au milieu de cet univers bouleverse! Et pourtant la France ne survit 
que dans la mesure ou chacun continue de fa ire ce qu 'il faisait it la place ou 
il a ere surpris par la catastrophe. Une activite individuelle interrompue, 
c 'est la vie du pays qui baisse d'autant. II faut que notre cceur continue de 
8 Albert Camus, Combat, (22.12.44), Azema, Jean-Pierre & Bedarida, Franyois, (ed.s) Le regime de 
Vichy et les Frmu;ais, (Paris: Librairie Artheme Fayard, 1992) p.621. 
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battre. Les longues maladies sont une epreuve pour Ie C02ur. «Il s 'agit que Ie 
C02ur tienne» disent les medecins: celui de la France tient, et il tiendra. 9 
Mauriac's devout Catholic faith was in tune with such an optimistic stance. The 
French may well have catastrophically defeated and had to endure the German 
Occupation of France but at the same time life had to go on. There was no point in 
putting down the ball and renouncing oneself to the demise of the world. The best 
attitude was to try to live one's life as one had done before the defeat. 
There was nothing one could do to prevent the German presence in France so 
many felt that there was no sense in brooding on it. Welih asked the question: "Qui a 
raison? Le pere Fram;ois, qui veut etre libre, ou la concierge, qui me disait a Paris: 
«Allemande ou Fram;aise, je tirerai toujours Ie cordon ... »?"lO There may have been 
a difference in attitude between the two but there may well not have been any 
discernible difference in tenns of behaviour. To actively fight against the Gennans 
was just as bad as joining them in their fight, as both choices required putting down 
the ball. Yet often those who continued their work found themselves in a 
compromising position: to continue to work might be perceived as support for the 
Germans but to refuse to work might well come at the expense of oneself or one's 
family. Those like Toesca and Dumeril, who worked alongside the Germans, could 
justifiably feel that they were best serving French interests yet that does not change 
the fact that their jobs both required them to work alongside the Germans every day. 
This dilemma affected almost every working individual: the grocer, who could sell 
his stock to regular clients at fair prices or to the Germans at a premium price; the 
factory worker11 , who worked for the German war effort. One had to weigh up the 
ethical side with the basic need for survival: "Je suis morte de fatigue. Si je travaillais 
pour les Allemands, j'aurai deux fois 11'zoins de mal et je gagnerais quarante-cinq 
francs par jour. Se Ie refuser au nom de ses principes?,,12 Yet certain occupations 
were at a disadvantage. Werth noticed the difference between his solitude and the 
distractions of the farmers working in Saint-Amour: "Je suts tout seul avec fa guerre. 
Ce qui du monde exterteur vient jusqu 'a moi n 'est que la guerre ou depend de fa 
guerre. Les paysans du moins continuent de soigner leurs betes, arrachent des 
9 Mauriac, CEuvres compN'.tes, p.331. (Paris, 1942) 
10 Werth, DepOSition, p.253. (5.11.41) 
11 See Burrin, La France a I '/ieure allemande, pp.289-293, for how the perception of fact01Y workers 
sent to Germany changed over the course of the period. 
12 Moret, Journal d'une mauvaise Franr;aise, p.187. (1.9.42) 
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pommes de terre. ,,]3 The peasants still had their work to keep their minds from 
dwelling on the defeat, and no one could blame them for continuing their work. The 
German military presence in France did not change the fact that the stock still had to 
be managed and crops still had to be harvested. The same could not be said for the 
artists who worked in Paris, whose work was not always regarded as essential 
everyday practice. 
The problem for these diarists was that it was impossible to continue living as 
one had done before because the German presence and the new Vichy regime had 
brought in a new element into the equation with respect to work: namely whether one 
was betraying one's country by collaborating with the enemy. This was collaboration 
not in the original sense of the armistice terms but what it would come to mean for 
the French people: collusion with the enemy. The diarist Dumeril, who worked as a 
translator in the Nantes administration, believed that the only option was: "A ttendre, 
c' est la seule chose a faire, et faire son travail au jour Ie jour. ,,14 Some, however, 
would break free from this resignation, believing that it was unpatriotic. That is not to 
say Dmneril was unpatriotic. Like the title of his diary, he was indeed un honnete 
homme. Yet absent from his attitude is the possibility that continuing one's work 
might be perceived as betraying France. When a gentleman approached him to ask 
him to devenir adherent de «Collaboration» his reply was simply: "Pas Ie temps de 
m 'en occuper, et neutralite absolue de ma part.,,]5 The problem was, however, 
whenever there was a question of interaction with the Germans, one simply could not 
remain neutral; one had to choose which side one was on. This may well have been 
less relevant in the context of the Occupation but in the context of the Liberation and 
the purge that followed, everyone's behaviour during the Occupation would be 
scrutinised. What one had chosen to do could bring serious consequences later on. 
Galtier-Boissiere was aware that some had been too hasty in their decision-making: 
Dumaine me dit: «11 y a des gens qui ont cru fin juin 40 que Londres serait 
occupe 15 jours apres et its ont pris position. Aujourd 'hui its s 'accrochent a 
la collaboration parce que si les fridolins sont battus, its sont surs d' etre 
fusilles ou pendus.» 16 
The overwhelming majority were far more hesitant in that they chose to 
neither actively collaborate nor resist. Yet this does not mean that they had not made 
13 Werth, Deposition, p.47. (26.9.40) 
14 Dumeril, Journal d 'un honnete homme pendant I 'occupation, p.120. 
15 Ibid., p.129. (9.3.41) 
16 Galtier-Boissiere, Journal, p.50. (25.7.41) 
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a choice but, rather, that they had not gone too far in their choices. The diarist Toesca, 
who had a subtle but significant difference in opinion to that of Dumeril, was more 
aware ofthe situation when he listed his aims as a bureaucrat in Paris: 
Je precise ma position; quel que soit Ie poste auquel on est appele en ce 
moment: 1) apporter un soulagement aux miseres humaines; 2) essayer de 
convaincre les Franc;ais qu'ils ne peuvent rien faire de pire que de se battre 
entre eux; 3) d'autre part, je refuse de suivre aveuglement les ordres. Je ne 
veux rien entre prendre queje ne l'approuve en conscience. 17 
One must never discount that Toesca was playing to his reader but from the reading 
of his diary, there is a clear difference in opinion to that of Dumeril in that he was 
always clear that he was working for the best interests of France, whether they 
coincided with German wishes or not. Dumeril, on the other hand, was convinced that 
there were enough decent Germans to ensure that working with them was the best 
chance of making the Occupation run as smoothly as possible. There was no 
suggestion of duping the Germans as with Toesca. 18 Moreover, it was not only 
working with the Germans where the French had to examine their conscience. Rist 
was asked to be the Vichy ambassador in the United States but eventually turned 
down the offer as he could not be sure of the designs of Vichy with respect to the 
Americans. 19 Drieu, who was editor of the Nouvelle Revue franc;aise O\!RF), which 
was supervised closely by the Germans, was asked to work for Vichy: 
On me propose d'entrer dans l'appareil de Vichy (pour y organiser la 
surveillance de la litteraturel). Mais puis-je servir directement Ie 
Gouvernement de Vichy, si conservateur, si reactionnaire? ... Resterai-je un 
Franc;ais en l'air? Comme tant d'autres. Je sers la France en individu, dans 
Ie cadre d 'une situation purement personnelle. Mal vu des Gaullistes, des 
a tten tis tes, de la plupart des collaborationnistes. Eternelle histoire du 
litterateur, quand il a Ie moyen d' etre independant. 2o 
It seems strange that someone who was working under close German supervision 
should be concerned about betraying France by working for Vichy. The implication is 
that working for Vichy would be far more dishonourable than working for the 
Germans. 
Those who worked in the Occupied Zone were effectively only concerned 
with the Germans. Galtier-Boissiere noted the seemingly flippant remark: "Comment 
sera gagnee la guerre? «Par l'or america in, la tenacite anglaise ... et la comedie 
17 Toesca, Cinq ans de patience, pp.116-117. (17.6.42) 
18 Ibid., p.82 La politique actuelle consiste a amadouer les Allemands le plus possible, ales detoul'11er 
des exactions qu 'ils sont Pl'ets a commettre. (25.8.40) 
19 Rist, Une saisol1 gatee, p.186. (13.9.41) 
20 Drieu, Journal, p.272. (21.9.41) 
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!ram;aise.»,,21 In France there is a saying: tout commence et fin it par des chansons. 
Was it not best to promote French culture in an otherwise oppressive Gennan world 
or was this simply helping, intentionally or not, the Gennan cause by distracting the 
French from the harsh realities of the Occupation? After the Liberation, the argument 
was bandied about that all the French plays, films and books that appeared during the 
Occupation years were in defiance of the Gennans, who were intent on destroying all 
cultures other than their own. Burrin points out, however, that the Gennan policy of 
promoting and encouraging French culture was a very liberal one and went against 
the strict guidelines adhered to back in the Reich. Moreover, such a liberal policy had 
many benefits for Gennany: it made order easier to maintain by distracting the French 
population; it encouraged the idea of collaboration by promoting the belief that the 
French had a cultural role to play in a Nazi Europe. It also made a contrast between 
the harsh restrictions imposed in the so-called zone libre and the ostensibly tolerant 
Occupiers. They were keen to create the illusion that one could continue working 
nonnally as one had done before the war.22 
The artists working in Paris were not helped by the fact that they often 
maintained a high profile, which would cause much resentment after the Liberation. It 
was hard for many to accept that people could continue to enjoy success, notoriety 
and seemingly such familiarity with the Gennans in a time of such suffering and 
repression. On August 23, 1944, Sacha Guitry was arrested and put in prison for 
alleged crimes of collaboration but would be released two years later, having been 
found not guilty of the charges laid against him. His motivation for writing his 
postwar memoirs, Quatre ans d'occupations, was essentially to prove his innocence. 
The title is most appropriate as within the broad framework of the Occupation, Guitry 
was lost in his own world of work. For him, the two remained separate: he may have 
lived under the Occupation but in his eyes he did not work under the Occupation. He 
always maintained that despite the Gennan presence in France, this did not extend, in 
his eyes, to his work. His work was something which the Gennans could never take 
away from him. Furthennore, his work was not merely a means of expressing himself 
but also himself as a Frenchman. Guitry was no Gennanophi1e, unlike Dumeri1, and 
could not even speak Gennan to Jiinger when he met him in person. Petain would 
21 Galtier-Boissiere, Journal, p.136. (26.1.43) 
22 Burrin, La France a l'heure allemande, pp.329-330. 
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maintain that his presence in France acted as a shield for the French. Guitry would go 
further to say that his work during the Occupation acted as a sword: 
Car, encore une fois, si des Fram;ais furent etonnes de me savoir en plein 
Paris des l'an 40 - je sais des Allemands qui en etaient encore bien plus 
etonnes qu 'eux. A cet egard, on me dira: - Mais comment se fait-il que vous 
ayez pu jouer devant eux pendant quatre ans de suite, vous qui dites si bien, 
et qui prouvez d'ailleurs, que vous ne les aimez pas? Je repondrai: - Parce 
que ce n 'etait pas Ie moment de penser a ses preferences et de s 'occuper de 
ses opinions. Je m 'etais fourre dans la tete l'idee que ma presence a Paris 
pouvait dans une certaine mesure servir la France, et je lui faisais 
allegrement Ie sacrifice de mes gouts. 23 
One may well question his sincerity but the question he raises is still pertinent. To 
return to Mauriac' s image, Guitry was well aware of the temptation to stop 'playing 
ball' but he believed that to do so was to renounce the only positive course of 
action.24 
French History has shown France's ability to endure catastrophes and rise 
above them. De Gaulle noted in his memoirs: "Vieille France, accabtee d'Histoire, 
meurtrie de guerres et de revolutions, aUant et venant sans relliche de la grandeur au 
declin, mais redressee, de siecle en siecle, par Ie genie du renouveau. ,,25 Even in 
France's darkest hours great work could still be achieved. Guitry believed that there 
were only two things left for him to admire in his beloved country: the glorious 
history of France and the Arts.26 Some of the masterpieces of Manet, Renoir and 
Monet were painted during the years 1870-1871, when the north of France was 
occupied by the Gennans. Guitry took this to mean that 
rien ne peut abattre Ie Genie de la France [ ... .] Voila ce que faisaient des 
hommes de genie a I 'heure ou la France vena it de perdre la guerre. Et 
devant ces merveilles, n 'a-t-on pas l'impression que ce que I 'on perdait d 'un 
cOte, on Ie regagnait de 1 'autre? Car on a bien Ie droit de considerer que des 
a:uvres pareilles, cela tient lieu de victoires. Passons maintenant dans la 
salle voisine. Vois done: Matisse, Bonnard, Dunoyer de Segonzac, Othon 
23 Guitry, Quatre ans d'occupations, p.95. See also pp.394-395. Gcethe's presence at Errurt before 
Napoleon was a comfort to the German people. Guitry believed, similarly: if devait mettre S011 
prestige, quelque faible qu 'if fut, au service de la France. 
24 Jackson, The dark years, pp.302-303. The post-war reputations of artists did not always reflect a 
balanced assessment of their conduct during the Occupation. Paul Claudel, who wrote an 'Ode to 
Petain' in 1940 and another one to de Gaulle in 1944, would be unfairly singled out for his initial 
admiration for petain. There is the contrasting example of Edith Thomas, who claimed that she refused 
to publish anything during the Occupation but tIlls 'choice' was helped by Gallimard's rejection of her 
manuscript in 1942. 
25 Gaulle, Charles de, Memoires de guerre, (Paris: Gallimard, 2000), p.5. 
26 Desanti, Dominique, Sacha GUitlY: cinquante ans de spectacle, Chapter Five in Quatre ans 
d'occupations, p.249. 
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Friez, Maillol, Utrillo, Wlamin ck, Despiaux, Touchagues, Brianchon - la 
France continue. 27 
The Germans may have occupied French soil but they could not take away her past 
and they could not take away French culture or, at least, they should not be allowed to 
do so. 
Guitry would have us believe that his plays were a means of expressing 
himself as a Frenchman. Aristide Maillol, arguably the finest sculptor in the world at 
that time, agreed to leave his Mediterranean retreat to open the exposition of Arno 
Breker at the Tuileries in April, 1942. Guitry believed that there were two ways this 
could be taken. Firstly, it could be interpreted that Maillol came to Paris at the behest 
of the Germans and "s 'est vautre devant les Occupants" for which he should have 
been ''frappe d'Indignite Nationale". Secondly, it could be interpreted that Breker 
summoned his "maitre venere" and received Maillol as one would receive royalty. 
Breker would be the one bowing to Maillol: 
et a cette minute la, c 'est l'Allemagne qui s'incline devant le genie de la 
France - et la France n 'est pas vaincue a cette minute-la - et loin de se 
vautrer devant les Occupants, M Maillol est alors le symbole vivant de la 
France immortelle - it prouve une fois de plus que Paris, militairement 
occupe, conserve neanmoins tout son rayonnement et continue d' etre 
«l'enclume des renommes» - selon ['expression si belle de Hugo. 28 
The former opinion might well be seen more in the light of the post-Liberation 
examination of the behaviour of the French during the Occupation. The latter view 
might bear more weight in the context of the Occupation: France had been defeated 
and was trying to rebuild herself. The Arts were a means of conveying not only to the 
French but also to the Germans that France still lived on. The German occupation 
force could not be stopped but one could help to stand up to the German cultural 
mvaslOn. 
One could be cynical and believe that Guitry was merely protecting his own 
interests and paid little attention to the interests of France. Yet when one looks at it 
from the other perspective, the situation appears to be much more complex. Whether 
one believes Guitry or not, his argument does make sense. The problem was, 
however, that he had no appreciation that his seemingly patriotic actions could be 
perceived as collusion with the enemy: 
27 Guitry, Quatre ans d'occupations, pp,415-416. 
28 Ibid., pp.384-385. 
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Des lors, on avouera que j 'ai vraiment de la malchance: quand je me refuse 
a jouer devant les Allemands, mon geste est «politique» et je dessers la 
France - quand je joue devant eux, je trahis mon pays !29 
His attitude was very much in tune with that of Cocteau: "La radio anglaise m 'accuse 
de «colla borer». La presse franco-allemande m 'accuse d 'etre gaulliste. Voila ce qui 
arrive aux esprits libres qui refusent de se miler de politique et n y comprennent 
rien.,,30 The two were very similar in that neither of them had any notion of politics. 
Gheusi, director of the Opera, wrote in his memoirs of Guitry: "II ignore la politique 
et n 'a pas la ressource de lui attribuer les ewinements.,,31 Cocteau and Guitry were so 
involved in their own artistic worlds that they were unable to realise that their actions 
could offend some people. A good example is the infamous newspaper article that 
Cocteau wrote about the German sculptor Amo Breker: 
Je vous safue Breker. Je vous safue de fa haute patrie des poetes, patrie ou 
fes patries n 'existent pas, sauf dans fa mesure ou chacun y apporte Ie tresor 
du travail national. Je vous salue ... parce que dans la haute patrie ou nous 
sommes compatriotes, vous me parlez de fa France. 32 
Cocteau simply meant to say that he admired Breker as a sculptor rather than 
as a German but he could not appreciate that at a time when Germany had a 
stranglehold on France that such a tribute to a German could have an adverse reaction 
on the French public. Cocteau often dined with and met German officers such as 
Hinger but, in his eyes, their similar interests transgressed national boundaries?3 He 
admired the words of Stendhal written during the Restoration: "Rien de ce qu' on fait 
ici ne peut me toucher, ecrivait Stendhal; je suis passager sur Ie vaisseau. L 'essen tiel 
est qu 'on aU de fa tranquillite et de bons spectacles.,,34 It appears very naIve on 
Cocteau's behalf that he could simply opt out of the Occupation and carryon as 
before without attracting criticism: "Dujardin m 'ecrit ce soir: «Vous n 'ites pas venu 
a notre seance, aux Mathurins. Vous ne lisez done pas les journaux?» Non je ne les 
lis pas. Et comment ferais-je pour les lire! Mon epoque n 'est pas celIe dont ils 
parlent. Mon epoque n 'est pas la leur.,,35 One is struck when reading the diary of 
29 Ibid., p.86. 
30 Cocteau, Journal, p.372. (1.10.43) 
31 Desanti, Sacha GuitlY: cinquante ails de spectacle, p.248. See also Cocteau, Journal, p.91. (19.4.42) 
32 Cocteau, Journal, p.133. (23.5.42) See p.128. Cocteau was greatly encouraged by Hitler's words to 
Breker that he intended to come to Paris with artists rather than generals. (18.5.42) 
33 Ibid., p.31. (12.3.42) 
34 Burrin, La France a l'heure allemande, pp.340-34l This was taken from Roger Vailland, who was 
initially a firm believer in 1940 of Franco-German collaboration but would later come to join the 
Resistance. 
35 Cocteau, Journal, p.71. (4-5.4.42) 
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Cocteau how little the Occupation appears to have encroached on his life: "Arrivee de 
Leonce Rosenberg et naturellement on reparle de I J epoque. Grande fatigue. Leonce 
me dit: « Vous ne changez pas.» Je lui reponds: (de suis trop distrait pour 
changer.»,,36 He could not understand why the public vilified artists, who were 
maintaining the grandeur of France but it was not so much the fact that Cocteau 
continued to work that irked so many people but, rather, that he outwardly behaved as 
though there was no German Occupation. It is this acceptance of defeat, coupled with 
his stubborn determination to carryon with his life, that drew so much criticism. Yet 
there seems to be a fine line between the attitude ofCocteau and that of Dumeril. The 
only difference was that Cocteau was in the public eye. His work, therefore, had more 
far-reaching significance. 
The question is could anything positive come out of the Occupation or were 
the French, to use Guehenno' s image, confined within the prison walls? Hoffmann 
raises the question how much of les annees noires was a period of decline and how 
much of the post-liberation years was a period of renewal?37 What, in short, was the 
legacy of the Vichy period? What indictment of the French during those years 
prevents any positive reflection? What cannot be denied is that the Arts flourished 
during the Occupation, which suggests that the French refused to renounce 
themselves to their fate and continued tojouer ala balle.38 Moreover, it suggests that 
there was a voracious appetite for something that was able to distract the French from 
the harsh realities of the Occupation. Werth would be especially critical of the 
tendency to block out the war. Yet perhaps in his rural world of Saint-Amour, where 
he was unable to go to the theatre, he was perhaps not in the best position to comment 
on the impact the theatre and cinema had on the Parisian population. In a city where 
there were German signs on almost every comer, here was an opportunity to be 
exposed to a uniquely French environment: French actors, French issues and, perhaps 
most importantly, the French language. This notion of malleability was not just 
confined to the artists working in Paris but applied to every French individual, and 
would continue to be examined by the diarists throughout the Occupation.39 
36 Ibid., p.53. (23.5.42) Rosenberg was a famous art dealer. 
37 Hoffmann, Essais sur la France, p.9. 
38 See Jackson, The dark years, pp.310-318. Cinema audiences, for example, had never been larger. 
There were 220 million cinema goers in 1938, 225 million in 1941 and over 300 million in 1943. 
39 This will be further discussed in the following section. 
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Returning to one's work in general terms was part of this process but the Arts were a 
means of making this transition easier. 
These artists were in the majority but there were writers, such as Guehenno 
and Mauriac, who believed that it was totally inappropriate to produce any piece of 
work in times of such repression. Although he published La Pharisienne in 1941, 
Mauriac chose not to publish anything else during the Occupation. In 1942, he wrote 
in the Gazette de Lausanne: 
De to utes les epreuves que subit aujourd'hui un ecrivainfranc;ais, il n 'en est 
aucune qu 'il devrait accueillir de meilleur cceur que celle du silence. 
L 'homme dont c' eta it Ie metier que d' exprimer en toute rencontre son 
opinion, est invite a se taire, - non certes a ne plus juger, mais a garder pour 
lui son jugement, a Ie reviser a loisir dans cette longue retraite du 
malheur. 4o 
Instead Mauriac chose to write clandestinely and actively became involved with the 
literary resistance. This suggests a definite change in attitude from his earlier stance 
of continuing to jouer a la balle. The notion of silence is an interesting concept. 
Silence could be used as a powerful weapon and, moreover, was often the only 
weapon available to the French. Arguably the most famous underground pUblication 
was Vercor's Le silence de la mer, which centred on the sea of silence between a 
young girl, who could be seen as representing France, and a very polite German 
officer, who could be equally seen as representing the courteous and correct Germans 
of the summer of 1940. The young girl refuses to speak at all to the German officer 
despite his charming manner and his assurances that Germany and France will come 
together in peace. Her stand is vindicated when the German officer reveals that he has 
been fooled all along as Germany intends to destroy France and her culture. 
Guehenno was another, who had no time for those who continued to work in the field 
of literature. Their excuse that they must continue to write for the good of French 
literature did not hold with him, as no one was indispensable in his eyes. 
Guehenno firmly believed that the Occupation effectively meant that every 
individual was in prison and that the only honourable thing to do was to ''peindre les 
murs de sa prison.,,41 He had no time for writers, who chose to go outside the prison 
walls and talk about subj ects that did not deal with the Occupation, as that was the 
only problem, in his eyes, that was on the minds of the French pUblic. He also had 
nothing but contempt for those who willingly served the German cause by spreading 
40 Jackson, The dark years, p.335. 
41 Guehemlo, Journal des a11lu!es noires, pp.72-74. (30.11.40) 
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their propaganda.42 Burrin argues that Guehenno's philosophy was far too demanding 
for the overwhelming majority of authors and academics, who believed that the 
publication of a book did not have to recognise the Occupier nor the politics of the 
Occupier.43 Silence was, for the majority, impossible as they had to make a living 
somehow. Those, like Guehenno, who refused to publish anything under the German 
Occupation, could afford to, as he had his teaching job to fall back on. Cocteau would 
similarly make the point against Mauriac at the end of the war in response to 
Mauriac's criticism: 
Andre Dubois me rapporte que Fram;ois Mauriac est td~s monte contre moi. 
II trouve que je n 'ai pas opte politiquement et me reproche mon article sur 
Breker. Ceci est encore de la bile et il ferait mieux de se souvenir, comme 
moi, de notre amitie si grande et si ancienne ... Moi, on m 'a ruine avec 
I 'affaire des Parents terribles, on m 'a frappe et blesse I 'ceil, etc. Mauriac est 
riche. II peut vivre. II faut que je gagne ma vie. 44 
Yet Guehenno was right to distinguish between those writers who wrote for 
themselves and those writers who wrote essentially for the Germans. Those who 
wrote for the newspapers fall into the latter category but there were also authors such 
as Jacques Chardonne, who openly supported collaboration with Germany. His 
infamous work, L 'ete a la Maurie, which he would be punished for after the 
Liberation, was an ill-advised eulogy of German culture in a time where the French 
felt vulnerable to the all-conquering Germans. It is a story of a vineyard owner who 
offers willingly a glass of cognac to a German officer as a sign of his esteem and 
respect for Germany. The message is unmistakable: France is willingly offering itself 
to Germany as a partner. 
Like so many aspects of the Occupation, the problem is not so much with the 
people who fall into black-and-white categories of resistance or collaboration but, 
rather, with the people who fall into the overwhelmingly larger grey area. The likes of 
Vercors and Chardonne fall into the categories of black and white but in between is 
the much larger grey area, which incorporated all those who felt that they were 
justified in their actions but who appeared after the Liberation in a much less 
favourable light. De Beauvoir is an example of someone who is far more difficult to 
judge. She could not help but have sympathy for Cocteau's attitude while at the same 
time disapproving of it: 
42 Ibid., pp.74-75. (30.11.40) See also Werth, Deposition, p.484. (5.6.43) 
43 Burrin, La France it l'heure allemande, p.338. 
44 Cocteau, Journal, p.498. (5.4.44) 
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II disait que Ie Poete doit se garder du siecle, rester indifferent aux folies de 
la guerre et de la politique. «lIs nous embetent, disait-it. Tous: les 
Allemands ... les Americains ... its nous emb§tent.» Nous n 'etions pas du tout 
d'accord, mais nous avions de la sympathie pour lui; nous goutions sa 
presence insolite dans cette nuit balafree de rayons vert esperance. 45 
The implication is that the idea in theory was sound but it did not work in the reality 
of the Occupation. She clearly stated that there was an unwritten rule amongst artists: 
On ne devait pas ecrire dans les journaux et les revues de zone occupee, ni 
parler a Radio-Paris; on pouvait travailler dans la presse de la zone libre et 
a Radio-Vichy: tout dependait du sens des articles et des emissions. Publier 
un livre de I 'autre cOte de la ligne etait parfaitement licite; ici, la question se 
posait; finalement on estima que la aussi, c' etait Ie contenu de I' ouvrage qui 
. 46 
comptazt. 
Yet she later contradicted that statement with the following claim: 
Le seul probleme, c' eta it de gagner ma vie. Je ne sais par quel truchement 
j'obtins une situation de «metteuse en ondes» a la radio nationale; j'ai dit 
que, d 'apres notre code, on avait Ie droit d ~y travailler: tout dependait de ce 
qu 'on y faisait. 47 
After having earlier stated that her moral position was such that one had to consider 
what one did before taking it up, she maintained that survival was the only concern, 
which was her way of justifying work for Radio Paris (qui ment et qui est allemand). 
This did not prevent her, however, at showing contempt for the following: 
je condamnais tous les collaborateurs; mais a l'egard des gens de mon 
espece, intellectuels, journalistes, ecrivains, j 'eprouvais un degout in time, 
precis, douloureux. Quand des litterateurs, des peintres allaient en 
Allemagne assurer les vainqueurs de notre adhesion spirituelle, je me 
sentais personnellement trahie. Je considerais les articles de Deat, de 
Brasillach, leurs denonciations, leurs appels au meurtre, conune des crimes 
aussi impardonnables que les activites d 'un Darlan. 48 
There was never any suggestion that she might figure among these artists who had 
betrayed France. 
This, at base, was the moral malleability that Werth49 and Mauriac could not 
condone. It would be unfair to put De Beauvoir and Sartre in the same camp as 
Chardonne but at the same time their actions were questionable when someone of 
their standing could help add weight to the German cause, however small or 
unintentional their contribution might be. Guitry's argument was if people like him 
45 De Beauvoir, Laforce de I 'age, p.600. 
46 Ibid., p.528. 
47 Ibid., pp.554-555. 
48 Ibid., pp.515-516. 
49 Werth, Deposition, pp.247-248. (13.10.41) 
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had refused to work under the German Occupation, the Parisian population would 
have been more exposed to German films and plays. The problem was that all these 
arguments make good points and, indeed, the complex nature of the situation, makes 
them all effectively valid points. The film, Le Corbeau, was attacked by all sides, 
including the Germans, because it offered no simple answers. It contains a scene, 
which admirably portrays the ambiguity and complexity of the Occupation. A 
seemingly respectable psychiatrist, who in the end turns out to be the Crow, gives a 
lesson on morality to a doctor: 
"You think that all people are good or evil [he grasps a hanging light which 
casts a pool of light in the otherwise dark room]. But where is darlmess? [he 
pushes the lamp and it begins to swing], where is light? Where is the border 
of evil? [The lamp illuminates different parts of the room as it swings]. .. 
Since a whirlwind of hate and denunciation has blown throughout this town 
all moral values are more or less corrupted. You have been affected like the 
others. One only has choices you know. ,,50 
During the Occupation darkness and light could be said to represent the black 
and white notions of collaboration and resistance. The majority of the French 
population, however, represented the constantly shifting area where those two notions 
met. The choices they made never clearly cast them into light or darlmess but nor 
could it be said that they remained fully outside of either of these two notions at any 
one time. The influential image of the French as passive victims has to be set against 
ample opportunities for profit and pleasure that many were only too ready to take. 
The Germans took many French people on as employees, many businesses were 
offered contracts to supply the German military and infornlal opportunities began to 
abound on the black market. Just as administrators tried to define what was legal in 
terms of private relations between the French and Germans, so too did French 
communities fix the bounds of what was morally acceptable. The problem was that 
how morality was defined collectively by the French during the Occupation was often 
not the same as how it was defined after the Liberation.51 Jiinger did not approve of a 
young woman's job to attract and take clients to a club but he did acknowledge: "It 
faut pourtant nourrir la mere qui est malade, et autres .wins de ce genre."S2 One had 
to survive above all, even if it meant compromising one's principles. 
50 Jackson, The dark years, p.326. 
51 Gildea, Marianne in chains, pp.14.15. 
52 JUnger, Premier Joumal Parisien, p.29. 
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Paris: a city of defiance or acquiescence? 
In the course of its long history, Paris had experienced many sieges but it had 
very rarely experienced defeat or occupation. The 19th century saw Paris, for the first 
time in 1814 and then in 1871, occupied by foreign forces. However traumatic these 
occupations had been, they only lasted a short amount of time. The occupation of 
1940 would last a matter of years and not months or days. It was not so much the 
problem of coming to terms with defeat but coming to terms with the presence of the 
enemy for such a prolonged time. There was a fine line between continuing one's life 
and being too resigned to the defeat. The diarists based in Paris had to come to terms 
with the German military presence right from the outset of the Occupation. Paris may 
well have had special qualities that were not noted by diarists living elsewhere in 
France but ultimately its people were, nevertheless, representative of the French 
people as a whole. It is necessary to first examine those special qualities before 
examining the wider aspects of the behaviour of the Parisian people. Whilst the 
particular charms of Paris may well have been unique to Paris, the recording of those 
special qualities can be seen in a more general sense as a means of combating the 
German presence. It is not necessarily what the diarists observed that is significant 
but, rather, the fact that what they chose to record made an impact on their behaviour. 
The leitmotiv of the pecheurs it fa ligne or the extravagant hats worn by Parisian 
women appear countless times in the diaries of those living in Paris. They were a 
symbol of French defiance and represented a refusal to allow the Occupation to grind 
the Parisian popUlation down. These diarists, more often than not of privileged 
means, were aware of the problems of food and fuel shortages, and how those 
problems particularly affected the poorer sections of Paris society. Yet their tendency 
to accentuate the positive aspects of the Occupation is a representation of the 
determination of the French people, as a whole, to get through the Occupation. At the 
same time, however, it is an indication that those who were more disposed to cope 
with the harsher aspects of the Occupation could more afford to appreciate the 
positive aspects. 
What is noticeable when reading the diaries of those living in Paris is that the 
city gave off a special aura that is not present in the diaries of those living elsewhere 
in France. Toesca put it succinctly: "A Paris, to utes choses baignent dans une fumiere 
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differente. ,,53 This was true in a literal sense as well as a figurative sense. During the 
Occupation, lighting was prohibited at night, and, furthermore, only the Germans and 
those with special permission could use automobiles. This helped to create the 
impression of living in a primeval Paris where the simple pleasures of life were not 
yet engulfed by the frenetic pressures of the modem day: 
La ville est si calme qu 'on entend les grillons au pied des immeubles, dans 
les sous-sols des boutiques, et que les hulottes ou les chouettes appellent 
toute la nuit dans les arbres des squares. Paris ne s 'occupait pas, naguere, 
des phases de la fune. A present, les «silences amis» de cet astre sont des 
benedictions: l'architecture des rues, la figne des perspectives se montrent 
dans une nouvelle atmosphere de calme et de beaute. Et de plus on peut 
circuler sans se casser la figure au coin des trottoirs. Nos successeurs 
n 'auront pas idee de ce Paris de conte de fees, de cette ville au bois dormant 
qu 'aura enchantee un moment Ie Demon de la guerre. 54 
There is the curious contradiction that Paris owed its silence and natural lighting to 
the Germans but at the same time there was a dismissal of their presence in Paris. 
Paris may well have no longer been the capital of France but it still remained 
the cultural capital of France. For all the criticism laid against Cocteau, he embodied 
Paris' defiance of the Occupation in that he continued with his work as he had done 
before the Occupation. Yet it was not just his work that determined his behaviour: 
Beaute prodigieuse de Paris en 1942. Les sirenes. La foule qui profite des 
alertes pour deambuler dans les tenebres. Une fenetre rouge. La Comedie-
Fram;aise completement ilIuminee. .Les Allemands qui decouvrent des 
France les unes sous les autres et dechiffrent des enigmes. Les voyageurs qui 
arrivent de zone fibre, stupefaits par la ville comme des vieilles dames de 
province en exit avec la cour. Les restaurants au se vend tout ce qui ne doit 
pas se vendre, malgre les punitions, les amendes, les fermetures. Les danses 
clan destines, les orchestres dans des caves, les insultes de la presse, les 
theatres qui regorgent de monde, les jeunes acteurs qui emergent, les vieilles 
tragediennes qui rejouent, la jeunesse qui grouille et qui nOllS donne a lire 
piece sur piece. Jean Marie poursuivi dans les rues par des grappes de 
jeunes fiUes qui veulent des autographes. Le soil', je lange la queue 
interminable qui attend fe spectacle de fa Com edie-Fram;a ise. J'entre dans 
Ie Palais-Royal et de cour en CaUl', de colonnade en colonnade, je rentre 
chez moi, dans fa ville interdite, la ville chinoise, la ville italienne, la 
Padoue, la Venise, Ie Hong-Kong des joueurs de Balzac. 55 
It was as if the city itself was resisting the German Occupation, which, in tum, gave 
the people an air of indifference to the Germans. The air of rebellion was symbolised 
by the restaurants defying Vichy food restrictions or the throngs attending plays. It is 
53 Toesca, Cinq ans de patience, p.120. (25.6.42) 
54 Therive, L 'envers du decor, p.121. (May 1942) 
55 Cocteau, Journal, pp.34-35. (13.3.42) 
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significant to note that Vichy had prohibited organised dances. It took the view that 
France was in mourning after its defeat and that so long as families were deprived of 
their loved ones in prisoner-of-war camps or German factories, there should be no 
cause for merry-making. 56 
Of course, the Germans were only too keen to promote the idea that life 
should continue as normal, and that this should compare favourably with the 
infinitely more austere life in the Unoccupied Zone. This would explain the stupefied 
looks Cocteau observed on the faces of those who had come from the so-called zone 
libre. In such an environment, it was easy to ignore the German Occupation and 
remain light-hearted. It was one thing, however, for the Germans to encourage such 
an environment but the desire to escape from the realities of the Occupation 
ultimately came from the French. Bobkowski recalled a night where a film was 
interrupted by a bombing raid. Such an event might have dampened spirits but he 
observed that everyone left in high spirits: "Les rues, argentees par Ie clair de la 
lune, etaient calmes et sitencieuses. Une nuit idea Ie pour I 'amour et les 
bombardements. Demain, nous irons voir la suite. Dites-moi si la vie ne vaut pas la 
peine d'etre vecue!,,57 The Occupation had seemingly returned Paris to a simpler time 
where one had the time to appreciate its splendour. Yet one could just as easily focus 
on the negative aspects of occupied Paris: the curfew, the food and fuel restrictions or 
the German military presence. There was instead a determined effort to emphasise the 
positive aspects of life in occupied Paris: "Ce desert parisien des dimanches 
parisiens! Qui n 'aura pas connu avec nous cette epoque n 'aura rien appris du gout 
profond des hommes pour cette sorte de simplicite. ,,58 
Even the Germans could not help but be impressed by Paris. Even before the 
Russian front was opened up, France was seen as a land of plenty. Leben wie Gott in 
Frankreich was a phrase much used by the Germans to sum up the ease of life in 
France.59 The German soldiers were often more like tourists than enforcers of the 
peace. Junger was evidently captivated by the city: 
vivre a Paris m 'aide a me maintenir plus que ne Ie feraient mes occupations 
habituelles. Et it est bien possible, en eifet, qu 'it se cache pour moi dans 
56 Gildea, Marianne in chains, pp.134-135. 
57 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.318. (26.3.42) 
58 Deharme, Les annees pel'dues, pp.80-81. (11.5.41) See also p.84: La vie reprend un sens primitif; on 
se sert it nouveau de ses mains, de ses pieds, de son esprit d'invention ... On retrouve ce qui ne se livre 
que dans Ie caime, ia projondeur, et les lentes promenades eblouies. (31.7.41) 
59 Gildea, Marianne in chains, p.71. 
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cette ville non seulement des dons particuliers, mais aussi des sources de 
travail et d 'activite efficace. Elle est toujours, et dans un sens presque plus 
essentiel encore que naguere, la cap ita Ie, symbole et citadelle d 'un grand 
style de vie transmis par les siecles, et aussi de ces idees qui rallient toutes 
les intelligences, et qui de nos jours, font defaut precisement aux nations. 
Peut-etre ferais-je bien de mettre a profit d'abord la possibilite de prendre 
pied ici. Elle s 'est offerte a moi sans que j y fusse pour rien. 60 
Paris had retained a certain magical charm that could not be affected by the swastika 
flag flying from the Eiffel Tower or the German signs that found themselves on 
nearly every street corner. This, in turn, seemed to rub off on the Parisian population: 
Comme les Allemands doivent etre honnes de ce Paris du printemps, de 
cette bonne grace, de ces fleurs, de ces chapeaux de femmes, de ces petits 
carrosses traines par des couples de cyclistes, par l'incroyable force de 
resistance de l'air! Paris digere tout et n 'assimile rien. Les grandes 
pan cartes allemandes des Champs-Elysees, on les sent la comme les ciseaux 
dans l'estomac de l'autruche. Aucune importance. Un spectacle de legerete 
profonde qui depasse de beaucoup ce qu 'on lui reproche - qui est un 
h ' .. t 61 erolsme, une ver u. 
Such behaviour was encouraged by the fact that the Germans did not seek to impose 
themselves on Paris. There were certainly forces working for the interests of 
Germany, such as the collaborationist press, but the spirit of Paris was by no means 
extinguished by the German presence. 
The Parisians felt sufficiently confident to display their indifference to the 
Germans in their outward behaviour. Many diarists observed the extravagant hats 
many Parisian women wore: 
Maintenant, on n 'a qu 'un ticket de viande par semaine. Les feuilles des 
marronniers deviennent appetissantes. Les asperges coutent vingt francs la 
botte, une sardine au vinaigre trois francs cinquante, il n y a pas de vin, pas 
d'ceufs, pas de poisson, et extremement peu d'amour dans ['air. Jamais les 
femmes n 'ont he plus belles sous leurs chapeaux de chiens savants ecrases 
de tulle, de fleurs, d'oiseaux et de fruits. Les petits souliers de bois a 
empeigne de paille n 'ont pas encore trouve leur forme definitive. 62 
Such extravagance may appear absurd when many felt great hardship but they were 
seen as a kind of antidote to the Occupation. They were a symbol of the Parisians' 
determination not to let the Occupation grind them down into despair. In a time 
where resources were becoming scarcer and more expensive, here was a symbol of 
French enterprise and creativity which could shine through even in such dark times. 
60 Jiinger, Premierjournal parisien, pp.33-34. (30.5.41) 
61 Cocteau, Journal, pp.112-114. (6.5.42) 
62 Deharme, Les annees perdues, pp.77-78. (25.4.41) See also p.130. (18.11.42) Therive, L'envers du 
decor, p.75. (11.5.41) Cocteau, Journal, p.200. (11.9.42) 
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Moreover, such things were extremely personalised. Meat and chestnut trees, fish and 
love belong to quite distinct orders, and each individual would have different ways of 
coping with the Occupation. The smallest things could make a significant difference: 
Ne pas voir seulement Ie cote pueril de la chose: il se cree une ambiance 
favorable a toutes les entreprises. memes les ridicules, les absurdes, les 
folles, les desespenies. Dans un tel bouillon de culture tout est possible. 63 
After an appeal on English radio in 1941, French authorities were busy everywhere 
getting rid of V signs, adopted by the British as a sign for victory.64 Many diarists, 
particularly Galtier-Boissiere, recorded examples ofpetites histoires, such as jokes or 
graffiti written in toilets.65 Guehem10 was heartened by the Parisian's patriotic efforts, 
at a simple level, where the dressing in the national colours gave a sense of fraternity 
and was a means of preventing resignation to defeat. 66 Where people had few means 
at their disposal and where active resistance was perceived as mmecessary 
provocation of the dominant Germans, here was something in which everyone could 
get involved. Drieu, however, believed that this was a sign of decadence in that the 
French were only capable of a petit patriotisme: 
Les Franc;ais ne sont plus capables de patriotisme genereux, createur, 
ofJensif, mats Us sont encore capables de patriotisme passif - comme les 
Italiens du XVIIIe devant les Autrichiens. Un patriotisme de ricanements, de 
bons mots, de petits com plots un patriotisme de mort. 67 
Yet Bobkowski recalled how one beautiful Sunday morning he awoke to the familiar 
sounds of the radio playing Liszt, Chopin and Ravel. The repetition of such simple 
things gave an illusion of continuity but also, more importantly a "sentiment de «paix 
malgre tout»".68 It was important to think that one could still not be affected by the 
Occupation. 
The notion of malleability in the face of adversity continued to be explored by 
the diarists throughout the Occupation, and not just by those living in Paris. Gide, for 
example, took comfort in the passages from de Montesequieu's Cahiers: 
Une des choses que I Jon doit remarquer en France, c' est I' extreme facilite 
avec laquelle elle s 'est toujours remises de ses pertes, de ses maladies, de 
ses depopulations, et avec quelle ressource elle a toujours soutenu ou meme 
surmonte les vices interieurs de ses divers gouvernements. Peut-etre en doit-
63 Toesca, Cinq ans de patience, p.129. (23.7.42) 
64 Dmneril, Journal d 'un honnete homme pendant I 'occupatio/l, p.116. 
65 Werth, DepOSition, p.354. (4.10.42) Petain est un vendu ,vritten in a toilet. 
66 Gu6henno, Journal des annees noires, pp.165-166. (23.7.41) See also Junger, Premier journal 
parisien, p.23. (3.5.41) 
67 Drieu, Journal, pp.273-274. (23.9.41) 
68 Bobkowski, Ell guerre et en paix, p.339. (28.6.42) 
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elle la cause a cette diversite meme, qui a fait que nul mal n 'a jamais pu 
prendre assez de racine pour lui Gter entierement Ie fruit de ses avantages 
naturels. 69 
The opinion of Bobkowski lay somewhere in the middle. He was often frustrated with 
the behaviour of the French, as it often did not live up to his high expectations. Yet 
every so often he would reflect and remark that one ultimately had to admire their 
behaviour, even though at times it frustrated and disappointed him: 
Je regarde les gens se promener, pecher a la ligne. lei, tout est en harmonie 
avec soi-meme, les gens n 'ont ni problemes ni complexes, ils n 'ont pas envie 
de decrocher la lune. La vie est eux, eux c 'est la vie. II ne faut pas chercher 
a com prendre. II faut prendre les choses comme elles viennent, maudire et 
pester par habitude, ne pas avoir l'ecume aux levres mais un sourire, une 
plaisanterie. Et ne meme pas cacher son egoisme. L 'homme n 'est qu 'un 
homme et la vie est courte. Cette attitude n 'est peut-etre pas la meilleure, its 
la paieront peut-etre cher un jour. Voila ce qu 'on nous apprenait. Mais, en 
fin de compte, il faudrait etre fou pour se tourmenter par un apres-midi 
pareil avec des pensees qui n 'apporteront rien a personne. Je prefere boire 
une biere et fumer une cigarette. Pourquoi faut-il toujours que je cherche 
des fraises des bois dans les cimes des arbres, les yeux honteusement tournes 
vers Ie sol? II ne faut pas descendre parce qu 'en bas it n y a ni bourrasques, 
. . b .. 70 
m nuages, m rUlt, nz vacarme ... 
Such behaviour represented a desire to continue 'playing ball'. A degree of egotism 
was permissible in the interests of keeping up collective spirits. 
With the passing of time, however, and the increasing strain on the 
population, together with the increasing repression of Vichy and the Germans, it 
became harder for the French to maintain their characteristic humour in the face of 
such suffering. What Werth could not accept was that this increase in suffering made 
no visible impact on the behaviour and actions of the French people. Mauriac was 
another, who felt that continuing as if everything was normal was merely a 
resignation to defeat. The leitmotiv of les pecheurs a la ligne, recorded by many other 
diarists, held no interest for Mauriac as he believed that this indifference was merely 
a disguise for self-interest: 
« Voila ce qui nous sauvera: c 'est la mollesse de cette population ... » He bien, 
non: nous croyons en I 'homme; nous croyons avec tous nos moralistes que 
I 'homme peut etre convaincu et persuade: meme ces bourgeois qui 
enfouissent des cassettes dans leurs massifs de begonias, - oui, meme ces 
in term edia ires pour la vente de toute denree consommable, nous croyons 
qu'ils ferment les yeux et peut-etre qu'ils serrent les poings, place de la 
69 Gide, Journal, pp.87-88. (19.7.41) This bears a remarkable resemblance to de Gaulle's own view. 
See also Galtier-Boissiere, Journal, p.58. 29.8.41 
70 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.209. (3.8.41) See also p.251, (23.12.40) and Deharme, Les 
annees perdues, p.75. (31.1.41) 
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Concorde, devant ces drapeaux (je ne les ai jamais vus qu'it travers une 
brume de larmes) - ces drapeaux ou la croix gammee ressemble it une 
araignee repue, gonjlee de sang. 71 
His Catholic faith made him believe that every French individual could block out the 
temptation to be consumed with self-interest and make a stand. Mauriac had no 
concept that this selfishness might have been motivated by something else other than 
greed. There was no thought that confronting the harsh realities of the Occupation 
required something more than a determined mind and steadfast spirit. 
It would be wrong to say that this malleability was the one common trait in 
Parisian behaviour. These romantic images of Paris must be qualified. It is important 
to remember that while the diarists refer to other people's attitudes and behaviour 
during the Occupation, they themselves were overwhelmingly from a privileged 
background. Therive was a writer who had the means to escape the suffering, which 
afflicted the poorer sections of Paris society: 
Notre diner mensuel se cache au premier etage d 'un hotel discret, dans un 
quartier impossible. Une charmante atmosphere de confort, de conspiration, 
it cause des propos qu' on tient contre I' etat des choses, et it cause du menu 
qui est Ie contraire de reglem en ta ire. 72 
The diarists, therefore, were in an infinitely better position than ordinary citizens to 
appreciate the unique splendours of Paris. That is not to say that they did not have to 
experience the rigours of the Occupation. Galtier-Boissiere was one of many to 
observe the deteriorating food supply: "Le ravitaillement est tres difficile. Souvent cet 
hiver, Charlotte se leva it avant Ie jour pour fa ire la queue it la boucherie. Beaucoup 
de gens ont maigri de cinq, dix et meme vingt kilos. «J'ai continuellement faim», me 
dit A.,,73 Bobkowski revealed how the lack of food could have wider ramifications 
than just hunger: 
Un froid de canard. On mange de la vache enragee. C' est d' ailleurs tout ce 
qu 'on peut trouver. II n y a pas un legume, meme pas de navets. Pas une 
pomme de terre, pas une carotte. Rien. Si en decembre nous n 'avions pas 
fait venir un sac de pommes de terre et quelques provisions, nous n 'aurions 
rien it manger. Les gens sont devenus irritables, et Ie fameux humour des 
Fram;ais et leur familiarite ont disparu. 74 
It would follow, therefore, that the more one had to think about the struggle 
for survival, the less disposed one would be to appreciate the lighter side of life. The 
71 Mauriac, CEuvres completes, p.364. See also Drieu, Journal, pp.224-225. (29.5.40) 
72 Therive, L 'envers du decor, p.125. (May 1942) See also Cocteau, Journal, p.57. (26.3.42) 
73 Galtier-Boissiere, Journal, p.30. (7.3.41) See Guehenno, Journal des annees noires, pp.82-83. 
(23.12.40) 
74 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.295. (5.2.42) 
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chasm of experience often between the rich and the poor is a fundamental concept 
and is one, perhaps, that may not have been considered sufficiently by the 
historiography of France because of its emphasis on political divisions. It may have 
been equally ignored by the diarists, as most were simply not directly exposed to the 
plight of the poor. This does not mean, however, that they were insensitive to it,75 
Th6rive commented: 
Je viens d'avoir ['impression poignante qu'it existe deux Frances. Le matin 
it 6 hew'es, dans Ie metro nocturne, une foule protetarienne, sale, noire, mal 
nourrie, qui, avec des mines hagardes, gagne I 'atelier en rongeant des 
quignons de pain. A 11 heures, la ligne de demarcation franchie, dans une 
gare de fa Creuse, des families de hobereatlX amenes par leurs voitures, leur 
chauffeur portant des valises, des jeunes gens avec une raquette sous Ie 
bras, les embrassades, les papotages, les recommandations pour un service 
de porcelaine que fa tante Emma va acheter it Limoges it titre de cadeau de 
noces. «Avec un filet dore, mais pas comme celui de Monique, surtout ... » Les 
deux morceaux de France ne se recolleront peut-etre jamais, ou, s'its se 
recollent, la brisure s 'etendra ailleurs. 76 
This idea of two Frances in a socio-economic sense rather than in a physical or 
political sense is very significant when considering the obsession of the French 
people with survival. 
The Parisian underprivileged were especially afflicted by the penury of 
provisions. The German war economy saw most material leave Paris for the Reich 
and there was nothing coming back in return. There was no increase in goods for 
consumption even though the German Occupation forces had first share of the 
markets, and even those who worked could buy nothing as the shops were often 
empty. Yet the big problem was that produce from the provinces was not getting 
through as before due to problems of petrol shortages and the requisitioning of lorries 
and trains by the Germans.77 Those who could afford to often went to the countryside 
to obtain food: 
Le debarquement anglais traeasse tout de meme les Frant;ais. Oit aller en 
vaeanees, maintenant? La moitiC de Paris passe I 'ete en Bretagne paree que 
75 Lannoy, Fran((ois de, Album memorial Paris en guerre 1939-1944, (Paris: Editions Heimdal, 1994) 
pp.llO-ll1. For example, on July 27 1940, 150859 people received the unemployment benefit in Paris 
but this number would climb to 399 964 by November 23 1940. Yet after May 1941, unemployment 
started to drop significantly; in November 1941 the figure would drop to 100 000 and 42 000 in 
August 1942. This dramatic drop can be explained by the adaptation of the Parisian economy. 
76 Th6rive, L 'envers du decor, p.111. (19.3.42) See also Dehanne, Les annees perdues, p.n. (23.9.41) 
77 Perrault, Gilles, Paris sous ['occupation, (Paris: Be1fond, 1987) p.186. See Veillon, Vivre et survivre 
en France, pp.120-121 for statistics on the decrease in food rations. 
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c 'est la qu 'on trouve le plus de beurre, d'ceuft et de lait, et voila que les 
Anglais commencent a leur fa ire peur pour de bon. 78 
For the other half, who had no contacts in the countryside or who could not afford to 
leave Paris, the situation was much more grim: 
On a un peu honte de manger. Les pauvres gens du quartier n 'ont plus de 
pain. lis ont des maintenant utilise tous les tickets de fevrier. Si nous 
mangeons encore a la maison, c 'est que nous sommes des bourgeois et qu 'a 
grands frais nous pouvons fa ire venir de Bretagne des colis. 79 
The black market created a parallel economy which did not enrich the state eoffers 
and, therefore, the authorities were obliged to raise taxes to gain more revenue.80 
Parisians had to become innovative. Tomato plants were grown on rooftops, potatoes 
in courtyards and cat numbers began to dwindle, even after the newspapers published 
after 31 October 1941 that the cats carried dangerous diseases. 81 
The juxtaposition of the hardships of the Occupation and the need to carryon 
with one's life is a constant theme with all aspects of the Occupation. Moreover, it is 
one which can be interpreted differently by the diarists. Take the following romantic 
image conjured up by Toesca: 
Aujourd'hui, dimanche. Temps ideal: fraicheur de I'air. Solei!. II court dans 
Paris une brise de haute montagne. La pluie recente a donne de ['eclat aux 
verdures. Les arbres, Ie ciel, les etres sont heureux de vivre. Les jeunes fiZZes 
sortent avec leurs seins nouveaux, qui ont pousse sous fa tiedeur des 
manteaux d 'hiver. La mode, par necessite de la bicyclette, accentue cette 
effervescence des corps. Jambes et cuisses au vent, souvent joliment teintees 
d'ocre legeI'. Vus de loin, dans Ie mouvement et Ie flottis des etoffes fegeres, 
ces corps sont agiles, ailes, genti!s... On a beaucoup de mal a penser a la 
guerre, a la mort, a la misere. Pourtant ... Des que je suis chez mot, ces 
realites m 'agtssent: j 'ecoute un instant fa radio; je vois roder fa faim. Moi-
meme j 'evoque melancoliquement sur une assiette tiede un «tournedos» 
Epais et saignant. Vision refugiee depuis longtemps dans Ie domaine des 
t . 82 songes gas ronomzques. 
What is the lasting impression of this image? Does the romanticism override the 
realism? It appears that the hardships of the Occupation became more acute in the 
private world whereas outside the private sphere the collective spirit of Paris was 
much more upbeat. Again, it is a question of perspective and experience. Bobkowski 
was amazed how free he was able to move around Occupied France, yet he was a 
78 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, pp.333-334. (9.6.42) See also Rist, Une saison gatee, p.196. 
(13.10.41) Gu6henno, Joumal des annees noires, p.89. (3.1.41) 
79 Gu6henno, Joumal des annees noires, pp.l03-104. (21.2.41) 
80 Lannoy, Paris en guel'/'e, p.11I. 
81 PeLTault, Paris sous I 'occupation, ppAO-42. 
82 Toesca, Cinq ans de patience, p.170. (19.5.43) 
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Pole who was accustomed to much greater surveillance and restriction.83 Yet the 
following quotation seems extraordinary within the context of the Occupation: 
Deuxieme anniversaire de la guerre. J'ai du mal it Ie croire. Pour !'instant, 
on a niussi it tenir Ie coup. Jusqu 'it present, j'ai eu de la chance. J'ai honte 
de Ie dire, mats malgre tout ce qui nous est arrive, je ne me suis jamais senti 
aussi heureux que ces dernieres annees, meme pendant ces deux annees de 
guerre. C'est la premiere fois de ma vie que je me sens aussi bien. J'ecris 
cela en bant en pleine possession de mes moyens. Je suis incapable de 
m 'expliquer ce phenomene. C'est ce que j'eprouve et je n y peux rien. Peut-
etre suis-je unique en mon genre it I 'heure actuelle? La vie, cette vie 
menJeilleuse, riche, Ie Paris du temps en guerre, chaque journee, 
m 'envahissent totalement.84 
It is unlikely that he would have felt this way had he been exposed to the deprivations 
which the poorer sections of Parisian society had to endure or indeed those of his 
fellow Polish citizens. Yet what his testimony provides is evidence contrary to the 
notion that life during the Occupation was always arduous. 
Personal experience was crucial in forming opinion. The seemingly banal 
statement of Werth carries a lot more truth to it than first appears: "L 'homme est une 
dr/)[e de bere. Tous les soucis que j 'ai de moi-meme et du monde sont balayes parce 
quej'ai reussi it reparer mon briquet.,,85 Individual concerns could do much to sway 
opinion or block out other troubles. Guehenno had admiration for a friend who 
refused to let despair get the better of him. This was someone who refused to stop 
'playing ball': 
J' admire dans Jean P aulhan ce don qu' it ad' alleger la vie autour de lui. 
Quel camarade delicieux et cornrne it m 'aura aide a vivre dans cette prison. 
Il marche comme un funambule, se dress ant it chaque pas sur la pointe des 
pieds, et si I'on marche pres de lui, presque tout de suite on eprouve qu 'on 
marche plus tegerement. Ce n 'est pas qu 'ilne soit grave au fond de lui, mats 
il n 'accepte pas que sa gravite I 'accable. 86 
This outward sign of insouciance went very much against Gu6henno' s belief that the 
Occupation had imprisoned the French, and yet it is interesting to note that he 
admired such behaviour. There was a free spirit within him that could not be taken 
away by the Germans and yet someone like Cocteau had the very same attitude. 
83 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, pp.339-340. (28.6.42) 
84 Ibid., p.214. (1.9.41) 
85 Werth, Deposition, p.266. (16.2.42) 
86 Guehenno, Journal des anm!es noires, p.189. (26.9.41) See Werth, Deposition, p.210. (28.5.41) One 
could become desensitised to the war but that does not necessarily mean it no longer failed to make an 
impact. 
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It raises the issue of what the diarists chose to talk about. Those who wrote 
about the marvels of Paris during the Occupation were, in part, responding to those 
very marvels. There is a kind of reciprocation between what the diarist observed and 
how that observation affected the diarist. When the diarist recorded the beauty of 
Paris, it was not an impartial view but, rather, a recognition that that beauty had 
affected the diarist. Similarly, if one was to focus on the negative aspects of the 
Occupation, rather than the uplifting images, it was an indication of the state of mind 
of the diarist. Bobkowski, with little work for him to do in the summer of 1942, had 
time to remark upon the fashion and perfume of the women: "Paris est baigne de 
solei! et de chaleur; la vie, qui s 'est plus ou moins adaptee aux conditions actuelles, 
rejleurit avec une insouciance bien franr;aise, elle est tout sourire. ,,87 There is a desire 
to record this behaviour because it is inspiring. On the other hand, there was a 
reluctance to dwell on any negative behaviour. As Guehenno admitted: 
II semble que ce pays meure comme mis au rancart du monde. Et sa mort 
n 'est que Ie plus infime fait divers en marge de f' evenement. Sf je n 'ai rien 
ecrU dans ces cahiers, c 'est qu'il n 'est pas bien utile de noter sans doute 
qu'if netge, que nous avons fatm, que nous avons froid, que les fusillades 
continuent, deux ou trois chaque jour (elles n 'ont meme plus les honneurs de 
la premiere page dans les journaux), que les gens n 'en pensent plus rten, 
sauf Marcel Deat peut-etre qui ajoute chaque matin une strophe a sa cantate 
de I 'ordre nouveau. 88 
When the majority of the popUlation was waiting for the war to be brought to an end, 
there was only so much of the horrors they could absorb. As Guehenno alludes to, 
one became desensitised in a way to the shooting of hostages by the Gennans. It was 
not that they were any less horrible but, rather, that the French felt more and more 
hopeless to do anything about it. To focus on that would be giving into despair: 
J'ai pense it tous ceux qui, dans les gJ'andes villes surtout, souffrent de plus 
en plus cruellement de la faim. Une chose me frappe: de plus en plus, dans 
la rue, on croise des gens qui ont ['air fatigue, qui ont mauvaise mine, qui 
marchent lentement, qui ont du mal a porter leur fardeau. Si je me laissais 
aller, je noterais chaque jour a que! point je souffre de voir tant de misere 
autour de nous. 89 
Taking the time to appreciate something positive was important in terms of 
being able to continue one's life with some degree of purpose. If one lost all hope, 
was that not just as bad as siding with the enemy? The problem was that too often 
87 Bobkowski, En guel're et en paix, p.337. (25.6.42) 
88 Guehenno, Joumal des amuies noires, pp.238-239. (14.2.42) See also Deharme, Les annees perdues, 
p.151. (3.5.43) 
89 Boegner, Les camets du Pasteur Boegner, p.164. (2.2.42) 
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such behaviour could be seen as acceptance of defeat and that acceptance could often 
lead to an acceptance of the German presence in France, as well as an ease of 
interaction with them. Gu6henno had no time for those who felt one had to make the 
best of the situation. The Occupation was a prison and one did not converse with the 
guards. Yet other diarists felt that such behaviour was merely an adaptation to the 
defeat in order to overcome the difficult situation and resist the temptation to fall into 
despair. The following observation of Bobkowski admirably portrays the complexity 
and ambiguity of the French people during the Occupation: 
Paris et la pensee franr;aise sont un melange de champagne, de piche, de 
bourgogne, de sardines, et de from ages. Savoureux, excitants, digestes, 
epices, releves, zegers. Et pratiques. Les Franyais n 'aiment pas les 
surhommes et les idees superieures. C'est ce qui leur donne toujours de 
l'attrait, meme si on peut parfois en avoir assez et meme les mepriser en tant 
qu'individus. Leur comportement pendant cette guerre est peut-etre 
simplement humain et pratique? Pratique, certainement. La meilleure 
preuve, c' est que je reviens tranquillement du theatre et que je peux reflechir 
a tout cela. [oo.] Les Franyais s 'en tireront. Mieux: ce seront des heros. Et 
tout recommencera: hier, je ne les supportais plus; aujourd 'hui, je les aime; 
d ., l d" 90 emazn, Je es mau lrGl ... 
He raises the interesting notion that the French, as individuals, were more suspect in 
their behaviour than they were collectively, where presumably their legere and 
pratique attitude cancelled out their individual weaknesses. The problem was that 
after the Liberation, individuals would be singled out for punishment rather than the 
French people collectively. 
90 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, pp.l97-198. (17.5.41) 
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Part Two 
Pour la patrie ou pour I 'homme interieur? 
«Des ce jour, je vis clairement que les ewJnements ne sont rien, que I 'homme 
interieur est tout.» Pour que I 'homme interieur soit tout, if faut qu 'it se soustraie it 
l'evenement au que, cedant it ['evenement, il ne lui cede que son corps. Sf l'univers 
/ " . I" 91 ecrase, tant PlS pour umvers. 
The uneven material decline. 
The Nazi aim in France was to systematically plunder agricultural foodstuffs 
and materials to sustain its war machine. As Goering put it in August 1942: '''If the 
French hand over until they can't hand over any more, and if they do it of their own 
free will, then I'll say I'm collaborating. ",92 Material problems were a constant felt 
and recorded by the diarists throughout the Occupation but what varied was the extent 
to which the diarists experienced these material difficulties. Out of an the material 
difficulties, food was the problem that dominated the thoughts of the diarists the 
most: "Si je cite ces lignes c 'est que, relisant les lettres re{:ues it cette epoque, je 
remarque avec quel soin taus mes correspondants decrivaient leurs repas; Olga 
meme n y manquait pas. Manger etait un probleme crucial.,,93 Class or wealth, 
moreover, were not always a determining factor. This section is concerned with 
examining the different levels whether they be regional or individual - of material 
problems experienced by the diarists, the different ways they overcame those material 
problems, and whether that impacted on how they viewed their situation in relation to 
the needs ofthe nation. 
Each diarist endured the Occupation as part of a collective experience, yet their 
experiences can be seen in a wide variety of contexts. Gide argued from his vantage 
point in Algeria: 
91 Werth, Deposition, p.50. (2.10.40) 
92 Jackson, The dark yeats, p.215. 
93 De Beauvoir, Laforce de I 'age, p.565. Even Junger (Premierjou171aI parisien, p.206) felt obliged to 
record at the end of 1942: Au demeurant, la pure et simple decouverte de la nourritUl<e est devenue un 
tour deforce, car il n ya presque plus rien dans les boutiques, et lafamine gagne du ten<ai1l. (3.10.42) 
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Les gens de ce pays paraissent a ceux du Nord presque indifJerents et 
insensibles a la catastrophe qui mutile la France. 11 faut des qua/iM.s de 
C(Eur et d' esprit tres rares ~our etre sin cerement emu par ce qui ne nous 
atteint pas personnellement. 4 
The effects of the Occupation would take time to filter down to every region of 
France. The lack of fraternity was certainly encouraged by the circumstances of the 
debiicle but there was also an unwillingness to allow the experiences of others to 
overshadow the experiences of those seemingly unaffected by the Occupation. The 
Occupation, therefore, struck a great blow to French national identity, and the 
preoccupation with survival would only exacerbate the process of national 
disintegration. The altruistic sentiment of the following newspaper article would 
certainly not endure beyond the summer of 1940: 
Le rationnement nous montre le visage de la defaile, il faut payer, il faut 
montrer la solidarite avec tous les FralU;ais. Nous qui mangeons Ie ble venu 
d'autres regions, ilfaut nous priver de notre huite d'olive pour accroitre Ie 
k . , d I . t t "' 95 stoc en matzeres grasses e a natzon au entzere. 
Solidarity would become unrealistic when restrictions became more global and every 
region in France started to feel the pinch.96 
Whilst the Occupation was a period filled with significant historical events, 
the diarists observed that the primary focus for the French people was on survival. As 
Werth neatly put it: "Toile de fond: Syrie, Russie. Premier plan: ventre et tabac.,,97 
The rumbling of stomachs would only increase as the Occupation wore on, as the 
official rations would only become more meagre. One could argue that it was both 
Vichy'S and Gernlany's inability to find a solution to the supply problems that would 
account for the overwhelming indifference of the French population: 
La grande desolation du pays, it n 'est pas donne a tant de FralU;ais, ni 
constamment, de la sentir. Ce que I' on eprouve bien plutot, ce sont des 
douleurs particulieres; et, pour la plupart, c'est la gene des restrictions, 
l'inconfort de I' exit, la crainte de la disette de demain. Sf la domination 
allemande devait nous assurer I 'abondance, neuf Fram;ais sur dix 
l'accepteraient; dont trois ou quatJ"e avec sourire. Et it n:v a pas it, s 'en 
indigner, non plus que ce que j 'en dis. Ceux qui sont capabZes de s 'emouvoir 
authentiquement pour des motifs intellectuels sont tres rares; capables de 
94 Gide, Journal, pAl. 16.7.40 
95 L 'Eclail'eur de Nice et du Sud-Est, (4 August 1940) Veillon, Vivre et survivre ell France, pp.90-91. 
96 JackBon, The dark years, pp.249-250. l11e level of rations for the largest category of the population 
was 1 327 calories per day as opposed to an average of 3 000 per day before the war. This barely 
adequate ration was steadily reduced as the Occupation progressed, and even then it was difficult to 
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97 Werth, Deposition, p.223. (30.6A1) 
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souffrir de carences non materielles. Et peut-etre vaut-i! mieux qu 'i! en soit 
. .98 
amsl. 
Werth was one of those rare individuals who could do just that. He was discouraged 
how the cult of individuality appeared to have blinded the majority of the Saint-
Amour locals to the events of the war or the climate on the domestic front: 
Les gens de Bourg ne pensent qu 'a leur ventre. J'aimerais mieux dire: ne 
pensent que leur ventre. Le reste, i!s ne Ie pensent pas. Mais its Ie sentent 
vaguement. Les grands evenements ne sont un excitant, un bouleversement 
de pensee que pour les forts. 99 
Werth's situation in Saint-Amour may well have contributed to his capacity to 
think beyond his personal problems. The last quotation indicates that life in Saint-
Amour was relatively easy in comparison with what other diarists experienced. 
Despite his reproaches, Werth owed his peasant farmer friend, Laurent, a debt of 
gratitude. He ensured that Werth never went hungry: "Quant aux paysans, i!s pensent 
que, quoi qu'i! arrive, its ne mourront jamais de faim [ ... ] Je mangerai du boudin 
demain. Laurent va tuer un cochon non declare, un cochon qui fait dans les cent 
trente kilos.,,100 The other diarists, who lived overwhelmingly in urban areas and 
often had families to feed, were much more preoccupied with the quest for food. The 
peasants' relatively comfortable lives stirred up envy and jealousy particularly 
amongst the urban workers: 
Ce qu'i! y a d'ideal, d'espoir humain dans la revolution echappe aux 
paysans d'ici. Pour eux, elle n 'est que colf:re de lafaim. «Si tout se termine 
comme on espere, me dit Laurent, c'est-a-dire si les Boches s'en vont, les 
Anglais pour rattraper les Boches ou les Boches pour n 'etre pas rattrapes 
detruiront les voies de chemin de fer. Les villes ne seront plus ravitaillees. 
Alors les ouvriers - moi, je ne leur donne pas tort et moi, je ferais comme 
eux, parce que la faim, c' est la faim - les ouvriers viendront piller les 
fermes.» 101 
Certainly there was a degree of plundering of the countryside by those visiting from 
the towns or by those selling produce on the black market to the highest bidder, who 
invariably came from an urban centre. 102 Yet what this clearly indicates is that the 
98 Gide, Journal, pp.36-37. (9.7.40) See also Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, pp.348-349, (26.8.42) 
99 Werth, Deposition, p.165. (31.1.41) See p.494. (8.7.43) Werth was greatly disappointed in the 
absence of revolutionary spirit shown by the Saint-Amour peasantry. 
100 Werth, Deposition, p.l16: (1.12.40) 
101 Ibid., p.359. (12.10.42) See p.329. He refers to the peasants as a nouvelle bourgeoisie, celle du lard 
et du pain blanc. (30.7.42) 
102 Jackson, The dark years, pp.250-251. For example, on two days in April 1942, the police searched 
every passenger at Lille railway station. They seized 9 550 kilos of potatoes, 170 kilos of beans, 120 
kilos of peas, 430 kilos of wheat, 70 kilos of meat, 230 eggs and 16 chickens. But most individuals 
184 
Occupation was not kind to the urban workers, and that the peasant farmers were at a 
distinct advantage. Survival was up to the individual and it was not only where the 
individual was geographically placed that could determine how difficult it would be 
for that individual to survive. Some were more favourably disposed to overcome the 
material difficulties than others because of their jobs, their wealth, or their contacts. It 
was better, for example, to be young and resourceful rather than a wife of a prisoner 
of war, or a mine worker in the Nord, where one was entitled to supplementary 
rations, rather than an office worker in Paris. 103 
The changing fate of the war after the Allied landing in North Africa did 
nothing to stop the diarists' obsession with material needs. If anything, due to 
Germany's increasing desperation, it only intensified the problem. The following 
passage from Roussin indicates a significant change from his initial opinion: 
Mais la fievre etait la, avec des heures d 'abattement ou je pensais a tout ce 
qui se passait dans Ie monde et ou je me trouvais grotesque, centre sur mes 
petites histoires et mes problemes d 'horlogerie dramatique, comme si Ie 
monde precisement n 'existait pas. [ .. .] Mais rien n 'ira it vite encore et pour 
moi se posaient constamment des problemes a resoudre de logement, de 
chauffage et de fonds necessaires a la subsistance de ma petite famille. 104 
Roussin would come to realise that he could not hide away from the war and its 
effects. Yet the last phrase suggests that however much his opinion had changed, he 
was still very much centred on his petites histoires. The sense of being caught up in a 
wider problem did not translate into compassion for others nor did it steer him away 
from his preoccupation with his own particular interests and those of his immediate 
family. Even Werth, who experienced comparatively no real problems with obtaining 
food, would come to realise that not all of France was in such a fortunate position: 
Leur ai-je assez reproche, aux gens du bourg, de ne penser qu 'a leur ventre! 
La verite est qu'ils avaient quelque prevoyance et quelques notions de bons 
sens et d'economie. Maintenantje crains sans cesse que Suzanne et Claude, 
a Paris, n 'aient faim. Quant a moi, je suis mou comme un cheval prive 
d'avoine. 105 
It is only natural to assume that those diarists such as Roussin, who were directly 
responsible for their family's survival as well as their own, should dedicate more time 
and effort to preoccupying themselves with everyday survival. 
only carried small quantities of goods (between 10 and 30 kilos), which they felt was for their own 
legitimate use. 
103 Veillon, Vivre et survivre en France, p.l63. 
104 Roussin, Rideau gris et habit vert, pp.l20-121. 
105 Werth, Deposition, p.480. (29.5.43) See also Deharme, Les al1111?eS perdues, p.92. (23.9.41) 
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The historian Gildea argues that though severe shortages and high prices set 
the French against each other in the struggle for survival, their inventiveness allowed 
them to get by. Those living in the country managed to avoid pressure from the 
German and French authorities to hand over their produce in order to keep enough 
back for a parallel market supply for friends and relatives in exchange for clothing 
and other manufactured goods, which were hard to come by in the country. The 
Systeme D or Systeme de debrouillage required the French to establish new networks 
and to cooperate as never before. Survival was not only about queuing and scratching 
out a meagre existence but also developing family, neighbourhood and business 
contacts to ensure the continuation of one's survival. Solidarity and inventiveness 
were essential to offset the failure of the Vichy government to adequately provide for 
the French people. 106 The diaries certainly provide examples of the Systeme D. Rist 
grew his own potatoes to supplement the insufficient official ration: 
Nous ramassons nos pommes de terre et nous ecossons Ie soir nos flageolets. 
La recolte de pommes de terre sera plus Jaible que nous ne pensions. Si nous 
avons 300 a 350 kilos, ce sera un maximum. C'est de quoipasser trois mois 
avec notre grande maisonnee. Les attributions officielles - si elles se 
realisent - nous donnent par mois pour toute la maison 34 kilos/l07 
Yet Gildea's argument suggests that everyone had the means of forming these 
contacts or finding ways to supplement their official rations. If that were true, how 
does one explain that France's caloric intakes were the lowest in Europe?108 
Furthermore, Gildea may be right that these networks put in place by the 
French people went beyond the individual level but he fails to acknowledge that it 
was ultimately the individual's interests driving these exchanges. These networks 
were not motivated by the desire to improve the life of the local or national 
community but to secure the best possible life for that individual or that individual's 
immediate family. The fact that networks were established is more an indication of 
how desperate the French were to secure scarce resources rather than a sign of 
willingness to cooperate for the greater collective gain. Th6rive observed two people 
at a restaurant decide to share a bottle of wine, which would have otherwise been 
beyond their means. But they made sure that each one got an equal measure: 
"Interessant symptome de I' esprit communautaire chez les Franr;ais, et de ses 
106 Gildea, Marianne in chains, p.lli. 
107 Rist, Une saison gatee, p.270. (5.9.42) 
108 Jackson, The dark years, p.223. It is important to acknowledge that such comparisons are difficult 
to make because of significant regional variations but this, nevertheless, suggests that some were 
clearly missing out. 
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limites.,,]09 The French were willing to cooperate beyond the individual level but only 
if it best served their own interests. On vacation in Montolieu, Guehenno remarked 
that although there was a drought and the people talked of a famine, he was aware 
that the peasant farmers were still eating behind closed doors. Only those who were 
passing through went hungry, which caused him to reflect on these farmers: 
Les paysans des fermes alentour ne savent pas bien que penser: les 
reglements de Vichy les agacent, mais c' est tout de meme un fameux temps 
que celui ou on peut vendre un a!uf six francs, un lapin de garenne pris au 
piege dans le champ du voisin soixante francs. 110 
If food shortages were more marked in the towns, why did this not translate 
into dissidence in urban areas? From the reading of the diaries, it appears that life in 
urban centres, on the whole, was certainly much more demanding, since there were 
greater numbers competing for resources. III The large sea ports of Nantes and Saint-
Nazaire were even worse off, as they were not only deprived of overseas trade due to 
the Allied naval blockade but they were also cut off from the hinterland. Dumeril, 
who lived in Nantes throughout the Occupation, noticed the consequence of France's 
integration into the German war economy. Not only was there the systematic 
requisition of industrial goods by the Germans - the railway lines of N antes-
Chateaubriant, the metal of statues with the exception of anti-English statues, tractors, 
horses and bicycles1l2 - but also the systematic requisition of agricultural goods. It 
was the latter that preoccupied the Nantes population the most: 
D 'autre part, le gouvernement fram;ais a fait arreter dans toute la zone 
occupee (et peut-etre l'autre?) pour les interner, tous les gens suspects de 
communisme, dans la nuit du 26 / 27 septembre. Une reglementation plus 
severe de la cOte est aussi paralt-il en preparation. Mais ce qui domine pour 
le grand public, c' est le soud de manger. Car la penurie de vivres se fait de 
plus en plus forte. Le beurre a tout a fait disparu ou presque, et les a!ufs 
ega lem en t, meme cet he. Il y a des <<juites» inexpliquables, dues au marche 
noir, probablement. 113 
This passage aptly shows where the priorities of the Nantes population lay. Dumeril 
believed that the result of the material decline was a moral decline. The following 
109 Therive, L 'envers du decor, p.187. (10.11.43) 
110 Guehenno, Journal des amuies noires, p.346. (20.7.43) See also Gide, Jou/'llal, p.163. (3.1.43) It 
would be unfair to say that all these exchanges were motivated by greed. Laurent, for example, was 
only too happy to provide food for Werth. 
111 Jackson, The dark years, pp.249-250. Histoy confirms this impression. In thirty-nine mainly rural 
departements, mortality rates in 1941-1943 were lower than in 1936-1938, whereas in cities they were 
higher. 
112 Dumeril, Journal d 'un honnete homme pendant I 'occupation, p.206. 
113 Ibid., p.234. (30.9.42) See Rist, Une saison giitee, (p.324. (1.3.43)) for a similar account of the 
difficulties experienced in Paris. See also Galtier-Boissiere, Journal, p.30. (7.3.41) 
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observation was inspired by another letter of denouncement which he was exposed to 
through his work. He believed that the cumulative effect of the material restrictions 
was placing further strain on a nation already afflicted with deep divisions: 
II ne faut pas que cette situation se prolonge des annees, tout comme la 
l11isere au point de vue physique. Notre pauvre peuple se degraderait de 
toutes manieres, physiquement et l110ralement, sf cette mlsere dura It des 
annees encore. En effet a t 'autre guerre, it y a eu des pertes et miseres 
en 01'111 es, mais f 'espoir de la victoire etatt la, toujours. Cette fois, notre 
peuple a ete decourage et ballote de toutes manieres, surtout par fa division 
entre Franr;ais qui n 'a que trap dure et qui a al11ene des denonciations et des 
rancunes inexpiables. 114 
Dumeril reveals that life in Nantes was brutal and that even someone working in 
conjunction with the German military authorities was still very much affected. Yet on 
a deeper level, his argument also suggests that the negative impact on the moral 
behaviour of the French people, caused by the deteriorating material situation, was 
inevitable. There was only so much the people of Nantes could physically withstand 
and, therefore, the closer they reached those physical limits, the more inclined they 
were to tum against one another. 
Bobkowski noted that the preoccupation with food caused a similar lack of 
collective spirit amongst the Parisians. They became so obsessed with the desire to 
have things return to their accustomed maImer that they neglected their duty to their 
country: 
Le bifteck. Quand on parle de la France, c 'est un element qu 'on ne peut pas 
negliger, Ie bifteck est Ie probleme n °1 des Franr;ais, du haut en bas de 
I 'echelle. Patriotisme, liberte, patrie? Que non! Un bifteck! Un 
chateaubriand epais, saignant, a point, temire. lIs attendent les Americains, 
mats croyez-vous qu'ils en attendent leur liber/e, leur independance? Non. 
D' abOI'd du corned-beef et des confitures ... 115 
The following timetable of a Parisian woman on February 15, 1943 illustrates how 
the penury of provisions could sway the French from more noble concepts: 
7h30: chez Ie boulanger. Achat de pain. II y aura des biscottes (Ill heures. 
9heures: jour de viande. Le boucher previent qu' elle ne sera distribuee que 
samedi. 9h30: chez Ie cremier. II ne recevra Ie fromage qu' a 17 heures. 10 
heures: chez Ie tripier. Mon numero 32 passera a 16 heures. 10h30: chez 
114 Ibid., p.299. (14.7.43) See also p.234. (30.9.42) See also Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.360. 
(6.9.42) 
115 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, pp.315-316. (22.3.42) See also Galtier-Boissiere, Journal, p.208. 
(July 1944) 
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l'epicier, il y aura des legumes a 17 heures. 11 heures: retour chez Ie 
boulanger. II n y a plus de biscottes. 116 
This woman waited four and a half hours for practically nothing, with the prospect of 
more waiting in the afternoon and no guarantee of getting what she was entitled to. 
Faced with such a timetable, it is easy to see why selfish preoccupations 
overshadowed other concerns. Moreover, it demonstrates how those living in urban 
areas often simply had no time to worry about anything other than their individual 
concerns. 
Yet does the absence of any revolutionary spirit amongst the overwhelming 
majority of the French imply that in some small part, however grave the material 
situation in which they found themselves, it was not so desperate as to make them 
take matters into their own hands? Certainly there were demonstrations - mostly in 
the South - but the Germans, and later the milice1l7, were quick to stamp out any 
threat of disorder. 118 Yet Werth had observed very early on an underlying feeling of 
relief that the Occupation would not make a negative impact on rural life: 
Laurent a craint aussi des requisitions globales de betail, de cochons, de ble, 
d'avoine. J'ai senti alors en lui la coiere du paysan qui prend sa fourche. 
«On ne sait pas ce qui peut arriver, m 'a-t-il dit. (:a pow'rait bouger dans les 
campagnes. Quand l'homme a fatm ... » II attribuait alors aux Allemands 
I 'intention d' affamer la France et se mefiait du gouvernement dans la main 
de I 'Allemagne. Aujourd 'hui, il attend sans inquietude. II est convaincu que 
ni Hitler ni Petain ne seront assez malins pour lui prendre sa ferme, tout son 
betail, toute sa recolte. 119 
The phrase Quand l'homme afaim ... implies that dissidence comes from hunger but 
this never eventuated on any significant scale anywhere in France. Bobkowski argued 
that the real rigours of the war had yet to reach France: "La guerre dure deja depuis 
quatre ans, mais pour la France, elle n 'a pas encore commence. Pour elle et pour 
beaucoup d'autres pays, elle ne commencera ... qu 'apres la guerre.,,120 He often 
observed how the French constantly complained of the food shortages but, in his 
116 Veillon, Vivre et survivre en France, p.220. See also pp.l20-121 The extension of military 
operations on several fronts, particularly in Russia, increased the demands of the Germans. The official 
ration of360g of meat, in theory, was reduced to 120g in 1943. In Seine-et-Oise, from December 1940 
to the Liberation, the meat rations were only honoured in December 1941 and JanualY 1942. Until the 
spring of 1942 the quantity effectively distributed varied between 90 and 100g per week. It got even 
worse after that date, reaching as low as 60g in January 1944. 
117 See Giolitto, Piene, Histoire de fa 711ilice, (Paris: Perrin, 1997) for an insight into the notorious 
Vichy police. 
118 See Laborie, L 'opinionfranr;aise sous Vichy, p.268 and Jackson, The dark years, pp.276-277. 
119 Werth, Deposition, pp.74-75 (25.10.40) See also Toesca, Cinq ans de patience, pp.86-87. (5.9.40) 
120 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.507. (19.8.43) 
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eyes, France was still a rich nation in comparison with Poland. 12l Certainly the food 
situation leading up to and after the Liberation deteriorated rapidly, as priority for 
supplies was given priority to the advancing Allies,]22 yet there was never any sign of 
any real dissidence against either Vichy or the German occupation force. Although 
not applying to the same context, the following phrase recorded by de Beauvoir at a 
lunch with two Parisian women is most appropriate: "«Persecutes ou non, les gens 
qui ont quelque chose dans le ventre s 'en sortent toujours.»,,123 The woman was in 
fact talking about the persecuted Jews, who were perceived to have the necessary 
means to get by. Yet the same principle can apply on a more global scale with respect 
to the diarists and the supply problems. No matter how much the diarists were 
afflicted by the material decline, they were still able to endure the problem. 
Bobkowski believed that despite the war and despite the German plundering of stock 
and produce there was still a choice of what one could buy and it was not always 
expensIVe: 
Bien que ce soit la guerre en France, on continue it voir des vestiges de 
richesse. En depit du pillage allemand, en depit des requisitions repetees, on 
ne peut pas parler de famine. Il y a toujours du ch 0 ix, it y a toujours une 
certaine variete et it est possible d'organiser sa «petite vie». On retrouve 
dans l' atmosphere ce rien qui a si vite fait de vous rendre heureux. 124 
Diarists such as Cocteau or Deharme, who were able to dine at restaurants where 
adequate food was still available, may well have agreed with Bobkowski. The peasant 
farmer or those urban dwellers who had contacts in the countryside might also have 
agreed. There may well have been general hardship, and the diarists may well have 
devoted a lot of their time to the quete du ravitaillement. The material problems may 
well have prevented active support for Vichy or Germany but at the same time they 
were insufficiently severe to provoke active resistance. 
La patrie and patriotism. 
No one could dispute the fact that the catastrophic defeat had seen the fall of 
France as a nation. The Germans occupied not just Paris, as they had done after the 
Franco-Prussian war, but almost two-thirds of France. Eventually the whole of France 
121 Ibid., pp.ll0-ll1. (14.9.40) and p.170. (2.11.40) 
122 See Rist, Une saison gdtee, p.398, (10.4.44) and Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.580. (13.7.44) 
123 De Beauvoir, Laforce de l'dge, p.486. 
124 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.453. (13.4.43) 
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would be occupied, and those living in the so-called zone libre would be freed from 
the illusion that French sovereignty still existed. All the diarists had to come to terms 
with the Occupation but not all of them felt the need to reflect on what the 
Occupation meant for the future of France. What is significant in this section to note, 
therefore, is not so much their reaction to the defeat of France but their reactions 
beyond the defeat. It was impossible to ignore the fact that France had been 
physically defeated but what ofthe more abstract notion of France as an idea? Did the 
German occupation fix the idea of France in a state of suspension or did it continue to 
exist in a state of perpetuity? The French were forced to look on as external forces 
decided the fate of France. Yet should their passivity be seen in a positive or negative 
light? Moreover, what role did the protagonists Petain and de Gaulle have in shaping 
the idea of France? Can their roles be separated from the respective camps that they 
represented? 
The overwhelming majority of the French population may have adopted an 
attentiste policy but what were they ultimately waiting for? The restoration of France 
as a nation or the restoration of their normal way of life? Werth, in particular, often 
called into question during the Occupation the existence of any tangible national 
sentiment amongst the French people: 
Quand, pour la premiere fois, je vis, pres de Montargis, un regiment 
allemand fouler Ie sol franr;ais, ce regiment insultait a la fois mon sens 
national et a mon internationalisme. Egalement blesses I 'un et I 'autre. Mais 
je ne savais pas encore que la France deviendrait, sous l'occupation 
allemande et sous l'occupation Petain un my the plus lointain, plus 
insaisissable que I 'internationalisme. 125 
Not everyone would be exposed in 1940 to the physical occupation of French soil by 
the Germans. Neither would everyone share Werth's sense of national humiliation. 
Diarists, such as Roussin, felt too relieved that their comer of France appeared to be 
unaffected by the Occupation to be concerned that the rest of France was under a 
German stranglehold. Cocteau was too immersed in his work to concern himself with 
the wider implications of the Occupation. His patrie, which transgressed national 
borders, was his artistic world. 126 Dumeril ultimately hoped for the restoration of 
France but was determined to extract the maximum good out of France's enforced 
relations with Germany.127 Yet for diarists such as Guehenno, Werth, and Rist, there 
125 Werth, Deposition, pp.66-67. (21.10.40) See also p.345. (4.9.42) 
126 Cocteau, Journal, p.31. (12.3.42) 
127 Dumeril, Journal d 'un hOllnete homme pendant 1 'occupation, p.233. (19.7.42) 
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was a seamless transition from the France of pre-1940 to the France of post-1940. 
France may well have been different in structure in terms of government and 
authority, not to mention physical structure, but the idea of France remained 
unchallenged for these diarists throughout the German occupation. The majority of 
the selected diarists made very few references to France as an idea, or at least made 
very few references to the notion of France as an idea. But does this necessarily mean 
that they were unconcerned with the fate of the French nation? Did their 
preoccupation with their own individual problems represent a loss of French national 
identity? 
It is useful to look at the diarists who did concern themselves with an abstract 
notion of France and asked them to concern themselves with such thoughts in a time 
where survival of the individual was paramount. Werth liked a phrase he had heard 
on the English radio - "Les Franc;ais qui sont en France eprouvent la meme nostalgie 
de leur pays que ceux qui sont a I 'etranger,,128 - but did he fully grasp the 
ramifications of such a sentiment? This nostalgia for the way France used to be 
implies that France was viewed very differently during the Occupation. Indeed, as 
Bobkowski had observed, there was the temptation to take the view that France had 
ceased to exist with the signing of the armistice: 
«Cette periode ne s 'inscrira jamais dans I 'histoire de France. Elle entrera 
dans I 'histoire de I' occupation.» C' est c;a, c 'est exactement c;a qui les 
perdra. Ils sont totalement aveugles. lis se laissent encore plus leurrer par 
leur nationalisme et la France eternelle que nous par la Po logn e. 129 
If the Occupation period was a parenthesis in French history, it meant that all the 
French had to do was to outlast the Occupation on an individual basis in order for 
France to restore itself on a national basis. The problem was that the lengthy duration 
of the Occupation created the temptation to narrow the focus of the French to their 
own personal interests: 
Mais it est vrai que beaucoup d' entre nous ne savent que la subir, que 
I' esclavage peut passer en habitude, qu'it a trouve jusqu 'a des amuseurs qui 
I' entretiennent, que la trap longue misere jinit par reduire Ie meilleur it ne 
" ·130 penser qu a Sal. 
128 Ibid., p.375. (5.11.42) 
129 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.530. (13.10.43) See also Werth, Deposition, p.598. (404.44) 
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Guehenno, who was evidently impressed by the courage displayed by those fighting 
in the Resistance, always maintained the hope that the French would contribute in 
some way to the restoration of France: 
Ces jeunes patriotes ne craignent rien tant que de paraitre nationalistes. Et 
c 'est la un de leurs traits les plus emouvants sans doute. lIs ne veulent pas 
que leurs sou.[(rances leur fassent perdre la raison et reduisent en eux I 'idee 
de la patrie. 1 1 
Yet he himself played an active role in the literary Resistance. One did not have to be 
prepared to literally fight for the idea of France. One simply had to be willing to hold 
on to the idea of France. Like Werth, Guehenno had witnessed the betrayal of France 
by certain people but he certainly did not feel that only a tiny minority were fighting 
to preserve the idea of France. The vast majority chose to neither collaborate nor 
resist. Does this imply a sense of national community? Was the fact that so few chose 
these two paths an indication of a national instinct to wait for more certain times? 
Was this, moreover, an indication that the overwhelming majority did believe, or at 
least hoped, that France would be eventually restored to its citizens? Can their 
decision, therefore, to remain outside these parameters be seen as motivated by a 
sense of national duty or was it simply a coincidence that so many individuals refused 
to make these extreme choices? 
It is useful to examine those diarists who openly acknowledged that they no 
longer held any further regard for the idea of France. Drieu is an obvious example of 
someone who was prepared to give up the notion of France in order to embrace the 
fascist doctrine and the construction of a united Europe, which, in his eyes, would be 
a complete opposite to the antiquated and decadent France of old. Drieu raised the 
interesting point of what it felt like to be French and what the idea of being French 
meant to each French individual: 
J'ai toujours he partage a l'egard de la France entre un sentiment et une 
idee. Le sentiment m 'attache a cette chose qui fut energique et exquise et qui 
l'est encore au fond du peuple et des monuments subsistants et chez 
quelques artistes contemporains - l'idee me fait voir la fin du temps des 
patries. Je vois I 'hroitesse de ces formes qui ont ete valables entre Ie XVe et 
Ie XIXe siecle, mais qui ne peuvent plus nourrir les necessites humaines 
d ' . d'h' 132 aUJour Ul. 
These two aspects, whilst connected to the same notion of la patrie, remained 
separate on a lower level. It was impossible to deny one's French cultural heritage but 
131 Ibid., p.381. (5.1.44) 
132 Drieu, Journal, p.205. (19.5.40) 
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it was possible to deny the future existence of France. It was the latter that separated 
Drieu from the other diarists and drove him to actively collaborate with the Germans: 
II y a toujours en moi un gout de la catastrophe, de la defaite. Fai reporte 
sur la France la defaillance de I 'etre en moi. Mais si je suis ainsi, la France 
doit etre ainsi puisque je porte la France dans mes veines et que leur 
pulsation dit prophetiquement la sante de la France. Le temps des patries est 
passe. Never more. Plus jamais de France - ni d 'Allemagne. Je sens que 
tout va se confondre dans une Europe, &re nouveau etrange qui nous 
paraitra monstrueux, forcement. 133 
Drieu does raise the interesting point ofthe parallel nature between the individual and 
one's country. Individuals who raised their own individual questions were at the same 
time raising the questions concerning their country. Since all the individuals 
collectively made up France, it was impossible to think in terms of the individual 
without thinking at the same time about the country of that particular individual. This 
goes against Cocteau's notion of the "haute patrie", where art transcended national 
borders. 134 
The ambiguous nature of the idea of France allowed a certain degree of 
movement in opinion. This was particularly the case in the early years of the 
Occupation. Up until 1942, it remained possible for people of opposing views to 
maintain cordial relations. In May 1941, Drieu sent his latest book to Guehenno with 
a dedication 'as a token of complete disagreement', which Guehenno found ''plut6t 
gentil". Similarly, Mauriac wrote to Drieu in December 1940, expressing his 
difference in opinion but at the same time maintaining that Drieu's position was 
'defensible'. He remarked to the writer Jean Grenier, who was seeking advice on 
whether he should accept a position in the NRF which Drieu edited, that no one had 
the right to cast a stone at anybody, such was the state of France.135 Although 
Mauriac could not envisage how France would be able to restore itself, he never gave 
up hope that this would happen. Yet, like Drieu, he believed that the defeat would 
permanently topple France from its pre-eminent position: "Oui, une France meme 
restauree se trouvera releguee a un rang modeste et, sur ce plan-la, aucune chance 
ne demeure pour nous de regagner la premiere place. ,,136 Other diarists, who did not 
share Drieu's extreme belief that the time of patries was over, agreed that individuals 
could share a common feeling of what it felt like to be French but could differ on the 
133 Ibid., p.171. (11.4.40) See also p.327. (8.2.43) 
134 Cocteau, Journal, p.133. (23.5.42) 
135 Jackson, The dark years, p.275. 
136 Mauriac, CEuvres completes, p.371. See also Drieu, Journal, p.501. 
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exact nature of what it meant to be French. Gide believed that it was impossible to 
renounce his French origins but for him the idea of being part of a French nation was 
far more abstract: 
Je me sens issu de la culture franr;aise; m 'y rattache de toutes les forces de 
man cceur et de man esprit. Je ne puis m 'ecarter de cette culture qu 'en me 
perdant de vue et qu 'en cessant de me sentir moi-meme; mais je crois que 
['idee de patrie, dont on fait sf grand abus en temps de guerre (au elle 
devient indispensable pour entra'iner Ies hommes au combat et Ies 
rassembler sous un meme drapeau), je crois que, cette idee, it est difficile de 
l'ancrer solidement dans Ie cceur de !'immense majorite des incultes; sinon 
par une simplification mensongere. Les interets particuliers, autour d'une 
entite: Ia France; autour d'un tronc, ce ne peut etre qu 'en l'ebranchant. 137 
The diarists overwhelmingly rejected Drieu's belief that France would never rise 
again from its defeat but Gide maintained that this conviction was tempered by the 
fear that any given individual might conceivably fail to outlast the war to see the 
restoration of France. The entire occupation of France after November 1942 and the 
increased repression of both Vichy and the German Occupation force only served to 
heighten that fear. Gide was prepared to recognise that the essence of France was still 
alive but he was certainly not prepared to sacrifice his life for some abstract notion, 
which had been used in the past to manipUlate people's emotions. Could this be 
attributed to the fact that he spent the Occupation years in North Africa and, so, felt 
detached from the experiences of the French in a national sense? Regardless, it is 
evident that Gide felt that his own interests were ofprimary concern. 
What was inexcusable in the minds of many diarists was the abandoning of 
France to pursue one's own interests. Many of the diarists were bitterly opposed to 
such a strategy, and this opposition became more acute as the Occupation wore on, 
with the growing realisation that Vichy's fortunes were tied in with those of 
Germany. Despite Mauriac's initial acceptance of Drieu's stance, he would come to 
have no sympathy for those who actively sought collaboration with Germany. He did 
not accept their argument that one could not betray France if France no longer 
existed. He saw behind their attempt to distance themselves from the idea of the 
French nation as a means of justifying their treasonous actions: 
Les plus fins de ceux qui ant trahi pressentaient bien cette angoisse en nous: 
taus leurs discours, taus leurs ecrits s 'efforc;aient de fa reveiller. S 'Us 
avaient atteint a nous persuader que la grande nation de naguere ne serait 
plus desormais qu 'une comparse dans le conjlit des empires, du meme coup 
137 Gide, Journal, pp.191-192. (13.2.43) 
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its eussent ete, absous a leurs yeux et aux natres: la ott les nations n 'existent 
plus, Ie mot ttahison n 'a plus de sens. Quel n 'eat eM leur bonheur sf 
vraiment la France avait pu passer pour morte! Car on ne saurait trahir une 
morte. A les entendre, its avaient embrasse les genoux du vainqueur parce 
qu'its ne trouvaient plus aucune patrie a qui se vouer. Nous observions de 
loin ces faux orphelins qui faisaient semblant de croire qu'ils n 'avaient plus 
de mere. 138 
What mattered was not so much that France had physically been defeated but, rather, 
that the idea of France should live on despite the Occupation. Mauriac's strong 
religious faith prevented him from falling into total despair. In this last regard, there 
are striking similarities with Guehenno, who also refused to dwell on the defeat. 
Gu6henno had no strong religious convictions but he shared Mauriac's strong 
conviction in the idea of France to the extent that he too entered the Resistance on a 
literary level. One article he wrote, which was never published, was entitled La 
France qu 'on n 'envahit pas. Guehenno intended to use this article as a plea to every 
French citizen to lock themselves in the unobtainable fortress of the idea of France. 139 
To give in to despair was to betray France, as despair was an act of 
resignation as well as an acceptance that France no longer existed. Gu6henno felt it 
was cmcial for the French people to understand that the idea of France could not be 
taken away from them by the German invaders and that it was essential, for the 
rebuilding of the French nation, to remain positive about the idea of France: "Je me 
refugierai dans mon vrai pays. Mon pays, ma France est une France qu 'on n 'envahit 
pas.,,140 The French had to resist Vichy propaganda and refuse to accept the idea that 
France was defeated, except in the military sense. Rist was equally firm in his idea of 
France. He believed that only a minority were willing to betray the idea of France by 
claiming that it had been relegated to the past. The fact that the overwhelming 
majority refused to join the ranles of these traitors was a sign of their belief in the idea 
of France and their hope that the French nation would be fully restored: 
«Croire a la France.» Ce n 'est pas croire a une abstraction dejinie par 
l'histoire des sieeles passes. C'est croire aux Franr;ais d'aujourd'hui. C'est 
croire qu 'it y a encore, dans les descendants actuels des Franr;ais du passe, 
assez de force, d' energie, d' enthous iasme, de vertu, pour qu 'ils puissent se 
138 Mauriac, (Euvres completes p.370. See also Guehenno, Journal des anm!es noires, pp.42l-422. 
(28.6.44) 
139 Guehenno, Journal des amll§es noires, p.2l. (5.7.40) 
140 Ibid., p.l8. (25.6.40) See also: (27.6.40) 10 Encore ulte fois mon pays, ce pays qui n 'est qu 'une 
idee, 71 'est pas envahi, ne Ie sera jamais. 2° Petain /l 'est pas la France. Petain et Laval ne par/ent pas 
pour nous. LeuI' parole ne nous engage pas et ne saUl'ait nous deshonorer. 3° La seule bonne mesure 
de I' evenement doit etre prise it l' echelle elu man de. Dans Ie monde, la France n Jest pas vaincue. 
196 
delivrer de l' oppression exterieure, se construire une organisation sociale et 
politique viable, et se defendre contre l'ennemi. Or c 'est cela justement que 
les reactionnaires defaitistes ne peuvent pas faire. Ils parlent de la France 
du passe. Ils hai'ssent la France d 'aujourd 'hui - c 'est-a-dire les Fram;ais 
d'aujourd'hui, parce que 90 % d'entre eux se refusent a ecouter leurs 
vieilles rengain es, et ont dejinitivement brUle ce qu'ils adorent encore. Les 
reactionnaires fram;ais ne croient pas a la France, parce qu'ils la detestent 
et s 'en dejient. C'est pourquoi ils l'ont trahie sans scrupule et livree avec 
plaisir a l'ennemi. Cette pretention de limiter la notion de France a celle du 
passe c 'est la negation meme du patriotisme, c 'est nier qu 'it y ait encore une 
France. 141 
Rist was targeting more the Paris collaborationists, who had abandoned the idea of 
France to seek favour from the German invaders and advance their own personal 
interests. He was reassured that the overwhelming majority still held onto the notion 
of France and believed that France still lived on. It was the people, therefore, that 
made the nation. 
Other diarists, however, were less charitable in their opinion towards the 
general population. Bobkowski had observed in 1943 that opinion had really started 
to change only because Germany's repression had started to become intolerable rather 
than coming from any collective patriotic desire: 
Je n 'ai encore jamais reussi a faire comprendre a un Fram;ais pourquoi 
nous ne collaborons pas, sauf a quelques-uns que je n 'ai d'ailleurs 
convaincus qu'it moitie. Bien sur, je parle de la vieille generation. Les 
jeunes, eux, commencent a reagir massivement. Je pourrais etre mechant et 
dire que c' est paree que les Allemands commencent it marcher sur leurs 
. d 142 pze s ... 
Bobkowski was alluding to the growing numbers of young workers who had become 
disaffected with the Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO) and had evaded their 
obligations. Werth had observed sudden transformations in opinion as early as 1942 
but he believed that this turnaround in opinion affected a far more general section of 
the population. This may well have been because young workers who rebelled against 
the introduction of the STO were infinitely more likely to have come from urban 
areas rather than rural areas such as Saint-Amour. The heavy emphasis on agriculture 
in Saint-Amour meant that contact with Germans was often profitable, which would 
have affected people's attitudes towards the Germans. Werth argued with a peasant 
over the proportion of people who supported the Germans: 
141 Rist, Une saison gatee, p.404. (24.5.44) 
142 Bobkwoski, En guel're et en paix, p.513 (22.8.43) 
197 
Prenez les commen;ants, me repond-il, il y en a bien la moitie qui sont pour 
les Boches. Ou du moins il y a quelques mois. 9a a quand meme change. 
Mats if faut com prendre que ce n 'est pas des opinions, que ce n 'est pas des 
hommes. C'est des girouettes. lIs regardent le balaneier et its sont du cote 
qui leur paraft Ie plus fort. Alors its sont pour les Boches, pour ne pas avoir 
d' ennuis avec Ie gouvernement. Ce n 'est pas des opinions, ce n' est pas des 
hommes. 143 
Werth may well have disputed the proportion but he very much agreed with the 
sentiment. He felt that too many were interested in best serving one's individual 
interests rather than those of the French nation. Yet how could anyone detennine 
what was in the national interest in a time of such uncertainty? 
People may have had different conceptions during the Occupation, 
particularly in the initial period, as to how to best serve France. De Gaulle, trying to 
calm things down in the National Assembly at the end of 1944, exclaimed: "lin) a 
personne iei [".] qui n 'ait servi la Patrie et la Repub/ique, mais en 1940, on pouvait 
avoir des conceptions difJerents sur Ie service de la Patrie. ,,144 The implication is that 
things became clearer the longer the Occupation wore on. Certainly the increased 
repression of both the Gennan Occupation force and Vichy after 1941 saw many 
abandon their allegiance to Vichy and the policy of collaboration. Yet very few of the 
diarists actually adjusted their behaviour to the changing climate. Dumeril, for 
example, was convinced that close cooperation with the Gennan military authorities 
was the best means of yielding the best possible outcome for both sides. At the end of 
1943, Dumeril was heartened to find again two men on both sides, who were capable 
of working together. On the French side: "M Ie Prefet Bonnefoy, profondement 
patriote, comprend l'importance capitale de la liaison avec l'occupant.,,145 On the 
Gennan side, Dr Bassler reminded Dumeril of his excellent relations with Dr Hotz 
before he was killed in 1941: 
C' est un intellectuel, humain, rejlechi, nullement nazi. II sa it que son pays 
court a sa perte, if cherchera ainsi toujours a attenuer les ordres draconfens 
qu 'if re<;oit, et, sf possible, a temporiser ... 146 
Bassler would be, in Dumeril's eyes, a buffer against the pro-Nazi Feldkommandant, 
who had been transferred from the Russian front. Although Dumeril realised that the 
situation had changed, in that Germany's overall defeat seemed inevitable, he was 
convinced that his attitude should remain the same. Toesca's attitude towards his 
143 Werth, Deposition, p.376. (5.11.42) 
144 Galtier-Boissiere, Journal, p.295. (28.12.44) 
145 Dumeril, Journal d'un hOlll1ete homme pendant l'occupatiol1, p.347. (23.9.43) 
146 Ibid. 
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administrative work also remained the same: "Mon metier: utiliser les ressources des 
instructions pour arracher aux Allemands les Franr;ais.,,147 Toesca had a far more 
cynical view of relations between the French administration and the German military 
authorities yet, like Dumeril, he never wavered in his appreciation of the value of his 
work. Toesca was aware, however, that the closer the time came to the Liberation, the 
more likely his work would be perceived as treasonous. I48 In 1940, those people who 
had abandoned their administrative posts were perceived as traitors but in 1944 their 
decision was more likely to be seen as patriotic. Toesca did not want to work in the 
Ministry of Interior so close to the end but at the same time he did not want to give 
the appearance of joining les resistants de la derniere heure.,,149 
History from above, with its benefit of hindsight, can sometimes be 
disadvantaged. Post-Liberation France tended to portray Resistance fighters as heroes 
and patriots. This may well have been the case in the context of 1944 yet the danger 
is to think that this is applicable to the whole of the Occupation period. Most of the 
Resistance ranks were swelled near the end of the Occupation. For example, many 
young workers trying to avoid the compulsory drafting of the STO joined the maquis. 
It was believed at the Liberation that the workers had formed the bulk of the 
Resistance. Mauriac wrote that the working class alone had been faithful to the 
profaned patrie. 150 Certainly by 1944, workers were over-represented in the 
Resistance but this had not been the case for the first two years of the Occupation 
where there was no organised Resistance movement. During this period, the workers 
were often described as the most apathetic and passive section of the popUlation. All 
reports suggested that they had no sympathy for Vichy but remained quiescent 
because of their fear of unemployment and the difficulties of survival with the rising 
of prices and the blocking of wages. Moreover, the majority of the French population 
held a mistrustful, even cynical view of the Resistance right up until the end of the 
Occupation. lSI Gildea takes the example ofthe villagers of Maille, in Touraine, where 
147 Toesca, Cinq ans de patience, p.297. (19.7.44) 
148 Ibid., p.220. (15.3.44) Not that this was the case. For example, Toesca was officially warned not to 
reveal confidential information about Gestapo prisoners. He was advised to do it in a more discreet 
fashion. 
149 Ibid., p.312. (30.7.44) 
150 Jackson, The dark years, p.296. 
151 Gu6henno, Journal des annees noires, pp.402-403. (25.3.44) But see Laborie, L 'opinion ji"a11r;aise 
sous Vichy, p.305. Whilst it would be naYve to think that some Resistance activities did not provoke 
some anger it would also be naYve to think that German reprisals always caused hatred towards the 
Resistance. A report from Jean Cassou stated: Lorsqu 'on a eu I 'occasion de visiter un village pille et 
incendie par les Allemands, on ne recueille de la part de fa population pas un seul mot de 
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a maquisard attack had provoked German brutality. A German unit torched the 
village and massacred 126 of the 627 inhabitants. Those who survived the massacre 
were tom between anger and despair. The survivors were ambivalent about the 
Resistance, as they redeemed France, but at the same time they had brought tragedy 
to them. 152 
Furthermore, it would be wrong to think that one could be only patriotic by 
fighting in the Resistance. One must get away from the black and white notions of 
resistance and collaboration, of good and evil. Although the French police were 
involved in shameful actions such as the rafles of 1941-1942, there were times when 
they turned a blind eye to defiance of German authority. Bobkowski had experienced 
numerous times officers turning a blind eye to false papers, which saved many Jews 
from being deported.153 This is what at times Werth had difficulty in viewing from 
his isolated, rural world: "Les «terroristes» sont-ils la France? Si on repond: «non», 
il n y a plus rien qu 'une masse petite-bourgeoise qui attend que les Anglais, les 
Americains, les Russes ou n 'importe qui lui rendent les bonheurs du ventre et la 
liberte du confort.,,154 His view was tainted by the ostensibly selfish inhabitants of 
Saint-Amour and the sparsity of human contact. Yet there were times when Werth 
encountered a sign of hope, which made him reflect that things were not as bad as 
they often seemed. This cynicism came from his lack of exposure to defiant acts. The 
inhabitants of Saint-Amour were relatively well off in terms of provisions and they 
did not have to experience the German occupation until the end of 1942. There were 
no large-scale demonstrations or any acts of collective defiance. It was infinitely 
more difficult to fight for something when you had more to lose: 
Je crois que Laurent est toujours pret (comme ille disait, il y a deux mois) if 
donner, contre la victoire anglaise apportee sur un plateau, une de ses 
vaches, la moins bonne. Mais il reprouve Ie sabotage des voies ferrees. (On 
a, ces derniers jours, fait derailler un train if Sainte-Croix.) «Qui risque 
d' aller en prison? Dit-il, c' est ceux qui gardent les voies. Si j' en voyais un 
qui veuille faire derailler un train, je I 'en empecherais if coups de gourdin. 
Je n 'ai pas d'envie d'aller en prison, ni d'etre fusille. Quant if me sauver, if 
prendre Ie maquis,j'ai autre chose iffaire,j'ai mon travail... »155 
recrimination contre Ie maquis et fa resistance. On se trouve en presence d'une sorte d'acceptation 
farouche. 
152 Gildea, Marianne in chains, pp.395-397. 
153 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.477. (26.7.43) See also Galtier-Boissiere, Journal, p.73. 
(5.11.41) 
154 Werth, Deposition, p.612 (16.4.44) 
155 Ibid., p.499. (21.7.43) 
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The diarists living in Paris, on the other hand, where life was much harsher and the 
number of inhabitants was far greater, were witness to many more incidents of 
collective defiance. These acts may have been on a small scale but they, nevertheless, 
showed a collective spirit and a sign that the idea of France had not been snuffed out 
by the German Occupation. The French flag was forbidden under the Occupation but 
Toesca noted the Parisian population's readiness to defy this law: "Le patriotisme se 
porte beaucoup cette annee dans les cravates. Au theatre aussi les acteurs 
recherchent le tricolore... On fintt par ne plus efre arrete par ce bleu-blanc-rouge a 
force d'en voir.,,156 Even Jiinger was aware that there was a definite resentment ofthe 
German presence in Paris: "Sur les murs des maisons de Paris, on peut voir 
frequemment la date de «1918», ecrite a la craie. Et aussi: «Stalingrad». Qui sail 
"Z' t . A ?,,] 57 SIS n y son pas vazncus, en meme temps que nous. 
The ambiguity of the period, therefore, must not be discounted. Just as there 
were different ways of serving the French nation, so too were there different ways of 
betraying it. The moral universe of Occupied France was notoriously murky. The 
problem was that it was difficult to decide whose actions were honourable at anyone 
given time. It was a matter of perspective, but those actions would eventually come to 
be judged after the Liberation within the context of 1944, as opposed to within the 
context of the time in which those actions were performed. Rist, for example, talking 
to the nephew of the Governor General of Belgium, Falkenhausen, raised the case of 
a woman who was on trial for harbouring a shot-dovvn Polish pilot: 
«Ce qu'il y a affreux dans la guerre, c 'est que les memes actes qui 
para issen t criminels aux uns sont consideres par les autres comme 
heroi'ques», if m 'a dU: «Oui, vous avez raison, - et sans doute si j' avais ete a 
I I d fi ., . fi . I A } 158 a pace e cette emme, ] aurazs azt a meme c 1Ose. ». 
This woman's actions would undoubtedly be perceived as heroic in the context of 
liberated France yet officially her actions were considered patriotic in 1942. Those 
who fought in the Resistance were often labelled as ten-orists and those who worked 
for Vichy may have thought that they were working for the best interests of France. 
Guehenno observed how the maquis, in an effort to combat the mistrust of the 
majority of the nation, stressed in their underground newspapers that they were not 
156 Toesca, Cinq ans de patience, p.146. (10.12.42) See also Jackson, p.439. The second half of 1942 
would see for the first time the growing disaffection from Vichy translate into collective action. Two-
thirds of the sixty-six demonstrations that took place occ1U'red in the South, with crowds numbering 
fifteen thousand in Lyons and Marseilles. 
157 JUnger, Secolldjournal parisien, (Paris: Christian B01U'gois Editeur, 1980) p.9. (21.2.43) 
158 Rist, Une sarson gatee, p.268. (25.8.42) 
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terrorists as they were portrayed by Vichy propaganda. They endeavoured to convey 
the notion that "I 'ordre n 'est pas necessairement identique it la legalite" and that the 
milice were labelled the ''forces du maintien de I' ordre" so that they might appeal to 
the bourgeoisie, who merely wanted their security preserved. 159 Matters were 
complicated by the fact that there was not just one patrie but two or three. The French 
might have been loyal to Vichy, as it was the legitimate government, but also loyal to 
de Gaulle and the Free French on the grounds that the Vichy leaders were traitors. 160 
It took time for many French to realise that those who officially represented 
France did not necessarily speak for France. Werth came upon a passage, written by 
Xavier de Maistre in 1795, one month after the entire occupation of France: 
Le gouvernement est-it bon? La patrie est dans toute sa force; devient-it 
vicieux? La patrie est malade; change-t-il? Elle meurt. C'est alors une 
nouvelle patrie et chacun est Ie maitre de l'adopter ou d'en choisir une 
autre. 161 
The question became much more relevant after 1942 whether it was treasonous to 
betray the will of Vichy as it appeared that Germany would be defeated. The problem 
was that it would take another two years for any betrayal to be vindicated or to see if 
the adopted or chosen nouvelle patrie would be condoned. Werth realised that there 
were many who believed that they had acted patriotically in the early years of the 
Occupation but who had come to realise that their position was no longer tenable with 
the changing nature of Vichy: "II y a beaucoup de nuances entre les traitres qui se 
veulent traitres et ceux que la trahison entraina avant qu'its aient reconnu son 
visage.,,162 Those who openly collaborated were a distinct minority but Werth 
believed that there were far more who had betrayed the French nation in a less overt 
fashion: 
Et les collaborateurs? J'entends non pas ceux qui ont publiquement trahi, 
mais ceux qui ont trahi en desir et en pensee, ou les pauvres idiots qui, 
jusqu'it la fin, balbutierent la legende du marechal? Sans doute its 
disparaltront dans la masse. Mais en quelles regions de cette masse? Et 
I .,' b II 7163 eurs toxznes s y resor eront-e es. 
159 Gu6henno, Journal des annees noires, pp.401-402. (25.3.44) See also Werth, Deposition, p.612 Les 
«terroristes» sont-Us la France? Si 011 repond: «non», il n 'y a plus rien qu 'une masse petite-
bourgeoise qui attend que les A ngla is, les Americains, les Russes ou n'importe qui lui rendent les 
bonheurs du ventre et la liberte du contort. (16.4.44) 
160 Gildea, Marianne in chains, pp.16-17. 
161 Werth, Deposition, p.401. (11.12.42) 
162 Ibid., p.460. (19.4.43) 
163 Ibid., p.642. (17.5.44) See also pp.480-1 Werth met someone who worked in Vichy. He was not a 
fully-fledged collaborator and had admirable qualities but Werth was still critical: Toutes les idees qui 
sont assez legeres pour qu' on puisse les tenir entre deux doigts, il les sa is it. Celles qui sont plus 
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It worried Werth that these people would go unpunished and that they might 
eventually come to betray the French nation once again in a similar period of 
upheavaL 
Even those who had openly betrayed France might have acted out of noble 
intentions or at least shared similar beliefs to those who had refused to compromise 
their French identity. Pierre Laval is the obvious example whose actions have been 
interpreted by some as honourable. 164 The notable example out of the selected diarists 
is Pierre Drieu La Rochelle. He openly admitted: 
je ne tenais nullement it la France ... Pourtant j'ai eu des boufJees de passion 
patriotique. Sans quoi je n 'aurais pas eM collabo car je I 'at eM avant tout 
pour tirer quelque chose des Allemands pour la France. Sans quoi, je ne les 
aurais admires, preferes que de loin. Doriotiste, aussi par patriotisme. Non 
communiste par reaction «patriotique», autant que bourgeoise en 1934. 165 
The Paris collaborationists may have felt that they were acting in the best interests of 
France by quelling the Communist threat and ridding France of its internal enemies. 
Junger, for whom interestingly Paris became a spiritual patrie, lamented the fact that 
Drieu had killed himself: 
II semble qu 'en vertu de quelque loi, ceux qui avaient des motifs nobles de 
cultiver I 'amitie entre les peuples tom bent sans remission, tandis que les bas 
profiteurs s 'en tirent. Montherlant, dit-011, est egalement poursuivi. II 
s'imaginait encore que l'amitie chevaleres~ue fut possible; les leches-bottes 
lui montre11t maintenant qu 'i[ 11 'en est rfen. 66 
JUnger was clearly targeting the Paris collaborationists, such as Doriot, who craved 
political power. They were merely interested in pursuing their own interests whereas 
JUnger believed that Drieu was sincere in his desire for the creation of a strong, 
uoified Europe. Drieu's attraction to Germany, in Junger's eyes, was not a betrayal of 
France but, rather, an honest attempt to create a positive partnership between the two 
countries. In that respect, his attitude can be seen as similar to that of DumeriL The 
only difference was that Drieu could not envisage the restoration of France. 167 
Drieu was far from being the only diarist to lament upon the national 
disintegration of France. Drieu's antidote for this national disintegration may well 
lourdes, il les laisse tomber. (29.5.43) He blocked out an the negative aspects of Vichy so that he 
could still shelter within: Il ne se fait point d'i/lusions sllr Vichy. Mats il se nifilgie en Vichy, qui est 
11011 seuiement son pain quotidiel1, mais aussi son opiulIl. Vichy lui est reposal1t comme un film 
absurde, It was not a question of him not knowing the atrocities which had been going on but, rather, 
that he chose to ignore them. 
164 See Rene de Cbambrun's Mes combats pour Pierre Laval, (Paris: Gallimard, 1990). 
165 Drieu, Journal, pp.394-395. (June 1944) 
166 Jiinger, Secondjou1"l1al parisien, p.325. (7.9.44) 
167 Drieu, Journal, p.333. (3.3.43) 
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have been extreme but his belief that France's national identity had been eroded was 
certainly a commonly held view: "La defaile de la France? La corruption, la 
decadence; les Fram;ais, pendant cette guerre, auront tout ete: communistes, 
socialistes, pacifistes, anarchistes, tout sauf des Franr;ais.,,168 Diarists such as Werth 
and Guehenno may well have differed in their beliefs on how to combat this national 
disintegration but they, nevertheless, shared the view that France had been reduced 
from a national community to small, competing groups of like-minded individuals. 
Werth would go so far as to entertain whether notions such as la patrie or Ie peuple 
were simply invented by historians: "La France est en trom;ons [ .... ] Le peuple la 
reinventera+il? La bourgeoisie n plus capable de penser la France. L'idee de 
France est devenue une idee difficile. peuple I 'eclaircira+elle? Mais le peuple 
existe encore?"l69 Werth oscillated much more in his opinion of Ie peuple. The 
apathy and indifference shown by many of the inhabitants of Saint-Amour tainted his 
overall image of the peuple. The people of Saint-Amour did not resemble in any way 
the people Werth was used to interacting with in Paris, and he often made clear that 
he felt uncomfortable in their presence. 170 One gets the feeling that ~Werth's unease 
with his situation affected his perception of the people of Saint-Amour, which, in 
turn, tainted his view of France irrevocably. Vichy played on these divisions and 
feelings of national disintegration. It offered the illusion to the French people that it 
could finally assure after years of frustration, to use the expression of Franc;ois 
Bedarida, "['impossible symbiose du national et du social."171 Although the France 
du marechal would also come to be occupied and the popularity of P6tain would 
diminish in the South, the idea of France would continue to be une idee difficile 
throughout the Occupation. This France of divisions would continue to be pulled at 
from different directions by competing factions. Werth wondered how all these 
tronr;ons could fonn a whole again but again the fundamental difference with Drieu 
was that he had hope that this indeed would happen. 
Guehenno was more optimistic than Werth that the idea of France could again 
be shared by its citizens. Where he differed from Werth was in his view that the 
168 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.372. (14.10.42) See also Welih, Deposition, p.150. (1.3.41) 
169 Werth, Deposition, p.150. (1.3.41) 
170 Ibid., p.409. (29.12.42) 
171 Laborie, L 'opinion jran9aise sous Vichy, pp.200-201. See Burrin, La France a l'heure allemande, 
p.20: Petain informed the French people, on June 25, 1940, of a building of a France neuve: Ie 
gouvernement reste libre, la France ne sera administree que par des Fra1l9ais. 
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breakdown in national fraternity had been as a result of the circumstances of the 
Occupation: 
11 n y a plus de France, il n y a que des Fram;ais iso!es sans presque 
aucunes relations l'un avec l'autre que des relations secretes, dangereuses 
et interdites, et cela meme rendra bien difficile dans les annees a venir tout 
jugement general sur ce pays. Chaque Franr;ais, sans aucun secours, sans 
rien qui I 'inspire, confine dans sa prison, ne vaut plus que ce qu'il valait 
tout seul. Et, il est vrai, certains se sont habitues a la servitude, deja si 
longue, si ancienne et ils attendent la fin, n'importe queUe fin. Mais 
innombrables aussi ceux qui veillent, et je ne finirais pas de noter ici les 
noms et les aventures de ceux que je connais s'il n y avait a cela pour eux 
aucun peril. Car nous en sommes la que je puis bien noter ici, sans 
compromettre personne, toutes nos hontes, mais il me faut garder pour moi, 
dans ma seule memoire, jusqu 'aux noms de ceux qui, dans Ie silence et Ie 
secret, sauvent I 'honneur. 172 
Gu6henno raises an important point with respect to what the diarists chose to record. 
The Occupation had effectively closed off relations with other French citizens on a 
national level. Each individual was confined to a cell, which deprived the French of a 
collective voice. Gu6henno was well aware of those people who had broken their 
silence to betray themselves as well as their country but he was adamant that there 
were just as many who had strived to save France's honour. Others had accepted the 
presence of the German captors too freely but Gu6henno remained, nevertheless, 
optimistic that this had more to do with the lengthy duration of the Occupation, and 
that there were sufficient numbers who refused to accept their servitude. Gu6henno 
was very similar to Werth in his belief that the idea of France had been sacrificed to 
the preoccupation with personal survival. The deportations became even more 
numerous and Gu6henno wondered why the whole of France did not rebel and not 
just a few courageous people. He had a good deal of respect for Ie peuple but at the 
same time he felt a little disappointed in their lack of revolutionary spirit. He felt that 
most of the young people being deported were resigned to going: 
Beaucoup parlent deja des difficultes qu'ils creeraient a leurs parents, s'ils 
s 'enfuyaient ... La faute n 'en est a personne et a tout Ie monde, a la lachete 
commune: il est de plus en plus difficile a qui Ie voudrait de se cachero Les 
epreuves, les souffrances de ceux qui sont deja partis obligent ceux qui ne 
. 173 
sont pas partls encore. 
172 Gu6henno, Journal des a117uies noires, p.365. (13.11.43) See also Deharme, Les amuies perdues, 
p.l80: Je me replonge dans Chateaubriand pour me consoleI': «Quand la liberte a disparu, if reste un 
pays, mais if n y a plus de patrie», me dil-il. (14.4.44) 
173 Ibid., p.344. (12.6.43) 
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At times one feels that some diarists' expectations were too high. Historically 
le peuple had been the most active group in bringing about change, and it seems that 
at times this group was unfairly blamed for the general lack of revolutionary spirit. 
Yet there was a heavy price to pay for defying the German presence in France. 
Alsace-Lorraine, for example, underwent a total transformation into a German 
province. Those who tried to escape the compulsory Wehrmacht service had reprisals 
exacted on their families. 174 The reprisals after Resistance activity go some way also 
to explaining the resentment their activities sometimes inspired. Guehenno could not 
see why the workers who were brave enough to hide away should be punished by 
those who had abided by German orders, yet he did not have to deal with the 
consequences of their evasion. In this respect, Werth appears to be more reasonable in 
his opinion of the workers: 
Brun, le menusier, part apres-demain pour la Carinthie. Il est triste et plein 
de colere. Je ne puis m 'empecher d'etre duro «Les ouvriers fram;ais n 'ont 
pas bronche, tant qu'it s 'est agi de fabriquer, en France, des armes pour 
l 'Allemagne; its n 'ont commence a resister ou gemir que du jour ou l' on les 
a contraints ales fabriquer en Allemagne meme. C'est la passivite des 
ouvriers qui a permis a Hitler et a Laval, operant progressivemen t, d'obtenir 
quelque deux cent mille departs. Du moins c 'est le chiffre qui circule.» Je 
suis injuste sans doute et je suppose les ouvriers deteneurs d'un immuable 
pouvoir revolutionnaire dont ils pourraient user, a leur caprice, en toute 
circonstance. 175 
He even recorded with pride an incident of open defiance by some drafted 
workers. Trains, taking about six hundred young workers to Germany, were 
sabotaged and the passengers sang the Marseillaise and the Internationale and cried: 
«Vive de Gaulle! Laval au poteau!». It was clear that Werth was ultimately hoping 
for such events to broaden out onto a national scale: "Est-ce une etincelle unique? Y 
a-t-il beaucoup d' etincelles semblables? Allumeront-elles un foyer ?,,]76 
There was an expectation for change to be carried out from below but it 
should never be forgotten that the leaders who represented France shaped the 
behaviour of the French people. Although Vichy spoke officially for all of France, the 
German military authorities effectively had complete control of the Occupied Zone, 
and all of France after November 1942. The German occupation created a void in the 
French nation, which, to a large extent, Petain attempted to fill. He was a barrier to 
174 Jackson, The dark years, pp.246-248. 
175 Werth, Deposition, p.440. (3.3.43) 
176 Ibid., pp.445-446. (23.3.43) 
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the erosion of national authority caused by the German occupation. P6tain, therefore, 
embodied the idea of France. Yet the fact that Vichy never gained any widespread 
support would suggest that there were limits to the lengths the French people would 
go to follow P6tain. The longer the Occupation went on and the more the general 
situation deteriorated, the more likely that initial goodwill would fade: 
«Le pays doit savoir que nous avons he battus. J'ai passe trois mois a Ie 
dire autour de moi et depuis deux ans je me Ie repete a moi-meme tous les 
matins.» Le «glorieux soldat de Verdun» se livre la tout en tier: un maniaque 
de la capitulation, un masochiste de la defaite. 177 
The prefect of Rodez wrote openly in September 1942: "La majorite de la population 
continue a venerer Ie Marechal mais elle Ie suit moins en tant que Chef qu' en tant 
que personne de legende, magnifique vieillard aux dons, aux vertus honnantes. ,,178 
Gu6henno noted that Petain's speeches became shorter and much more vain and 
pompous after the entire occupation of France. P6tain even proudly declared that he 
had more powers than Louis XIV: "Vous n 'avez qu 'un devoir: obeir, nous a-t-i/ dit ce 
• T T ' , I . . , . I F ,,179 sOlr. r oUS n avez qu une seu e patrze que} zncarne: a rance. 
What these words suggest is that the defeat of France had also seen the demise 
of the French patrie. The French nation was no longer in existence but Petain, as 
opposed to Vichy, claimed that he embodied the spirit of France. To serve him, and 
him alone, was to serve the French nation. Consenting to P6tain's wishes and the 
implication that to do so was 'French' is essential in understanding the public support 
for marechalisme. 180 By that same logic, to serve de Gaulle was to betray la patrie: 
Etre pour de Gaulle, conclut Beraud, c'est refuser son CCRur au Marechal, 
c 'est desesperer du salut de la patrie. Etre pour de Gaulle, c' est preferer au 
vainqueur de Verdun, Ie fuyard de Bordeaux. Etre pour de Gaulle, c 'est 
d I I · d A 181 pren re contre e sauveur e partz u traztre. 
That such an attitude could still be held in 1943, when Germany's fortunes had well 
and truly taken a tum for the worse with their capitulation at Stalingrad, illustrates 
how Vichy propaganda had made an impact during its formative years, and goes 
some way to explaining the residual support for Petain when Germany's fate 
177 Galtier-Boissiere, Journal, p.lOO. (29.5.42) 
178 Laborie, L 'opinionji'anc;aise sous Vichy, p.257. See also Jackson, The dark years, pp.280-281. 
179 Gu6henno, Journal des amu!es noires, p.302. (21.11.42) See also Bun-in, La France it l'heure 
allemande, p.170. This speech came on 19 November, 1942 to assure the French people that nothing 
had changed with the complete occupation of France: Je reste votre guide. Vous 11 'avez qu 'un seul 
devoir: obeir. Vous n 'avez qu 'un seul gouvernement: celui it qui j 'ai donne Ie pouvoir de gouverner. 
Vous n 'avez qu 'une patrie que j 'incarne: la France. 
180 Laborie, L 'opinion ji'anc;aise sous Vichy, p.234. 
181 Galtier-Boissiere, Journal, p.l42. (13.3.43) 
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appeared sealed. 182 Petain, therefore, was more than just a leader. His leadership was 
presented as the only honourable option. He represented a model of behaviour, 
namely one of steadfastness and honour. To reject him was not only a betrayal of 
Petain the leader but also Petain the protector of the nation. He assumed a mythical 
significance well beyond his actual practical functions. 
De Gaulle would come to assume a similar position. It took much longer, 
however, for the French people to associate the idea of France with de Gaulle. There 
were several reasons for this. Firstly, General de Gaulle was perceived initially as 
belonging to the military personnel who had betrayed France whereas Petain's 
military legacy represented someone who had saved France. Secondly, he did not 
have a physical presence in France. His voice could be heard on la radio anglaise but 
there were no portraits of him displayed in provincial shop windows. Petain's 
physical presence was less relevant in the Occupied Zone but at least he was seen not 
to have abandoned France. De Gaulle was initially simply a voice, and it took time 
for the French people to realise that that voice spoke for France. Werth would observe 
near the end of the Occupation that de Gaulle had assumed a similar position to 
Petain at the beginning of the Occupation. It was not so much the individual, de 
Gaulle, whom people increasingly began to follow but, rather, what he represented: 
On en tend partout le mot: gaulliste. On en tend moins souvent le nom de de 
Gaulle. Il y a contraste entre l'immense role historique, qui Jut, qui est le 
sien et on ne sait quel effacement de son personnage. Il a parle, quand tout 
se taisait, quand tous se taisaient ou parlaient ldchement. Il a agi, quand 
tous renom;aient. Il a fait rentrer dans l 'histoire la France, qui en bait 
expulsee. Mais on ne lui a pas fabrique, it ne s 'est pas fabrique de legende. 
Il ne rend pas la justice sous un chene. Il ne pince pas l' oreille des engages 
volontaires. 183 
In the beginning, de Gaulle's voice was propagated by Vichy as being a voice of 
dissidence. His association with London was ill-received in a period of brief 
Anglophobia after such incidents as Mers-el-Kebir. It took time to reveal that 
England was acting in France's best interests and for Germany to reveal its true 
intentions. It should be no surprise that de Gaulle's growing popularity coincided 
with a growing resentment amongst the French people of Germany's presence in 
France and Vichy's ill-advised association with the unwanted invader. Werth argued 
that de Gaulle was different from Petain and Hitler in that his spirit of defiance was 
182 See Toesca, Cinq ans de patience, pp.235-253. P6tain's visit to Paris, in Apri11944, still managed 
to attract a significant crowd. 
183 Werth, Deposition, p.571. (13.2.44) 
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not a myth born out of propaganda but a true reflection of his actions. Yet de Gaulle. 
acting in exile. was himself far less a tangible force than what his defiance 
represented to the French people. 
The most significant aspect to take out of this is how quarante millions de 
Petainistes could suddenly become quarante millions de gaullistes. Historians. such 
as Paxton, have claimed that this sudden transformation was simply a reflection of the 
changing state of Germany's fortunes, and the realisation by the French people that 
the de Gaulle camp would be victorious and that siding with the losing camp would 
have serious repercussions. 184 There is evidence in the diaries to support this claim. 
Galtier-Boissiere recorded the indignant reaction of a mother whose daughter's head 
had been shaven: "Sf elle a couche avec les Allemands, c 'est qu 'elle avail dix-sept 
ans, monsieur, comprenez-vous? Mais pourquoi lui avoir coupe les cheveux, c 'est 
une honte, monsieur! Elle etait prete it coucher aussi bien avec Ies Americainsi»,,185 
There was a natural instinct to side with the victors. Many 'horizontal collaborators' 
were punished after the Liberation as they were a potent symbol of what had 
happened to France. Yet Werth found more disturbing those people who managed to 
escape punishment: A woman, who had been a sworn patriot, remarked after the 
defeat of 1940: 
«11 ne faut pas oublier que nous sommes vaincus.» Et, comme on dit: Je ne 
me sens pas Ie courage d' enlever aux vieilles femmes la foi qui les console», 
elle dit aussi: « Vous avez fot dans I 'Angleterre, je ne veux pas vous eniever 
vos illusions.» Et elle dit aussi: «La France est pourrie; I 'Allemagne, peuple 
jeune, peut la regenerer.» Aujourd'hui, elle est gaulliste, gaulliste fervente. 
Mats elle ne cacherait pas cinq minutes d 'horloge un parachutiste anglais. 
Bat ... a oublie qu 'apres la debdcle it disait: «Que l 'Europe soU fafte par 
l'Allemagne ou par un autre peuple, qu 'importe ... Moi, je prefere Gr.ethe it 
Shakespeare et Ies Anglais n 'ont ni phitosophes ni musiciens.» lIl'a oublie 
completement. Et, sf I' on Ie lui rappelait, il le nierait de bonne fot. La 
memoire est une etrange faculte. 186 
Werth remarked how these people, who had previously been patriots, were so easily 
caught up in Vichy propaganda. The woman's comments are a minor image of 
Petain's words. With the realisation that Petain was no longer in any dominant 
position of power, she became gaulliste, even though her claims were hollow. The 
134 Paxton, Old guard and new order, pp.234-235. 
185 Galtier-Boissiere, Joul'Tlal, p.207. (22.8.44) See also Moret, Journal d'ul1e mauvaise Fra11f;aise, 
pp.237-238. (9.9.44) 
186 Werth, Deposition, pp.570-571. (10.2.44) 
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man's denial that he had ever supported Germany's designs for creating a unified 
Europe illustrates how people could switch sides so easily. 
Yet the problem becomes more complex if one entertains the notion that the 
forty million supporters of Petain or de Gaulle were more supporters of the ideals 
embodied by those two men rather than supporters of the men themselves. In that 
sense, there was no real change between 1940 and 1944. The French had been 
supporters of honour and defiance not only in 1940 but also in 1944. What had 
changed was the people who embodied those ideals rather than the French people's 
commitment to those ideals. Guehenno acknowledged the ever-pressing desire to get 
through the war at all costs but, unlike Werth, he felt that the overwhelming majority 
had not compromised their values: 
On se mefie de taus, Allemands, Anglais au Russes, et on ne pense qu'il 
«passer au travers» sans dommage, comme si la grande masse de ce pays ne 
tenait plus rien qu'd vivre, d n'importe quel prix. Mais quel petlple vi! 
autrement qu 'une minorite, par quelques-uns qui l'inspirent, Ie menent? 
Cette minorite est main tenant contrainte au silence. Ne pm-lent que des 
traitres et les laches. De lil cette impression de mollesse que donne 
l' opinion. Mais, au juste, il n y a pas d' opinion, et, si I' on y songe, I' espece 
d'inertie qu' oppose d la propagande la masse d' ordinaire si malleable est 
un bon signe de la dignite instinctive du pays. 187 
The sudden switch in support for de Gaulle from support for Petain can be seen, 
therefore, in a positive light. Just as the French distinguished between Petain and 
Vichy, so too can they be seen to have distinguished de Gaulle from the Free French 
or the Allies. 
It is important to further explore the reasons for P6tain's residual popularity. 
Firstly, Laval did not enjoy the legacy of the glorietlX soldat de Verdun. Petain could 
be seen as a saviour figure and a protector of the French people, as he had already 
proven that he could stand up to the Germans. In a time of defeat and humiliation, 
P6tain was a symbol of honour and defiance. It made sense that he would endeavour 
to protect and best serve France's interests as he had done at Verdun. To serve Petain, 
therefore, was to be complicit in that role of defiance. In this respect, the widespread 
support for P6tain could be seen, at least initially, as patriotic. Laval, on the other 
hand, had no such past on which to rely. Consequently, his actions were much more 
likely to be interpreted as those of an opportunist rather than those of a man trying to 
protect France: 
187 Gu6henno, Journal des annees noires, pA06. (30.4.44) 
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cet homme incapable de sentir a la franc;aise ramasse dans son cerveau des 
idees qu 'un Fram;ais n 'aurait jamais eues: pour lui c 'est fa guerre en sol 
qui est mauvaise, peu n 'importe pour queUe cause au contre quel ennemi; 
taus les moyens sont donc bons pour ['eviter; c'est l'Allemagne qui est fa 
plus dangereuse, donc aidons-Ia. C'est bas. Mais c 'est en meme temps dJune 
absence inoui'e de clairvoyance. Car if est Ie seul a ne pas voir que la partie 
est en train d'etre perdue par l'Allemagne, et que lui-meme ne survivra pas 
au dishonneur des propos qu 'il ttent. 188 
The notion of Petain's double jeu is testimony to the fact that his actions were 
interpreted far more favourably than those of LavaL The notion of P6tain serving as a 
shield for the French people against the Gennans could not possibly apply to Laval, 
who had openly wished for a Gennan victory. Laval's unwavering commitment to 
collaboration led to his downfall at the end of 1940 yet his submissiveness, in the 
context of the period after 1942, when defeat for Gennany increasingly appeared 
inevitable, was not only incomprehensible but also unforgivable. 
The longer the Occupation went on, however, the more increasingly difficult 
it became for P6tain to maintain the distinction between himself and the repressive 
policies of Vichy represented by LavaL The legend of the Father of the French nation, 
for example, was only possible ifP6tain was absolved of responsibility for the actions 
of Vichy. This was perhaps less vital in the context of 1940 when collaboration was 
still a benign policy but in the context of 1943, when the Milice came into force and 
with the introduction of the STO, P6tain's complicity became increasingly impossible 
to refute. The danger bolcheviste was no longer a large enough threat to offset the 
resentment of Vichy openly working for Gemlany. A report in April 1943 stated: "Ie 
pourcentage des anticollaborationnistes depasse 90%, leur nombre tend a faire bloc, 
a se souder, a se cimenter meme.,,189 One of Vichy's founding principles, the 
protectorate role, was completely undennined. 1944 saw not only a separation of 
popular opinion from Vichy but also the perception that Vichy was a separation from 
France. Werth observed how the French people increasingly began to disassociate 
themselves from P6tain and what he stood for: "Petain aurait dit: «II faut a la France 
une defaite.» Une defaile pour la sauveI' du Front populaire et du gachis 
democratique. A-t-il dit cela? Ou bien une legende du traitre Petain se substitue+ 
188 Rist, Une saison p.284. (23.10.42) Compare with Galtier-Boissiere, Journal, p.130 Et it Y a 
encore des marechalistes pour prl?tendre que Petain joue un double jeu et negocie avec 1 'Amerique 
tout en collaborant avec Hitler «dans I 'h01111eun> et (<ell toute loyautel ». (14.12.42) 
189 Laborie, L 'opinion ji'a1u;aise sous Vichy, pp.284-286. 
211 
elle it la legende du p~re de la Patrie?,,]90 Petain's promise of no more lies made 
sense in the context of 1940, when the French needed to come to terms with their 
defeat, yet as the Occupation wore on, the notion that the defeat had ultimately been a 
positive thing for France made no sense in such a repressive climate. Even Drieu, 
who had welcomed in 1940 the opportunity to rid France of its decadence, realised 
that the Vichy leaders represented the very things they claimed they were fighting 
against: 
Ce vieux con de marechal, ce salaud de Laval reagissent comme its sont aux 
evenements. J'ai toujours meprise ce general passif, ce defenseur de Verdun 
purement negatif. Cette vieille bourrique du juste milieu ... Il va bien flanque 
de Laval, ce gnome hideux issu de tout !'ignoble reve d'enrichissement du 
proletariat franc;ais. 191 
It is clear that Drieu reserved his special contempt for Laval. Yet few diarists were 
willing to go that one step further and brand collectively P6tain and Laval as traitors: 
Que de fois nous avons dit, parlant de Petain ou de Laval: «Ce n 'est pas si 
simple que c;a. Ils n 'ont pas trahi comme on trahit au Cinema.» Notre sens 
critique, notre volonte de juste critique, notre sentiment de la complexite, 
notre obsession plutot de la complexite, notre peur enfin d'etre «primaire» 
nous ont trompes. La cauteleuse brutalite de Laval, la cynique hypocrisie du 
sinistre vieillard, ce n' est pas si complique que c;a. C' est comme au 
Cinema. 192 
This reluctance to linle Petain to Laval's treachery indicates that Petain's character, as 
opposed to the man himself, and the part he played in Vichy, had a lasting effect on 
the French people. It took time for the realisation to occur that P6tain had betrayed 
France. The policy of collaboration was roundly rejected by the French people but it 
took time for P6tain to be implicated in that policy. It was difficult to thinle that 
someone in whom they had placed their trust had turned out to have betrayed them. 
However, that might well explain why there appeared to be such a sudden shift away 
from P6tain to de Gaulle. 
It is important to look beyond the dramatic events of the Occupation and 'big' 
issues that surrounded the period. They certainly played a significant role in shaping 
opinion but one must not look past the impact that the everyday problems had on the 
lives of the diarists who endured the Occupation on a day to day basis. It would be 
these problems that would constantly weigh on their minds and shape their view of 
the world. Werth was an exceptional case in that he could not, and did not have to, 
190 Werth, Deposition, p.492. (2.7.43) 
191 Drieu, Journal, p.303 (8.11.42) 
192 Ibid., p.450. (30.3.43) See also Rist, Une saison gatee, p.354. (9.9.43) 
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work during the Occupation. His position of relative ease and solitude in Saint-
Amour afforded him a vision of the world around him that was not blinded by other 
distractions. Some diarists, such as Roussin and Cocteau, blocked out the war by 
focusing their attention on their work. The majority would continue to work 
throughout the Occupation. Those like Rist and Dumeril would keep themselves very 
busy but they were fortunate in that their work would never be in the public eye. 
What one did as an occupation would not be the only thing by which one was judged 
after, and indeed during, the Occupation period. One's public image could playa 
significant part in the collective spirit of the French people. This must be 
distinguished from the private world of each individual. Putting on a visibly upbeat 
front was just as important as accentuating the positive aspects of life during the 
Occupation. It was a means of overcoming the weight of individual concerns that 
centred on survival. At one time or another, food became an obsession for every 
diarist. The quest for food could often get in the way of more noble concerns, which 
might help explain why there were so very few actively involved in the evolution of 
the Occupation. It might also be explained by an instinctive willingness to follow 
successively the patriotic ideals embodied by two otherwise vastly different leaders. 
The dichotomic axes of collaboration and resistance required active participation but 
the diarists observed that there was much greater flexibility within the infinitely 
broader grey zone of accommodation. 
The end? 
At its inception, this thesis posited as its primary objective the delineation of a 
comprehensive representation of life during the Occupation at the individual level. In 
order for such a representation to be fully realised, some reference to the conclusions 
of the personal narratives examined in this thesis is required. From an historical 
perspective, the signing of the armistice on June 22 1940 and the Liberation of Paris 
on August 25 1944 are the two defining temporal parameters of the Occupation 
period. The diarists, however, were much less clear in their starting-points and end-
points. Each diarist would have a different motivation for writing but the fact that the 
majority continued to write beyond the Liberation period suggests that their writing 
journey was incomplete. 
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It should come as no surprise that the testimonies of the diarists that have been 
privileged in this thesis manifest a narrative conclusion in the true sense of the 
word. 193 They conclude with a positive and definitive image of liberation, evoking the 
restoration of freedom and the realisation of a longed-for end. The reader of 
Bobkowski's diary, for example, is left with the clear impression that the Occupation 
period was brought to a close with the arrival of the American forces: 
J'ai l'impression de rever, mais je ne reve pas. Il en arrive continuellement. 
Chemises vertes, pantalons verts et guetres vertes. Ce sont enfin les autres. 
Ceux qu 'on a attendus pendant de si longues annees; cette fois, ce sont bien 
eux. A peine trois mois apres avoir debarque, its sont it Paris. lis sont 
superbes. C 'est un autre monde qui entre dans Paris, c 'est la liberte. 194 
Bobkowski would later admit to feeling regret over the fact that his native Poland 
would not be in such a fortunate position as France in terms of being able to restore 
itself to the position it held before the war. Yet the sense of palpable relief that 
freedom had finally been restored to France is unmistakeable. There is, furthermore, 
an overwhelming sense of resolution, which marks the terminus of his authorial 
odyssey. The closing line of Guehenno' s diary also unambiguously closes the chapter 
of his Occupation experience: "La liberte, la France recommence.,,195 The Liberation 
released Guehenno from his prison cell, where he had previously only been able to 
hold onto the idea of France. The Occupation experience, therefore, is perfectly 
enclosed within the confines of his text, and is concluded with the termination of the 
narrative. Werth, who had always felt frustratingly out of the grasp of history 
throughout the murky climate of the Occupation period, was overcome at the 
Liberation with a cognisance that he had reached the end of a historically significant 
period: "Je ne savais pas que I 'histoire existait. Je ne croyais pas it l 'histoire. Et void 
que tout est plein de resonances historiques. Ma poitrine est gonflee de l 'histoire. ,,196 
This was a definite change in thinking on his behalf, which points to a wider 
significance in relation to our broader study. 
There is for these diarists none of the uncertainty associated with the 
beginning of the Occupation, which can be explained by the fact that they believed 
193 This is not as apparent with the testimony of Rist as it is with the testimonies of Werth, Gu6henno 
and Bobkowski. His concern for what kind of government would be set in place after the Liberation 
compelled him to continue writing, though it is clear that he did so on an irregular and less detailed 
basis. 
194 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.613. (25.8.44) 
195 Gu6henno, Journal des amuies noires, p.438. (25.8.44) 
196 Werth, Deposition, p.723. (24.8.44) 
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that the Liberation had brought closure to the Occupation. The same cannot be said 
for June 1940 in that the Occupation did not bring closure to the debacle. The 
Occupation brought an end to the fighting but it did not bring the diarists any closer 
to the restoration of peace. No one in the summer of 1940 could have possibly 
conceived of the direction that Vichy would take but everyone was certain that the 
Liberation spelt the end for Vichy: 
Ce qui est surprenant, c' est l' evanouissement total et sans bruit de tout ce 
qui touche it Vichy. Personne ne sait rien de l' ancien gouvernement. Mais 
personne non plus ne demande it savoir quelque chose. 197 
It would take time for every region of France to be liberated but the liberation of Paris 
would, nonetheless, officially restore France to its position before the war. There was 
a willingness to leave the sordid chapter of Vichy behind them, whereas these very 
diarists had been adamant throughout the Occupation that they should never lose 
sight of how the Occupation had come about. Werth would be overcome with 
emotion at the sight of the liberating forces but the presence of killing machines was a 
direct contradiction to this joy, not to mention a reminder of his nation's suffering. 
Yet he refused to allow that to get in the way of his elation: 
Ce sentiment est-it donc si comptique, si difficite a saisir? Ceux a qui je l 'ai 
avoue m' ant taus dit: « Vous oubtiez ce qu'its ant fait, les assassinats, les 
tortures ... » Je n 'oublie rien. Mais un homme humilie, son humiliation est en 
. 198 
mOl. 
In that sense, these diarists accord the Occupation years a parenthetical aspect, which 
suggests that they preferred to emphasise the discontinuity of the Occupation period. 
The resolution implicit in these testimonies does not figure so clearly with the 
other diarists. The majority exhibit a real sense of irresolution, whereby the problems 
encountered during the Occupation appear to persist and essentially remain 
umesolved. Gide, for example, would exhibit none of the pride or sense of history 
displayed by Werth in the closing of the Occupation experience: 
N'avoir rien a faire, le cerveau vide, les yeux fatigues ... Jamais encore 
attente ne m 'a paru si longue; et sans doute precisement parce que les 
evenements se precipitent. Un ordre de mission pour Rome doit m 'atteindre 
sous peu, et m 'en voyer en Itatie, alors que c 'est en France que je voudrais 
etre deja; que je pourrais etre ... Ah! qu 'it me tarde! Je crains de manquer de 
souffle au dernier moment pour cette derniere cote a gravir; n 'avoir plus le 
temps d'embrasser les quelques-uns que je voudrais pourtant revoir avant 
de fermer les yeux pour toujours. J'ecoute a la radio, six fois par jour, les 
197 Rist, Une saison gatee, p.433. (27.8.44) 
198 Werth, Deposition, pp.725-726. (25.8.44) 
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memes nouvelles que deja j 'avais lues dans Ie journal du matin, comme sf 
mon attentive impatience pouvait hater les evenements ... 199 
It is clear that France did not represent for Gide what it did for Werth. He allowed his 
individual concerns to overshadow the national significance of what had happened in 
France. Perhaps this can be explained by his geographical situation in Algeria but 
there seems to be an underlying failure to recognise that anything had changed for 
him with the Liberation. 
Most of the diarists preferred to emphasise the continuity of the Occupation 
period not only in terms of before and after June 1940 but also in terms of before and 
after the Liberation. Galtier-Boissiere had observed how those who hated the 
Republic had exploited the events of 1940 to achieve their goals. He saw the same 
thing occurring after the Liberation: "Nous concluons que les ex-tortures n 'ont rien 
de plus presse, en periode revolutionnaire, que de devenir tortionnaires.,,200 There 
was certainly the expression of joy at the liberation of France but this was 
undennined by the recognition that there appeared to be an endless cycle of 
vengeance. The following passage from Roussin illustrates how the unpleasant nature 
of the acts carried out after the Liberation appear to have overshadowed his joy at the 
liberation of France: 
Mats je ne raconterai pas fei ce qui fe fut sf souvent depuis, de ces journees 
a la fois bouleversantes par la liberte retrouvee et fgnobles a certaines 
heures de basse vengeance. Le comique c8toyait I 'heroisme et parfois 
l'odieux: on pouvait voir une menagere inveteree donner quelques coups de 
plumeau sur une barricade et des femmes rasees - croix gammees au rouge 
a levres sur Ie front et les joues - livrees aux crachats, aux insultes, aux 
bousculades de fa foule. 201 
De Gaulle's position on the purge that followed the Liberation was that it was 
imperative that those who had betrayed France should be brought swiftly to justice 
but those who had acted faithfully should not be caught up with these traitors, who 
were firmly in the minority.202 The 'horizontal collaborators' were a convenient outlet 
for the frustrations and resentment built up over the 'dark years', as they were a 
visible reminder of the indignity of the period. But does Roussin's unease with such 
vengeful acts not also suggest that he felt that very few French had acted nobly or 
heroically during the Occupation? 
199 Gide, Journal, p.276. (5-7.9.44) 
200 Galtier-Boissiere, Journal, p.255. (21.10.44) See also p.222. (29.8.44) 
201 Roussin, Rideau gris et habit vert, pp.151-152. See also Moret, Joul'I1al d'une mauvaise Franr;aise, 
p.227. (29.8.44) 
202 Galtier-Boissiere, Journal, p.249. (14.10.44) 
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The problem was that, along with many aspects of the Occupation, it was 
usually very difficult to differentiate between those who had served France and those 
who had betrayed France. At the Liberation, the French once again appeared to 
clamour around a single individua1. De Gaulle would refuse to aclmowledge the 
existence of the Vichy government in a similar way to Petain's attempt to separate 
himself from the chaotic years of the 1930s. However, just because France appeared 
to be united behind one man does not mean that the French were united in thought. 
The Liberation, as in the summer of 1940, saw some motivated by revenge and others 
motivated by a desire for a fresh start. The overwhelming majority, however, 
continued to remain outside these areas of active participation. This is illustrated by 
the diarists' unease over the propagation of the myth that Paris, and not the American 
forces, drove out the Gelmans: 
Les manchettes des journaux: Paris conquiert sa liberte par les armes, Paris 
se lib ere lui-meme. Et toute la France se libere elle-meme; c 'est tout juste si 
c 'est avec l'aide modeste des Allies. Dans une semaine, on ne parlera plus 
du tout des Americains ni des Anglais. Le coq! II est difficile de trouver 
meilleur symbole. Toute cette assemblee, qui cause sous les porches et dans 
les cafes, bat des ailes et pousse des cocoricos, dresse la crete ... et attend les 
conserves et Ie chocolat americains! Mats des qu 'on entend Ie bruit lointain 
d'une motocyclette allemande, la rue se vide en l'espace de trois secondes, 
les portes se ferment et on se bagarre pres du trou de la serrure pour voir. 
Paris «se bat».203 
Only a tiny minority within France fought against the Germans during the 
Occupation. Although Resistance numbers would swell near the end of the 
Occupation, they would never attain a significant proportion of the popUlation. 
Roussin was well aware of the eagerness to give credence to de Gaulle's myth of a 
Resistant France: 
La France paraissait Ie pays des heros inconnus. Qui n 'avail pas appartenu 
a quelque organisation clandestine? Celles-ci fleurissaient d' autant plus 
qu 'elles etaient secretes et par consequent ignorees. Se comptaient sur les 
doigts ceux qui n 'avaient pas, dans une clandestinite heroi'que, servi de la 
noble cause. S'ils n 'en haient pas les martyrs, il n y avail vrairnent pas de 
leur faute. lIs ne pouvaient expres se fa ire fusillerP04 
focus appeared to be on getting through to the other side unscathed. 
Collaboration and resistance required active and committed participation but there 
203 Bobkowski, En guerre et en paix, p.611. (22.8.44) See also Journal, p.210, 
(24.8.44) and Toesca, Cinq ans de patience, p.327. (20.8.44) 
204 Roussin, Rideau gris et habit vert, p.152. See also Galtier-Boissiere, Journal, p.230. (30.8.44) 
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was much greater flexibility within the infinitely broader grey zone of 
accommodation: 
Entre la Collaboration et la Resistance, i! semble qu 'it y ait la difference du 
blanc au noir. Et it est vrai que quelques etres, des juin 1940, ont trouve 
dans leurs profondeurs, leur certitude. Mais combien ont oscille, sans qu 'on 
puisse bien savoir s'ils cedaient it leur interet, aux pressions des 
propagandes, it un etourdissement par les chocs de I' epoque. 205 
The observations made just before the liberation of Paris by diarists, such as de 
Beauvoir and Therive, represent the wider problem of how the behaviour of the 
French during the Occupation should be interpreted: "La matinee paraissait paisible; 
on apercevait sur les berges de la Seine des pecheurs it la ligne et quelques jeunes 
gens qui prenaient Ie soleil, en maillots de bain; mais des F.F.I se cachait derriere 
les balustrades des quais. ,,206 Throughout the Occupation, the French waited for 
external forces to deliver them from their German captors. Should this indifference to 
the war be interpreted in a positive or negative light? Diarists such as Werth, Mauriac 
and Guehenno, would often question whether this indifference simply reflected an 
acceptance of defeat and an inability to look beyond one's personal interests. Others, 
such as Gide and Galtier-Boissiere, preferred to view this indifference as a means of 
overcoming the defeat of 1940 and lasting until the end. 
The same dilemma can be seen with the different attitudes to work. The owners 
of the newspaper L 'Illustration would be attacked from all quarters after the 
Liberation. They published a justification of their decision to keep printing whilst 
being under German supervision: "Peu de gens savent - osent-ils ecrire - ce qu'il 
leur fallut de courage et de resistance pour soutenir cette lutte de quatre annees. 
Seule leur conscience connait Ie prix de cet ejfort.,,207 Yet Galtier-Boissiere argued 
vigorously that nothing would have changed had these owners left the paper in the 
hands of the Germans. Those writers working for the collaborationist press, and those 
such as Guehenno and Mauriac who wrote for the literary resistance, are rare 
examples where the black and white notions of collaboration and resistance are 
appropriate. The majority, however, found it impossible to follow the austere 
example of Guehenno, who refused to have any interaction or dealings with the 
Germans. Yet diarists, such as Dumeril and Toesca, who worked alongside the 
Germans every day, certainly did not disgrace themselves. Those, like Cocteau, who 
205 Werth, Deposition, p.566. (4.2.44) 
206 De Beauvoir, Laforce de l'age, p.608. See also Therive, L 'envers du decor, p.212. (13.8.44) 
207 Galtier-Boissiere, Journal, p.241. (1.10.44) 
218 
fall into the grey zone of accommodation, present much more difficulty in 
deciphering the merits or flaws of their behaviour: "La France, sous I 'occupation 
allemande, avait Ie droit et Ie devoir de se montrer insolente, de manger, de briller, 
de braver l'oppresseur, de dire: "Tu m 'enleves tout et il me reste tout".,,208 Such an 
attitude seems sound in theory. Guitry would similarly present some sound arguments 
after the Liberation in his attempt to clear his name. It could be argued that Dumeril 
and Guitry, for example, shared a similar attitude in that they both refused to allow 
external considerations to get in the way of doing what they felt was best for France. 
The problem was that each case would be judged on an individual basis after 
the Liberation. The diarists would often respond to the significant events of the 
Occupation in a uniform manner but the experience of everyday life would be 
influential in shaping their attitudes and behaviour. The diarists' personal 
experiences, therefore, rather than their collective experience, would determine how 
they were perceived after the Liberation: 
Les gens qui font la queue devant la boulangerie suivent du regard rune 
patrouille allemande]. De I 'hostilite, oui: de la haine, pas. Seuls ceux qui 
ant souffert dans leur propre cceur, dans leur propre chair parviennent a 
cette violence qui s 'appelle Twine et qui peut mener au meurtre. 209 
The overall experience of the Occupation would differ from one diarist to another, 
ilTespective of whether they came from the same region or background. Furthermore, 
the fact that they overwhelmingly remained outside the notions of collaboration and 
resistance prohibits any definitive view of how the French acted during the 
Occupation. To paraphrase Paul Valery, if humanity exists only thanks to the mass of 
people for whom survival is more important than action, its fate is determined by 
those who act and decide. This minority was divided into two heterogeneous but 
irreconcilable groups in occupied France: those who acted in the goal of liberating 
France and those who acted in the goal of bringing France and Germany together.210 
This would have important ramifications for the direction France would take after the 
Liberation. Did those who had fought in the Resistance have any right to control the 
destiny of France whilst those who had collaborated deserve to be excluded from its 
future? And how could France be seen to be representing the majority? How was it 
208 Cocteau, Journal, p.5S7. (23.9.44) 
209 Toesca, Cinq ans de patience, p.328. (22.8.44) 
210 Hoffmann, Essais sur la France, pp.68-69. 
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possible to reconcile everyone's differences? In this light, it is easy to see how the 
Occupation period continues to weigh so heavily on contemporary France. 
220 
221 
CONCLUSION 
The study of private diaries written during the Occupation of France 1940-
1944, as a primary source, is a relatively unexplored path of inquiry. The fact that 
increasing numbers of historians readily use them as a secondary source for their 
research proves their value as historical tools. The primary focus on these individual 
testimonies offers us a new perspective, which History often overlooks. The 
individual, despite the claim of Giisdorf, does have a place in history. Furthermore, 
the diaries prove that an individual is able to record history at the time that particular 
individual is experiencing it. History from above strives for order and firm 
conclusions, whereas history from below has a more chaotic view of events. The 
temptation, therefore, is to think that the only conclusion one can draw with regard to 
testimonial literature written during the Occupation is the redundancy of definitive 
conclusions. The problematic nature of reaching conclusions on the private diaries 
written during the Occupation period should not, however, render them irrelevant as 
an historical source. Rather, it should be seen as embodying the highly complex 
nature of the Occupation period. The fact that the individual testimonies bring this 
complexity into focus, thereby challenging the simplifying tendencies of historical 
conclusions, is reason alone for further pursuing this field of study. Their 
personalised approach to the living of history is a reminder that the French endured 
the Occupation period on an individual level, which prohibits any globalising view of 
the period. 
The first chapter shows that France was far from a nation of quarante millions 
de Petainistes and the French were even far less approving of the Vichy regime. The 
lmowledge of what the Vichy regime would become was withheld from them. They 
endured the Occupation from day to day without ever lmowing when the end would 
exactly come. The diaries afford us, therefore, a personal insight into a given moment 
in time, free from the shadow of events to come. The diarists show in the summer of 
June 1940 that they were more concerned with the immediate past rather than the 
immediate future. Moreover, as the epigraph in the introduction states: Au fond de 
1 'histoire, it y a des sentiments. It is always useful to bear this phrase in mind when 
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discussing the historical events of the Occupation. Behind the momentous historical 
events of the debiicle and the defeat lie the impressions and desires of every 
individual who witnessed those events. The Occupation may well have affected the 
French on a national level in a tmifonn manner, in the sense that France was occupied 
by the Gennans and was forced to supply the German war machine in manpower, 
foodstuffs and materials. Yet on an individual level, one's experience of the 
Occupation became infinitely more varied. It was not just a matter of whether one 
lived in the Occupied Zone or the Unoccupied Zone, whether one was rich or poor. 
The differences in attitude can be attributed to more subtle reasons. One's Jewish 
origins could force one into hiding, whereas one's Polish origins could force one into 
believing that the Occupation did not necessarily place the French in a dire position. 
The Occupation could be seen by one individual, like Guehenno, as a prison, whereas 
another, like Cocteau, might not acknowledge the notion of a prison at alL The 
diarists may have been divided on what the defeat meant for the French and what was 
the next best step yet it is precisely this difference in opinion which is of historical 
significance. 
The Occupation is the most heavily researched period in French history. The 
fact that historians continue to study this period today not only indicates the 
complexity of the period but also the unresolved nature of the historiography. That is 
not to say that historical consensus has not been reached on many platfonns but, 
rather, that many questions still remain unanswered. The second chapter reveals how 
much the historiography has evolved but the issue of Jewish persecution in Occupied 
France is an example of where the historiography needs to further grow. Moreover, 
the unresolved issues relating to Vichy France cannot always be attributed to the 
complexities and ambiguities of the period itself. The lack of consensus on several 
recent issues of national importance with links to Vichy France has brought about a 
clouding or distortion of the past. The trial of MalUice Papon is an example of how 
the lack of resolution and conciliation after the Liberation allowed the demons of the 
Occupation period to continually haunt the French. The prosecution called the 
historian Robert Paxton as an expert witness but many would express unease at what 
they saw as the intervention by historians in the historical process itself. Indeed, the 
ambiguous verdict both illustrated and perpetuated the lingering inability or 
unwillingness on the part of the French to agree on a single interpretation of what 
223 
occurred during the years 1940-1944.1 The Liberation, and well beyond, would see 
different groups try to stamp their authority on what happened during the Occupation 
in order to propel their respective organisations to the forefront of debate. Jean-Noel 
Jeanneney, for example, would write in the introduction ofRist's Une saison g{itee: 
Quarante ans ant passe, et notre memoire collective n 'a pas cesse d'etre 
hantee, modefee, bouscuUe par le contrecoup de ces temps-lit. Le n~cit ne 
finit pas d 'en etre reecrit, au gre des sensibilites mobiles des generations 
successives, au gre des fiertes heritees, des plaidoyers obsession nels et des 
colorations retrospectives qu'impose fa suite d'une histoire en marche. Le 
moment n' est pas venu viendra-t-il jam a ic.-; ? - au se fixeraient 
definitivement quelques interpretations indiscutees eclairant d 'une lumiere 
immobile la France de I' occupation ... 2 
Inherent in these words is the belief that the answers to this fervent desire for a 
definitive view of the Occupation period lie within the pages of the diaries written 
during this period. Their testimonies remain unchanged and untainted by the various 
factions and predispositions oftoday. 
This is what unites all the diaries examined in this thesis. The individual 
testimonies may well have been written for different reasons, they may well have 
been written under different circumstances and represent fundamentally different 
points of view, but they all remain firmly anchored to that past. They may offer a 
personalised window into the world of 1940-1944 but it is a window that can only be 
accessed through their words. In that sense, their private testimony of the period 
remains forever frozen in that time and unaffected by the shadow of events to come. 
This is the advantage of the private diaries, as we are not only able to see their 
judgements and impressions at a particular point in time but also we are able to see 
how these attitudes and beliefs change over time. There may well be a significant 
unwillingness or refusal on the part of the overwhelming majority of the diarists 
examined in this thesis to privately discuss the issue of Jewish persecution in France. 
Yet the few references to this issue by certain diarists provide enough evidence to 
suggest that the persecution of the Jews aroused more sympathy as well as outrage 
amongst the French the longer the Occupation went on. The same could be said for 
the attitudes of the French with respect to Vichy and the German occupiers. The 
longer the Occupation wore on, the more angry and hostile the population became 
and yet the notion of accommodation, which historians apply to the majority of the 
I Sarah Fishman and Leonard Smith, France at War. Vichy and the historians, (Berg: New York, 
2000), pp.1-2. 
2 Rist, Une saison gatee, p.9. 
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French population throughout the Occupation, does not reflect this growmg 
resentment. The private diaries also show that this process was far from linear. The 
Anglo-American landing in North Africa in November 1942 can be seen from a 
historical perspective as a significant turning-point but the diarists certainly did not 
uniformly or irrevocably share emotionally in this change of fortunes. 
The third chapter suggests additional reasons as to why the majority of the 
French population chose neither to actively collaborate nor actively resist during the 
Occupation. The question why the overwhelming majority of the French population 
remained under the collective banner of accommodation appears to be neglected by 
the historiography of the period. History from above has a tendency to search for the 
'big events' to answer the 'big questions'. The impact of the banal, everyday events 
on the French is often overlooked. The constant quest for food, the moral dilemma of 
interacting with or working for the German occupiers quite possibly had more of an 
influence on the diarists' attitudes than the big events examined in the second chapter. 
The diarists may well have been divided on what constituted treason or patriotic duty 
but they were, nevertheless, all cognisant of these issues. The French lmew that their 
actions would eventually be judged after the war and the fact that de Gaulle preferred 
to punish only a tiny minority after the Liberation should not detract from that. 
A further comprehensive study of the questions raised by the diarists during and 
after the Occupation deserves to be undertaken. Were the French responsible for the 
government representing them? Should the actions of a treacherous minority form a 
collective stain on the wider French population? Did the bourgeoisie deserve to be 
singled out for their inclination to accept the occupation of France? Was post-
Liberation France simply a continuation of the Occupation years under the guise of 
different forms? The responses to such questions have already been answered to some 
extent in this thesis. But they also constitute a further realm of inquiry, where the 
individual testimonies of these and other diarists can again playa primary role. 
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